

Beyond 2012 Achieving a New

Nuclear Security Architecture

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Conference on the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit
and Next Generation Nuclear Security
Seoul 2011

Achieving a New
Nuclear Security
Architecture

Why a new Nuclear Security Architecture?


Many voices are pointing out the need to reshape the **current regime** in order to improve its current and future performance .

It implies to define a strategic orientation to:

- Integrate and harmonize current components
- Overcome weaknesses
- Close identified gaps

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- Some of the detected weaknesses:
- Efforts and initiatives with overlaps
 - Overwhelming bureaucratic burdens
 - Threat perceived as distant
 - Accomplishment below expectation
 - Lack of universal acceptance



An intricate constellation of international instruments, mostly voluntary and nonbinding.

Increasing complexity

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**Root
causes
of
difficulties**

Conceptual

Ideological


Practical

The Current Nuclear Security Regime


Root Causes of difficulties

Conceptual


Low / null recognition of **the threat, in fact not validated yet**



Low priority given to nuclear security within national agendas



Such mindset can and must be changed with cooperative work



2012 and beyond


The Current Nuclear Security Regime

Root Causes of difficulties

Ideological

Long-standing prejudices / antinomies:

- Western powers and Non-aligned states with opposed interests
- Many of the current initiatives perceived as only functional to certain states or group of state's interests.



Arises disproportionate resistances.

Distrust reaches multilateral organizations such as IAEA, UNSC.

The Current Nuclear Security Regime


Root Causes of difficulties

Practical

Social, economic, and technological conditions present in many states make it **difficult to afford initiatives' duties and burdens.**

Low ability of international community to deal with nuclear transgressions (**low effectivity of enforcement**).

Lack of consensus between the **extent of multilateral control versus state's sovereign rights.**



Difficulties could potentially grow in the future with the increase of global complexity, including diversity of actors, and severity of challenges/ threats. Present situation and future scenarios reinforce the need of a change, as soon as possible.

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Threats with their many faces, are there, and will likely remain:

Terrorists' intentions to get HEU and build a crude weapon are very well known since a long time ago...

Radioactive sources, even more available worldwide than fissile materials, could be employed for a radiological attack, which could cause less casualties than improvised nuclear explosion, but a huge global distress.

The terrorist attack to a nuclear facility could result on consequences similar to Chernobyl o Fukushima....

... and the two latter scenarios are tagged by many studies as more likely than the crude weapon's one...

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
Required a planned evolution from the current regime to a carefully formulated architecture, keeping the best of the regime

Regime

Somewhat chaotic, result of different partial initiatives, but much effort done so far.

Lack of a common view, and widely accepted actions.

Weaknesses and gaps raises many concerns about its ability.



Architecture

Based on an **agreed long range strategic vision.**

Result of a careful design.

- Systemic and articulated
- Simple
- Optimization of resources
- Sustainable
- Evolves with changes
- Inclusive



2012 and beyond


The New Nuclear Security Architecture

Key concepts

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- Convincing definition of threats and risks, and of their transversal nature (all countries would be affected), including the need to develop a clear **case for action**.
- A long-range and agreed strategic vision.
- The design should cover all expressions of the nuclear security risk:
 - nuclear materials
 - radiological materials
 - nuclear facilities
- All countries must be included in order to reach an essential and universal understanding of nuclear security threats.
- Equity of duties and benefits will encourage participation through incentives and opportunities.
- Available funding must be used to help countries with social, economic, and technological deficits on a fair basis.
- Dynamic and flexible model able to match future evolution of threats.



Agreed in
Seoul 2012

Irma Arguello
Seoul, Nov 2, 2011


The New Nuclear Security Architecture Proposal

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Given the complexity of the required change....

The Proposal should be developed by a **Highest Level Multidisciplinary Group of Experts with a broad representation**, able to study the current situation and to formulate an appropriate design, taking as a basis the so called **Key concepts**.



Concept launched
in Seoul 2012

The New Nuclear Security Architecture Proposal

Beyond 2012


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Tasks to be carried out by the Highest Level Multidisciplinary Group of Experts

- Exercise to define multidimensional impacts for any country, including a distant one [physically and politically], of a nuclear incident occurring somewhere in the world. Case for action.
- Integration of current tools into a new set of simpler instruments that prioritize actions over reporting, with a comprehensive approach concerning threats, actors, and quality of former tools.
- Definition of minimum sets of universal standards, and the rationale for adopting them.
- Definition of inclusive policies of duties, benefits, and incentives.
- Proposed managerial / commercial roles taking into account the diversity of countries' profiles.



Irma Arguello
Seoul, Nov 2, 2011



Defined in 2012
and beyond

The New Nuclear Security Architecture Proposal

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Tasks to be carried out by the Highest Level Multidisciplinary Group of Experts

- Reassessment of roles of multilateral organizations, including the consideration of a specialized organization. Required changes of roles associated to the New Architecture.
- Ways to promote reduction of fissile stockpiles and conversion of HEU reactors.
- Proposal of regional solutions to deal with implementation, sharing of best practices, and control.
- Ways to achieve a full inclusion of think tanks, the nuclear industry, and other social actors.
- Potential synergies with Safety and Safeguards system, without losing the focus!!!! Integration of the 3 Ss in the long term?



Defined in 2012
and beyond

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The Nuclear Security Summit concept should persist,
but its long term relevance should increase

So far
(current regime)



Required for a quantum leap
(nuclear security architecture)

Washington DC 2010
Seoul 2012

Seoul 2012
and beyond

Successful top level political process.
Placed NS high on the international agenda.
Focused on limited short term goals for
nuclear materials.

Strategic incubator and Steering
Committee of changes, while
managing adequately the transition.

Environment to progressively
enhance political will.

Environment for validation of key ideas
and promotion of changes.

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Unequal opportunity to put the idea of a new nuclear security architecture to work

Desirable actions compatible with already taken commitments


The **need of shaping a new architecture** included as a part of the Seoul's declaration.

Agreement on the foundations of the new architecture, review of the key concepts.

Decision on appointing of a high level expert group to formulate the proposal, based on the key concepts and outlined tasks.
Delegation of the project management.

Self-recognition as the adequate environment to gain political will for the proposal to monitor the early advances on implementation.

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Requires breaking paradigms

Traditional roles and postures of suspicion must yield to confidence and trust if the global community.

Non-aligned and independent actors must consider that they are not immune to the impacts of a devastating nuclear attack -- no matter where it strikes, opposition should convert into cooperation.

Western countries -- especially the United States and their allies -- need to exert a more subtle leadership by showing a willingness to offer more opportunities to more countries.

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A clear understanding of threats and consequences,
a strong global political will,
and cooperative attitudes of all states
are powerful drivers of success
in enhancing nuclear security through
a high level architecture.

Seoul 2012 is the opportunity to
give the first step.

Thank You !

Irma Arguello

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