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		<pubDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 03:36:23 CST</pubDate>
		<lastBuildDate>Tue, 21 May 2013 03:36:23 CST</lastBuildDate>
		<ttl>60</ttl>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S. Delay on Anti-Nuclear Terror Measures Hinders Global Efforts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=bace4d76-bcdd-42b9-98b7-747a280efb73]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The government&rsquo;s decision to charge surviving Boston Marathon bomber Dzhokhar Tsarnaev with the use of a weapon of mass destruction struck many Americans as peculiar. At first glance, the Tsarnaev brothers&rsquo; bombs do not seem to match the definition or popular perception of a WMD. For decades, that term has been interpreted as referring to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, which uniquely possess the ability to kill people in numbers large enough to be considered massive.<br />
	<br />
	Two factors, among others, help explain the government&rsquo;s decision: The charge is seen by prosecutors as relatively easy to level&mdash;and prove&mdash;compared to other possible crimes, and it is one of the few federal crimes that can be punished by the death penalty.<br />
	&nbsp;&nbsp; &nbsp;<br />
	The ease with which the government can pursue capital punishment in this instance, if it so desires, highlights the increasing irrelevance of a dispute between Senate Judiciary Chairman Sen. Patrick Leahy, a Democrat, and, Sen. Charles Grassley, the ranking Republican committee member, that is holding up important new anti-nuclear and anti-radiological terrorism legislation. The tragic attacks in Boston should encourage the lawmakers to find a compromise to protect U.S. and global security against the very real threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. As horrible as the events in Boston were, had the Tsarnaev brothers actually gained access to nuclear materials, the result would have been much more recognizable as a WMD attack and would have caused far greater casualties.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12958/u-s-delay-on-anti-nuclear-terror-measures-hinders-global-efforts">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 17 May 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[How do you solve a problem like plutonium?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=bc4160f0-1929-4c0d-bf6b-1ebd0003a31b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Four years ago in Prague, President Barack Obama focused the world&#39;s attention on a <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered" target="_blank">&quot;strange turn of history:&quot;</a> Even as the danger of global nuclear war has lessened, the threat we face from nuclear materials is greater than ever, because of international terrorist networks, a global black market trade, and the spread of technology that could help build a bomb.</p>
<p>
	Through the Nuclear Security Summit process initiated in 2010, countries have started securing some of the most vulnerable materials. But they have largely left plutonium untouched. As <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university" target="_blank">Obama warned in a later speech</a>, this time on the margins of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, &quot;We know that just the smallest amount of plutonium -- about the size of an apple -- could kill hundreds of thousands and spark a global crisis.&quot;</p>
<p>
	Of the two materials that can be used to construct nuclear weapons, it&#39;s easy to see why so much effort has been focused on highly enriched uranium (HEU), widely considered to pose the most urgent threat from terrorist use. There are about 1,440 tons of HEU in more than 32 countries, spread across a difficult-to-determine number of military sites and more than 100 research reactors and other civilian facilities. Unlike plutonium, HEU can be used to make the simplest kind of nuclear weapon -- a device that shoots one piece of HEU into another, causing a nuclear explosion.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/how-do-you-solve-problem-plutonium">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 06 May 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Organizer Eyes New Global Consensus At Nuke Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0e4bc8a5-7a3a-4871-8c91-085062baecbf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	While the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit is unlikely to lead to comprehensive, international standards for locking down vulnerable atomic materials, nations could still take steps that failed to materialize in two previous gatherings, a key diplomat said on Thursday.</p>
<p>
	Security advocates outside of government have argued that initiating a comprehensive framework that would be binding across all participating nations would be a logical next step for the summit process that began in 2010 in Washington and could end next year in The Hague.</p>
<p>
	Such a system would set global security standards and universalize a regime that observers say is now a patchwork of agreements, many of which are voluntary, Togzhan Kassenova, a nuclear policy associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted during a discussion at the organization&rsquo;s headquarters.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/diplomat-aims-new-nuke-security-steps-next-summit/">View full article...</a></p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 02 May 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[How Obama Learned to Love the Bomb]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=9f220293-17fd-405d-b567-3191d373bddf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In the winter of 2012, President Obama stood on a <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/12/04/president-obama-pushes-nonproliferation" target="_blank">podium at the National Defense University</a> to honor the 20th anniversary of a program that successfully dismantled nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union, declaring, &quot;We simply cannot allow the 21st century to be darkened by the worst weapons of the 20th century.&quot; He reaffirmed his commitment to continue investing in nonproliferation, because &quot;our national security depends on it,&quot; he said. But his administration&#39;s recently released <a href="http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/14budget/Content/volume1.pdf" target="_blank">budget proposal</a> reflects the opposite agenda: It makes big cuts to nuclear nonproliferation programs while beefing up funding for the United States&#39; nuclear weapons stockpile.</p>
<p>
	&quot;I&#39;m baffled as to why they would do that,&quot; says Barry Watts, a senior fellow at the <a href="http://www.csbaonline.org/" target="_blank">Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments</a>, a national-security policy think tank, said of the Obama administration. &quot;Nonproliferation goes straight to the heart of their policy.&quot; Obama&#39;s budget proposal for 2014 would cut $400 million from nonproliferation programs compared while spending an additional $560 million on extending the life of our atomic arsenal (compared with the fiscal 2012 budget).</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The Global Threat Reduction Initiative is a &quot;core material security program to ensure that terrorists can&#39;t their hands on nuclear weapons-usable material,&quot; explains Kingston Reif, director of nonproliferation programs at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. In&nbsp;2012, the administration projected that it would spend $630 million on the GTRI in 2014. Obama&#39;s current budget proposal requests $424 million. Obama&#39;s 2013 budget proposal for GTRI was so low that Congress voted to increase funding by $35 million beyond the level that the administration requested. &quot;We are hoping for the same thing this year,&quot; Reif says.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The shift away from nonproliferation efforts is likely the result of austerity policies crimping the president&#39;s agenda, says Reif.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/obama-budget-nuclear-nonproliferation-stockpile">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 23 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Budget Cuts Deeply From Threat Reduction Accounts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0f988cd0-7671-4cd3-bf46-57c15ee68f66]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration&rsquo;s new budget would cut more than $300 million from programs intended to prevent terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials or other ingredients for weapons of mass destruction, according to a new analysis by an organization that advocates the work.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;If enacted by Congress, these cuts will undermine global U.S. leadership to prevent nuclear terrorism,&rdquo; the Partnership for Global Security said in the <a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=fy14_nuclear_security_budget_request.pdf">report</a>. &ldquo;They also threaten the foundation of threat reduction programs that have been built up over two decades to protect the public from the misuse of nuclear and radiological materials.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Warnings from the nongovernmental organization and <a href="news.cfm?action=article&amp;page=0&amp;id=d2ea65d9-846a-4985-8867-2e2fd7c1eb17">like-minded groups</a> came days &ndash; or, in one case, just hours -- before two bombs detonated Monday along the finish line of the <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/plenty-clues-few-leads-motive-boston-marathon-bomber/">Boston Marathon</a>, killing three and injuring close to 200. While post-Sept. 11 terrorist plots against the United States have focused on conventional means, issue specialists say now is not the time for leaders to let their guard down against the <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/despite-wmd-fears-terrorists-still-focused-conventional-attacks/">WMD threat</a>.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Partnership for Global Security President Kenneth Luongo said there is cause for worry that go beyond the numbers. For example, the Energy Department&rsquo;s new budget plan affirms Washington&rsquo;s intent to protect the world&rsquo;s &ldquo;most vulnerable nuclear materials&rdquo; as of this year. That seems a step back from <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nuclear-security-deadline-arrives-work-remaining/">President Obama&rsquo;s</a> pledge in April 2009 to secure &ldquo;all vulnerable nuclear material&rdquo; within four years, he said.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Changing &lsquo;all&rsquo; to &lsquo;most&rsquo; is moving the goal posts when no one knew where the goal line was to begin with,&rdquo; Luongo asserted by e-mail. &ldquo;They were let off the hook in the first term when no one pressed them to define &lsquo;all,&rsquo; but that goodwill evaporated a long time ago. Now we are confronted with a major policy change buried in the bowels of a budget document with no explanation.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The <a href="http://www.publicintegrity.org/2013/04/09/12467/obama-proposes-shifting-funds-nuclear-nonproliferation-nuclear-weapons">Center for Public Integrity</a> reported before last week&rsquo;s federal budget rollout that reduced nonproliferation funding was proposed primarily to allow more money to flow into nuclear arms modernization projects.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Is it true? I don&rsquo;t know if anyone in the administration will admit it, but it certainly seems like it might be true,&rdquo; Luongo told <em>Global Security Newswire</em>. &ldquo;If it is it is a much bigger issue than just cuts -- it is an issue of prioritization.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&quot;While the administration has achieved a great deal over the past four years ... by NNSA&#39;s own admission there is more material to remove, reactors to convert and/or shut down, and buildings with radiological and nuclear material to protect,&quot; Kingston Reif, of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, said by e-mail on Thursday. &quot;As recently as two years ago NNSA gave no indications that it was planning to significantly reduce the scope of its work. ... It&#39;s difficult to escape the conclusion that weapons programs are being prioritized over the nuclear and radiological material security and nonproliferation budget.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-budget-cuts-deeply-threat-reduction-accounts/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 18 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Making America Safer From Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=53bf43fa-affc-462e-aa47-ec8f7c6e8435]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Three years ago this week, President Barack Obama signed the New START treaty with Russia.</p>
<p>
	The stroke of a pen ended the lull in inspections of Russia&rsquo;s nuclear stockpile and allowed the U.S. and Russia to start eliminating excess Cold War nuclear capabilities in a mutual, verifiable way.</p>
<p>
	Reflective of its name, the treaty was a new start in a much more aggressive global effort to decrease the modern risk posed by nuclear weapons: preventing terrorists from acquiring a nuclear weapon, a commitment shared by former Presidents Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush, as well as national security officials from both political parties. So just what more can we do to keep America and her allies safe from the modern threat posed by nuclear terrorism?</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.rollcall.com/news/buskirk_and_toma_making_america_safer_from_nuclear_terrorism-223832-1.html?pos=oopih">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Proposes Shifting Funds from Nuclear Nonproliferation to Nuclear Weapons]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e54ffb86-f252-4d39-81bc-d0906ae98ac4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The Obama administration will propose a deep cut in funding for nuclear nonproliferation programs at the Energy Department largely so it can boost the department&#39;s spending to modernize its stockpile of nuclear weapons, according to government officials familiar with the proposed 2014 federal budget to be unveiled Wednesday, April 10.</p>
<p>
	The half-billion-dollar shift in spending priorities reflects an administration decision that nuclear explosives work the Energy Department performs for the military should be both accelerated and expanded. But Democrats on Capitol Hill and independent arms control groups predicted the decision will provoke controversy and a substantial budget fight this year.</p>
<p>
	Under the 2014 proposal, the Energy Department&#39;s nuclear weapons activities funding -- which includes modernization efforts for bomber-based and missile-based warheads -- would be increased roughly 7 percent, or around $500 million, above the current level of $7.227 billion for these activities.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Tom Collina, research director for the Arms Control Association, a Washington-based nonprofit group, said &quot;in a way,&quot; it seems inconsistent for the administration to promote arms control while cutting the DOE&#39;s nonproliferation budget. But he said officials may have calculated that they cannot win congressional support for further cuts in nuclear arsenals with Russia without spending billions more to refurbish America&#39;s remaining stockpile of nuclear weapons, under a bargain Obama struck during his first term.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/09/obama_proposes_shifting_funds_from_nuclear_nonproliferation_to_new_nuclear_weapo?page=0,0">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 09 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Work Remains as Nuclear Security Deadline Arrives]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=10c65709-3d36-48eb-9913-b2a8cb6badb3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	President Obama&rsquo;s goal of locking away all vulnerable nuclear material from terrorists&rsquo; grasp by today remains incomplete, despite significant security advances over the past four years.</p>
<p>
	On April 5, 2009, Obama stood before tens of thousands of people in Prague, where he <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/05/obama-prague-speech-on-nu_n_183219.html">declared</a> a series of steps his administration would take to advance the vision of a world without nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>
	Among those measures: &ldquo;A new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;I think even the White House would admit that the four-year pledge is not going to be reached in four years, in part because they never defined what the goal of that four-year pledge was,&rdquo; said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;That four years was a sprint within a marathon to get a plan in place for how we do this,&rdquo; Deepti Choubey, senior director for nuclear and biosecurity at the Washington-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, told <em>Global Security Newswire.</em></p>
<p>
	<em>...</em></p>
<p>
	<em>&quot;</em>Any act of nuclear terrorism anywhere, no matter where it is, is going to have a reverberation around the world that is extremely negative,&quot; Luongo said. &quot;I think that&rsquo;s the way you have to look at this. Not what can&rsquo;t be done but what needs to be done.&quot;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;This is a never-ending process. As long as nuclear materials that are weapons usable are in use there&rsquo;s always going to be a need for maintaining high security on those materials,&rdquo; said Charles Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists. &ldquo;There will be new threats developing, there will be new terrorist groups or even new state-level threats.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Washington has stepped up existing defense projects, particularly removal of fissile materials from other nations and converting foreign reactors to use proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium, but has not instituted new practices, Luongo said in an interview. Federal funding for the work has also remained largely frozen from Bush-era levels.</p>
<p>
	Luongo said he suspects the White House believes it cannot persuade nations to accept more aggressive measures or greater transparency about what actions are already being taken. Anticipating that some nations would not join a stepped-up global regime is no cause for not trying, he argued.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;There are no standards, nobody has to do anything, nobody has to report to anybody, nobody has to provide any transparency,&rdquo; Luongo said. &ldquo;There&rsquo;s no requirement that any country do anything.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;I think we&rsquo;ve had some tentative success and we will see where some of these ideas have landed in the official process, whether they will make their way to the end,&rdquo; Choubey said. &ldquo;There&rsquo;s a lot of careful tending and further development that needs to be done.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	A new security framework does not have to be established from the start, but rather could be rolled out over a period of years as states work alone or in groups toward an accepted goal, Luongo stated. In that, it would be similar to agreements on fluorocarbons or climate change, he said.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;I understand the danger and the concern that people have about entering into a big new international negotiation, and I don&rsquo;t think that&rsquo;s what we&rsquo;re arguing,&rdquo; he said. &ldquo;What we&rsquo;re arguing is there needs to be a process by which you actually improve the nuclear security system in reality, over a period of time. And we&rsquo;ve put that date as 2020.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Ferguson said his discussions with officials from Nuclear Security Summit participant states suggest the process will end in 2014. He and others also played down the likelihood that leaders would agree to an overarching security framework.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The priority should be on strengthening existing measures, including pushing for universal membership in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, Ferguson said.</p>
<p>
	The United States has not ratified the nuclear terror accord, and is among more than 30 nations that must still approve an amendment to the physical protection pact before it can be enacted.</p>
<p>
	Bringing the amendment into force before the 2014 summit &ldquo;would be a powerful statement,&rdquo; Ferguson said.</p>
<p>
	In the absence of the biannual summits, nations and international organizations will have to ensure they maintain the personnel and resources to continue safeguarding or eliminating nuclear materials and weaning more facilities off weapon-grade uranium, he added.</p>
<p>
	Each government should have one senior official who could track progress and threats and then have access to the head of state, according to Ferguson. &ldquo;There has to be someone minding the ship,&rdquo; he said.</p>
<p>
	Luongo warned that the issue could slip from top-level focus should the summits come to a final end next year.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;If it falls back to the technical level again, I&rsquo;m not sure you&rsquo;re ever going to get it back up,&rdquo; he said.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nuclear-security-deadline-arrives-work-remaining/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 05 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Amid Threats, N. Korea's Neighbors Rethink Defense Policies]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=95dac981-7367-47d6-9e7c-3369ffc192ce]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	North Korea has been a big headache for the United States, with the new leader there saying almost daily that his country is ready to go to war.</p>
<p>
	Speaking in Washington on Wednesday, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the U.S. can&#39;t afford to dismiss that talk as bluster.</p>
<p>
	&quot;It only takes being wrong once, and I don&#39;t want to be the secretary of defense who was wrong once, so we will continue to take these threats seriously,&quot; he said.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	William Tobey, who worked on nonproliferation issues in the George W. Bush administration, says he&#39;s not convinced by the South Koreans&#39; arguments &mdash; that reprocessing nuclear fuel makes sense for economic and energy reasons.</p>
<p>
	&quot;I wouldn&#39;t question South Korean motives,&quot; he said. &quot;On the other hand, as you go through the arguments that have been advanced in favor of reprocessing, it&#39;s really possible to knock them down one by one.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.npr.org/2013/04/03/176166676/north-korea-has-u-s-and-south-korea-rethinking-defense-policies">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[DOD Advisers Worried About 'Momentum' Of CTR Program Sans Sen. Lugar]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=44e96071-5e8b-45d6-9bf5-d807985fe39a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<span class="memoSpan">Defense Department leaders should help groom new &quot;champions&quot; in Congress for the Cooperative Threat Reduction program following Sen. Richard Lugar&#39;s (R-IN) exit from politics earlier this year, according to a group of Pentagon advisers.<br />
	<br />
	The recommendation is included in the unclassified minutes of a secret December 2012 meeting of the DOD Threat Reduction Advisory Committee, which were published in February. &quot;The retirement of Senator Lugar leaves a huge void to be filled,&quot; according to the minutes. &quot;The CTR program needs to appoint leaders that will maintain the program&#39;s momentum.&quot;<br />
	<br />
	Lugar lost his primary election to Tea Party-backed Indiana State Treasurer Richard Mourdock in May 2012, bringing his 36-year career in the Senate to a close when the 112th Congress ended on Jan 3, 2013. Led by former Sen. Gary Hart (D-CO), the TRAC advises the under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, Frank Kendall, on issues related to weapons of mass destruction and their disposal.</span></p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	<span class="memoSpan">&quot;[T]he original Nunn-Lugar era is close to over and the question is what comes next,&quot; said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. &quot;There are no Nunns or Lugars in the current Congress who are invested in the CTR program the way those two were.&quot;</span></p>
<p>
	<span class="memoSpan">Still, modernizing the program is possible by modifying the founding legislation, taking into account that most CTR projects are now focused on bio-weapons outside Russia and a more global program orientation not only at DOD but also the Energy and State departments, Luongo wrote in an email to Inside the Pentagon.<br />
	<br />
	As for a new agreement with Russia -- &quot;assuming there is one&quot; -- the pact would no longer have that country as the major recipient, according to Luongo. In addition, &quot;Russia will not be accepting liability for any catastrophe that occurs under the program,&quot; he added. Moscow has had longstanding concerns over what were essentially blanket liability protections for U.S. personnel working in Russia that were carried forward since the program&#39;s beginning.</span></p>
<p>
	<a href="https://defensenewsstand.com/index.php?option=com_ppvuser&amp;view=login&amp;return=aHR0cHM6Ly9kZWZlbnNlbmV3c3N0YW5kLmNvbS9jb21wb25lbnQvb3B0aW9uLGNvbV9wcHYvSXRlbWlkLDI4Ny9pZCwyNDI5ODgxLw">View full article...</a> (account required).</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Apr 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear states divided on India joining export control group]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=460ff690-5ab3-42d7-9dac-3405e53290c8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<span id="articleText"><span class="focusParagraph">The United States and three other big powers this week argued for allowing nuclear-armed India into an atomic export control group, but China and several European states appeared doubtful about the move, diplomats said on Wednesday.</span></span></p>
<p>
	<span id="articleText">They said the divisions were in evidence during closed-door talks of the 46-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group on the sensitive issue of whether India could join and become the NSG&#39;s only member that is outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).</span></p>
<p>
	<span id="articleText">The United States, France, Britain and Russia were among those which backed membership for India - Asia&#39;s third-largest economy - while smaller European states such as Ireland, the Netherlands and Switzerland had reservations, the envoys said.</span></p>
<p>
	<span>...</span></p>
<p>
	Nuclear expert Daryl Kimball said India wanted to join the NSG because of prestige but that this would undercut the group&#39;s ability to ensure that New Delhi respects the non-proliferation commitments it made to win support for the 2008 exemption.</p>
<p>
	&quot;Those commitments included no further nuclear weapons testing, compliance with site-specific safeguards, and support for a fissile material production moratorium,&quot; said Kimball, of the Washington-based Arms Control Association.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/03/20/nuclear-suppliers-india-idINDEE92J0CL20130320">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 21 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[House Panel Votes to Adopt Nuclear Security Pacts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c3d1243e-521c-41a0-8712-24e527a85989]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A U.S. House of Representatives panel on Thursday passed <a href="http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1073">new legislation</a> to ensure the nation is in compliance with two international nuclear security agreements, but it does not address points of contention from an earlier draft blocked in the Senate last year.</p>
<p>
	The latest bill would not extend federal wiretapping authorities to specifically include investigations related to a nuclear incident and would not permit execution of a person convicted of an &ldquo;act of nuclear terrorism&rdquo; resulting in death, Representative John Conyers (D-Mich.) said during the bill&#39;s <a href="http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/Markups%202013/mark_03142013/03%2014%2013%20Markup%20Transcript.pdf">mark-up by the House Judiciary Committee</a>. &quot;These controversial provisions are not necessary in order to implement the underlying treaties,&quot; Conyers said.</p>
<p>
	Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/senator-looks-attach-terror-treaty-legislation-defense-bill/">opposed a version of the bill</a> in the previous Congress in part because it lacked such language. An anonymous hold by a GOP lawmaker prevented the earlier proposal from advancing through the Senate after it cleared the House of Representatives.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;We hope that the full House will quickly follow the Judiciary Committee&rsquo;s lead in approving the legislation. Then, as was the case at the end of last year, the ball will be in the Senate&rsquo;s court,&rdquo; Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said in an e-mailed statement by the Fissile Materials Working Group.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/house-panel-votes-adopt-nuclear-terrorism-pacts/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 15 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nonproliferation in a time of austerity]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4dc65810-54e1-4ffd-af5d-532547d2494f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Since the early 1990s, the nonproliferation community has obsessed over the annual appropriations to programs at the US defense, state, and energy departments that are designed to keep weapons of mass destruction (WMD) out of the wrong hands. While the budgets of individual programs have fluctuated, the unmistakable trend in US nonproliferation spending was upward. Program managers could generally count on this year&#39;s budget being higher than last year&#39;s, and next year&#39;s being higher still.</p>
<p>
	On the whole this was a good thing. As threats grew and evolved, governments had to keep pace. But today, amid the global economic downturn, nonproliferation budgets around the world are shrinking. Just this month, the White House announced a <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nuclear-nonproliferation-activities-suffer-under-budget-cuts-hagel/" target="_blank">$57 million funding cut to the Defense Department&#39;s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program</a>.&nbsp;Though some will lament the passing of the golden era of nonproliferation spending, more judicious outlays may not be all bad. One unforeseen byproduct of perpetually growing budgets was a sapping of the motivation of the governmental and nongovernmental organizations that make up the &quot;nonproliferation complex&quot; to adapt to changed circumstances. Nowhere has this flagging of innovation been more evident than in attempts to address the proliferation challenges emanating from the next generation of potential nuclear states in the developing world.</p>
<p>
	Despite the ebb and flow of the global economy and the countless headline-grabbing security threats that occupy popular attention, the world is a safer and more prosperous place than ever before. The past decade has witnessed <a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/08/15/think_again_war" target="_blank">fewer deaths from violent conflict</a> than any in the previous century.&nbsp;And over the past 15 years alone, the lives of even the world&#39;s poorest citizens have improved more rapidly than during any other period in human history. By virtually every measure, we are living longer, healthier, and more productive lives, according to <a href="http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/The_MDG_Report_2012.pdf" target="_blank">a report from the UN Development Programme</a><span class="caps-label">&nbsp;PDF</span>. Much of this success is directly attributable to an unprecedented era of globalization and innovation. Worldwide prosperity has spread along with the flow of advanced technologies from richer to poorer nations.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/nonproliferation-time-of-austerity">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama to push for nuclear treaty]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b043a201-20be-42d7-af7f-03f4ad1a5c7f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	President Obama will renew his push for a nuclear treaty at the United Nations in his second term, administration officials say.</p>
<p>
	The president made banning the further production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium a priority in an April 2009 speech in Prague, but progress on a treaty stalled due to opposition from Pakistan.</p>
<p>
	Administration officials and arms control activists believe they now have a new window for action. They point to increased cooperation on the UN Security Council and the beginning of John Kerry&rsquo;s tenure as secretary of State as reasons for optimism.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;John Kerry comes to the position with an immense depth of experience on nuclear, non-proliferation and disarmament issues and he has long supported the risk-reduction measures that the Obama administration has committed itself to,&rdquo; said Daryl Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;He is going to be a very active and creative force for advancing the president&#39;s nuclear risk reduction agenda, which remains unfinished.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Kimball said progress on Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) would depend on cooperation from Pakistan, which harbors fears of archrival India having more access to fissile material. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council might hold side talks with India and Pakistan in April to try and move the treaty forward, he said.</p>
<div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-align: left; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;">
	<a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/global-affairs/un-treaties/282051-obama-to-push-for-nuclear-treaty-in-second-term">View Full Article...</a><br />
	&nbsp;</div>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 09 Feb 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama?s modest gains in nuclear security vision]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1927d04d-e3bb-470f-b658-21ee028e37ad]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Four years ago, President Barack Obama called preventing nuclear terrorism a top security priority, but the U.S. is only marginally safer from that threat today. Obama has a limited window in his second term to achieve his nuclear security vision. If missed, the opportunity may only recur after a nuclear catastrophe &mdash; one that could have been prevented.</p>
<p>
	It was only last April in the casino town of Batumi, Georgia, that a cigarette-smoking man wearing a suit expressed interest in buying uranium for his Turkish boss. Fortunately, Georgian police were tapping the room and arrested him and others, halting any potential sale. This incident was the latest in a long line illustrating ongoing black-market demand for nuclear materials that could be fashioned into a &ldquo;dirty&rdquo; bomb or nuclear device.</p>
<p>
	Since 1993, there have been roughly 2,000 cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material logged by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Thirty illicit radioactive trafficking incidents were reported in the former Soviet region alone from 2009-11. As Obama said in December, &ldquo;Make no mistake, if [terrorists] get [nuclear material], they will use it.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/obamas-modest-gains-in-nuclear-security-vision-86414.html">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 18 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[SecDef Nominee Hagel To Face Questions On Nukes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=88ca378b-c68a-430f-a3ba-2f663d66f4d7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	When former Sen. Chuck Hagel (R-Neb.) appears before the Senate Armed Services Committee as President Barack Obama&rsquo;s choice to replace Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, he will likely be grilled on his past statements about Iran, Israel and maybe even his views about sexual orientation. But former colleagues in the Republican Party are also likely to take him to task for his support for downsizing the U.S. nuclear force.</p>
<p>
	Even President Ronald Reagan called for a world without nuclear weapons. But Hagel, who served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with then-Sen. Obama (D-Ill.), has taken the talking point further than others in the party. He has signed onto a report by Global Zero that would reduce the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to a maximum of 900 total nuclear weapons over 10 years, on the way to completely eliminating the world&rsquo;s deadliest weapons by 2030.</p>
<p>
	Coupled with the nomination of fellow foreign relations colleague Sen. John Kerry (D-Mass.) as secretary of state, Obama has created &ldquo;a very strong team on arms control,&rdquo; says John Isaacs, executive director of the disarmament advocacy group, Council for a Livable World.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.aviationweek.com/Article.aspx?id=/article-xml/asd_01_14_2013_p03-02-535933.xml">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 14 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Hagel?s Nuclear Options]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2b794153-4c9a-4f97-80ee-3ec1e01f9ccc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	When Chuck Hagel arrives at the Pentagon, pending Senate confirmation, near the top of his E-Ring inbox will be President Obama&rsquo;s plans to reduce and upgrade America&rsquo;s nuclear arsenal.<br />
	<br />
	The 2013 nuclear agenda could be quite full. The Pentagon has yet to release its plan to implement the <a href="http://www.defense.gov/npr/" target="_blank">Nuclear Posture Review</a>, and amid continuing resolutions funding the fiscal year and the sequester-delayed budget request for 2014, the new defense secretary must decide the pace of building new nuclear submarines and strategic bombers. Additionally, the Obama administration is poised to start pushing below the caps established by the New START treaty, which limits the United States and Russia to 1,550 warheads each. With that agenda already penciled in, Hagel&rsquo;s nomination has both thrilled nuclear disarmament advocates and concerned nuclear hawks in Congress.<br />
	<br />
	Conservatives already have tried to block Hagel&rsquo;s path to the Pentagon by labeling him soft on Israel, Iran, and war in general. And now they&#39;re trying a new angle: he&rsquo;s soft on nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Other advocates agree. &ldquo;There is a mainstream point of view&rdquo; on nuclear arms reductions, said Daryl G. Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, which advocates for fewer nuclear weapons. A 2012 Pentagon white paper already has called specifically for a smaller nuclear force, Kimball said.<br />
	<br />
	...<br />
	<br />
	&ldquo;Hagel will be part of that equation as Washington and Moscow try to go forward to try and go beyond New START,&rdquo; Kimball said.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	So how many warheads, submarines, bombers, and missiles are enough? Russia is the only other country with enough nuclear weapons to challenge the U.S. arsenal, yet arms trackers say Russia&rsquo;s arsenal is likely going to shrink because of cost.&nbsp; &ldquo;The last I heard, the Cold War is over. We&rsquo;re no longer enemies. There&rsquo;s virtually no chance of a bolt from the blue,&rdquo; Kimball said.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://e-ring.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/11/hagels_nuclear_options">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 11 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Fears grow over Syria uranium stockpile]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=cfacd832-2e02-48c4-83c6-27b1c7bd82d9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Nuclear experts in the US and Middle East have raised concerns about the security of up to 50 tonnes of unenriched uranium in Syria amid fears that civil war could put the stockpile at risk.</p>
<p>
	Since the start of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad two years ago, western governments have been heavily focused on the fate of Syria&rsquo;s chemical weapons and worry that those stocks might be taken over by militant groups.</p>
<p>
	But government officials and nuclear experts have also expressed fears to the Financial Times about what may be a significant stockpile of uranium inside Syria.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies think-tank said: &ldquo;It has always been a mystery where the fuel was coming from for Al-Kibar. There is reason to believe there is uranium in Syria and that would be of value to Iran.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a450b660-5998-11e2-88a1-00144feab49a.html#ixzz2J1ZTRlaS">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[A threat that demands action]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=91f3847d-68df-4b4c-ac87-0b4705f27f41]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	For years, American politicians on both sides of the aisle have agreed that nuclear terrorism is one of the most serious national security threats the United States faces. In 2013, President Obama must capitalize on this rare consensus point and on his own power as a second-term president. After all, despite ongoing polarization in Washington, bipartisan cooperation has been the norm for nuclear security since the launch of the Nunn-Lugar program more than two decades ago, making the issue a unique outlier in Washington -- and for good reason. Nuclear terrorism is a real possibility that would cause catastrophic damage.<br />
	<br />
	<strong>The problem.</strong> A fascinating and largely overlooked report issued a year ago by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) assesses the damage that would befall Washington, DC, in the event of a nuclear terrorist attack. The report, presented as a case study in disaster response, assumes that a terrorist detonates a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device -- that is, a crude nuclear bomb -- in downtown Washington. Unfortunately, the basis for such a study is all too sound.<br />
	<br />
	Fissile material is widespread and has been sold on the black market: There is currently enough fissile material across the globe for more than 100,000 additional nuclear weapons, and there are 20 known cases of unauthorized possession. These days, should a capable terrorist group acquire sufficient quantities of highly enriched uranium, it could produce an improvised nuclear device using a &quot;gun-type&quot; design and still have an impact similar to that of Hiroshima. (Modern-day strategic nuclear weapons are orders of magnitude more powerful than those used during World War II.)</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/threat-demands-action">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 08 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Kim's Call for Peace with S. Korea Met With Skepticism ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0b1b9732-1404-48bf-8661-c3dc276ebbda]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	North Korean ruler Kim Jong Un&rsquo;s call on Tuesday for warmer relations with South Korea was met skeptically, with issue experts saying Pyongyang remains unlikely to shut down the missile and nuclear arms programs that have so long undermined efforts to improve relations between the neighboring states.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Experts told <i>Global Security Newswire</i> the Kim regime is likely seeking to capitalize on the election of a new South Korean president [Park Geun-hye].</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Park is untested right now so it is really too soon to tell&rdquo; what she will do on North Korea, Sharon Squassoni, director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies&rsquo; Proliferation Prevention Program told <i>GSN</i>. &ldquo;I think that delinking some of the humanitarian aid from the security situation, I think you could have some positive benefits there,&rdquo; Squassoni said.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/kim-jong-uns-call-peace-s-korea-met-skepticism/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 02 Jan 2013 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Paths forward for the Nuclear Suppliers Group: Adapting to the 21st Century]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e2d576fe-3785-4955-8bb6-cdcb23456fe7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In the years since it was established in 1975, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) has emerged as a comprehensive multilateral export-control regime for nuclear materials and technology. Another regime, the Zangger Committee, held its first meeting four years before the NSG came into existence, but it is the NSG that has demonstrated greater dynamism and has emerged as more relevant since the end of the Cold War.</p>
<p>
	The Zangger Committee was established to help signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) understand the technical issues related to transfers of nuclear materials and technology. But the committee did not include countries that were not signatories to the treaty; one such nation was France. The NSG, established as a complement to the committee, brought nations like France into the control regime. (France would accede to the treaty and also join the Zangger Committee in 1992).</p>
<p>
	In my own country of India, many people believed that the entire idea of bringing France into the nuclear control framework was to neutralize the power of Gaullism in France&#39;s economic and technology policies abroad. That is, France had often resisted the policies toward the developing world of other Western nations, and Paris&#39;s Gaullist impulses could be co-opted by bringing France into the NSG. In India, the Zangger Committee and the NSG were both understood as regimes for denying technology to the developing world -- as undesirable barricades that blocked the flow of goods and technology to countries pursuing economic development through peaceful nuclear energy programs. A segment of Indian government and civil society continues to understand the systems in this fashion.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/paths-forward-the-nuclear-suppliers-group">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 31 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Designing and Implementing Best Practices in Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fec64f1d-cc0d-472c-8b65-58431afbaa90]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	This paper analyzes the contribution that best practices can make to the field of nuclear security by doing the following:</p>
<ul>
	<li>
		Defining what is meant by best practice</li>
	<li>
		Specifying a methodology for deriving it</li>
	<li>
		Understanding the resulting characteristics of the method</li>
	<li>
		Comparing its pros and cons to other methods contributing to security, such as guidelines and regulations</li>
</ul>
<p>
	<a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/William_Tobey_Defining%20and%20Implementing.pdf">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 19 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[White House Slashes Funding for Megaports Program]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1f7c8f14-3c88-4b02-a52a-f1317aebdff1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration has sharply reduced spending on a program to combat smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials through foreign seaports, and it has yet to disclose findings from a recently completed review expected to shape the effort&#39;s future, a <a class="lingo_link" href="http://topics.nationaljournal.com/Senate+Appropriations+Committee/" rel="nofollow" style="cursor: pointer; display: inline; font-family: Georgia,&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,Times,serif; font-size: 13px; font-weight: 400; font-style: normal;">Senate Appropriations Committee</a> staffer told&nbsp;<em>Global Security Newswire</em>.</p>
<p>
	Obama officials have implemented an 85 percent funding curb they requested for the&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/auditors-seek-more-extensive-preparations-us-radiation-detection-initiative/">Megaports Initiative</a>&nbsp;in the current budget year, capping fiscal 2013 expenditures at $19.6 million and suspending any expansion of the effort that originally aimed to place radiation detection gear at 100 foreign seaports by 2018.The number of seaports covered by the project stood at 42 as of August.</p>
<p>
	In calling for the cut, the White House Management and Budget Office said the program&#39;s impact was &quot;diminishing&quot; as it completed deployments at higher-priority facilities, according to a Government Accountability Office&nbsp;<a href="http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649759.pdf">report</a>&nbsp;issued last month. Management and Budget personnel cited other issues including a shortage of data for measuring the effort&#39;s success, and the possibility of overlap between Megaports activities and nonproliferation efforts such as the Homeland Security Department&#39;s&nbsp;<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/homeland-security-extend-nuclear-scanning-deadline/">Container Security Initiative.</a></p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	One independent expert said the Megaports funding reduction was &quot;a very abrupt, precipitous and dramatic cut with no forewarning and not a very good explanation.&quot;</p>
<p>
	&quot;This is about a bigger issue of engagement globally on the prevention of nuclear terrorism,&quot; said Kenneth Luongo, who heads the Partnership for Global Security. &quot;If the U.S. doesn&rsquo;t press this kind of cooperation, other countries are not going to.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/white-house-slashes-funding-for-megaports-program-20121211">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 11 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Georgia's Nuclear Black Market]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=33848a95-0c66-4526-8212-fff1f1aacf6e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	BATUMI, Georgia -- On the gritty side of this casino resort town near the Turkish border, three men in a hotel suite gathered in secret to talk about a deal for radioactive material.</p>
<p>
	The Georgian seller offered cesium, a byproduct of nuclear reactors that terrorists can use to arm a dirty bomb with the power to kill. But one of the Turkish men, wearing a suit and casually smoking a cigarette, made clear he was after something even more dangerous: uranium, the material for a nuclear bomb.</p>
<p>
	The would-be buyers agreed to take a photo of the four cylinders and see if their boss in Turkey was interested. They did not know police were watching through a hidden camera. As they got up to leave, the police rushed in and arrested the men, according to Georgian officials, who were present.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&quot;Real buyers are rare in nuclear smuggling cases, and raise real risks,&quot; said nuclear nonproliferation specialist Matthew Bunn, who runs Harvard&#39;s Project on Managing the Atom. &quot;They suggest someone is actively seeking to buy material for a clandestine bomb.&quot;</p>
<p>
	The request for uranium raises a particularly troubling question.</p>
<p>
	&quot;There&#39;s no plausible reason for looking for black-market uranium other than for nuclear weapons_ or profit, by selling to people who are looking to make nuclear weapons,&quot; said Bunn.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/10/georgia-nuclear-black-market_n_2270643.html?utm_hp_ref=world">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 10 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Post-2014 Nuclear Security Mulled]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f2fc62ba-40f9-4539-86f9-4f03c27a3edf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Nuclear security summits held in 2010 and this year have achieved a great deal by focusing world leaders&rsquo; attention on the issue of securing nuclear materials, but there are ways to preserve much of that focus once the series of summits ends, a senior U.S. nuclear policy official said last month.</p>
<p>
	Speaking Nov. 5 in Arlington, Va., Laura Holgate, senior director for weapons of mass destruction terrorism and threat reduction at the National Security Council, said a main U.S. goal is to &ldquo;leave behind a strengthened web of treaties, institutions, norms, and practices that will reliably secure nuclear materials.&rdquo; She emphasized the roles of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and of national regulatory bodies.</p>
<p>
	The first nuclear security summit, which sprang from a commitment President Barack Obama made in his April 2009 Prague speech on nuclear weapons policy, took place in Washington in April 2010. The second one was in Seoul last March.</p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_12/Post-2014-Nuclear-Security-Mulled">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 10 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Uncooperative Threat Reduction]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=15ff597f-86f0-4e39-be46-98ca868d56d5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h1>
	Uncooperative threat&nbsp;reduction</h1>
<p>
	<span class="submitted meta">By Fissile Materials Working Group | 7 December 2012 </span></p>
<p>
	For more than two decades, the United States and Russia have worked together to secure Soviet stockpiles of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and materials, but now the future of this unprecedented partnership, the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement, is in jeopardy. After several months of negotiations, Russian officials have publicly stated that they will not renew the current agreement, which forms the legal basis for cooperation between the two countries and is set to expire in July 2013. In early October, <a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/Nunn-Lugar-Programs-Future-Uncertain">a Russian Foreign Ministry statement explained</a>: &quot;Our American partners know that their proposal is at odds with our ideas about the forms and basis for building further cooperation in that area. To this end, we need a more modern legal framework.&quot; And yet, the Russian vision for the future is not clear.</p>
<p>
	American officials are stressing the <a href="http://en.ria.ru/mlitary_news/20121012/176565808.html" target="_blank">national security value of Cooperative Threat Reduction</a> programs and the administration&#39;s sincere desire to continue working with Russia to reduce the vulnerability of weapons of mass destruction and related materials to theft, proliferation, and sabotage. US-Russian weapons security and dismantlement programs were created at the end of the Cold War and have been hailed as successful models of international cooperation for extremely sensitive security issues. Cooperative Threat Reduction collaborations underscore both the transnational nature of the weapons security threat and the ability of even the staunchest of adversaries to put aside other issues to address it. These are critical concepts to sustain.</p>
<p>
	The US Defense Department and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) spent nearly $650 million in 2012 on Russia-focused threat-reduction programs. Under the Obama administration&#39;s 2013 budget request, this figure is closer to $500 million. Most of this funding is provided through the National Nuclear Security Administration, not the original suite of Defense Department programs that were created to deal with loose nukes in the early 1990s. The amount that the Defense Department invests in the program is not trivial, but the program has significantly diversified its focus to include threats outside Russia and to secure cooperation around global biosecurity. The NNSA&#39;s International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, which is responsible for nuclear material security in more than 40 nations, however, invested some $300 million in Russian activities in 2012 alone; this program will be devastated if the Cooperative Threat Reduction agreement lapses without a new accord in place. For 2013, the administration requested a dramatic cutback of the program&#39;s <em>global</em> focus that would leave the initiative almost entirely -- 70 percent -- Russia-focused. It is clear that the United States had no intention of wrapping up threat-reduction activities with Russia next year.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/uncooperative-threat-reduction">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 07 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama Underscores Need for Further Progress to Reduce Nuclear Dangers]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7e4271d8-7b52-4e8e-9e84-c854bb6f650d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In his first foreign policy-related address since his reelection, on Monday Dec. 3 President Obama praised the architects of the highly-successful Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, he reaffirmed his commitment to the action plan toward a world without nuclear weapons, and he underscored his commitment to achieve further progress to reduce the threats posed by nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.</p>
<p>
	While Obama did not break new ground, <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/12/03/remarks-president-nunn-lugar-cooperative-threat-reduction-symposium">his remarks </a>are an important signal to his national security team, the Congress, the American public, and the world that he intends to complete unfinished nuclear risk reduction tasks that he set out in his historic <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3626">Prague address in April 2009</a>.</p>
<p>
	In the speech which capped a day-long conference titled &ldquo;Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction: Partnering for a More Secure World&rdquo; at the National Defense University, Obama praised former Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) and Dick Lugar (R-Ind.) for their visionary and bipartisan leadership to conceive of and support the program.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://armscontrolnow.org/2012/12/04/obama-underscores-need-for-further-progress-to-reduce-nuclear-dangers/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 04 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[President Obama honors Nunn and Lugar at the National Defense University]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=3b5ad9cc-aa6e-4bff-8866-6af8c4735096]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Today (December 3) President Obama spoke at the National Defense University (NDU) as part of a day-long symposium to commemorate the 20th anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program and honor the two men most responsible for its extraordinary achievements: former Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and outgoing Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN). Your humble blogger was lucky enough to attend both the symposium and the President&#39;s speech.</p>
<p>
	You can read the text of the President&#39;s remarks <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-and-remarks">here</a>.</p>
<p>
	In general, there wasn&#39;t anything earth-shatteringly new in the address (save for some good jokes from the President about traveling with Senator Lugar back when they were both Senators). The part of his comments that appears to have grabbed the most press attention was the President&#39;s clear message that the use of chemical weapons &quot;would be totally unacceptable&quot; that &quot;there would be consequences.&quot; As I recall President Obama <a href="http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5598/deterring-syrias-cw">sent a similar message</a> last August.</p>
<p>
	In his remarks the President commended the phenomenal success of CTR, reiterated that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to US national security, warned that far too much nuclear material lacks adequate protection, pledged to continue investments in nuclear material security programs, expressed a willingness to work with Russia as an equal partner to update CTR to comport with current realities, and book-ended the speech with his commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons. Obama was lean on specifics about what he hopes to accomplish in his second term on the nuclear threat reduction front - though he said at the outset of his comments that his intent was not to give a major speech, but to honor Senators Nunn and Lugar.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/12/3/232853/389">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Time Is Now to Act on Treaties to Guard Against Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5ed7378e-82f0-4ca3-856c-141efb4f84c7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p _mce_style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; font-family: Georgia,Times New Roman,Times,Serif; font-size: 12pt;">
	As the 112th Congress enters its final days, one of its critical priorities should be approving implementing legislation for two treaties that help raise the barriers against nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p _mce_style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; font-family: Georgia,Times New Roman,Times,Serif; font-size: 12pt;">
	For more than a decade, U.S. defense and security leaders have warned that nuclear terrorism poses a severe threat to American security. The 9/11 Commission report stated, &quot;The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world&#39;s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world&#39;s most dangerous weapons.&quot;</p>
<p _mce_style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; font-family: Georgia,Times New Roman,Times,Serif; font-size: 12pt;">
	During the 2004 presidential debates, the two candidates agreed that &quot;the biggest threat facing the country is weapons of mass destruction in the hands of a terrorist network.&quot; At the Cooperative Threat Reduction symposium in Washington, D.C., December 3, President Obama reiterated that &quot;nuclear terrorism remains one of the greatest threats to global security.&quot;</p>
<p _mce_style="margin-top: 0px; margin-bottom: 0px; font-family: Georgia,Times New Roman,Times,Serif; font-size: 12pt;">
	<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/issuebriefs/Time-Is-Now-to-Act-on-Treaties-to-Guard-Against-Nuclear-Terrorism">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 03 Dec 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Good time to Show he Deserves the Nobel Prize]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=144494fc-f500-461f-9301-3d05019cb98c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="JTparagraph">
	HONOLULU &mdash; At a recent international conference, a colleague asked, somewhat irreverently (but not irrelevantly), &quot;Now that Obama has been re-elected, will he finally earn his Nobel Prize?&quot;</p>
<p>
	It&#39;s a fair question. Hopes were high in the international disarmament community after President Barack Obama&#39;s 2009 Prague speech when he pledged to move toward a nuclear weapons-free world. But those who cheered the loudest then are among the most disappointed now, frustrated over the slow progress toward this goal.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p class="JTparagraph">
	Finally, the U.S. ability to combat the proliferation-terrorism nexus has proved limited. Although U.S. endorsement of nuclear disarmament has improved the atmospherics, little tangible progress has been achieved on the nonproliferation and nuclear security fronts. Many Non-Aligned Movement members in Asia (and beyond) continue to argue that the &quot;baby steps&quot; undertaken thus far do not justify more efforts from them on nonproliferation and nuclear security. This seems remarkably shortsighted since proliferation and especially acts of nuclear terrorism will have a much greater impact on their societies and economies than most seem willing to acknowledge. But the quid pro quo mentality remains nonetheless.</p>
<p class="JTparagraph">
	<a href="http://www.japantimes.co.jp/text/eo20121129a3.html">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 29 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Japan's Nuclear Mistake]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=3f1d2ae0-777b-46f0-a515-4e7d9a61f9a4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	THIS year has seen a lot of concern about the confrontation between China and Japan over a group of islets in the East China Sea.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	Less attention, though, is being paid to what may be a more destabilizing development: next year Japan plans to bring its long-delayed Rokkasho reprocessing plant online, which could extract as much as eight tons of weapons-usable plutonium from spent reactor fuel a year, enough for nearly 1,000 warheads. That would add to Japan&rsquo;s existing stockpile of 44 tons, 9 of which are stored in domestic facilities.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	Japan has repeatedly vowed never to develop nuclear weapons, and there&rsquo;s no reason to doubt that now. But there&rsquo;s more to worry about: reprocessing not only creates a tempting target for terrorists, it also sets a precedent for countries around the world to follow suit &mdash; and pushes the world toward rampant nuclear proliferation.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/29/opinion/japans-nuclear-mistake.html?_r=0">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Pit Stop in Istanbul on Way to Nuclear Security Summit in 2014]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5c01f38a-bad7-4a0a-9d80-5a2b19775ccf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Officials from more than 50 nations have been gathering together in <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tag/Istanbul">Istanbul</a> to begin planning for the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit, which will be the third of its kind that will be focused on preventing nuclear terrorism.<br />
	<br />
	The first summit was convened in April 2010 in Washington D.C. with the participation of the heads of state and government of 47 states and the chiefs of international organizations &ndash; the largest of such gatherings since the end of World War II. During the Washington summit, world leaders underlined the importance as well as the urgency of taking swift and effective measures against the threat posed by the possibility of transnational terrorist networks acquiring nuclear materials, namely highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.<br />
	<br />
	The success of the first summit paved the way for the second summit, which convened in Seoul in March with a record participation of 53 heads of state and government, as well as representatives of the United Nations, International Atomic Energy Agency, <a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/tag/European%20Union">European Union</a> and Interpol.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/pit-stop-in-istanbul-on-way-to-nuclear-security-summit-in-2014.aspx?pageID=449&amp;nID=35616&amp;NewsCatID=396">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Critical Questions: Urgent Decisions for the Second Obama Administration]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b72760cf-2ac3-4302-81e4-6cd37427ad3a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In his April 2009 speech in Prague, President Obama announced &ldquo;a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years&rdquo; in an effort to prevent nuclear terrorism.[25] In fact, much of what the administration did in this regard was not new. For example, the U.S. government has operated programs for decades to minimize the civil use of <a class="glossary-popup" href="http://www.nti.org/glossary/highly-enriched-uranium-heu/">highly enriched uranium (HEU)</a>, since HEU can also be used as <a class="glossary-popup" href="http://www.nti.org/glossary/fissile-material/">fissile material</a> for nuclear weapons. In addition, the George W. Bush Administration&rsquo;s <a class="glossary-popup" href="http://www.nti.org/glossary/global-threat-reduction-initiative/">Global Threat Reduction Initiative</a> stepped up spending and focus on these activities after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.</p>
<p>
	But the Obama administration did make one signature step forward: establishing a series of nuclear security summits that brought top-level political focus to efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, a set of issues previously relegated to lower level officials and technical experts. Washington hosted the first nuclear security summit in 2010, which brought together leaders from 47 countries, the largest such gathering since the formation of the United Nations in 1945. An even larger number of countries sent representatives to a second summit hosted by South Korea in Seoul in 2012. And at that summit, governments agreed that the Netherlands would hold another summit in 2014.[26] So far, the summits have been seen as producing mixed results. While the communiqu&eacute;s and official documents from the summits have been cautious in tone, full of caveats and escape clauses, the summit process has been useful in leveraging commitments from individual countries and groups of countries to take concrete actions on nuclear security.</p>
<p>
	The next administration will need to determine how to approach two overriding issues. First, a growing number of governments have expressed concern that this somewhat technical issue does not merit high level summits every two years, and so it is not clear if the summit process will continue beyond 2014. Indeed, U.S officials have indicated that they would like member states to give the International Atomic Energy Agency a more central role in managing these concerns. Secondly, the administration will have to decide how ambitious an outcome it will push for at the Netherlands Summit. Some NGOs, and governments such as Australia, would like to see the summit commit to a stronger nuclear security regime. These steps, for example, might include instituting binding legal standards for nuclear security, or requirements for some outside review of a country&rsquo;s nuclear security efforts (e.g., by the IAEA or other countries or organizations).</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/issues-obama-administration-its-second-term/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Treaties Need Grassley's Help]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1aa79ddc-9bd7-4427-93c0-cff05d6c2d0e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	As the Congress gathers in Washington for its final session of the year, bipartisan cooperation is going to be needed more than ever to address the urgent issues facing the nation. One of its critical priorities should be approving two treaties that help construct barriers to nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>
	Iowa&rsquo;s Sen. Chuck Grassley, who had previously delayed passage, is now in a unique position to make this happen.</p>
<p>
	For more than a decade, U.S. defense and security leaders have warned that nuclear terrorism poses a severe threat to American security. The 9/11 Commission report stated, &ldquo;The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world&rsquo;s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world&rsquo;s most dangerous weapons.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20121118/OPINION01/311180031/-1/debatedemafter/Another-View-Nuclear-treaties-need-Grassley-s-help?nclick_check=1">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 17 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Democracy and the Bomb]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=548d1b89-72ce-4225-bb94-d732fc2d17c6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In a democracy, there is no greater responsibility than voting for our government representatives. Whether choosing a state legislator, mayor, congressional representative, or president, selecting among candidates and sending them off to formulate and enact laws on our behalf is the single most important duty of a citizen. And many of us Americans exercised that right in last Tuesday&#39;s national elections. Many also canvassed communities, talked to neighbors, called strangers, got out the vote, and volunteered at polls on Election Day. Yet it is after all the votes are in and the candidates have either claimed victory or conceded that the real work of democracy begins. Or at least it should.<br />
	<br />
	Too often, however, many of us lucky enough to live in democracies view elections as the only responsibility we have as citizens and leave the policy discussions to the elected and to the experts. There are some good reasons for this, of course. People are busy making a living, finding a job, paying bills, sorting out finances, going to school plays, helping out at the local library, going to church, and caring for children and parents. And, if these were not enough in the way of obstacles, some issues -- like climate change and nuclear security -- seem complicated, contentious, and far removed from our daily lives. Political leaders and policy experts don&#39;t always encourage a lot of participation, either; perhaps they believe that citizens are badly informed about issues and that their participation will result in poor decisions. So, the pressures on time and attention, along with the complexity of the issues and lack of encouragement, lead most people to accept the role that policy elites have assigned them -- the ignorant, uninterested public.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kennette-benedict/democracy-and-the-bomb">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Little Hope Seen for Nuclear Security Bill Passage in Lame-Duck Session]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6e215fe1-bef3-46a4-961f-add5cb1411bf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	ASHINGTON -- Proponents of a legislative effort to bring the United States into line with two international nuclear security agreements appeared skeptical on Tuesday that Congress would be able to complete the task by the end of this year&rsquo;s lame-duck session.</p>
<p>
	The bill, which has passed the House but is being <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/adoption-nuclear-security-pacts-stalls-senate/">held up</a> by an anonymous Republican in the Senate, is meant to ensure the United States meets legal standards required under the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Terrorism. The pact, which entered into force in 2007 and now has 82 state parties, requires member nations to criminalize the possession and use of nuclear weapons and related radioactive material. The deal also sets guidelines for the extradition and prosecution of individuals linked to nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>
	The legislation would also bring the United States into line with a 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The change, which has yet to enter into force, would add standards for domestic storage, use and transfer to an agreement that originally focused on protecting international shipments of civilian nuclear material. To date, 59 of 97 countries needed to bring the amendment into <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-looks-updated-nuclear-security-pact/">force</a> have taken the necessary legislative step.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Kingston Reif, nuclear nonproliferation director at the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, echoed Ford&rsquo;s view on the prospects for congressional compromise before lawmakers close up shop for the year.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;It&rsquo;s not looking great at this point but there is still time in the lame duck and I think it would be very helpful if senators on both sides of aisle who are supportive of robust U.S. leadership on nuclear security continue to have the conversation with Senator Grassley on the importance of this legislation and see what may be able to be worked out,&rdquo; Reif said. &ldquo;Even if nothing can be worked out in the lame duck, at least that could be an important down payment on ensuring swift passage in the next Congress.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/experts-see-little-hope-nuclear-security-bill-passage-lame-duck/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Recommendations to Prevent Catastrophic Threats]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5231700d-9aac-49ab-96a4-f2710095d728]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	FOREWORD</p>
<p>
	What are the major national security threats facing the United States? How is science and<br />
	technology connected to national security? What can the next U.S. president do to prepare fora potential disaster?</p>
<p>
	Only three days after the national election, the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) hosteda day-long symposium that featured distinguished speakers who provided recommendations tothe new administration on how to respond to catastrophic threats to national security.</p>
<p>
	These experts addressed the policy and technological aspects of conventional, nuclear, biological,and chemical weapons; biotechnology; nuclear safety; electricity generation, distribution,and storage; and cyber security. These policy memoranda call for a coordinated national effortto prepare for, prevent, and respond to catastrophic threats to the United States.</p>
<p>
	Mr. Charles Blair focuses on understanding of terrorists&rsquo; ideology and of the command and<br />
	control structure of groups who may carry out nuclear and radiological threats. Dr. Sidney<br />
	Drell questions whether it&rsquo;s possible for the United States to escape the nuclear deterence trap,in addition to the current nuclear policy in general. Dr. Richard L. Garwin goes one step furtherand declares that nuclear weapons are more of a threat to developed society than a usefultool. Dr. Garwin lists numerous recommendations to reduce the current threat of nuclearweapons. Mr. Hans Kristensen provides options for nuclear force reduction. Dr. Robert S.Norris writes that fundamental changes to U.S. war planning are a prerequisite to achievingsmall stockpiles of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.fas.org/_docs/2012_Policy_Memos.pdf">View Full Report...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Senate, Grassley Must Take Lead On Preventing Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f2246d54-5837-47d3-8642-79490dd845eb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	We need every tool available to prevent nuclear terrorism. Unfortunately, two treaties that have been awaiting Congressional approval for more than half a decade that will enhance our ability to protect nuclear materials and go after terrorists intent on using them are stalled in Congress. This is unacceptable. Now that the election is over, one of the first orders of business when Congress returns should be to get past the bickering and pass these two nonpartisan treaties our military leaders have been pleading for.</p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
<div class="module">
	<div>
		<div>
			<div>
				<div class="vbanner" style="">
					Defense and security experts down the line agree that nuclear terrorism is a major threat in the 21st century. Since the end of the Cold War, there have been more than 2000 confirmed cases of illicit or unauthorized trafficking of nuclear and radioactive material. As the 9/11 Commission Report states, &ldquo;The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world&rsquo;s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world&rsquo;s most dangerous weapons.&rdquo; Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted that inadequately secured stores of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials offer &ldquo;potential source material&rdquo; to terrorists.</div>
			</div>
		</div>
	</div>
</div>
<p>
	<br />
	But while nuclear terrorism is one of the biggest threats to our security, it is also one of the most preventable. Two treaties with very complicated names but very straight-forward goals will equip our security and intelligence communities with tools they need to better prevent attacks. The Convention on the 2005 Amendment to the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) will increase our ability to confront nuclear terrorism by 1) protecting domestic nuclear material and 2) promoting international cooperation in investigating, extraditing and prosecuting suspected terrorists.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/266845-senate-grassley-must-take-lead-on-preventing-nuclear-terrorism">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama?s Second Chance at Prague Nuke Agenda]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a53a16f2-d3b2-4cdc-8491-740bfb301a43]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The US electorate has spoken, and most of the international diplomats, academics, and others with whom I spoke on the day after our presidential election on 6 November breathed a sigh of relief that the stewardship of the world&rsquo;s (still) sole superpower will remain in safe hands for another four years. The rest of the world <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-20008687">famously backed Barack Obama</a>, so while much of the satisfaction I heard about the Democrat&rsquo;s re-election pertained particularly to the nuclear-policy matters being addressed in my various meetings, I also found myself, as an American citizen abroad, congratulated more broadly.</p>
<p>
	The election turned on domestic issues, and even the presidential debate that was supposed to be dedicated to foreign policy pivoted back to the American economy and education system. Nevertheless, the question that I have been asked most is how Obama will use his renewed lease on the White House&nbsp;to address global issues.&nbsp;In my area of specialisation on arms control and non-proliferation, everyone agrees there is much to be done.&nbsp;Unfortunately, there seems little scope for Obama to do it. And, of course, Iran looms large on his agenda.</p>
<p>
	Obama aimed high in his initial foray into the nuclear subject with his <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered" target="_blank" title="The White House: 'REMARKS BY PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA' April 2009 (new window)">speech</a> in Prague in April 2009. The following year he struck the New START nuclear arms agreement with Russia and <a href="http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2010/index.htm" target="_blank" title="US Department of State: 'Nuclear Security Summit 2010' (new window)">corralled global leaders</a> to prioritise efforts to counter nuclear terrorism. After these signal achievements, however, the nuclear agenda stalled.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/11/08/obamas-second-chance-at-prague-nuke-agenda/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[White House Official: Russian Concerns With CTR Agreement Are "Valid"]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=180b2ea5-0738-464a-9847-6f31ed5d235a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A key White House official on Monday suggested that the changes Russian officials are looking to make to a bilateral agreement that allows the United States to help secure and dismantle Soviet-era weapons of mass destruction are not unreasonable.</p>
<p>
	The future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in Russia was thrown into question last month when officials there said publicly their government was not interested in extending the pact that has enabled the initiative to operate within the country since the early 1990s.</p>
<p>
	During the past two decades, the United States has used the program to provide Russia with more than $7 billion in funds, equipment and expertise for securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear arms and other unconventional weapons. The U.S. government and its contractors are shielded from virtually all liability from incidents that could occur during the course of CTR work under the enabling umbrella agreement &ndash; an issue that has long been contentious in Moscow.</p>
<p>
	The agreement expires in June. The Obama administration earlier this year proposed extending the deal but received a chilly response from Moscow.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Moscow&#39;s stance on the CTR agreement is consistent with those it has taken on other international issues since Vladimir Putin reassumed the Russian presidency in May<strong>, </strong>suggested Andrew Semmel, a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;What the president has done now is to alert all of his emissaries around the world to take a tough position on a number of issues and I think [the CTR stance] is one of the manifestations of this,&rdquo; Semmel said during the panel discussion. &ldquo;I think this is something that has pervaded in a number of issues including the CTR program.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, told <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ctr-program-could-survive-despite-russian-objections-experts-say/"><em>Global Security Newswire</em></a> previously that Russia might raise objections to a Defense Department requirement that it conduct inspections to ensure that any equipment it pays for in Russia has been properly installed. He said Russian officials &ldquo;balk&rdquo; at this requirement.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/white-house-aid-russian-concerns-ctr-agreement-are-valid/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Promoting Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security in the Middle East Region]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=06089ddc-c9ce-40be-931f-3dd08b9691c7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Introduction</p>
<p>
	As states in the region work towards establishment of a Zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, they may in the meantime wish to consider cooperative measures in the field of nuclear safety and security that would be valuable in their own right and could help to establish the greater sense of trust that will be necessary for materialization of a &ldquo;Zone&rdquo;. With nuclear power having newly arrived in the region and with more reactors on the way, issues of nuclear safety and nuclear security take on vital importance. It will be critical for Middle East states that are pursuing nuclear power to implement effective national policies, to sign up to international instruments and to adhere to global regimes. Mutual encouragement to adopt such national policies and practices in one way that states of the region can join in common purpose. Another way, and at a higher level of political difficulty, Middle East states may find utility in coordination and cooperation on a regional basis. At the higher level of aspiration, states might seek to build a structure for regional collaboration on nuclear and radiological safety and security.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/.../fitzpatrick2.pdf">View Full Paper...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nunn-Lugar?s Legacy Imperiled on Two Fronts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a0ab66a3-800b-4bb4-bfd8-bfdc0b06a94a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Rarely do major foreign policy initiatives begin on Capitol Hill. But two decades ago, amid the chaos of the Soviet Union&rsquo;s collapse, two veteran senators persuaded a Cold War Congress to fund a new program that would secure and dismantle the former empire&rsquo;s vast inventory of nuclear weapons, delivery systems and associated materials. The idea was to prevent them from falling into the hands of terrorists or other rogue actors.</p>
<p>
	In the two decades that it has been operating, the Cooperative Threat Reduction program &mdash; known simply as Nunn-Lugar for its Senate authors, Democrat Sam Nunn of Georgia and Republican Richard G. Lugar of Indiana &mdash; has helped destroy a huge arsenal of nuclear warheads, missiles, chemical shells and weapons-grade uranium. After Nunn retired in 1997, Lugar continued to champion the program, which &mdash; at a cost of $15 billion so far &mdash; has proven to be one of the nation&rsquo;s most effective non-proliferation initiatives.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;These are not crazy demands,&rdquo; says John Isaacs, executive director for the Council for a Livable World, a group that advocates for nuclear non-proliferation. &ldquo;What the Russians are demanding is perfectly reasonable and should be able to be worked out in negotiations.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Progress on one unlocks progress on another,&rdquo; Isaacs says. &ldquo;Everything is connected.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://public.cq.com/docs/weeklyreport/weeklyreport-000004171640.html">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 03 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Presidential Candidates' Paths Diverge on Nuclear-Weapon Policies, Arms Control]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5fced0d8-e9fa-45d7-841b-bd1d61a0a147]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	President Obama and Mitt Romney have staked out diverging paths for nuclear weapons policy, global nonproliferation approaches and arms control, according to a review of their positions and interviews with issue experts.</p>
<p>
	Romney is generally skeptical of the value of <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/former-white-house-aides-new-nuclear-guidance-have-lasting-effect/">nuclear weapons reductions</a> and other arms control measures, whereas Obama has largely embraced these as policy tools. Obama, for example, wants to seek Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, while the Republican challenger&rsquo;s advisers do not see that as a possibility during a Romney administration.</p>
<p>
	The next president might be expected to grapple with Russia&rsquo;s increasing reluctance to continue Cooperative Threat Reduction efforts, despite a continuing risk of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons proliferation.</p>
<p>
	The possibility of an Israeli attack against Iranian nuclear facilities could loom early in the next presidential term, as might a decision about whether the United States should use its own military to stop any potential effort by Tehran to build a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;That undoubtedly will be a concern of any administration, assuming that force has not been used prior to the new administration taking office,&rdquo; said William Potter, speaking in his capacity as a professor of nonproliferation studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The threat to drop joint CTR efforts &ldquo;is a challenge for whoever the next president is,&rdquo; said Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security. &ldquo;And it&rsquo;s not an issue that&rsquo;s totally within our control.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;If they bring in all the Bush people, I think that you are going to see the same problems you had in the Bush administration&rdquo; internationally, Luongo said. &ldquo;If they bring in more moderate people, they can work with anyone.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/presidential-candidates-paths-diverge-nuclear-weapon-policies-arms-control/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 02 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Revisiting Radioactive Source Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=20b9a7ad-3657-41b1-9c38-8a4188435d87]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The possibility of radioactive material falling into the hands of criminal organizations or terrorists remains a real and persistent security threat. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that, <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/itdb.asp" target="_blank">since 1993, there have been more than 2,000 confirmed incidents of lost regulatory control over potentially dangerous material</a>, including nearly 150 incidents last year. Given the unsettling frequency of reported cases, it may seem surprising that there is no legally binding international convention pertaining to the safety and security of radioactive sources that requires states to take preventive action. However, imposing binding commitments on states to enact stronger regulatory controls -- though potentially useful to some degree -- is not a silver bullet for what will remain a very large and multifaceted security challenge.</p>
<p>
	Radiological security is commonly associated with the threat of terrorists detonating a &quot;dirty bomb&quot; -- a dispersal device consisting of conventional explosives laced with radioactive material -- as a way of using people&rsquo;s natural fear of radiation to create chaos that is disproportionate to the actual health risk. However, it is important to remember that there are numerous other ways in which radioactive material could be used to wreak havoc: It could be a surreptitiously placed radiation-emitting device or -- as <a href="http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=1201" target="_blank">James Acton, Brooke Rogers, and Peter Zimmerman point out in the journal <em>Survival</em></a> -- used in an attack that causes people to inhale, ingest, or immerse themselves in a radioactive substance. The dirty bomb scare is only the tip of the iceberg with respect to radiological threats.</p>
<p>
	Moreover, because these materials are widely used in medicine, industry, and agriculture, there are literally millions of potential sources of radioactive material around the world. Also, small-but-significant amounts of radioactive material remain in thousands of orphaned containers outside regulatory control. Yet all of these radiological materials originate from a relative few supplying countries -- Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Russia, South Africa, and the United States -- that produce and export them. Therefore, a top-down approach to security focused primarily on regulatory controls at the state level does have some intuitive appeal.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/revisiting-radioactive-source-security">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 02 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nunn-Lugar Program?s Future Uncertain]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=cdcfb44b-41eb-47bb-9171-84abbadfd633]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In a potential setback for U.S.-Russian relations, Moscow said in October that it would not sign an agreement drafted by the United States to extend the two countries&rsquo; 20-year partnership to dismantle and secure Russian weapons, materials, and delivery systems left over from the Cold War.</p>
<p>
	The United States, however, hopes to extend the so-called umbrella agreement, which provides the underlying legal framework for the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The program is commonly known by the names of the authors of the 1991 legislation that established the effort, Sens. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) and Sam Nunn (D-Ga.).</p>
<p>
	If the program, widely viewed as one of the most successful initiatives to control excess Russian weapons of mass destruction, is not renewed, &ldquo;Russia&rsquo;s unsecured weapons and materials [would] remain a temptation for terrorists of all varieties to buy or steal for use in future attacks,&rdquo; <i>The New York Times</i> editorialized Oct. 17.</p>
<p>
	In comments that many interpreted as an indication the deal was dead, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov said Oct. 10 that &ldquo;[t]he American side knows that we do not want another [Nunn-Lugar] extension,&rdquo; according to Russia&rsquo;s Interfax news agency.</p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/Nunn-Lugar-Programs-Future-Uncertain">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Strains Seen in Japan?s Plutonium Policy]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c6f4557e-7a82-4ede-a733-bd3275a93173]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Japan&rsquo;s recently proposed energy strategy is not clear on how to address fundamental policy questions on the country&rsquo;s approach to spent nuclear fuel, reprocessing, and plutonium use, a Japanese official and a U.S. nuclear expert said in interviews last month.</p>
<p>
	On Sept. 14, the Japanese government issued an energy strategy document that contemplates the phase-out of nuclear power by about 2040. A cabinet decision five days later made clear that the strategy document did not constitute a binding policy decision, and the strategy could be scrapped entirely if the current Japanese government falls from power in the upcoming elections, which are expected to take place by next summer.</p>
<p>
	The new energy strategy is part of Japan&rsquo;s response to the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear reactors on March 11, 2011.</p>
<p>
	For decades, a central part of Japan&rsquo;s nuclear plans has been what energy and nonproliferation specialists call &ldquo;closing the fuel cycle.&rdquo; That involves reprocessing the spent fuel from power reactors to separate plutonium that is then used in making fresh fuel for reactors.</p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_11/Strains-Seen-in-Japans-Plutonium-Policy">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 01 Nov 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[A Nuclear Nightmare]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=15ee133b-d90a-4d9d-809d-842bd10e3c11]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Halloween is a time for scary tales and horror movies. It is appropriate, then, that this Halloween falls just after the 50th anniversary of one of the most terrifying real-life horror stories of all time: The Cuban Missile Crisis.</p>
<p>
	The crisis began on October 16, 1962, when photographs taken by an American U-2 spy plane exposed the secret construction of Soviet nuclear missile sites in Cuba. It was the ultimate trick or treat, with the emphasis on trick.</p>
<p>
	Upon learning of the secret Soviet deployment, many of President John F. Kennedy&rsquo;s advisors recommended that he launch an air attack and invasion of Cuba to destroy the missile sites and overthrow Cuban leader Fidel Castro. Fearing the consequences of an attack, Kennedy instead opted for a quarantine of Cuba to allow for a diplomatic solution.</p>
<p>
	This strategy worked, but just barely. On October 28, 1962, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to withdraw his arsenal of missiles and nuclear warheads from the island in exchange for Kennedy&rsquo;s public commitment not to invade Cuba and his secret concession to withdraw US Jupiter missiles from Turkey at a later date. Had the crisis lasted much longer, Kennedy may have given the order to strike.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/265099-a-nuclear-nightmare">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 31 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Terrorism and Global Security: The Challenge of Phasing out Highly Enriched Uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d204a6b7-7f40-4e7c-ae29-a679a593e362]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	This book examines the prospects and challenges of a global phase-out of highly enriched uranium and the risks of this material otherwise being used by terrorists to make atom bombs.</p>
<p>
	Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, have demonstrated repeatedly that they seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst even to many security specialists, tons of bomb-grade uranium are trafficked legally each year for ostensibly peaceful purposes. If terrorists obtained even a tiny fraction of this bomb-grade uranium they could potentially construct a nuclear weapon like the one dropped on Hiroshima that killed tens of thousands.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415660686/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 30 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[50 Years After the Cuban Missile Crisis: The Nuclear Threat is Still With Us]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2b317335-8a60-4991-a69f-944a8bae65fb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A Sunday like today, October 28, but 50 years ago, during the Cold War, the concrete possibility of a nuclear holocaust was left behind, after many days of extreme tension. Only the good judgment of <strong>John F. Kennedy</strong> and <strong>Nikita Khrushchev</strong> avoided the disaster that they had helped create. Many in both governmental circles promoted the use of nuclear force as the best alternative to define the conflict. A third actor, the Cuban leader <strong>Fidel Castro</strong>, also pushed the Soviets to carry out a nuclear attack against the United States.</p>
<p>
	Nevertheless, good judgment prevailed over pressures. <strong>Both statesmen were wise but also, they were very lucky&hellip;</strong></p>
<p>
	It is disappointing to say that after 50 years, <strong>the nuclear threat is still with us</strong>. The expectations of a post Cold War distension in nuclear terms gave way, perhaps too soon, to a hardening of positions, and to more nuclear armed states, from 4 to 9. Moreover, nuclear terrorism, immune to any deterrence and ready to impose its own rules is, appeared in the forefront as perhaps the more dangerous and likely XXI Century threat.<br />
	<br />
	There is no doubt that the world is today more complex and uncertain than during the Cold War. There are <strong>still 20,000 nuclear weapons</strong>, <strong>many on high alert, deployed in 14 countries</strong>. Beyond good intentions, at the present time, many of nuclear disarmament commitments are still pending of accomplishment, while virtuous and successful cooperation systems, such as <strong>Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement</strong> between USA and Russia, popularly known as Nunn-Lugar Agreement, which made possible the dismantlement of more than 7,000 nuclear warheads form the former USSR, run the risk of being deactivated.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://npsglobal.org/eng/component/content/article/147-articles/1049-50-years-after-the-cuban-missile-crisis.html">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 28 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Policy Memo - Effective and Sustainable Global Nuclear Security: Looking Beyond the Horizon]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=911547dd-1a8c-4a06-a18e-d0f5a10a26ee]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	With the Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) process likely coming to an end after the 2014 summit in the Netherlands, the next eighteen months are crucial for setting an effective long-term agenda for nuclear security and capitalizing on the momentum created by heads-of-state-level political engagement. Integral to crafting this agenda is the consideration of metrics that will allow for not only measuring progress made in securing nuclear material over the span of the three summits, but also for determining the post-summit future of the nuclear security policy discussion.</p>
<p>
	Although the goal of locking down all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years was agreed to by leaders at the 2010 Washington summit, the goal will not be met by 2014, and even with stepped-up efforts since the first summit, in 2010, a number of nuclear security gaps will remain. Within this context it is important to recognize that improving the nuclear security architecture cannot be confined to or defined by the summit process, but rather the NSS should be seen as a driver of a larger, long-term effort to improve nuclear security worldwide.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/spc2012/NukeSecurity_PM_10-26_FINAL_KP_PDF.pdf">View Full Memo...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Advancing China's Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a27117b6-0cdc-4f9e-ace6-26e253d167b9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	China, like all nuclear weapon states, bears a responsibility to provide leadership in nuclear security issues. But China&#39;s strategy for securing its nuclear weapons -- and the complex of facilities where fissile material for weapons is fabricated and stored -- has so far remained largely opaque.</p>
<p>
	What we do know about Chinese nuclear security is encouraging. As in all nations, however, room for improvement surely exists. At the 2012 nuclear security summit in Seoul, <a href="http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t918472.htm" target="_blank">Chinese President Hu Jintao said</a>, &quot;In the future, China will [take further] nuclear security measures, make sure [of] the security of its own nuclear materials and facilities, [and] improve &hellip; overall nuclear security.&quot; But converting Hu&#39;s political commitment into practical, sustainable reality will require China to assess its nuclear sector&#39;s vulnerabilities along several dimensions, ranging from regulatory arrangements to physical infrastructure to the nation&#39;s security culture. Once vulnerabilities have been accurately assessed, the path will be clear to minimize China&#39;s nuclear security threats.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/advancing-chinas-nuclear-security">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Media Backgrounder: Nuclear Weapons and the Foreign Policy Debate]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=50f65562-373b-4d93-811e-c4e3960df75b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis almost led to nuclear war, nuclear weapons still pose enormous risks to U.S. and global security. Today, there still are nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons, and there are nine <a href="http://armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat" target="_blank">nuclear-armed states</a>. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material, and the threat of nuclear terrorism is real.<br />
	<br />
	This backgrounder provides some key facts concerning nuclear weapons issues that will shape the national security choices of the next U.S. president over the next four years:</p>
<ul>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#1">Iran&#39;s Nuclear Capabilities and &quot;Red Lines;&quot; </a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#2" target="_self">Options for Preventing a Nuclear-Armed Iran; </a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#3" target="_self">U.S. and Global Nuclear Forces;</a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#4" target="_self">Further U.S.-Russian Nuclear Cuts and China;</a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#5" target="_self">Nuclear Modernization and Nuclear Weapons Spending;</a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#6" target="_self">Preventing Nuclear Terrorism;</a></li>
	<li>
		<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate#7" target="_self">Ballistic Missile Defenses.</a></li>
</ul>
<p>
	<b>Iran&#39;s Nuclear Capabilities and &quot;Red Lines&quot;</b><br />
	A central issue in 2013 will be how to handle Iran&#39;s nuclear program, which could be used as the basis for building nuclear weapons in the years to come.<br />
	<br />
	President Obama has said repeatedly that he will not allow Iran to possess nuclear weapons. Governor Romney has also said he will not allow a &quot;nuclear-armed&quot; Iran. However, in October 8 speech he said:&nbsp; &quot;I will put the leaders of Iran on notice that the United States and our friends and allies will prevent them from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/Media-Backgrounder-Nuclear-Weapons-and-the-Foreign-Policy-Debate">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 22 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[50 Years After Cuban Missile Crisis: 5 Ways U.S. Must Promote Nuclear Nonproliferation]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4f160dba-c762-4af2-979f-87f190c31c63]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, the threats posed by the bomb have changed but still hang over us all. Today, there are still nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons and nine nuclear-armed states. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material and the risk of nuclear terrorism is real.</p>
<p>
	The massive nuclear arsenals of the <a class="inform_link" href="http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/United+States" target="_self">United States</a> and <a class="inform_link" href="http://www.csmonitor.com/tags/topic/Russia" target="_self">Russia</a> &ndash; the most dangerous legacy of the cold war &ndash; have been reduced through successive arms control agreements. However, deployed US and Russian nuclear forces still exceed 1,500 strategic warheads each &ndash; far more than necessary to deter nuclear attack.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2012/1019/50-years-after-Cuban-missile-crisis-5-ways-US-must-promote-nuclear-nonproliferation/End-cold-war-thinking">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Boost Phase]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0e8818cf-92ed-47af-ac54-181063aeb367]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Last week, alarm bells rang as the first <a href="http://mdjonline.com/view/full_story/20528559/article-Russia-drops-bombshell-on-U-S--nuclear-safeguard-plan?mobile_view=false" target="_blank"><font color="#0066cc">headlines</font></a> ran about Moscow&#39;s &quot;bombshell&quot; decision not to renew the 1992 Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement underpinning efforts to improve nuclear security. Perhaps it was the context of chilling relations with Putin&#39;s Russia, including the <a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/21/russia-ngo-law-human-rights_n_1691651.html" target="_blank"><font color="#0066cc">crackdown</font></a> on nongovernmental organizations and the <a href="http://www.denverpost.com/nationworld/ci_21610508/cutting-off-usaid-russia-refashions-relations-u-s" target="_blank"><font color="#0066cc">eviction</font></a> of the U.S. Agency for International Development, that evoked such angst. The claim that U.S.-Russian nuclear security cooperation is dead, however, is greatly exaggerated.</p>
<p>
	The CTR Agreement was conceived and implemented in a very different time. The Soviet Union had disintegrated and Russia was financially supine. U.S. assistance was necessary to keep body and soul together for Russian nuclear weapons scientists, and to remove the temptation for them to sell their knowledge and wares to other nations or terrorists. In the absence of Soviet oppression, the Russian nuclear archipelago was a security nightmare, with fallen fences, crumbling buildings, poor procedures, and a demoralized (and all too often drunken) guard force. Championed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, and signed by President George H. W. Bush, the Cooperative Threat Reduction legislation created programs to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as to facilitate the destruction of missiles and chemical weapons.</p>
<p>
	Today, Russia is more prosperous and its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities are much more secure. Work under the Bratislava Initiative, agreed to by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2005, essentially completed physical security upgrades at nuclear weapons facilities in Russia. Fissile material production reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk were shut down and replaced with coal-fired plants. Hundreds of Russian ports, airports, and border crossings are now equipped with nuclear detection equipment. Over 400 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium has been down-blended to fuel reactors that now provide 10 percent of American electricity. Nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus have been removed to Russia, and the former Soviet nuclear test site at Degelen Mountain in Kazakhstan has been secured from scavengers. Moscow and Washington, among others, should be proud of these signal achievements.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/19/boost_phase">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Candidates Must Tackle Issue of Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ae4e1932-2e94-40b8-be6b-478d339975d2]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Even in an age of intense partisanship some issues rise above the fray. Preventing nuclear terrorism is one of them and for good reason.</p>
<p>
	The prospect of nuclear terrorism is at once one of the biggest threats to American security and one of the most preventable. But, like many foreign policy issues in 2012, nuclear terrorism has been overlooked. That is both unfortunate and unacceptable. Now, as focus turns to foreign policy issues, President Obama and Gov. Romney owe it to the American people to clearly articulate their vision to prevent these materials from falling into the wrong hands.</p>
<p>
	There is a clear consensus on the severity of the need to secure nuclear materials. The bipartisan 9/11 Commission that I chaired noted, &ldquo;The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world&rsquo;s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world&rsquo;s most dangerous weapons.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/18/3056540/candidates-must-tackle-issue-of.html">View full article...</a></p>
<div style="width: 1px; height: 1px; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font: 10pt sans-serif; text-align: left; text-transform: none; overflow: hidden;">
	<br />
	Read more here: http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/10/18/3056540/candidates-must-tackle-issue-of.html#storylink=cpy</div>
<div style="width: 1px; height: 1px; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font: 10pt sans-serif; text-align: left; text-transform: none; overflow: hidden;">
	&nbsp;</div>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 19 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Terrorists 'Acquire Nuclear Container to Smuggle Uranium']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24fa5ba9-41cb-4698-adc0-7c99ea011ce4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="firstPar">
	<p>
		Speaking in London, Yukiya Amano of the International Atomic Energy Agency, said groups&#39; efforts to build a dirty bomb were becoming &quot;more professional&quot;.</p>
</div>
<div class="secondPar">
	<p>
		It was particularly worrying, he said, that smuggling networks had hold of technology to evade sophisticated monitoring equipment designed to prevent proliferation of radioactive material.</p>
</div>
<div class="thirdPar">
	<p>
		&quot;Terrorists having access to nuclear material is a real threat,&quot; he said. &quot;They have developed a particular container to put enriched uranium in as samples. The groups repeat [deliveries] to defeat the preventive measures. This is a real threat.&quot;</p>
</div>
<div class="fourthPar">
	<p>
		Patricia Lewis, the head of the international security at Chatham House, said Mr Amano&#39;s comments appeared to confirm suspicions that groups had got their hands on devices used by scientists to prevent radioactive emissions in transit.</p>
</div>
<div class="fifthPar">
	<p>
		&quot;It is worrying because these containers can get past detectors,&quot; she said. &quot;We use these devices for security to block isotopes and you can certainly hide Highly Enriched Uranium in them. They can certainly get through the detectors.&quot;</p>
	<p>
		...</p>
	<p>
		Miss Lewis said the number of incidents published by the IAEA did not represent the full scale of the threat.</p>
	<p>
		&quot;Not all of these were reported as missing. Is that because the organisation that lost the material didn&#39;t know or didn&#39;t want to say,&quot; she said. &quot;There is no real sense of how big this is. Is the figure fairly accurate or the tip of the iceberg. Nobody knows.&quot;</p>
	<p>
		<a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/9616152/Terrorists-acquire-nuclear-container-to-smuggle-uranium.html">View Full Article...</a></p>
</div>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 17 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Russia To Go It Alone On Nuke Disarmament]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1f4c7f4d-cb01-46eb-ba1f-fe7a95c6e21c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Russia announced this week that it would no longer work to disarm nuclear and chemical weapons under the U.S. program known as Nunn Lugar. This was a very successful program that reduced Russia&#39;s stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction over the past 20 years. U.S. money and expertise drove the program, but now the Russians believe they have plenty of both to continue the job on their own. NPR&#39;s Mike Shuster reports.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	DARYL KIMBALL, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION: This has been one of the most successful security programs in history. And it has been a vital part of really ending the Cold War.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.npr.org/2012/10/14/162884789/russia-to-go-it-alone-on-nuke-disarmament?sc=emaf">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 14 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama Team Insists Security Effort with Russia Not Dead]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=794a61d0-78cc-444c-9b54-29bf9fec25fa]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Obama administration officials on Thursday said that a bilateral effort to help secure weapons of mass destruction in Russia is not dead, despite Moscow&rsquo;s announcement a day earlier that it is unwilling to extend an enabling agreement with the United States.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;We are still in talks,&rdquo; State Department spokeswoman Victoria Nuland said during a press briefing when asked about the future of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program in Russia.</p>
<p>
	Since the early 1990s, the United States has provided Russia with more than $7 billion in funds, equipment and expertise for securing and eliminating Soviet-era nuclear arms and other unconventional weapons through the CTR initiative. The program is enabled by an umbrella agreement that, among other things, shields the U.S. government and its contractors from virtually all liability stemming from incidents that might occur in the course of CTR work.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, told <em>GSN</em> earlier this week that Russia could raise objections to other aspects of the program, such as a Defense Department requirement that it conduct inspections to ensure that any equipment it pays for in Russia has been properly installed. He said the Russians &ldquo;balk&rdquo; at this demand.</p>
<p>
	Luongo and <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/ctr-program-could-survive-despite-russian-objections-experts-say/">other observers</a> suggested it is still possible to negotiate a revised agreement, however, and the Obama administration is now also making that case.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-team-insists-security-effort-russia-not-dead/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 12 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[US Nunn-Lugar Officials Rebut Reports Of Its Demise As Media Seem To Dig Its Grave]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1a8ea70c-5fff-47d2-9eaa-70203d450d2b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<span><span id="newsarticle_ingress">The announcement by Russia&rsquo;s foreign ministry yesterday &ndash; mostly by leaks to domestic media &ndash; that it will not renew the decades-old bilateral Nunn-Lugar program to dismantle Soviet-era nuclear and chemical weapons has left the American architects of the program scratching their heads.</span> <span id="author"> <a href="http://www.bellona.org/persons/1140449402.92">Charles Digges, </a> 11/10-2012 </span> </span></p>
<p>
	<span><span id="newsarticle_bodytext">Later announcements by the Foreign Ministry said it did not want the program unless there were major changes made to it, but did not specify what those changes it desired might be.</span></span></p>
<p>
	<span><span id="newsarticle_bodytext">What is clear is that 24 hours after the initial media reports hit the airwaves is that the Russian Foreign Ministry seems to have no unified opinion about the future of the program &ndash; except for making it tougher &ndash; while the US side seems to be reading in the tea leaves that the program is not ending so much as being demanded to change. </span></span></p>
<p>
	<span><span>...</span></span></p>
<p>
	<span><span id="newsarticle_bodytext">&ldquo;In my view, the end of the [Nunn Lugar] program [&hellip;] would be a serious mistake for both sides and for the global community,&quot; Kenneth Luongo, President of the Washington-based <a href="http://www.ransac.org/">Partnership for Global Security</a>, one of the America&rsquo;s most authoritative nonproliferation think tanks, told Bellona.</span></span></p>
<p>
	<span><span id="newsarticle_bodytext">&ldquo;There is little that binds the US and Russia together at this time and mutual cooperation to ensure that [weapons of mass destruction] are secured and not vulnerable to theft or proliferation is one of the strongest common links between the two countries,&rdquo; he said.</span></span></p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2012/lugar_responds">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 11 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Pakistan Up to Challenge of Protecting Nuclear Sites, Ex-Officials Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c8fcfcfe-6257-48ba-860c-c2a818e929e1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The Pakistani security establishment is capable of protecting the country&#39;s nuclear facilities against potential new attacks mounted by local extremist groups, <em><a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_10/Pakistani-Security-Called-Adequate">Arms Control Today</a></em> this month quoted ex-Pakistani and U.S. officials as saying.</p>
<p>
	The nuclear-armed South Asian nation&#39;s<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistani-minister-insists-nuclear-weapons-are-under-tightest-protections/"> atomic sites are &quot;very well protected&quot; </a>and protections at installations such as the Dera Ghazi Khan site are &quot;adequate&quot; for responding to terrorist dangers, ex-Pakistani Nuclear Command Authority arms control and disarmament chief Naeem Salik wrote in a mid-September e-mail message.</p>
<p>
	There were reports early last month of a Pakistani Taliban<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-deploys-forces-protect-nuke-sites-serious-taliban-danger/"> plot to attack the large nuclear complex</a>, which houses a number of uranium fuel cycle operations. Security around the Dera&nbsp;Ghazi Khan complex was said to have been significantly bolstered following discovery of the reported plot, but no attack emerged.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Salik also maintained the Dera Ghazi Khan site holds &quot;no fissile materials or weapons related facilities.&quot; Had the Taliban actually attempted to assault the complex, the result would have been &quot;more of an embarrassment than any real damage&quot; as the nuclear work at the isolated site is not military-related, he insisted.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/pakistan-challenge-protecting-nuclear-sites-ex-officials-say/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Letter To The  Editor: Democrats Delaying Treaty Bill]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f297297f-a8f4-4de8-b27e-de0b70c18b5c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In a recent letter to the editor, <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/patrick-j-leahy/">Sen. Patrick J. Leahy</a>, Vermont Democrat and the chairman of the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a><a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/judiciary-committee/">Judiciary Committee</a>, incorrectly wrote that &ldquo;an anonymous Republican hold&rdquo; had prevented swift passage of legislation implementing two treaties, one on nuclear and radiological terrorism and another on preventing nuclear proliferation (&ldquo;Nuclear terrorism bill delay unwarranted,&rdquo; Sept. 20).</p>
<p>
	I agree with <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/patrick-j-leahy/">Mr. Leahy</a> that swift implementation of those treaties is important to national security. However, the legislation passed by the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/house-of-representatives/">House of Representatives</a> and fast-tracked by the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a> Democratic leadership is flawed. It not only includes a drafting error that requires an amendment to ensure proper implementation, but it fails to include important provisions that were in President Obama&rsquo;s proposal for implementing the treaties.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/oct/2/democrats-delaying-treaty-bill/">View Full Article...</a></p>
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	<br />
	&nbsp;</div>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 02 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Sword of Damocles]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=52f0db14-b689-4296-b855-2ea48d6bb207]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Fifty years after the Cuban missile crisis brought the world to the brink of a nuclear holocaust, the threats posed by the bomb have changed, but still hang over us all. Today, there still are nearly 20,000 nuclear weapons, and there are nine nuclear-armed states. More countries have access to the technologies needed to produce nuclear bomb material, and the risk of nuclear terrorism is real.</p>
<p>
	The massive nuclear arsenals of the United States and Russia&mdash;the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War&mdash;have been reduced through successive arms control agreements. Yet, deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces still exceed 1,500 strategic warheads each, far more than necessary to deter nuclear attack.</p>
<p>
	Five decades ago, President John Kennedy warned of the possibility of dozens of nuclear-armed nations. Since then, world leaders have built up an extensive nonproliferation regime that has slowed the spread and reduced the salience of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_10/Focus">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 01 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Finding the Right Home for FMCT Talks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=67cebc0f-bfca-45c0-b4ed-0e3b83a9596d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Efforts to negotiate a fissile material cutoff treaty (FMCT), which would require states to cease production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, have been at an impasse for 17 years in the Geneva-based Conference on Disarmament (CD). Almost no substantive discussion has taken place on a treaty, which is a crucial step toward halting the manufacture of nuclear weapons worldwide.</p>
<p>
	As argued by Mari Amano, the Japanese ambassador to the CD, an FMCT would be an essential complement to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Once it enters into force, the test ban will act as a &ldquo;quality cap&rdquo; on global nuclear weapons programs while the FMCT would be a &ldquo;quantity cap.&rdquo; Yet problematically for those keen on advancing an FMCT, various countries, most recently Pakistan, have blocked the CD&rsquo;s work by taking advantage of the body&rsquo;s requirement for consensus.</p>
<p>
	The resulting frustration has fueled a growing movement to start formal FMCT negotiations in another forum. Most recently, Canada in 2011 convinced the UN General Assembly to pass Resolution 66/44, requiring the assembly to &ldquo;consider options for the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices at its sixty-seventh session.&rdquo; As expected, none of the draft programs of work proposed to the CD in 2012 was able to muster consensus support. The 67th session of the General Assembly thus opened in late September with the debate over parallel negotiating forums on its agenda.</p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_10/Finding-the-Right-Home-for-FMCT-Talks">View Full Article...</a></p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 01 Oct 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[S. Korea, U.S. at Odds Over Nuclear Pact]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5fb63e48-fc8b-44b7-aa90-1f31658178e9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Talks between South Korea and the United States on renewing their 1974 nuclear cooperation agreement appear stalled, with the main sticking point the countries&rsquo; differences over Seoul&rsquo;s pursuit of the nuclear fuel cycle.</p>
<p>
	Many observers say they do not expect to see significant progress until next year, after the U.S. presidential election this November and South Korea&rsquo;s in December.</p>
<p>
	A key point of contention is pyroprocessing, a spent fuel treatment process that South Korea is developing and says is significantly more proliferation resistant than conventional reprocessing. A U.S. official has publicly disagreed with that claim, saying that pyroprocessing is reprocessing.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Sout-Korea-US-at-Odds-Over-Nuclear-Pact">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 30 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Improving Nuclear Security Regime Cohesion: Summary Report & Initial Policy Recommendations]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4f4beff8-53be-4552-8426-7b9dcd6db2b4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) have established global fissile material security as a top-level international objective and led many to consider whether today&#39;s nuclear material security regime is adequately adapted to the twenty-first century&#39;s globalized threat environment. While the regime has improved over the last decade, its developement still lags behind other nuclear regimes for safety, safeguards, and arms control. The current nuclear security regime relies almost entirely on the national protection and control systems of countries that possess nuclear and radiological materials and facilities to portect the public from unintended releases of radiation. However, there is a growing appreciation of the limitations of this approach and recognition that a more global, integrated, and comprehensive response is needed.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/nsgeg/Improving_Nuclear_Security_Regime_Cohesion.pdf">View Full Report...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 30 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Militants Attack Pakistani Base]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b6ab4e25-130c-4715-ac7b-a8f07e13843f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	An Aug. 16 attack on a Pakistani military base by militants has raised concerns about the security of the country&rsquo;s nuclear weapons, although Pakistani officials denied that nuclear weapons are stored at the base.</p>
<p>
	Located northwest of Islamabad in Kamra, the Minhas air base includes facilities for manufacturing various weapons systems, including the assembly plant for the Mirage and JF-17 fighter jets. According to U.S. experts, the Mirage may be nuclear capable, and nuclear weapons might be stored at the facility.</p>
<p>
	A spokesperson for Pakistan&rsquo;s Foreign Ministry said Aug. 16 that the country&rsquo;s &ldquo;strategic assets are safe&rdquo; and that &ldquo;all measures&rdquo; are in place to ensure the &ldquo;safety and security of our nuclear assets.&rdquo; U.S. Defense Department Spokesman George Little said during a press conference the same day that there was no indication that the attack had &ldquo;endangered the Pakistani nuclear stockpile.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Militants-Attack-Pakistani-Base">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 29 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nearly at The Brink: The Tasks and Capacity of The 1540 Committee]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=929cd39a-a811-4ac3-9d9d-f7c68a36c9cc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In June 2005, the congressionally mandated bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations concluded that the UN Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1540, &ldquo;created a potentially powerful tool for countering the nonstate proliferation threat.&rdquo;<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Nearly-at-the-Brink-The-Tasks-and-Capacity-Of-the-1540-Committee#1">[1]</a> The task force thought that the effectiveness of the resolution, which obliges all states to take measures to combat the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery to nonstate actors, would depend heavily on the committee it established to carry out its directives.</p>
<p>
	In particular, the task force wondered what standards the 1540 Committee, as it is known, would use to evaluate how well states were implementing the resolution; how much the committee would press states to comply with the legally binding obligations of the resolution; and whether the work could be done with only seven committee experts. By 2012, the answers to those questions are none, very little, and no, respectively.</p>
<p>
	The committee does not evaluate states; it uses the lightest of touches to encourage them to comply with the resolution, and it has far too few resources to do the work envisioned by the task force. Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that states have taken many actions meant to meet their obligations and that Resolution 1540 and the 1540 Committee have become linchpins in the global nonproliferation regime.<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Nearly-at-the-Brink-The-Tasks-and-Capacity-Of-the-1540-Committee#2">[2]</a></p>
<p>
	<a href="https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Nearly-at-the-Brink-The-Tasks-and-Capacity-Of-the-1540-Committee">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 29 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Senate Stalls Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Bill]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=198c209d-6c6b-4122-b9f3-fde442f264ae]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	After seven years, Congress still can&rsquo;t agree on measures to combat nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>
	Now, in an unexpected twist &mdash; just before the Senate recessed for the fall elections &mdash; Republicans tried to change anti-nuclear terrorism legislation the House embraced in June and which has the approval of the White House and former Bush administration officials.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	In a Sept. 13 op-ed in The Washington Times, Andy Semmel, a former Bush administration official, wondered what the holdup was.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Congress hasn&rsquo;t given its best effort to prevent nuclear terrorism,&rdquo; he wrote. &ldquo;Senate approval of the pending implementing legislation remains the last hurdle.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Leahy fired back in a letter to the editor, saying Senate Republicans were responsible for the setback.</p>
<p>
	Iowa Sen. Chuck Grassley, the ranking Republican on the committee, did not like how the bill was moving forward &mdash; with no opportunity to add amendments.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Given the seriousness of the topic and the differences between the House-passed bill and what the president proposed, Sen. Grassley asked for the bill to either be referred to committee, where members can offer amendments, or allow for a fair amendment process on the floor to reconcile the differences,&rdquo; a Senate source said.</p>
<p>
	One of his main objections was the death penalty provision, which had been stripped from the House bill with the White House&rsquo;s approval.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;It is vital that the Senate pass the implementing legislation, which has already been approved by the GOP-led House, in this session of Congress,&rdquo; said Kingston Reif, director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. &ldquo;Swift congressional approval is important not only to ensure U.S. laws are sufficient but also to help prod other countries into action.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://politico.pro/OrlmUy">View full article...</a>(Behind paywall)</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 27 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Adoption of Nuclear Security Pacts Stalls in Senate]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ad371521-b935-4673-87fb-b31f2b0e76de]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A congressional attempt to bring the United States into line with two nuclear security agreements appeared to stall late last week as a Republican senator sought changes to a <a href="http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr5889">compliance bill</a> cleared this summer by the House of Representatives.</p>
<p>
	The proposed updates might prove unacceptable to House lawmakers, preventing approval of the legislation before the current Congress adjourns in January. Meanwhile, a secret GOP hold has prevented the House-approved language from advancing through the Senate, according to a key Democratic lawmaker in that chamber.</p>
<p>
	The amended version of the bill -- put forward on Friday by Senate Judiciary Committee Ranking Member Charles Grassley (R-Iowa) -- would eliminate several alterations House lawmakers made to an earlier Obama administration draft of the legislation. Among other changes, the senator would reinstate language to the House proposal that might allow for the execution of a person convicted of an &ldquo;act of nuclear terrorism&rdquo; if it results in death, according to Beth Levine, Grassley&rsquo;s Judiciary panel spokeswoman.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	White House intervention might be necessary to break the deadlock, said Andrew Semmel, an advocate for U.S. ratification of the nuclear security agreements and a retired veteran staffer for Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.).</p>
<p align="left">
	&ldquo;It could very well be any number of reasons why they&rsquo;re dragging their feet on this,&rdquo; according to Semmel, who also served under the Bush administration as deputy assistant secretary of State for nuclear nonproliferation policy and negotiations. &ldquo;Oftentimes &hellip; if you follow the Senate and the House, the issue is not really the issue. It&rsquo;s something else,&rdquo; he told <em>Global Security Newswire</em> in an interview.</p>
<p>
	Washington&rsquo;s formal endorsement of the 2005 nuclear materials amendment could hasten the measure&rsquo;s entry into force by encouraging its ratification by other countries, a number of arms control advocates and former high-level U.S. officials have argued.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;Diplomats in both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations have made a point of urging ratification of these two treaties in meetings with their counterparts,&rdquo; Semmel stated in a <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/13/nuclear-terrorism-treaties-still-incomplete/"><em>Washington Times</em> commentary</a> published earlier this month.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;There is little doubt that other countries look to the U.S. for leadership to help make it easier for them to ratify the treaties and contribute their part in the global fight against nuclear terrorism,&rdquo; Semmel wrote. &ldquo;The immediate fate of the implementing legislation that is needed to enact and complete ratification of these two treaties rests with the Senate Judiciary Committee and the full Senate.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/adoption-nuclear-security-pacts-stalls-senate/?utm_source=dlvr.it&amp;utm_medium=twitter">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 27 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[How to Unsnag US-South Korea Nuclear Negotiations]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=bc82b30e-f810-4b33-915c-0b77a4195eab]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	With time running out before the expiration of the <a href="http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/inlinefiles/Korea_South_123.pdf" target="_blank">US-South Korea nuclear cooperation agreement</a><span class="caps-label">&nbsp;PDF</span> that has governed the two countries&#39; nuclear trade since 1972, negotiators remain far apart on the terms of a new pact. Failure to reach a deal would threaten billions of dollars in nuclear commerce between the two countries. It would also threaten Seoul&#39;s $20 billion contract to supply reactors to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), since those reactors contain parts and design information imported to South Korea from the United States under the current nuclear cooperation agreement. Surprisingly, however, the main sticking point in negotiations seems unlikely to be South Korea&#39;s desire to pursue a commercially untested form of reprocessing called pyroprocessing. Rather, the snag appears to be South Korea&#39;s interest in the other end of the fuel cycle -- uranium enrichment.</p>
<p>
	South Korean officials are interested in developing an enrichment capacity for reasons both economic and political. The political concerns that surround enrichment in South Korea can be eased by diplomats working out appropriate language. The economic issues, meanwhile, can be addressed through measures like arranging South Korean investment in US enrichment facilities -- which would provide Seoul much of what it wants from a domestic enrichment capacity without creating new proliferation risks.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/how-to-unsnag-us-south-korea-nuclear-negotiations">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 25 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Uranium Substitute Is No Longer Needed, but Its Disposal May Pose Security Risk]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2055f9d6-08fd-49aa-87ec-24af47c59581]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	At the dawn of the civilian nuclear age in the 1950s, one of the pressing questions was how to find enough fuel for reactors and bombs. The government and the private sector seized on a man-made substitute for natural uranium, producing about 3,400 pounds of an exotic and expensive material called uranium 233.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	Today, the problem is how to safely get rid of it.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	&ldquo;We do consider this to be waste,&rdquo; said <a href="http://www.em.doe.gov/bios/AsstSec.aspx" title="Staff bio.">David G. Huizenga</a>, the senior administrator for environmental management at the Energy Department. &ldquo;There&rsquo;s no further need for it.&rdquo;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	Uranium 233 looked attractive because it could be made in a reactor from thorium, a cheap and abundant radioactive metal, and, almost magically, the reactor would produce more fuel than it consumed. Utilities manufactured some of it at the <a href="http://www.nrc.gov/info-finder/decommissioning/power-reactor/indian-point-unit-1.html" title="N.R.C. background.">Indian Point I</a> reactor in Westchester County, N.Y., which is now retired, and at reactors in Colorado, Illinois and Pennsylvania.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	...</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	&ldquo;Nuclear physicists weren&rsquo;t geologists and didn&rsquo;t understand the supply of uranium,&rdquo; said <a href="http://www.princeton.edu/step/people/faculty/frank-n.-von-hippel/%20">Frank N. Von Hippel</a>, a physicist and public policy specialist at Princeton. &ldquo;It turned out there was more uranium than people thought and less nuclear power than people thought there would be.&rdquo;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	...</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	Because the uranium 233 is mixed in with dangerously radioactive materials, it is &ldquo;self-protecting&rdquo; to an extent, said Charles D. Ferguson, the president of the <a href="http://www.fas.org/" title="Official site.">Federation of American Scientists</a> and an expert on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Over time, he said, the radiation will diminish, and some of it has died away because the uranium 233 is 50 to 60 years old.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">
	<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/24/us/uranium-233-disposal-proves-a-problem.html?_r=0">View Full Text...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 23 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[What Can Destroy Strategic Stability: Nuclear Terrorism Is a Real Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=62c1843f-91e3-4c47-8510-c74ca4405f41]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	This article explores interpretations of the concepts of strategic stability and nuclear deterrence with a focus on distinguishing those factors that have a real destabilizing impact on cornerstones of strategic stability from those that are only perceived to be doing so.</p>
<p class="h-divider">
	&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	Cold War Years</p>
<p>
	The joint USSR-US Statement on the future negotiations on nuclear and space arms &ndash; that the two nations&rsquo; leaders signed - gave a most general definition of what constituted strategic stability during the Cold War. &nbsp;According to the June 1990 statement, strategic stability should be understood as such a balance of strategic forces of the two countries where there were no incentives for a first strike. That definition effectively replaced an earlier principle of &ldquo;equality and equal security&rdquo; which was amorphous and non-binding.</p>
<p>
	The statement essentially declared that future agreements should ensure strategic stability through stabilizing reductions of strategic offensive arms as well as through implementing the concept of the corresponding interrelation between strategic offensive and defensive weapons.&nbsp; Reductions in concentration of warheads on strategic delivery systems and preference for weapons with increased survivability were at that time identified as principles of stabilizing reductions.</p>
<p>
	However, this was not sufficient for implementation of the declared provisions. The sides needed to formalize the provisions, to reinforce them with quantitative correlations that would be both justified and illustrative.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22333/what_can_destroy_strategic_stability.html">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 21 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Letter to The Editor: Nuclear Terrorism Bill Delay Unwarranted]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=540df965-a905-4cf5-8fb6-75d415250c18]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	I read with interest the recent contribution by <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/andy-semmel/">Andy Semmel</a>, former deputy assistant secretary of state for nuclear nonproliferation in the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/george-w-bush-administration/">George W. Bush administration</a> (&ldquo;Nuclear terrorism treaties still incomplete,&rdquo; Commentary, Friday). In the piece <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/andy-semmel/">Mr. Semmel</a> advocates the swift passage of legislation to implement two critical anti-terrorism treaties.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/andy-semmel/">Mr. Semmel</a> asserts that &ldquo;the immediate fate of the implementing legislation that is needed to enact and complete ratification of these two treaties rests with the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a><a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/judiciary-committee/">Judiciary Committee</a> and the full <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate-judiciary/">Senate</a>.&rdquo; I share <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/andy-semmel/">Mr. Semmel</a>&rsquo;s sense of urgency, and he must have been unaware that as chairman of the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a><a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/judiciary-committee/">Judiciary Committee</a>, I requested this legislation be discharged from the <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/judiciary-committee/">Judiciary Committee</a> on Sept. 12 in order to expedite its passage by the full <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate-judiciary/">Senate</a>. The bill, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012, has now been cleared by all <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a> Democrats. Unfortunately an anonymous Republican hold has been placed on the bill.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/19/nuclear-terrorism-bill-delay-unwarranted/?utm_source=RSS_Feed&amp;utm_medium=RSS">View Full Article...</a></p>
<div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-align: left; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;">
	<br />
	&nbsp;</div>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 19 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[U.S. Should Allow South Korea More Atomic Activities: Govt. Think Tank]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ae644449-ef5b-42fe-95a9-406351df6715]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A South Korean think tank affiliated with the government on Monday urged the United States to permit Seoul to expand its range of permitted atomic energy production activities to include uranium enrichment and the recycling of used fuel, the <a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/09/17/38/0301000000AEN20120917002600315F.HTML">Yonhap News Agency reported</a>.</p>
<p>
	A soon-to-expire bilateral nuclear cooperation deal bars South Korea from recycling used atomic fuel or refining uranium -- activities that have both peaceful and nuclear-weapon applications. The two nations are negotiating a replacement accord that the<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-seen-still-unconvinced-south-korean-need-atomic-fuel-reprocessing/"> South hopes</a> will include the right to use developmental pyroprocessing technology, which does not remove separated plutonium from other atomic elements.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	&quot;Given the fact that South Korea has been actively working to strengthen a global nonproliferation regime, the U.S. needs to fully change its policy on nuclear cooperation with South Korea,&quot; report author Jun Bong-geun wrote.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-should-allow-south-korea-uranium-enrichment-right-govt-think-tank/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 18 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[S. Korea urges U.S. to Allow 'Peaceful' Nuclear Enrichment ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1828dc30-219c-43f8-a256-fd000fe757d8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	South Korea called for the United States to approve it undertaking &quot;peaceful&quot; enrichment of uranium and reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, a government think tank said Monday, as little progress has been made in bilateral negotiations to revise the countries&#39; nuclear accord.<br />
	<br />
	Under a 1974 accord with the U.S., South Korea is banned from enriching uranium or reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. The allies have held five rounds of formal negotiations since 2010 to rewrite the bilateral nuclear cooperation treaty, which expires in 2014.<br />
	<br />
	South Korea, a major nuclear energy developer, wants the U.S. to allow it to adopt a proliferation-resistant technology for enriching uranium and reprocessing spent atomic fuel from its 22 nuclear power plants, but Washington has been reluctant to do so.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The U.S. nuclear cooperation policy towards restricting South Korea&#39;s peaceful enrichment and reprocessing is contradictory to the bilateral partnership built on mutual respect under the Korea-U.S. strategic alliance,&quot; said Jun Bong-geun, a senior professor at the Korean Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, in a report.<br />
	<br />
	&nbsp;&quot;Given the fact that South Korea has been actively working to strengthen a global non-proliferation regime, the U.S. needs to fully change its policy on nuclear cooperation with South Korea,&quot; Jun said in the report. The institute is affiliated with Seoul&#39;s foreign ministry.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/09/17/38/0301000000AEN20120917002600315F.HTML">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 17 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Terrorism Treaties Still Incomplete : Other Nations Look to U.S. As Example]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=29f53a34-4e40-4619-b610-ad8e9dad160f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/congress/">Congress</a> hasn&rsquo;t given its best effort to prevent nuclear terrorism. Despite broad bipartisan recognition that nuclear terror is one of the biggest threats of our time, two common-sense anti-terrorism treaties have been on the &ldquo;to-do&rdquo; list for more than half a decade. The <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/senate/">Senate</a> has the opportunity to pass those treaties in the weeks ahead and should do so for one simple reason: They would make America more secure.</p>
<p>
	There is a long and commendable record of U.S. bipartisan support for policies and practices that prevent nuclear terrorism and impede nuclear proliferation. Successive administrations and both political parties have broadly agreed that combating nuclear terrorism ranks at the top of our foreign policy and national security agenda. The 9/11 Commission warned, &ldquo;The greatest danger of another catastrophic attack in the United States will materialize if the world&rsquo;s most dangerous terrorists acquire the world&rsquo;s most dangerous weapons.&rdquo; Former Secretary of Defense <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/robert-m-gates/">Robert M. Gates</a> noted, &ldquo;Every senior leader, when you&rsquo;re asked what keeps you awake at night, it&rsquo;s the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially nuclear.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Despite these and other meritorious actions, including the elimination of <a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/osama-bin-laden/">Osama bin Laden</a>, the threat of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation is not going away. We need more tools and more legal cooperation with other states to fill gaps that enable terrorists and other rogue elements to exploit weaknesses in the international system, weaknesses that jeopardize our security and the security of our friends and allies. The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) build upon past U.S. international initiatives to strengthen our hand against terrorism.</p>
<div style="overflow: hidden; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-align: left; text-decoration: none; border: medium none;">
	<a href="http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/sep/13/nuclear-terrorism-treaties-still-incomplete/">View Full Article...</a></div>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 13 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[A Blueprint of CBRN Security Culture]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=20c02595-ab44-4170-ba26-ed75bb7b6c32]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The unanimous adoption of UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1977 (2011) did not just extend the timeframe of the 1540 Committee, but made a significant step toward institutionalizing the 1540 process&mdash;a process designed to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) while keeping these deadly weapons out of the hands of sub-state actors. Its provisions encourage all states to prepare national implementation action plans and to promote the sharing of experience, lessons learned, and effective practices in areas covered by UNSCR 1540. Hence, one of the major tasks to keep this emerging institution on track is to identify a common foundation for threat perceptions and compliance motivation among all those who are supposed to organize, promote, and implement this process in the evolving threat environment.</p>
<h4>
	Why CBRN Security Culture?</h4>
<p>
	A practical tool to achieve this goal is to develop a comprehensive vision of security culture that is applicable to the expanding, very long-term mission of UNSCR 1540. That security culture enhances and supports the security regime was unambiguously recognized by the 2010 and 2012 Nuclear Security Summits. Held in Seoul, the 2012 summit adopted not just a summit communiqu&eacute; but several statements about individual components of nuclear security. These documents specifically cite the human element as key to achieving such goals as physical protection, transport, and IT security. There are at least four reasons why a common paradigm of security culture&mdash;a paradigm that applies to the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear fields alike&mdash;is becoming a necessity.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://cits.uga.edu/publications/compass_fulltext/a_blueprint_of_cbrn_security_culture">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 12 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Championing Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0481f0f8-8890-425c-b502-dde834ca0621]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Conventional wisdom holds that technical fixes can close loopholes in the emerging nuclear security regime. According to this approach, a large budget and enough capacity building resources will allow most issues to be addressed quickly and effectively.</p>
<p>
	Accordingly, many experts argue that the Nuclear Security Summit process, which began with an April 2010 meeting hosted by U.S. President Barack Obama in Washington and continued with a second summit that took place in Seoul this past spring, urgently needs to set higher expectations and pursue more ambitious goals. For instance, Joan Rohlfing, president of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, argues that &ldquo;we need to develop a comprehensive, universal, and ultimately enforceable [nuclear] materials control system.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, calls for a framework agreement to unite currently disparate and loosely-defined nuclear security conventions, rules, and standards.<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/10/championing-nuclear-security/dsz1#2"><sup>2 </sup></a>&nbsp;Akin to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, such an agreement would be universal, but it would permit a comprehensive system to be developed over time. It would promote recognition of nuclear security as a priority and require its parties to take specific steps to gradually achieve its objectives.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/10/championing-nuclear-security/dsz1">View Full Article...</a></p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 10 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama HEU Reduction Proposal Insufficient, Health Care Providers Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c930932d-a2de-4e1f-87c8-1d8ec0f413f9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	An Obama administration plan to change to the Medicare payment system for radiological isotopes used in diagnostic procedures would not give health care providers enough incentive to end their reliance on bomb-grade uranium, industry officials say.</p>
<p>
	The Health and Human Services Department in July proposed to pay providers more if they conduct diagnostic procedures on their Medicare patients using isotopes derived from low-enriched uranium. The plan &ndash; part of a wide-ranging proposed rule that would make numerous adjustments to the Medicare system -- is the latest attempt by Washington to wean the United States off medical isotopes produced with highly enriched uranium.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The disagreement over proper compensation &ldquo;underlines the need to pass appropriate legislation that would provide additional incentives for LEU-based production,&rdquo; Miles Pomper, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told <em>Global Security Newswire</em> on Thursday.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/obama-heu-reduction-proposal-insufficient-health-care-providers-say/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 06 Sep 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[A Regional Approach to WMD Nonproliferation in the Asia-Pacific]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a2bc8d06-381c-415b-ab09-d94eaae68e55]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces. Globalization turned the region into one of the most important international trade hubs, the home to leading dual-use companies, and the anticipated site of the world&rsquo;s most significant growth in nuclear energy. While those trends are beneficial, they also create new sources of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.<br />
	<br />
	Several existing initiatives laid the groundwork for regional cooperation on WMD nonproliferation. But there are still a number of steps that governments in the Asia-Pacific region can take to promote greater regulation and transparency:</p>
<ul>
	<li>
		<strong>Engage the private sector.</strong> Economy-focused organizations such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) could reach out to companies to raise awareness of proliferation risks and help them to adopt internal practices that are in compliance with governments&rsquo; export control regulations. Regional incentives for cooperation could also be established.</li>
</ul>
<ul>
	<li>
		<strong>Establish a clearing house for regional expertise sharing and assistance.</strong> Regional security will suffer if countries lack the resources and expertise to implement proliferation controls consistently. A regional forum could collect region-specific information so countries can benefit from each other&rsquo;s expertise.</li>
</ul>
<p>
	<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/14/regional-approach-to-wmd-nonproliferation-in-asia-pacific/dele">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[The oversight imperative]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=dbbb674a-41c4-4ca9-a59f-ce2099918272]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The prevention of nuclear terrorism, one of the foremost international security threats that we face today, relies on separate national regulations with little oversight. There are few international checks and balances on the physical protection of the treacherous material, which could be used to create nuclear devices by terrorists, aside from bilateral agreements and individual treaties formed at the will of individual states. This lack of binding guidelines and international oversight of nuclear security is inadequate for today&#39;s nuclear risks. Rhetoric from the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul is laden with expressions of hope that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will assume a larger role in nuclear security. With the summit process likely ending after 2014, there is an opportunity for the IAEA to take over as the key driver of improvements to international nuclear security. Optimistic expressions of hope and even opportunity aside, the future of the IAEA heavily depends on political dynamics, questions of funding, and member states&#39; initiative.</p>
<p>
	<strong>Current operations. </strong>Before the 2002 establishment of the Office of Nuclear Security, the IAEA had minimal tools for addressing nuclear security. Trevor Findlay, a senior fellow at the Centre for International Governance Innovation in Canada, details current advances in his<u> <a href="http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/6/unleashing-nuclear-watchdog-strengthening-and-reform-of-iaea" target="_blank">report</a>,</u> including the inaugural nuclear security plan, which was the agency&#39;s first comprehensive program to combat nuclear terrorism. In addition, the IAEA puts out its own <a href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf" target="_blank">guidelines</a><span class="caps-label">&nbsp;PDF</span>, which are useful for creating a common global norm, but are nonbinding. Many nations have also signed up for and received International Physical Protection Advisory Service <a href="http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/ippas.asp" target="_blank">missions</a>, in which IAEA experts review security measures at selected sites. Further, the <a href="http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm.html" target="_blank">Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</a> -- which compels participating states to disclose the safe transport of nuclear material -- requires members to designate a national point of contact to the IAEA in the event of a breach. In addition, more security progress was made in 2005 with an amendment to the convention that binds signatories to the protection of nuclear materials in domestic use, storage, and transport. Unfortunately, many key states, including the United States and China, still have not signed on.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/the-oversight-imperative">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 30 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Resolving the Market Mysteries of Medical Isotopes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4aabf68e-cb7b-41ff-a84e-a681969615d4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p id="p-1">
	For nearly four decades, antinuclear activists have called for limits on the use of highly installations around the world. Although Iran and North Korea might be among the obvious targets of that movement, so too has been the National Research Universal (NRU) reactor in Chalk River, Ontario, which produces medical isotopes using the potential bomb-making material.</p>
<p id="p-2">
	Yet, so vital has the output of the reactor been that Canada was able to earn a special exemption from a 1992 American law that compelled foreign reactors to commit to convert to low-enriched uranium (LEU) as expeditiously as possible if they wanted to access HEU fuel from the United States to use in their reactors. To that end, the US established a Reduced Enrichment for Research Test Reactors program to develop LEU for foreign reactors, which ultimately morphed into the Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which has targeted 200 reactors in the US and around the world for conversion or shutdown by 2020. To date, 72 have converted or closed their doors.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The proposed American move toward preferential procurement of isotopes made with LEU is expected to further alter the economics of production. It eliminates the prospect that a new pricing regime could be undercut by high-volume, lower-cost producers using HEU, says Alan Kuperman, associate professor of public affairs with the University of Texas at Austin. Moreover, most producers are well on their way to converting their facilities to run on LEU, he says, adding that the remainder are primarily found in Russia.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p id="p-22">
	But he also questions the wisdom of such a slow timeline for LEU conversion, in light of America&rsquo;s apparent intention to slam its doors to the use of isotopes produced through the use of HEU. &ldquo;To invest now a lot of money into producing isotopes with HEU is likely to be a huge waste &mdash;something Nordion shouldn&rsquo;t want to do, and Nordion shareholders should-n&rsquo;t want to do,&rdquo; he argues. &ldquo;And for the record, Canada&rsquo;s government really shouldn&rsquo;t be happy about Nordion encouraging increased civilian commerce in HEU. That&rsquo;s counter to what the Canadian government subscribed to at the Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, a policy of HEU minimization and eventually total phase-out.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.cmaj.ca/content/184/14/1561.full">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 27 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Russian Approval of Key Weapons Security Agreement Uncertain, Lugar Says]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f0278bba-6ec8-4705-88cf-79f165cef824]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The Obama administration has drafted a proposal that would extend a key weapons security agreement between the United States and Russia but it is uncertain whether Moscow will approve draft deal, Senator Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) said on Thursday.</p>
<p>
	The so-called umbrella agreement, which allows the United States to conduct Cooperative Threat Reduction operations in Russia, is due to expire in June 2013.</p>
<p>
	The program established two decades ago by Lugar and then-Senator Sam Nunn aims to secure or deactivate nuclear and other unconventional weapons systems left over from the Soviet Union. It has provided U.S. funds and personnel support to Russia and other nations toward that end. To date, the Russian component of the program has eliminated more than 7,000 strategic nuclear warheads and over 900 ballistic missiles, among other accomplishments.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	The liability provisions in the umbrella agreement and other such pacts were &ldquo;negotiated essentially when the Soviet Union had just collapsed and Russia&rsquo;s lawyers weren&rsquo;t really paying attention yet,&rdquo; Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University&rsquo;s John F. Kennedy School of Government who served as a nuclear security adviser to the Clinton administration, previously told <em>Global Security Newswire</em>.</p>
<p>
	As Russia&rsquo;s position in the world strengthens the likelihood that it will hold up renewal agreements over such issues increases, Bunn and other observers have said.</p>
<p>
	While many of the large-scale construction projects administered and funded by the Cooperative Threat program are mainly complete, the United States continues to administer a broad array of initiatives in Russia that could suffer a blow if umbrella agreement dissolves, Bunn warned.</p>
<p>
	In addition to maintaining the Mayak fissile material storage facility, the United States is also involved with facility security upgrades and efforts to strengthen nuclear protective regulations in Russia, Bunn said.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/lugar-russian-approval-key-weapons-security-deal-uncertain/">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 23 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[White House Stance On Medical Isotopes May Leave Foreign Producers Nuked]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=158e5681-f817-49d5-a8da-65a82a23b6a4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	There are two main obstacles that will affect medical grade isotope production: the aging nuclear reactors that produce the isotopes and the U.S. government&#39;s stance on foreign producers utilizing HEU (highly enriched uranium) used to produce medical isotopes. Earlier this year, a <a href="http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2012/01/Isotopes-group-letter-2012-Jan.pdf" rel="nofollow">coalition</a> of U.S. public health, medical, and nuclear nonproliferation experts urged Congress to restrict the use of imported Russian medical isotopes produced with HEU, which is bomb-grade uranium, and to block them completely within about five years:</p>
<blockquote class="quote">
	<p>
		<em>We write to urge you to amend S. 99, the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2011, which was passed by the U.S. Senate on 17 November 2011. The amendment is necessary to achieve the bill&#39;s two stated objectives: (1) minimizing global commerce in bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) to reduce risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation; and (2) ensuring a reliable supply of medical radio-isotopes derived from molybdenum-99 (Mo-99) -- which account for 80 percent of our country&#39;s 20-million nuclear diagnostic procedures annually -- by fostering domestic production without HEU.</em></p>
</blockquote>
<p>
	The coalition criticized Russia for expanding its use of HEU to produce medical isotopes so that it can dominate that particular sector of the U.S. health-care market. Their concerns were that, if successful, the Russian initiative would undermine Washington&#39;s efforts to promote domestic production of medical isotopes without HEU and to phase-out global commerce in such uranium.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://seekingalpha.com/article/822571-white-house-stance-on-medical-isotopes-may-leave-foreign-producers-nuked">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 22 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[IAEA Security Official Seeks more Money to Prevent Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=19c3ac60-3273-4392-9a78-14a500b5c250]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	WASHINGTON &ndash; The International Atomic Energy Agency&rsquo;s top nuclear security official said his operation must have more money and people if it is to meet nations&rsquo; growing demand for help in ensuring their atomic facilities are protected against terrorism.</p>
<p>
	As it stands, governments in some cases could wait for years to receive expert guidance in preparing a comprehensive protection program, according to Khammar Mrabit, head of the U.N. branch&rsquo;s Nuclear Security Office.</p>
<p>
	&ldquo;The risk is that there will be gaps in nuclear security in some countries, in some areas, that is not acceptable,&rdquo; he told <em>Global Security Newswire</em>. &ldquo;This is the risk and we would like to speed up the process of establishing and strengthening <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-un-nuke-watchdogs-agree-deepen-collaboration/">nuclear security</a> in these countries. &hellip; The sooner the better.&rdquo;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-security-chief-seeks-more-money-prevent-nuclear-terrorism/">See full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 20 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Intrusion Embarrasses ?Fort Knox of Uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d825e56a-f2e5-4ed0-8bad-b18c67ea64f8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Officials like to refer to the Y-12 National Security Complex as the Fort Knox for <span class="yshortcuts cs4-visible" id="lw_1345324240_4">highly enriched uranium</span>, which is why an unprecedented incursion by an 82-year-old nun and two fellow protesters has critics mocking the notion that the weapons plant is secure.</p>
<p id="yui_3_5_1_20_1350496212376_218">
	Operations resumed last week after being shut down over the embarrassing incident 18 days earlier. <span class="yshortcuts cs4-visible" id="lw_1345324240_1">The Department of Energy</span> has called on the contractor that runs the sensitive facility just west of <span class="yshortcuts cs4-ndcor" id="lw_1345324240_6">Knoxville</span> to explain why it shouldn&#39;t be replaced.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p>
	Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University&#39;s John F. Kennedy School of Government, said his own tour of the facility leads him to agree that penetrating the interior of the building would be a difficult proposition.</p>
<p>
	...</p>
<p id="yui_3_5_1_20_1350496212376_432">
	&quot;We were lucky in that regard that it was the nun and her cohorts, rather than a serious terrorist outfit,&quot; Stockton said. POGO, a Washington-based independent watchdog known for exposing overpriced military parts and other government shortcomings, has been a frequent critic of security lapses at the facility.</p>
<p id="yui_3_5_1_20_1350496212376_457">
	Stockton called the July 28 intrusion the &quot;only serious penetration of a plant&quot; that he&#39;s aware of since becoming involved in nuclear security issues in the mid-1970s.</p>
<p id="yui_3_5_1_20_1350496212376_433">
	&quot;It is simply (expletive) unbelievable,&quot; he said.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://news.yahoo.com/intrusion-embarrasses-fort-knox-uranium-193144627.html">View Full Article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 18 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Intrusion Embarrasses 'Fort Knox of Uranium']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=dfa5fb4f-41ab-4e3e-b8e4-ea09af58680e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Wyatt, the Y-12 spokesman, said after the plant ended its stand-down that the main security force operated by WSI Oak Ridge, formerly Wackenhut, has been downgraded to a subcontractor in response to the incident. Other improvements also were made, but he declined to provide specifics because the information is considered sensitive.</p>
<p>
	After the breach, the president and general manager of the Babcock &amp; Wilcox division that runs Y-12, Darrel Kohlhorst, retired from his job. He told The Knoxville News Sentinel that the company would emerge stronger because of the incident.</p>
<p>
	&quot;Well, I think it did show us we had some weaknesses. We had some deficiencies,&quot; Kohlhorst told the newspaper. &quot;The team has really attacked those things and corrected them, and I think we&#39;re actually going to be a lot stronger coming out of this thing.&quot;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/intrusion-embarrasses-fort-knox-uranium-17034494?page=2">See full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 18 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Where's the Oversight at Nuclear Labs? Hands-Off Approach is Recipe for Disaster]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=19d188ad-665a-47fa-ae37-68a144f33994]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	As the saying goes, &ldquo;The fish rots from the head down.&rdquo; This is certainly the case at the Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tenn., where an 82-year-old nun and two accomplices recently broke in, raising serious questions about the Department of Energy&rsquo;s (DOE) security strategy.</p>
<p>
	Energy Secretary Steven Chu said in a statement provided to the <a href="http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2012/08/huge-security-shake-up-at-y-12.html">Knoxville News Sentinel</a> on Monday: &ldquo;The department has no tolerance for security breaches at any of our sites, and I am committed to ensure that those responsible will be held accountable.&rdquo; But there is no denying that Y-12 was a giant failure of federal oversight. Now the people being axed are lower-level employees rather than those who have allowed the security standards to fall far below acceptable levels, such as Secretary Chu, himself.</p>
<p>
	Secretary Chu should be the first on the chopping block. He has been <a href="http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2010/03/chu_we_are_not_taking_safety_a.html">preaching for years</a> that government overseers should get off the back of the contractors and everything will be fine. Then, of course, he is shocked when Y-12 is successfully attacked by an 82-year-old nun.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2012/08/by-peter-stockon-and-lydia-dennett-as-the-saying-goes-the-fish-rots-from-the-head-down-this-is-certainly-the-case-at.html">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 10 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Security Questions Are Raised by Break-In at a Nuclear Site]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6a9f2e62-1bab-4c10-9036-c8e433c9c12e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="articleBody">
	<p itemprop="articleBody">
		WASHINGTON &mdash; An 82-year-old nun and two fellow pacifists who penetrated the defenses of one of the nation&rsquo;s most important <a class="meta-classifier" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/atomic_weapons/index.html?inline=nyt-classifier" title="More articles about nuclear weapons.">nuclear weapons</a> facilities last week are due in federal court in Knoxville, Tenn., on Thursday to face charges of trespassing and spray-painting antiwar slogans on a building that houses nuclear bomb fuel. But the incident has also put the Department of Energy&rsquo;s security system on trial.</p>
</div>
<div class="articleBody">
	<p itemprop="articleBody">
		The security breach, at Oak Ridge in Tennessee, has prompted the Department of Energy to reappraise security measures across its nuclear weapons program and private experts to criticize the agency&rsquo;s safeguarding of nuclear stockpiles.</p>
	<p itemprop="articleBody">
		The activists, who got past fences and security sensors before dawn on July 28, apparently spent several hours in the <a href="http://www.y12.doe.gov/" title="Y-12 site.">Y-12 National Security Complex</a> before they were stopped &mdash; by a lone guard, they told friends &mdash; as they used a Bible and candles in a Christian peace ritual. In a telephone interview, Sister Megan Gillespie Rice, of Las Vegas, said she was not sure exactly how long they were there. &ldquo;It was dark; we couldn&rsquo;t see our watches,&rdquo; she said.</p>
	<p itemprop="articleBody">
		<a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/08/us/pacifists-who-broke-into-nuclear-weapon-facility-due-in-court.html?_r=3">See full article here...</a></p>
</div>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 07 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Conversations with America: Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5c52ea2f-02ba-4f16-ac4e-32cd13d74714]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	See video <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FVQ2YIHabzk">here.</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 03 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Gen. Cartwright: "the retaliatory capability of 300 nuclear weapons...is catastrophic"]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a756257c-4d1e-451b-a67d-af12e4378d7f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	On July 25 the Senate Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee held a <a href="http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/ht-energy.cfm?method=hearings.view&amp;id=8434e3a5-d45f-4872-8c74-a4ec41dbf0fb">hearing</a> on the appropriate size of the US nuclear weapons stockpile to maintain a credible deterrent. Former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. James Cartwright headlined the witness panel, which also included former US Ambassador to Russia Tom Pickering and NoH favorite Keith Payne.</p>
<p>
	Cartwright and Pickering briefed the findings and proposals of the Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, on which they both served. The Commission&#39;s recent <a href="http://www.globalzero.org/en/us-nuclear-policy-commission-report">report</a> (titled &ldquo;Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Forces and Posture for the 21st Century&rdquo;) calls for significant changes to nuclear strategy and posture, headlined by an illustrative recommendation to reduce the size of the US arsenal to 900 total nuclear weapons by 2022, 450 of which would be deployed on an ICBM-less dyad of submarines and bombers. Cartwright and Pickering clarified that 900 total nuclear weapons should be the aim of the next round of arms control negotiations with the Russians, though they did not rule out unilateral steps or parallel reciprocal steps to help jumpstart the process.</p>
<p>
	See <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/issues/nuclearweapons/articles/nuclear_shields_dull_swords/">here</a> for our initial summary of the Commission&rsquo;s report. And check out John&#39;s excellent <a href="http://blog.livableworld.org/story/2012/7/25/16456/5070">summary</a> of the hearing over at the Chain Reaction.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/8/2/175226/9059">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 02 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Wither the Anti-terrorism Budget?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a570381c-3528-4c69-84d2-99e6cb0399a8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Nuclear terrorism is the ultimate preventable catastrophe. If highly enriched uranium and plutonium are adequately secured or eliminated, they cannot be stolen for use in a nuclear device. In 2011, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper noted that <a href="http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2011/03%20March/Clapper%2003-10-11.pdf" target="_blank">&quot;poorly secured stocks of [chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials] provide potential source material for terror attacks.&quot;</a><span class="caps-label"> PDF</span> Osama bin Laden may be dead, but the threat of nuclear terrorism remains.<br />
	<br />
	President Barack Obama has been on the front lines of this fight, launching the first in a series of international nuclear security summits in 2010 to provide a global forum to support efforts to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials within four years, strengthen global nuclear materials security, and prevent nuclear terrorism. Since April 2009, when the Obama administration began implementing the four-year goal, the Energy Department&#39;s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), home to the key programs tasked with securing and eliminating nuclear material at an accelerated rate, has removed more than 1,200 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and plutonium -- including <em>all</em> the highly enriched uranium from eight countries, most recently Mexico and Ukraine this year. In addition, the agency has completed security upgrades at 32 Russian buildings containing weapons-usable materials and downblended 2.9 metric tons of Russia&#39;s highly enriched uranium so that it could no longer be used in nuclear weapons or reactors. This is a remarkable return on a relatively limited investment.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kingston-reif/whither-the-anti-terrorism-budget.">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 02 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[From HEU Minimization to Elimination: Time to Change the Vocabulary]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=787e9431-d24b-4b52-bd8a-9ace43f3bd31]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Today, there are approximately 1,440 tons of HEU in the world, some of it poorly secured. Because this material an ideal target for terrorists seeking to build a nuclear weapon, efforts are underway to reduce, secure, and consolidate stocks of HEU. But simply minimizing the use of HEU is no longer sufficient to combat the risk of nuclear terrorism. The international community&rsquo;s efforts must now turn to elimination, with an initial focus on enhanced transparency and developing stronger international standards for the management of existing HEU inventories.</p>
<p>
	Low-enriched uranium (LEU) has proved acceptable for virtually all civilian applications, and there are few remaining technical barriers to the elimination of HEU use in civil and military applications. Important technical and political progress has been made through initiatives like the Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors program, the 1993 Megatons-to-Megawatts agreement between the United States and Russia and the Nuclear Security Summit process. The authors note that since 1978, &ldquo;62 HEU-fueled research reactors have been converted to use LEU fuel and 17 reactors have been shut down in 36 countries.&rdquo; Progress has also been made in the medical-isotope industry, where most producers have pledged to convert their reactors and targets to use LEU by 2016.</p>
<p>
	The United States&rsquo; Global Threat Reduction Initiative, in particular, has had significant impact on HEU minimization efforts, offering incentives such as new fuel, new facilities and technical upgrades to countries concerned that conversion to LEU might have negative economic consequences.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/analysis/opinions/heu-minimization-elimination-time-change-vocabulary/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 02 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[?A Regional Approach to WMD Proliferation in the Asia-Pacific]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=498ccc1c-f2ea-4d5a-afa4-25c52822835d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The Asia-Pacific region epitomizes the type of proliferation challenges the international community faces. Globalization turned the region into one of the most important international trade hubs, the home to leading dual-use companies, and the anticipated site of the world&rsquo;s most significant growth in nuclear energy. While those trends are beneficial, they also create new sources of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/08/14/regional-approach-to-wmd-nonproliferation-in-asia-pacific/dele">See full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 01 Aug 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Y-12 Plant Infiltration Bore Little Resemblance to Drills: Report]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d5f3bc7c-4696-4fbc-8580-d220581027c4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Situations routinely considered in defensive drills at the Y-12 National Security Complex appeared to have little in common with details from Saturday&#39;s infiltration of the Tennessee nuclear arms site by three antiwar advocates, the <em>Knoxville News Sentinel</em> reported on Tuesday (see <a href="/gsn/article/antiwar-protesters-infiltrate-y-12-nuke-plant/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1"><em>GSN</em></a>, July 30).</p>
<p>
	The facility&#39;s perimeter intrusion detection and assessment system at about 4:30 a.m. indicated a breach of the nuclear-weapon handling area, prompting a reaction by security personnel.</p>
<p>
	Upon arrival, a weapon-carrying security officer encountered the three activists -- 57-year-old Greg Boertje-Obed, 82-year-old Megan Rice and 63-year-old Michael Walli -- alongside a structure that contains large amounts of nuclear weapon-usable uranium.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/y-12-plant-infiltration-bore-little-resemblance-drills-report/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Budget Issues Could Restrict IAEA Atomic Detection Capacity]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=78e18921-aa73-4e18-b223-23f4f9305937]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A severe money shortage stands to restrict the International Atomic Energy Agency&#39;s capacity to detect clandestine nuclear efforts with potential arms-related aspects, a one-time Australian arms control envoy said in an <a href="http://www.cigionline.org/publications/2012/6/unleashing-nuclear-watchdog-strengthening-and-reform-of-iaea">assessment</a> made public on Wednesday (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-underfunding-risks-proliferation-experts-say/"><em>GSN</em></a>, Nov. 30, 2010).</p>
<p>
	The U.N. nuclear watchdog is a &quot;veritable bargain for international peace and security&quot; but &quot;is significantly underfunded, considering its responsibilities and the expectations increasingly being placed on it,&quot; wrote Trevor Findlay, now a scholar with Carleton University in Canada.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/budget-issues-could-restrict-iaea-atomic-detection-capacity/">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[About Time: Bill to Enhance Nuclear Security Moves through House]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a2817db2-2f8c-4959-9c76-99568d677006]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Legislation necessary to ratify two international treaties that improve nuclear security and strengthen measures to prevent nuclear terrorism finally <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-08/House_Passes_Nuclear_Security_Bill" target="_blank">passed</a> the House of Representatives on June 28 after multiple failed attempts to bring U.S. federal code in line with these important treaties.</p>
<p>
	The Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012 brings the United States into compliance with the 2005 amendment to the <a href="http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-physical-protection-nuclear-material-cppnm/" target="_blank">Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material</a> (CPPNM) and the 2005 <a href="http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/international-convention-suppression-acts-nuclear-terrorism/" target="_blank">International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism</a> (ICSANT). President Barack Obama committed to complete ratification of the two treaties at the<a href="http://armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Summit" target="_blank"> 2010 nuclear security summit</a> in Washington; however, legislation stalled in Congress until now.</p>
<p>
	Once the bill makes its way through the Senate, and is signed into law by the President, the U.S. federal code will finally comply with provisions in the treaties allowing the U.S. to deposit its ratifications of the nuclear security pacts.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://armscontrolnow.org/2012/07/13/about-time-bill-to-enhance-nuclear-security-moves-through-house/">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 13 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Contractors at Nuke Facilities Mishandled Explosives, Report Says]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5afdb170-9960-4b6d-b519-97b5f6e5afce]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Contractors at several government nuclear facilities have routinely mishandled explosives, unnecessarily endangering the lives of employees and the public, according to an inspector general&#39;s report released today.</p>
<p>
	The Department of Energy inspector general <a href="http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/INS-O-12-02.pdf">reported</a> that the contractors that operate four sites that handle nuclear materials did not fully comply with the department&rsquo;s explosives safety manual -&ndash; a nearly 500-page guide to handling and storing explosives. The sites in question are <a href="http://www.pogo.org/investigations/nuclear-security/lanl.html" target="_self">Los Alamos</a> and <a href="http://www.pogo.org/investigations/nuclear-security/sandia-national-lab.html" target="_self">Sandia </a>national laboratories, which perform nuclear weapons missions; Idaho National Laboratory, home to nuclear energy programs, among other science missions; and the Savannah River Site, which performs nuclear waste repurposing and cleanup.</p>
<p>
	The report said that management at the sites &ldquo;took immediate action&rdquo; in response to the inspector general recommendations, resolving many of the issues the report details. &nbsp;Among these issues were incorrect signage that misrepresented explosive hazards and the storage of combustible material in explosives bunkers.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2012/07/contractors-at-nuke-facilities-mishandled-explosives-report-says.html">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[SA Lags in Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d26410b7-ac62-4ea9-8ec2-89e08dccc9b5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Co-written by Harvard University associate professor and nuclear security specialist Matthew Bunn, Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four-Year Effort and Beyond, examines nuclear-material security globally.</p>
<p>
	It reveals that, though South Africa has completed substantial security upgrades at its Pelindaba nuclear facility, and implemented regulations requiring the protection of nuclear sites against threats, these have yet to be formally enforced.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.timeslive.co.za/thetimes/2012/07/12/sa-lags-in-nuclear-security">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Australia?s Nuclear Dilemma]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=14692a12-4544-4002-8d98-dbbb2c7f2ae4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h1>
	Australia&#39;s nuclear&nbsp;dilemma</h1>
<p>
	<span class="submitted meta">By Fissile Materials Working Group | 12 July 2012 </span></p>
<p>
	&quot;What will make a focus on nuclear security a permanent feature of what we do?&quot; asked Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard at the 2012 <a href="http://www.pm.gov.au/press-office/intervention-plenary-nuclear-security-summit-seoul" target="_blank">Nuclear Security Summit</a> held in Seoul in late March. Experts agree that the 2014 summit must go further in securing nuclear materials from disasters and, most important, terrorist threats -- but agreement on precisely how to do this is harder to come by. In this regard, Australia has much to offer.</p>
<p>
	Though much of the world may not realize it, Australia has a superlative record in nuclear security. A recent international report by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the <em>NTI Nuclear Materials Index</em>, <a href="http://www.ntiindex.org/indicators/security-and-control-measures/" target="_blank">placed</a> Australia first in nuclear security and control out of 32 states with weapons-usable nuclear materials. In addition, the country fulfilled key promises it made at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit -- such as passing the Nuclear Terrorism Amendment Act of 2011, which allows Canberra to ratify the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/australias-nuclear-dilemma">See full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 12 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[House Passes Nuclear Security Bill]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7b2a9df5-af00-4525-a8b1-01037d789c80]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	The House of Representatives on June 28 passed legislation required to bring the United States into compliance with two international treaties that improve nuclear material security and enhance measures to prevent nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>
	Efforts to implement the 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism began in 2008, but stalled in Congress. President Barack Obama submitted a similar draft proposal in 2010 and again in 2011 to implement the nuclear security agreements following his commitment to complete U.S. ratification at the 2010 nuclear security summit in Washington. (<a href="http://armscontrol.org/act/2010_05/Summit" target="_blank">See <i>ACT</i>, May 2010.</a>)</p>
<p>
	The updated legislation submitted to Congress would bring U.S. law into line with provisions in the treaties. Congressional passage of the bill is the last substantive hurdle to U.S. ratification of the pacts.</p>
<p>
	&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/2012_07-08/House_Passes_Nuclear_Security_Bill">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 09 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Report Blames Japanese Government for Nuclear Meltdown]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d2964b80-9c70-468b-9c98-5d34d6e5357c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	Transcript</p>
<p>
	<strong>RAY SUAREZ: </strong>The Fukushima nuclear accident is often seen as a consequence of a rare natural disaster. But a tough new report from Japan concludes that the accident was manmade in more ways than one.</p>
<p>
	The traditional narrative of what went wrong in Japan in early 2011 had gone like this. After withstanding a powerful 9.0-magnitude earthquake on March 11, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant lost all power to three of its six units when a tsunami destroyed its emergency generators and cooling pumps. With those offline and severe flood damage to structures and equipment, meltdowns soon followed and seemed unavoidable. But a new report released today says otherwise.</p>
<p>
	<strong>KENZO OSHIMA,</strong> Fukushima Nuclear Accident Commission (through translator): In this report, we have concluded that the Fukushima nuclear accident is a manmade disaster. In our process of investigating the background of the accident, we found that there were organizational problems, systemic problems, and human-related problems, as well as crisis management and governance problems.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/july-dec12/fukushima_07-05.html">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Iran Submarine Plan May Fuel Western Nuclear Worries]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d2616f7c-73fa-4ad0-a1df-bbf37137439f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<span id="articleText"><span class="focusParagraph">(Reuters) - Iran&#39;s announcement that it plans to build its first nuclear-powered submarine is stoking speculation it could serve as a pretext for the Islamic state to produce highly enriched uranium and move closer to potential atom bomb material.</span></span></p>
<p>
	<span id="articleText">Western experts doubt that <a href="http://www.reuters.com/places/iran" title="Full coverage of Iran">Iran</a> - which is under a U.N. arms embargo - has the capability any time soon to make the kind of sophisticated underwater vessel that only the world&#39;s most powerful states currently have.</span></p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/05/us-iran-nuclear-submarines-idUSBRE8640PC20120705"><span>See full article here...</span></a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 05 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Closer to Deciding on Size of Launch-Ready Nuke Arsenal]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f4afccda-3b38-4824-b04a-5ef62d4ccfc9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A growing consensus is emerging in the Obama administration that the size of the U.S. launch-ready nuclear arsenal should be between 1,000 and 1,100 weapons, the Associated Press reported on Monday following interviews with former and current officials (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/reports-obama-pursue-further-nuke-cuts-russia/"><em>GSN</em></a>, June 20).&nbsp;</p>
<p>
	Officials think an announcement on the matter could be declared as soon as July.</p>
<p>
	However, in light of strong GOP opposition to further reductions in the nation&#39;s atomic stockpile and the revving up of the presidential race, the Obama administration could also choose to delay any announcement of new arms cuts until the November elections are over, according to officials.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/6/28/225019/607">See full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Jul 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[House Passes Key Anti-Nuclear Terrorism Legislation: Senate Up Next]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c0eba566-c0f0-4b48-b889-7516cacbe473]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	In case you missed it amidst a rather eventful news day, the House this evening passed by voice vote H.R. 5889, the Nuclear Terrorism Conventions Implementation and Safety of Maritime Navigation Act of 2012.</p>
<p>
	This bipartisan legislation would expand and strengthen U.S. efforts to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism by implementing key requirements of the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ISCANT) and the essential 2005 amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM). The House Judiciary Committee <a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/6/5/181040/2727">favorably reported</a> the legislation on a voice vote to the full House on June 6.</p>
<p>
	The George W. Bush administration submitted the treaties to the Senate in September 2007 and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. However, prior to U.S. ratification, the agreements require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize specific offenses. There is substantial overlap between existing US anti-terrorism laws (including those implementing anti-terrorism treaties) and the crimes covered by the legislation, but some crimes are not prohibited by existing law. H.R. 5889 criminalizes certain acts relating to the possession and use of radioactive material and radiological dispersal devices and damage to nuclear facilities.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/6/28/225019/607">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 28 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[NNSA Considers Clarifying Statement on Russian Isotope Commitment]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d2a36efa-615a-45f2-b1fe-2193c0d75d5d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	WASHINGTON &ndash; The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration is considering clarifying recent congressional testimony that issue experts say could undermine efforts to produce medical isotopes using material that is unsuitable for weapons (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/experts-claim-heu-free-medical-isotope-production-method/"><em>GSN</em></a>, June 14).</p>
<p>
	The radiological isotope molybdenum 99 through the decay process generates technetium 99, which is used widely in medical diagnostic procedures. Historically, molybdeneum 99 has been produced using bomb-grade highly enriched uranium &ndash; of which the United States is a key supplier -- but NNSA initiatives in recent years have supported U.S. efforts to develop technology that would allow a switch to proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/nnsa-considers-clarifying-statement-russian-isotope-commitment/">See full article here...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 26 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and Radioactive Material]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f9ba6c28-0a32-4fcc-bd22-90ffd98a1fc0]]></link>
			<description/>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Renewal of Weapons Security Pact With Russia Not a Sure Thing, Experts Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a4aff610-db53-41ed-9d4a-bdfacf230a9f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>WASHINGTON &ndash; The renewal of a key weapons security agreement between the United States and Russia is not a sure thing despite preliminary assurances from an Obama administration official, issue experts warn.</p>
<p>Madelyn Creedon, assistant Defense secretary for global strategic affairs, told a Senate panel last week that the United States is looking to extend the so-called umbrella agreement that allows the United States to do work under the Cooperative Threat Reduction initiative in Russia. The agreement, which has authorized the Russian component of a program that has eliminated 7,619 strategic nuclear warheads and 902 ballistic missiles, among other accomplishments, is due to expire in June of 2013<strong>. </strong></p>
<p><a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/renewal-weapons-security-pact-russia-not-sure-thing-experts-say/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 20 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Testimony Before Canada?s Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5326b7b9-3fe4-42f1-95c9-1a1bf1a4125d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	<a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Iakijb5Pji4">Full video of the testimony...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Testimony for The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fec8a43c-f6f0-45f8-93fb-12906d5f4812]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="Centre">
	The Special Senate Committee on Anti-Terrorism</p>
<p class="Block">
	Ottawa, Monday, June 11, 2012</p>
<p class="Para2">
	The Special Senate Committee on Anti-terrorism, to which was referred Bill S-9, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, met this day at 1:30 p.m. to give consideration to the bill.</p>
<p class="Para2">
	<a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22127/special_senate_committee_on_antiterrorism.html">View full article...</a></p>
]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 11 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[House Panel Clears Bill to Adopt Nuclear Security Pacts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=91e307b6-4ff4-4139-a19b-5c1ed356a214]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. House Judiciary Committee on Wednesday passed without objection a bill to bring the United States into compliance with four international counterterrorism treaties, including two nuclear security agreements that arms control advocates have long urged the country to ratify (see <a href="gsn/article/legislative-quagmire-grips-nuclear-security-pacts-us/"><em><font color="#0066cc">GSN</font></em></a>, March 12).</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;Speedy congressional consideration is essential to helping better protect the United States and the rest of the world from nuclear terrorism,&quot; Miles Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, said in the Fissile Materials Working Group press release. &quot;I hope other members of Congress will show the same bipartisan leadership as the House Judiciary Committee and help the United States to ratify these treaties.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;Republicans and Democrats agree that nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to U.S. national security, and have a long history of bipartisan cooperation on efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism,&quot; Kingston Reif, nuclear nonproliferation head for the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation, added in the document. &quot;However, the inability of the United States to ratify these two essential treaties has been counterproductive and self-defeating.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/us-house-panel-clears-bill-adopt-nuclear-security-pacts/">View full article...</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 06 Jun 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit: How Much of a Success]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=60bf65c6-b2c3-4621-ad60-0aeb79876916]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p align="LEFT"><font size="3">The Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held in March 2012 was a watershed event for South Korea. It marked by far the largest gathering of world leaders on South Korean soil. The summit also further cemented the already remarkably close ties between the current U.S. and ROK governments, and offered a showcase for the country&rsquo;s burgeoning and increasingly export-oriented nuclear industry. </font></p>
<p><font size="3">
<p>The summit&rsquo;s ultimate impact is unclear, however. Despite the summit&rsquo;s incremental steps forward on nuclear security, it seems clear that participants will fall far short of their ultimate goal of securing all vulnerable fissile materials when a four-year push initiated by the United States ends next year. That has led the United States and South Korea to chart out different paths for the future of the summit process, with Seoul advocating a more ambitious course and Washington a more conservative one. And while the summit polished South Korea&rsquo;s global nuclear reputation, it remains to be seen how much the effort will further Seoul&rsquo;s goals to win new contracts overseas and obtain concessions in bilateral nuclear negotiations with the United States.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/milespomper_aps_paper.pdf">View full article...</a></p>
</font></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 23 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[An Assessment of the Nuclear Security Centers of Excellence]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=57486d9c-1f0a-4b13-aaca-d21affc62da0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, a number of countries announced  they were establishing centers of excellence to provide technical,  scientific, and educational support to assist in developing a robust  &ldquo;nuclear security culture,&rdquo; both nationally and internationally. A  number of other centers had also been established prior to the summit,  including those associated with the International Atomic Energy Agency. <br />
<br />
An  assessment of the existing and planned centers indicates that much  closer coordination and collaboration among the centers is needed in  order to optimize their full potential and to ensure their long-term  sustainability. <br />
<br />
In this policy analysis brief, Dr. Alan Heyes, a  senior visiting research fellow at the Centre for Science and Security  Studies in the Department of War Studies at King&rsquo;s College London, makes  recommendations to realize these goals.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=481">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 15 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Did you know? Kodak Park had a nuclear reactor]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c764d090-0e17-422d-a0f6-bf4565b2a69f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>For more than 30 years, Kodak Park was home to a little-known  underground labyrinth containing a small nuclear research reactor, one  of the few of its kind in the world.</p>
<p>It wasn&rsquo;t a power plant, and  carried no risk of explosion. Nothing ever leaked. Eastman Kodak Co.  officials say the research device was perfectly safe.</p>
<p>Still, the  reactor was locked down, remotely surveilled and tightly regulated &mdash;  mainly because it contained 3&frac12; pounds of highly enriched uranium.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.democratandchronicle.com/article/20120511/NEWS01/305120021/Kodak-Park-nuclear-reactor?odyssey=nav|head&amp;gcheck=1&amp;nclick_check=1">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 11 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Sustaining Nuclear Security Progress Beyond Seoul]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f5356e6b-c438-4684-9416-91765a318a35]]></link>
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<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:
&quot;Garamond&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;">The last two years have delivered substantial progress in bolstering global defenses against nuclear terrorism.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>This is in large part due to the successes of the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, D.C. and last month&rsquo;s NSS in Seoul, South Korea.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>In particular, the Summit process has accelerated efforts to remove and consolidate stockpiles of fissile material around the globe and has succeeded in increasing awareness of a serious global security concern that has long suffered from inattention and inertia. <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:
&quot;Garamond&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;">Nevertheless, nuclear terrorism is still a threat that is out of sight and out of mind for the public, the media, and many governments around the globe.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>This fundamental lack of attention and understanding is a major obstacle to continued progress on preventing nuclear terrorism.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>As a result, it is vital that the international expert community continue to educate others on the global dangers of nuclear terrorism and push world leaders to take steps to counter this dire threat.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;line-height:115%;font-family:
&quot;Garamond&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;">The Seoul Summit highlighted the fact that media attention on efforts to enhance nuclear security is sorely lacking.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>In the United States, two major storylines came out of the Seoul Summit, neither of which had to do with the steps that world leaders took to strengthen global nuclear security.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>First, journalists focused on North Korea&rsquo;s plans to launch a rocket, abrogating a tentative deal cut with the United States.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>Second, journalists picked up on an exchange between President Obama and Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, wherein the U.S. President indicated that he would have more flexibility to negotiate an agreement on Europe&rsquo;s missile defense system after the election.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.inens.org/inensinsights12012.pdf"><span style="font-size: 12pt; line-height: 115%; font-family: &quot;Garamond&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;"><span style="">View full article in INENS Insights...</span></span></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 03 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[To Counter Nuclear Smuggling, Target All Smuggling]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ce5267c0-cc43-4c52-bf69-b4b30a819d9e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama asserted that the most  immediate and extreme threat to national security was that posed by a  terrorist organization acquiring a nuclear weapon. As president, he  pledged to mitigate that potentiality by securing all vulnerable nuclear  material around the world within four years. Simultaneously, Obama  pursued a high-profile nonproliferation and arms control strategy that,  despite an intensive investment of political capital, has enjoyed only  halting progress. Nuclear reduction negotiations with Russia have  stalled. Prospects for multilateral treaties governing nuclear tests and  the production of nuclear bomb fuel are distant possibilities at best.  Meanwhile, Iran and North Korea march steadily forward with their own  enrichment and, in the case of Pyongyang, nuclear testing programs,  creating associated proliferation risks. Meanwhile, on Obama&rsquo;s all  important four-year goal, initial ebullience has given way to skepticism  and plodding progress, most recently <a target="_blank" href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11777/global-insights-the-nuclear-security-summits-priorities-and-pitfalls">illustrated last month by the Nuclear Security Summit</a> in Seoul, South Korea.<br />
<br />
In  Seoul, heads of state from more than 50 countries came together to take  action against the illicit proliferation of materials and technology  that can be used to build nuclear weapons or radiological &quot;dirty bombs.&quot;  The gathering yielded a series of sporadic new attempts to address the  lengthening proliferation supply chain around the globe, building on  progress made at the inaugural 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in  Washington, which resulted in bolstered efforts to secure fissile  material, primarily in post-Soviet countries.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/11903/to-counter-nuclear-smuggling-target-all-smuggling">View full article (subscription needed)...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Needed: A Bigger Toolbox for the IAEA]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2b8dd79b-31a2-4d1d-a5bc-a29f4928dcaf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The  basic aims of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are  fairly  straightforward: to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons; to  provide assurances,  through international safeguards, that peaceful  nuclear activities will not  lead to the production of nuclear weapons;  to promote, to the maximum extent  consistent with the treaty's other  provisions, the peaceful uses of nuclear  energy; and eventually to make  progress toward nuclear disarmament.</p>
<p>But enforcement of the treaty's provisions  has long been a major  challenge -- in part because the International Atomic  Energy Agency  (IAEA), which is empowered to enforce the Safeguards Agreements that  it  establishes with individual nations, is not empowered to enforce the  treaty as  a whole. That is, the agency has no executive force. In any  case, its role as  an international promoter of &quot;Atoms for Peace&quot; is as  important as its  safeguards function.</p>
<p>Limits on the IAEA's authority, particularly in the  field of nuclear  security, amount to a set of serious deficiencies in the   nonproliferation regime. For example, the agency cannot require states  to  establish systems for nuclear security. It has no authority to  verify that  nuclear materials within states are accorded appropriate  physical protection. Even  guidance on these issues is provided by the  agency only on request, and though the  IAEA regularly publishes <a target="_blank" href="http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1481_web.pdf">recommendations</a><span class="caps-label">&nbsp;PDF</span>  on these topics,  following the recommendations is not mandatory. No  nuclear security mandate  requires that states adequately protect their  nuclear materials.</p>
<p>In fact, the agency  lacks the authority to take action or even  comment on the measures that states enact  regarding physical protection  of nuclear materials unless states request that  the agency carry out a  specific mission to do so. And even if safeguards  inspectors were to  note inadequacies in nuclear security, they would not have legal   authority to report them.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/roundtables/tale-of-two-treaties">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 01 May 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[What Lies Beneath]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5a5cb91d-48ad-441c-8e42-6c63bc870f76]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>There's one fear that keeps leaders from across the globe awake at night: The prospect that somehow, somewhere, criminals or terrorists are getting their hands on the essential ingredients of a nuclear weapon. At the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.npr.org/2012/03/26/149376245/nuclear-summit-opens-in-seoul">nuclear summit</a> in South Korea last month, policymakers gathered to prevent that nightmare from becoming a reality by launching an initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear stockpiles within four years. But despite the fanfare surrounding the summit, one of the greatest recent successes in this initiative has thus far remained buried -- both literally and figuratively.</p>
<p>In an extraordinary feat of engineering and international cooperation, U.S., Russian, and Kazakh scientists, engineers, and miners recently secured enough fissile material for a dozen nuclear weapons that had been left behind vulnerable to theft<b> </b>in tunnels formerly used by the Soviet Union for underground nuclear weapons tests in Kazakhstan.<br />
<br />
The formerly secret mission was launched in 2005 at the encouragement of an intrepid U.S. weapons expert, after it was discovered that metal scavengers had penetrated the abandoned tunnels. The project received attention from the highest levels of government -- both President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama monitored its progress. It is an example of the quiet but essential international cooperation that is urgently needed to prevent terrorists from ever obtaining a nuclear weapon.<br />
<br />
How this extraordinary, seven-year effort came to pass deserves the long version of the story. From 1961 to 1989, the Soviet Union conducted hundreds of nuclear tests and experiments at a remote and forbidding site called Degelen Mountain. Located within Kazakhstan's Semipalatinsk test range, the site is about the size of New Jersey and located some 300 miles east of Astana, the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/">second coldest capital city</a>in the world. It was chosen by the Soviets precisely because it is so desolate: Temperatures soar to over 100 degrees Fahrenheit in the summer and plunge to -40 degrees in the winter. Blizzard conditions are common -- remarkably, they sometimes make the test site more accessible by filling in potholed roads, which have gone unrepaired since the Soviet era, with ice and snow.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/30/what_lies_beneath">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 30 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Could Less Be More]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c4601177-6bd1-4175-aaa9-97eadc4ce673]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h1>Could less be&nbsp;more?</h1>
<span class="submitted meta">				 									 					By Fissile Materials Working Group |  								25 April 2012			</span>
<p>The <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/2012-nuclear-security-summit-what-it-was-and-wasn%E2%80%99t">outcome</a>  of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit left a lot to be desired, and much  remains to be done to minimize the nuclear and radiological terrorism  risk. But the Seoul communiqu&eacute; along with the &quot;house gifts&quot; and &quot;gift  baskets&quot; -- financial and actionable pledges from willing nations to  improve nuclear security -- are still remarkable achievements given the  challenges involved in getting 53 states to take concrete steps and pass  a consensus agreement.</p>
<p>World leaders agreed on 18 actions in 11 nuclear security priority  areas on  everything from increasing material security to reinforcing  the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to  strengthening training, security culture, and information protection.  The Seoul communiqu&eacute; updates the 2010 communiqu&eacute; and work plan but also  adds new technical and incremental agreements. Fewer voluntary  commitments were made this year compared with 2010, but the 2012 moments  of consensus are noteworthy nevertheless.</p>
<p>Important new agreements in the communiqu&eacute; include a target date to  bring the crucial 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical  Protection of Nuclear Material into force, specific actions to increase  the security of radioactive sources, and an accord to minimize the use  of bomb-suitable highly enriched uranium in civilian applications -- an  agreement that proved especially tricky to reach. States will now  announce voluntary actions to minimize highly enriched uranium use by  2013 -- <em>if</em> it is economically feasible, <em>if</em> the supply of medical isotope is guaranteed, and <em>if</em>  states feel in a position to do so. A genuine commitment to put global  security concerns over commercial incentives would surely look very  different, but at least the expectation and some pressure to minimize  highly enriched uranium use is on record. Finally, a somewhat overlooked  new outcome of the summit is the  <a target="_blank" href="http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/resources/Seoul_Communique_FINAL.pdf">affirmation</a><span class="caps-label">&nbsp;PDF</span>  of the &quot;need to maintain effective emergency preparedness, response and  mitigation capabilities in a manner that addresses both nuclear  security and nuclear safety.&quot; Much potential remains for sharing <a target="_blank" href="http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2011/year-2011-issue-5/managing-the-consequences-of-nuclear-terrorism/">best practices</a>  and capacities in the areas of emergency response, risk communication,  and  decontamination. This affirmation is at least a good indicator.</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/could-less-be-more">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c647cbdd-2eaa-40e6-9ed9-f8189c5761b5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: justify;">Scheduled to take place in Seoul from  March 26 to 27, 2012, the &ldquo;2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit&rdquo; will  discuss issues such as cooperative measures to combat the threat of  nuclear terrorism; protection of nuclear materials and related  facilities; and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials.  Around 50 heads of state from countries such as the U.S., China, Russia,  Japan, Australia, India, Brazil, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,  Singapore, South Africa, the European Union, and more, as well as  officials from the UN and IAEA, are expected to participate in the  discussions.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">...</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The Nuclear Threat Initiative&rsquo;s (NTI)  Nuclear Material Security Index notes that there is no global consensus  about what steps matter most in achieving nuclear security. Rodrigo V.  Alvarez, an international partner of the Fissile Materials Working Group  (FMWG), said in a report that the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit in  March will be a critical opportunity for states to improve global  cooperation on nuclear terrorism prevention.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">&ldquo;Given that international terrorist  networks move, communicate, and operate across international borders,  all nations need to join together to ensure that there are no gaps in  global nuclear security,&rdquo; Alvarez said.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">The security of nuclear materials and  facilities is seen as a national reasonability. And, most countries  believe that it&rsquo;s the duty of each country to adopt a secure policy that  strengthens security of nuclear materials and the facilities. There is,  however, considerable scope for international cooperation to strengthen  nuclear security objectives and standards, according to summit&rsquo;s  organizers. At their website, the summit&rsquo;s organizers said that the main  objective of the Nuclear Summit process has been to &ldquo;focus high-level  global attention on the threat posed by nuclear terrorism and the  measures required to address the global challenge of preventing  terrorists and other non-state actors from gaining access to sensitive  nuclear materials, technology and information.&rdquo;</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="http://www.biztechreport.com/story/1891-nuclear-security-summit-seoul">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 25 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Inching Forward at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit  ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=79f1ca0d-bffd-40de-8d72-a061c89fb077]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>A few days before Seoul hosted the official Nuclear Security Summit in late March, experts met to discuss progress on nuclear security. The keynote speaker, Dr. Graham Allison from Harvard University, suggested a strategy of three &ldquo;No&rsquo;s&rdquo; to reduce future nuclear risks: no loose nuclear weapons or materials; no new national enrichment or reprocessing facilities; and no new nuclear weapon states. This strategy links traditional &ldquo;nuclear security&rdquo;&mdash;physical protection of nuclear material&mdash;with nuclear <br />
nonproliferation and fuel cycle management. Yet at the summit a few days later, the 52 heads of state, along with leaders of four international organizations on nuclear terrorism, focused on doing exactly the opposite: separating out nuclear security from nonproliferation, and putting as much distance between the growth of nuclear power and nuclear risks as possible. The result: underwhelming progress and no surprises.</p>
<p><em><strong>Modest Contributions&nbsp; </strong></em><br />
&nbsp;<br />
The 2012 Seoul summit was the midway point for securing the world&rsquo;s most vulnerable <br />
nuclear materials in four years, with the Netherlands agreeing to host the next summit in <br />
2014. The Seoul agenda primarily targeted nuclear material security, while stressing the <br />
importance of other topics: security of radiological sources, information and <br />
transportation security, combating illicit trafficking, nuclear safety in the post-Fukushima <br />
environment, and fostering a nuclear security culture. Korean officials emphasized their <br />
intention to focus on practical progress in nuclear security, but also to expand the <br />
objectives of the summit to engage a wider audience. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/private/apb159.pdf">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Developing a System Commensurate with the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=26d3602a-51f8-4a6e-8f2e-7acfce3a6112]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>A hot mic shouldn't overshadow a dirty bomb. The  Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul ended recently with two dominant story  lines: President Obama's &quot;hot mic&quot; comments to Russian President  Medvedev and the 53 participating governments congratulating themselves  on the summit's outcomes. Both miss the key strategic problem the Seoul  Summit did not address: the need to unify the current patchwork, largely  voluntary approach to nuclear security that is not commensurate with  the risk or consequences of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>A quick reading of the Seoul Summit Communique  highlights the problem. Virtually every significant substantive step  described in the communique is preceded by the words &quot;we encourage.&quot; So  states are &quot;encouraged&quot; to share best practices, to safely secure and  dispose of unneeded nuclear material, and to work with and support the  International Atomic Energy Agency. But there is no obligation to meet  the voluntary standards and no institution, not even the IAEA, with the  mandate to evaluate countries' nuclear security performance. This  underscores the fundamental failing of the current global approach to  nuclear security: it is based on national voluntary actions that are  unaccountable and inconsistent across borders.</p>
<p>There are a  number of G-8, U.N. Security Council, U.S.-Russian and other like-minded  states' nuclear-security initiatives and programs; however, none  develop globally agreed standards for nuclear security. But a security  system is only as strong as its weakest link. The current patchwork  arrangement of largely voluntary actions is full of potential gaps and  weak points that terrorists can exploit.</p>
<p>We know for a fact there are terrorist groups seeking nuclear  material and there is a black market in such material. In 2011, police  in Moldova broke up a black market smuggling operation attempting to  sell highly enriched uranium. Unfortunately, one member of the smuggling  group remains at large with as much as a kilogram of highly enriched  uranium, as does a potential buyer from North Africa.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/04/11/144811/developing-a-system-commensurate.html#storylink=misearch">View full article in <em>McClatchy...</em></a></p>
<p>Also published in the <a href="http://www.sacbee.com/2012/04/11/4405607/developing-a-system-commensurate.html"><em>Sacramento Bee</em></a> and <em><a href="http://www.bradenton.com/2012/04/11/3992689/developing-a-system-commensurate.html">Bradenton&nbsp;Herald</a>...</em></p>
<div style="width: 1px; height: 1px; color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font: 10pt sans-serif; text-align: left; text-transform: none; overflow: hidden;"><br />
Read  more here:  http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/04/11/144811/developing-a-system-commensurate.html#storylink=misearch#storylink=cpy</div>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 11 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Limited Success]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=eb6b8d2c-8643-41f5-897d-cc8de68cc998]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Nuclear Security Summit, the second of its kind, held in Seoul on  March 26-27, 2012 after a summit in Washington in 2010, brought together  the leaders of 53 countries, along with five leaders of four  international organisations tried to reduce the threat of nuclear  terrorism from the world. The main objective of the summit was to  prevent non-state actors, including terrorists and criminals, from  acquiring dangerous nuclear materials, as the greatest obstacles to  nuclear terrorism as not designing a weapon, concocting a plot or  recruiting volunteers willing to suffer martyrdom; it is acquiring the  fissile nuclear material needed for a nuclear explosive device. <br />
<br />
The  summit produced few significant outcomes. The conference, overshadowed  by concerns about North Korea&rsquo;s nuclear and ballistic missile  activities, shied away from expanding its mandate to call for concrete  steps towards ridding the world of atomic weapons. Though South Korea as  the host defended the summit, saying that it did &ldquo;yield practical  outcomes to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism&rdquo;, analysts described  the actual results modest and that nothing binding was adopted.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.deccanherald.com/content/240212/limited-success.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 06 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security's Top Priority]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1620fe92-cc5e-47d4-b3fa-621cd936d041]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h1>Nuclear security's top priority</h1>
<p><span class="submitted meta">																		By Fissile Materials Working Group | 								12 June 2012			</span></p>
<p>In the past two decades, at least two terrorist groups have made serious attempts at obtaining nuclear weapons or the nuclear material needed to make them. They won't be the last. Foiling terrorists willing to inflict unlimited damage requires the international community to prioritize the nuclear stocks that pose the greatest risks and take immediate steps to eliminate or secure them. The stocks of nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material that are most likely to fall into terrorist hands today exist in Russia, Pakistan, and countries with research reactors that use large quantities of highly enriched uranium (HEU) -- like Belarus, South Africa, and Japan. The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul made some progress toward eliminating dangerous HEU stocks, but it did not alter the security trajectory in either Russia or Pakistan. Preventing terrorists from acquiring  nuclear weapons or weapons-usable nuclear material in all countries remains the world's most urgent security challenge.</p>
<p><strong>Russia. </strong>With the help of billions of US dollars, Russia has dramatically improved security and accounting measures for its nuclear weapons and materials since the collapse of the Soviet Union. But significant weaknesses remain. Russia's main challenge is that it must secure an immense and sprawling nuclear complex. Russia has almost 200 buildings with weapons-usable nuclear material, almost 50 permanent nuclear weapons storage sites, and dozens more temporary nuclear weapons storage sites. The country's fleet of some 60 research reactors that use HEU now represents almost half of all the research reactors using HEU in the world, including two-thirds of the most dangerous types -- critical assemblies and pulse reactors -- which contain large amounts of weapons-grade HEU. Each cache presents an opportunity for theft; there is simply no scientific or military justification for such a vast number of facilities.</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/nuclear-securitys-top-priority">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Study of the Nuclear Security Centres of Excellence for the Carnegie Corporation of New York]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=bfe66a87-b846-4c99-81c2-0d46746a421d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span class="LargeText"><span class="SmallText"><span class="NormalText"><font size="3">One of the key outcomes of the April 2010 Washington Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) was the renewed commitment placed on enhancing the security of nuclear materials and expertise. The summit communiqu&eacute; acknowledged the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels to promote nuclear security culture through technology development, human resource development, education and training. It also placed an emphasis on optimizing international cooperation and the coordination of assistance. As their contribution to enhancing nuclear security, a number of states at the summit announced they were establishing &quot;national centres of excellence&quot; for nuclear security and other various regional support centres embracing nuclear security training and advice, with some also embracing training related to safeguards or integrating all nuclear training at one centre. Before the various &quot;Centres of Excellence&quot; (COE) become too entrenched the Centre for Science and Security Studies, King?s College London, sought to undertake an assessment of the concept, to identify ways in which international coordination in this area can be enhanced and to examine linkages with initiatives related to nuclear security education. It was felt that any assessment also needed to determine the prospects for the long-term sustainability of the Centres, to consider how they might be strengthened to ensure sustainability, and to identify the wider benefits of, and lessons learned from, the various approaches. </font></span></span></span></p>
<p>View full article...</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 04 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[I welcome parliamentary review: Obama]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f8d1d4bc-54a3-4a18-92cf-f43c9eef5714]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>S President Barack Obama and <span id="IL_AD3" class="IL_AD">Pakistan</span>&rsquo;s  Prime Minister Syed Yusuf  Raza Gilani vowed Tuesday to rescue a  troubled anti-terror alliance which almost ruptured over 10 months of  mistrust and recriminations.<br />
<br />
The leaders met on the sidelines of a  nuclear security summit here in the highest-level exchange between the  two sides since the killing of Osama bin Laden in a clandestine US raid  on Pakistani soil last May chilled ties. More recently a new breach  opened up over the killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers in November in US  air strikes, which prompted Islamabad to curtail <span id="IL_AD4" class="IL_AD">American</span> drone strikes and cut NATO supply lines into Afghanistan.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;There <span id="IL_AD8" class="IL_AD">have been</span>  times &ndash; I think we should be candid &ndash; over the last several months  where those relations have had periods of strains,&rdquo; Obama told reporters  as the meeting opened.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;But I welcome the fact that the parliament of Pakistan is reviewing, after some extensive study, the nature of this relationship.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;I think it&rsquo;s important to get it right. I think it&rsquo;s important for us to have candid dialogue, to work through these issues.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
Both  leaders expressed a desire to stabilise and secure the situation in the  long Afghan war, which has been beset by setbacks, including a massacre  of Afghan civilians by a US soldier and attacks on NATO troops by their  colleagues in the Afghan security forces.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;We are both  interested in a stable and secure Afghanistan and a stable and secure  region,&rdquo; Obama said. Gilani said: &ldquo;We are committed to fighting against  extremism. We want stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Experts said modest progress had been made in Seoul but cautioned many  of the tough issues to fully solve the problem had not been addressed,  with countries unwilling to make binding and transparent agreements.  &ldquo;The current nuclear material security regime is a patchwork of  unaccountable voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across  borders,&rdquo; said Ken Luongo, co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working  Group, a group of non-proliferation experts.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;Consistent  standards, transparency to promote international confidence, and  national accountability are additions to the regime that are urgently  needed.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=147166">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 03 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S. deal with europeans limits risk of illicit nuclear bombs]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1a14f9b0-d4e7-4c5c-bf67-225cf76d81c9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>In Seoul last week President Obama announced a major new deal with  Belgium, France and the Netherlands to reduce the amount of  highly-enriched uranium used to create medical isotopes. Under the new  deal, the three countries will soon start making isotopes only from  low-enriched uranium &mdash; the much safer nuclear material that isn&rsquo;t useful  for terrorists or rogue nations looking for a quick way to&nbsp;damage&nbsp;a  city by exploding a dangerous bomb.</p>
<p>In theory, the agreement will  make the world a safer place. This assumes, of course, that the gains  made in Seoul aren&rsquo;t undercut by cheaper HEU-produced isotopes due to a  joint Russian-Canadian agreement. Neither of those countries has agreed  to the shift embraced by the Europeans.</p>
<p>Some isotopes are used in  are scans for life-threatening conditions. About 50 percent of the scans  are related to cardiac disease and 20 percent relate to cancer. When  there have been isotope shortages, often caused by interference in the  supply chain that travels the globe, doctors have shown a reluctance to  perform tests or surgeries that might otherwise be routine.</p>
<p>Right  now, America provides isotope producers with much of the HEU &mdash; a key  component of a nuclear weapon &mdash; that they need to&nbsp;make&nbsp;the&nbsp;diagnostic  tools used in numerous medical procedures around the globe.  Nonproliferation experts have long pushed the major isotope generating  facilities (located in South Africa, Australia, Canada, France, Belgium  and the Netherlands) to use LEU &mdash; which is not suitable for nuclear  bombs &mdash; instead. They argue that the technology is there for  LEU-developed isotopes, and say that by limiting the movement of HEU  around the globe they are minimizing the security risk it represents.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><a href="http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/directory/faculty/alan-kuperman">Alan J. Kuperman</a>,  an expert who heads the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project, told  the Center that the Seoul agreement is &ldquo;a great accomplishment.&rdquo; But he  warns that without unless Congress intercedes, the Canadian-Russian deal  could undo the gains the nonproliferation committee has achieved.</p>
<p>There is a bill to encourage the use of LEU sitting in Congress right now, but as <a href="http://www.iwatchnews.org/2012/01/27/8003/loophole-senate-bill-may-create-nuclear-risks">reported by the Center in January</a>,  Kuperman and other experts have raised concerns that it does not  contain &ldquo;preferential procurement&rdquo; language allowing U.S. purchases only  from companies that go along.</p>
<p>That&rsquo;s a loophole Kuperman and  others think needs to be fixed. If Congress agreed, it would essentially  force the Canadian producer to follow the rest of the world in  switching to LEU, or lose out on the U.S. market entirely.  The U.S. consumes around sixty percent the world&rsquo;s supply of  isotopes from Molybdenum-99 each year &mdash; around 16 million procedures.  Without that language, buyers within the U.S. are free to choose between  the cheaper HEU and more costly LEU produced isotopes.&nbsp;</p>
<p>&ldquo;Preferential procurement would be very helpful,&rdquo; says <a href="http://cns.miis.edu/staff/pomper_miles.htm">Miles Pomper</a>,  a Senior Research Associate with the James Martin Center for  Nonproliferation Studies. &ldquo;It would help if the Canadians were just  reasonable and the Russians were reasonable, but that doesn&rsquo;t seem to be  the case.&rdquo;</p>
<p>But despite the concerns about the Russians and  Canadians, Pomper sees the Seoul deal as a step in the right direction.  &ldquo;It&rsquo;s a good deal. The big picture is, leaving aside details, this is a  real step forward by the Europeans. It&rsquo;ll have an impact.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;They&rsquo;re doing the right thing,&rdquo; he said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.iwatchnews.org/2012/04/02/8578/us-deal-europeans-limits-risk-illicit-nuclear-bombs">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 02 Apr 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The limited national security implications of civilian nuclear decline]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ee15dd1f-bf1f-4c51-bffb-5a9cded44d09]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>
	A declared exit from commercial nuclear power in the United States is highly improbable. But a stealthy, gradual nuclear decline motivated by economics seems reasonably likely, as US utilities decide to close some plants early, rather than implement costly post-Fukushima safety regulations, and the number of new nuclear power plants fails to offset retirements. If nuclear power does make a slow exit, the national security implications are smaller than sometimes suggested. Nuclear energy is far down the list of options for enhancing the US military&rsquo;s energy security. Weapons programs aren&rsquo;t dependent on the civilian nuclear industry, and the nuclear Navy has a reliable supply chain. The United States has not needed to produce fissile material for weapons in decades, and although tritium for defense purposes is now produced in civilian reactors, there are other options for obtaining it. A nuclear phase-out could affect US nuclear export control and nonproliferation efforts, but export controls are only one tool among many that can be used to curb the desire for nuclear weapons. Even in a slow slide toward phase-out, the United States would remain at the global nuclear bargaining table for decades because of its status as a military nuclear superpower.</p>
<p id="p-2">
	Late in 2012, Dominion Resources, Inc. announced it would shutter the Kewaunee Power Station in Carlton, Wisconsin. Kewaunee had just received a license extension to operate until 2033 (<a class="xref-bibr" href="http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/22.full#ref-13" id="xref-ref-13-1">Wald, 2012</a>). &ldquo;The situation Dominion faces at Kewaunee is the result of circumstances unique to the station and do not reflect the nuclear industry in general,&rdquo; said Thomas Farrell, Dominion&rsquo;s chief executive and chairman. &ldquo;The nation will be hard pressed to meet its energy needs, let alone do so in a secure and affordable manner, without a robust and growing nuclear energy program&rdquo; (<a class="xref-bibr" href="http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/22.full#ref-6" id="xref-ref-6-1">Dominion Resources, 2012</a>).</p>
<p id="p-3">
	Actually, Kewaunee may not be unique; it could be the first in a series of early retirements of aging US nuclear power plants. The fact that Dominion, with a $30 billion market capitalization, prefers to pay $281 million in decommissioning fees and other closing costs rather than operate the plant for another 20 years signals a generally grim economic outlook for nuclear energy in the United States.</p>
<p>
	<a href="http://bos.sagepub.com/content/69/2/22.full">View full article...</a></p>
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			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 31 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[From Washington to Seoul: Strengthening Nuclear Security ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=561a5df8-2fc3-48df-adab-a61311f76afc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>(In Russia - Translation forthcoming.)</p>
<p><a href="http://www.kazpravda.kz/c/1333156092">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 31 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[2012 Nuclear Security Summit: What it was and wasn?t]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b129c6c3-6d00-4f63-bda2-4c9506128a27]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p align="left">This week, world leaders descended on Seoul, South  Korea, for the second global Nuclear Security Summit -- a project that  started with President Obama's call to secure <em>all</em> vulnerable  nuclear material in four years (by the end of 2013). Unfortunately, most  of these world leaders did not storm the gates of the summit ready to  fight for that deadline. Many walked into a meeting already overshadowed  by various domestic agendas and geopolitics, putting a damper on the  real purpose of the gathering.</p>
<p align="left">That's too bad. The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in  Seoul could have been a watershed moment for nuclear security. After  all, the Obama administration's first global Nuclear Security Summit in  Washington two years ago that conceptualized nuclear security led to  some unprecedented outcomes: Participating nations fulfilled over 90  percent of their <em>voluntary</em> summit commitments -- resulting in  the reduction of vast amounts of highly enriched uranium, numerous  reactor conversions, and a series of anti-smuggling initiatives. The  Seoul conclave was primed to build on these successes by reenergizing  the international community on security issues, collecting more  commitments to reduce nuclear materials, implementing nuclear security  procedures and innovating global governance. Instead, it seemed everyone  was buzzing over just about everything other than nuclear security. And  what few accomplishments were achieved ended up more toothless than  most analysts had hoped.</p>
<p align="left">Undoubtedly, world leaders will take advantage of a  major international assembly to discuss other key issues on the  sidelines. But it was all too clear in Seoul that many were downright  preoccupied -- 2012 is simply too crowded with domestic issues and  election races for most leaders or media to concentrate on the task at  hand. This was perhaps best epitomized by President Obama's open-mic  gaffe, when he was overheard <a target="_blank" href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility.html?_r=1&amp;scp=4&amp;sq=obama%20open%20mic&amp;st=cse">telling</a>  President Medvedev, &quot;This is my last election. &hellip; After my election, I  have more flexibility.&quot; And of course, it doesn't help that nuclear  security is a tough sell to a global public more focused on the economy  and other kitchen-table issues than on the global stockpile of nuclear  materials; that is, nuclear security is a wonky concept that doesn't  ring a bell for most people. Timing, naturally, is everything.</p>
<p align="left">But, for some, it was difficult to focus entirely on the  summit. From the start, North Korea was the talk of the town among  everyone from journalists, diplomats, heads of state, and passersby.  Though the summit was a useful and necessary opportunity to send  Pyongyang a strong message, the fact is North Korea and the Nuclear  Security Summit are two completely distinct topics. The Nuclear Security  Summit targets <em>terrorists</em> and vulnerable nuclear materials while North Korea is a <em>state</em> that may provide nuclear <em>parts</em> to non-state actors but is a diplomatic and political chasm that goes far beyond the activities in Yongbyon.</p>
<p align="left"><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/2012-nuclear-security-summit-what-it-was-and-wasn%E2%80%99t">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 30 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Squandered Opportunities in Seoul]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=948b5acc-02f7-49d0-a9c8-35468ea9dcb3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>At this week&rsquo;s nuclear-security summit in Seoul, remarkably little  attention seemed to be focused on the issue at hand: preventing  terrorists from stealing nuclear materials or threatening nuclear  facilities. This was no fault of the South Korean hosts, who operated  the summit with military-like efficiency for the fifty-plus governments  in attendance. The hosts even provided a theme song, catchy logo and  endless banners proclaiming &ldquo;beyond security, towards peace,&rdquo; all while  making significant new technical and political contributions to  improving nuclear security. And it must be admitted the bad boys north  of the border did their part to shift their attention elsewhere by  threatening a missile test cloaked as a satellite launch. But the summit  itself was so uninspiring that even President Obama seemed to focus  more on future arms control talks with Russia&mdash;even in his now infamous  off-mic remarks to Dimitri Mevedev.</p>
<p>This uninspiring picture is not a surprise: the real world of  preventing nuclear terrorism is a far cry from movie thrillers or spy  novels. It involves the drudgery of locking up or removing dangerous  materials from sites scattered around the globe, haggling with  bureaucrats, sitting through tortuous international negotiations, and  convincing reluctant lawmakers to pass the right legislation and provide  appropriate funding.</p>
<p><a href="http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/squandered-opportunities-seoul-6709">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 30 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Assessing the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=cb944924-d28f-44af-8cf0-e5933f7a98e5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J4-qMkZUV-c&amp;hq_e=el&amp;hq_m=1452344&amp;hq_l=4&amp;hq_v=de54075041">View the video on Youtube here...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 30 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The Legacy of the Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6a88d4bd-4530-4264-ab01-1d7ce9b88926]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>With anxieties over the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran  looming large, heads of state from 53 countries convened in Seoul this  week to reaffirm and intensify their commitment to prevent nuclear  materials from getting into the hands of terrorists.</p>
<p>At the meeting, a follow-on to the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held  in Washington by President Obama, several countries agreed to concrete  steps to limit the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian nuclear  reactors. Major breakthroughs, however, were in short supply. In a  Q&amp;A, Mark Hibbs explains that this incremental approach of small  steps by like-minded countries is expected to continue in the years  ahead. There&rsquo;s little political will for setting up a binding and  comprehensive global nuclear security framework.</p>
<p>What was the purpose of the security summit?</p>
<p>The meeting was held to build on the understandings and commitments of  the 47 countries that participated in the 2010 summit to secure nuclear  materials against loss, theft, and misuse.</p>
<p>Like the first meeting, the Seoul summit had two main components. The  first was a communiqu&eacute;, agreed to by all participants, which identified  a dozen specific target areas needing attention. The second was a set  of specific commitments made by states to improve the security of their  nuclear materials and installations.</p>
<p>The communiqu&eacute;, for example, aspired to minimize the use of highly  enriched uranium; to bring into force in 2014 an amended international  convention to protect nuclear materials against loss or theft during  transport and use; and to protect sensitive information, vital to the  defense of nuclear installations and materials, against theft and cyber  attacks.</p>
<p><a href="http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/29/seoul-nuclear-security-summit/a5kl">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 29 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear summit makes modest progress]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ccb6b7bf-19cb-4c89-91cd-62675f7b0099]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p id="article_credit">SEOUL   &mdash;</p>
<p>World leaders made modest progress in efforts to combat the threat of  nuclear terrorism during a summit in South Korea that ended Tuesday,  but more vision and commitment is needed, experts said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;What we really needed from this summit was a little bit more vision  on how to move beyond where we are today,&rdquo; said Ken Luongo, co-chair of  the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), a grouping of  non-proliferation experts.</p>
<p>Luongo said the blueprint going forward had been watered down because  of the varying commitment levels of countries around the world.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The problem with this process is that it has devolved to a lowest common denominator through the negotiation process,&rdquo; he said.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The challenge of this summit process going into Netherlands (the  next summit in 2014) is to open up the vision so that there is a big  picture perspective on what we need to do to prevent nuclear terrorism.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Duyeon Kim, a deputy director at the Center for Arms Control and  Nonproliferation, said setting the target of the end of 2013 to minimise  the civilian use of HEU, such as in the medical sector, was a &ldquo;positive  step.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;But so far it&rsquo;s an &lsquo;encouragement&rsquo; to do so and the key is in the details, which are unclear,&rdquo; Kim said.</p>
<p>Experts highlighted much progress since the Washington summit, such  as removing enough HEU to make 19 nuclear weapons from eight countries.</p>
<p>But experts described the measures taken since 2010 as low hanging  fruit, and that momentum would be difficult to sustain without binding  and transparent agreements among all countries.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The current nuclear material security regime is a patchwork of  unaccountable voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across  borders,&rdquo; Luongo said.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Consistent standards, transparency to promote international  confidence, and national accountability are additions to the regime that  are urgently needed.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.japantoday.com/category/commentary/view/nuclear-summit-makes-modest-progress">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Las diferencias entre EE.UU. y Rusia frustran la Cumbre Nuclear de Seul]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c593eb30-001e-4e5b-99f7-e2fd45e53360]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="p">Con  un largo comunicado lleno de intenciones pero vac&iacute;o de medidas  concretas, ayer concluy&oacute; en Se&uacute;l una decepcionante II Cumbre de  Seguridad Nuclear. A diferencia de la reuni&oacute;n en Washington de hace dos  a&ntilde;os, que sent&oacute; las bases para reducir en 2014 las reservas mundiales de  uranio enriquecido y plutonio con el fin de que no cayeran en manos de  grupos terroristas, el encuentro finaliz&oacute; sin grandes avances.</p>
<p class="p">Entre  otros motivos porque afloraron las diferencias entre Estados Unidos y  Rusia a cuenta del escudo antimisiles que la Casa Blanca planea levantar  en Europa. Aunque el presidente norteamericano, Barack Obama, abog&oacute; por  seguir reduciendo el arsenal at&oacute;mico global, no consigui&oacute; arrancarle a  su hom&oacute;logo ruso, Dmitri Medv&eacute;dev, un compromiso como el de Washington  en 2010. Entonces, ambos pa&iacute;ses acordaron eliminar 37 toneladas de  plutonio, con las que se podr&iacute;an fabricar 17.000 bombas at&oacute;micas.</p>
<p class="p">Pero  el miedo del Kremlin a que el Pent&aacute;gono despliegue sus misiles cerca de  sus fronteras de Europa del Este ha impedido nuevos recortes  armament&iacute;sticos y de material nuclear. En la actualidad, las reservas  mundiales de uranio enriquecido ascienden a 1.600 toneladas y las de  plutonio a 500. En total, dan para fabricar 100.000 armas nucleares, que  se a&ntilde;adir&iacute;an a las m&aacute;s de 20.000 que, oficialmente, ya poseen Rusia  (11.000) EE.UU. (8.500), Francia (300), Reino Unido (225), China (240),  Pakist&aacute;n (90-110), India (80-100) e Israel (60).</p>
<p class="p">...</p>
<p class="p">&laquo;Aunque la cumbre es un paso adelante, a&uacute;n queda mucho por hacer y es  una pena que pa&iacute;ses como Rusia no hayan anunciado nuevas reducciones de  sus reservas radiactivas, algunas de las cuales son las m&aacute;s susceptibles  de caer en las redes de contrabando y tr&aacute;fico de armas&raquo;, explic&oacute; a ABC  Duyeon Kim, subdirectora del Centro para el Control de Armas y la No  Proliferaci&oacute;n. A su juicio, otro de los fallos de esta cumbre es &laquo;la  falta de financiaci&oacute;n para implementar en algunas naciones en v&iacute;as de  desarrollo las medidas de seguridad necesarias para proteger sus  materiales nucleares&raquo;.</p>
<p class="p">...</p>
<p class="p">&laquo;No se puede hablar de fracaso, pero los mandatarios deber&iacute;an  comprender que la seguridad nuclear es un problema global e imponer  requisitos de seguridad internacionales para proteger los arsenales  at&oacute;micos y las cada vez m&aacute;s numerosas instalaciones nucleares de uso  civil&raquo;, alerta Kenneth Luongo, copresidente del Grupo de Trabajo de  Materiales Fisibles.</p>
<p class="p"><a href="http://www.abc.es/20120328/internacional/abcp-diferencias-entre-rusia-frustran-20120328.html">View full article...<br />
</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Progress Towards Securing Africa's Nuclear Resources]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a0dba165-92ad-4649-9d83-db90d1114626]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Although the need to better secure nuclear and other radioactive material and  associated technologies has been on the international agenda for many years, it  has taken on heightened significance in recent times.1 This is as a result of  the uncovering of an international nuclear smuggling ring &ndash; the A.Q. Kahn  network2 &ndash; in 2004, implicating a number of citizens of various countries in  spreading sensitive nuclear technologies without authorisation; and, post-9/11  evidence suggesting that al Qaeda-linked groups may have an interest in  acquiring or developing a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) and in particular a  nuclear or radiological explosive/dispersal device.</p>
<p align="justify">Radiological dispersal devices (RDD) or &lsquo;dirty bombs&rsquo; combine a  conventional explosive device, such as TNT, with radioactive material. Compared  with a nuclear explosive device (any nuclear weapon or other explosive device  capable of releasing nuclear energy) RDDs generally require limited technical  knowledge to develop and the radiological isotopes can be obtained from a wide  variety of sources, including nuclear weapon arsenals, nuclear research  reactors, nuclear power plants and orphan sources &ndash; discarded and abandoned  redundant industrial products and waste from medical facilities &ndash; as well as  uranium mines and other mines that produce uranium as a by-product.</p>
<p align="justify"><a href="http://www.iss.co.za/pgcontent.php?UID=31486">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts urge leaders to think globally about nuclear security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d948ba75-9d27-4172-abc9-edbd8f66b69f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear security experts have called on governments to look beyond state  lines to tackle nuclear terrorism threats and disasters at a global  level. ?<br />
<br />
Members of the Fissile Materials Working Group said it  was time for states to look beyond their own individual commitments to  the bigger picture as they moved on from the Seoul Nuclear Security  Summit held on Monday and Tuesday. ?<br />
<br />
&ldquo;Nations are responsible,  but they also have an international obligation and how you match those  two things up hasn&rsquo;t been tried and hasn&rsquo;t really been worked on,&rdquo; said  Kenneth Luongo, co-chairman of the FMWG which advocates for stronger  nuclear security efforts. ?<br />
<br />
He added that international rules  were not keeping up with the reality of nuclear energy growth, as demand  surged along with the globe&rsquo;s growing population. ?</p>
<p>&ldquo;Nuclear power is going to grow in dangerous parts of the world, in  particular in the Middle East where there is not a safety or security  culture,&rdquo; he said, adding that every individual nation currently dealt  with nuclear security its own way. ?&ldquo;There is nothing that requires  countries to adhere to a uniform standard across borders and there is  nothing that requires them to take specific actions that the  International Atomic Energy Agency or any other body tells them to  take.&rdquo;?And Miles Pomper, research associate at the James Martin Center  for Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, said: &ldquo;The  communique itself, I am not really expecting much out of.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
Also  speaking on the summit sidelines Monday, Pomper blamed the summit  document&rsquo;s generic language for not binding countries to many  commitments beyond what they had promised already.<br />
<br />
While he  praised some pledges such as the Belgian, Dutch, French and U.S. joint  move to minimize their use of highly enriched uranium for medical  isotopes, he said that other states were likely to disappoint.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;On  the other hand, we are not going to see a commitment from Russia on any  of the highly enriched uranium issues and Russia is really where a lot  of the problem is. That is where there are a lot of facilities where the  highly enriched uranium is in the world.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;They have been pretty  good at taking material from other countries but they have done next to  nothing about their own highly enriched uranium.&rdquo;</p>
<p>The U.S., too, failed to ratify key international treaties ahead of the  Seoul summit in spite of being the initiator of the series of three  nuclear security summits, the final of which is expected to be held in  the Netherlands in 2014.<br />
<br />
Duyeon Kim, deputy director of nuclear  non-proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation,  said this summit&rsquo;s success could be judged on progress made since the  first summit in Washington in 2010, new actions pledged by state  leaders, and how much money governments bring to the table to implement  their commitments. <br />
<br />
&ldquo;Our understanding is that 90 percent of the  national commitments (made in Washington) may have been completed but  there is far more work that needs to be done,&rdquo; she said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120326001273">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Leaders act on nuclear threat, but N. Korea dominates]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=302fef2e-12b9-4484-a683-f55caaa92103]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>World leaders including US President Barack Obama called Tuesday for  strong steps to combat nuclear terrorism, wrapping up a 53-nation summit  overshadowed by North Korea's planned rocket launch.</p>
<p>&quot;Today we have set a new milestone in making the world a safer and more  peaceful place,&quot; South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak, who hosted the  summit, said at the end of the two-day event.</p>
<p>The leaders from 53 nations, including China's Hu Jintao and Pakistan's  prime minister Yousuf Raza Gilani, called in a communique for steps to  minimise civilian use of highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can be  used to make bombs.</p>
<p>They also called for safeguarding world stockpiles of HEU and plutonium, and tightening security of radioactive material that could be used to create a &quot;dirty&quot; bomb.</p>
<p>&quot;Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security,&quot; the leaders said in the communique. &quot;Defeating this threat requires strong national measures and international cooperation.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><span class="BL">
<p>&quot;<span id="IL_AD5" class="IL_AD">What we</span> really needed from this  summit was a little bit more vision on how to move beyond where we are  today,&quot; said Ken Luongo, co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group  (FMWG), a grouping of non-proliferation experts.</p>
<p>Luongo said the blueprint going forward had been watered down because of the varying commitment levels of <span id="IL_AD2" class="IL_AD">countries</span> around the world.</p>
<p>&quot;The problem with this process is that it has devolved to a lowest common denominator through the negotiation process,&quot; he said.</p>
<p>&quot;The challenge of this summit process going into Netherlands (<span id="IL_AD6" class="IL_AD">the next</span> summit in 2014) is to open up the vision so that there is a big <span id="IL_AD3" class="IL_AD">picture</span> perspective on what we need to do to prevent nuclear terrorism.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><span class="BL">
<p>Duyeon Kim, a deputy director at the Center for Arms Control and  Nonproliferation, said setting the target of the end of 2013 to minimise  the civilian use of HEU, such as in the <span id="IL_AD12" class="IL_AD">medical</span> sector, was a &quot;positive <span id="IL_AD11" class="IL_AD">step</span>&quot;.</p>
<p>&quot;But so far it's an 'encouragement' to do so and the key is in <span id="IL_AD1" class="IL_AD">the details</span>, which are unclear,&quot; Kim said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><span class="BL">
<p>&quot;The current nuclear material security regime is a patchwork of  unaccountable voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across  borders,&quot; Luongo said.</p>
<p>&quot;Consistent standards, transparency to promote international confidence,  and national accountability are additions to the regime that are  urgently needed.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Leaders_act_on_nuclear_threat_but_N_Korea_dominates_999.html">View full article...</a></p>
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			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Carelessness could be greatest threat of a dirty bomb]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=dc1d3b82-0b07-44ed-96d5-fbca5d78af07]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>At a hospital in a major US city, medical equipment used to sterilise  blood with radioactive caesium-137 is secured in room with a sturdy  padlock on the door. And the lock's combination is written on the door  frame.</p>
<p>That was only one of the glaring  security oversights inspectors found at medical facilities that store  radioactive equipment across the United States, according to a US  Government Accountability Office report. The US stockpile of radioactive  material, it would seem, is far from secure.</p>
<p>When world leaders  gathered in Washington for the inaugural Nuclear Security Summit in  2010, US President Barack Obama led talks on how to reduce the risk of  nuclear terrorism. This is again the main focus as leaders gather in  Seoul this week for another nuclear summit that concludes today.</p>
<p>Unlike  in 2010, leaders have another, equally challenging item on the agenda:  how to secure radiological sources that could be used in a &quot;dirty bomb&quot;.  And as the examples discovered by the GAO make clear, not even  Washington - a leading advocate for radiological safety - has a  foolproof strategy.</p>
<p>Part of the reason is the sheer quantity of  radioactive material. Unlike weapons-grade fissile material, which is  possessed by only a few countries and stored under tight military  controls, devices that use radioactive isotopes have civilian  applications ranging from medical research to food sterilisation in  every country around the globe. Despite regulations present in every  country, there are countless opportunities for devices to go missing.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the nuclear policy programme at the  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, says it is  this threat that faces smaller countries with developing economies and a  limited ability to police, monitor and control radiological material.  &quot;It is the developing countries that are especially keen to discuss  radiological security at the summit,&quot; she says, &quot;because in their view a  threat of radiological terrorism is more immediate than a threat of  nuclear terrorism.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thenational.ae/thenationalconversation/comment/carelessness-could-be-greatest-threat-of-a-dirty-bomb">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Action Needed to Fight Nuclear Terror]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e1cdf65c-622b-43d9-873d-ffd395c742a0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The international community should cut its dependence on hazardous nuclear materials and eradicate nuclear terrorism with the aid of multilateral frameworks, Li Hong, secretary-general of the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association, said in an exclusive interview with China Daily.</p>
<p>&quot;The huge amount of existing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials capable of producing nuclear warheads is posing threats to global peace and nuclear security,&quot; said Li, who was a member of the Chinese delegation at the Nuclear Security Symposium last week in Seoul.</p>
<p>Li said that currently there are about 10,000 nuclear bombs as well as 2,100 tons of nuclear fission materials, enough to make another 100,000 nuclear bombs, in the world.</p>
<p>Terrorists have sought to buy, steal or directly manufacture nuclear warheads, and global smuggling and illicit transactions of nuclear technologies and material &quot;have been rampant&quot;, Li said.</p>
<p>Around 2,100 cases of theft, sabotage or unauthorized access of nuclear materials were reported, according to International Atomic Energy Agency.</p>
<p>Nuclear facilities around the globe should reduce their reliance on reactors using high-enriched (90 percent enriched) uranium, which can be used in nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>&quot;Nuclear facilities should use more low-enriched uranium reactors with minor potential hazards to minimize security risks,&quot; Li said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/27/content_14918860.htm">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Le Sommet sur la sécurité nucléaire s'achève sur des progrès limités]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4c4c5d61-6247-4339-bcd5-7149f2f89ad3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Le Sommet sud-cor&eacute;en sur la s&eacute;curit&eacute; <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/nucleaire/" class="lien_interne" style="text-decoration: none; cursor: text;">nucl&eacute;aire</a> s'est termin&eacute;, mardi 27 mars, par l'adoption d'un <em>&quot;communiqu&eacute; de S&eacute;oul&quot;</em>  &agrave; la port&eacute;e relativement limit&eacute;e, mais t&eacute;moignant de certains progr&egrave;s  dans ce cadre de discussions propos&eacute; en 2009 par le pr&eacute;sident am&eacute;ricain <a class="lien_interne" href="http://www.lemonde.fr/sujet/d309/barack-obama.html" target="_blank">Barack Obama</a>.</p>
<p>Les dirigeants de 53 pays et des organisations internationales, dont  pour la premi&egrave;re fois Interpol, ont rappel&eacute; le risque repr&eacute;sent&eacute; par le  terrorisme nucl&eacute;aire, consid&eacute;r&eacute; comme <em>&quot;l'une des menaces les plus inqui&eacute;tantes sur la s&eacute;curit&eacute; internationale&quot;</em>.</p>
<p>Apr&egrave;s <a href="http://conjugaison.lemonde.fr/conjugaison/auxiliaire/avoir" class="lien_interne" target="_blank">avoir</a> r&eacute;affirm&eacute; les <em>&quot;objectifs communs de d&eacute;sarmement nucl&eacute;aire, de non-prolif&eacute;ration nucl&eacute;aire et d'usages pacifiques de l'&eacute;nergie nucl&eacute;aire&quot;</em>  formul&eacute;s lors du premier sommet, en 2010 &agrave; Washington, ils ont &eacute;mis une  s&eacute;rie de recommandations dans diff&eacute;rents domaines allant de la  consolidation de <em>&quot;l'architecture de la s&eacute;curit&eacute; nucl&eacute;aire globale&quot;</em>  au travers de textes telle la convention de 2005 sur la r&eacute;pression des  actes de terrorisme nucl&eacute;aire et l'amendement &agrave; la Convention sur la  protection <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/physique/" class="lien_interne">physique</a> des mati&egrave;res nucl&eacute;aires (CPPNM), &agrave; la lutte contre le trafic nucl&eacute;aire illicite ou encore la coop&eacute;ration internationale.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>R&eacute;agissant au communiqu&eacute;, <a class="lien_interne" href="http://www.lemonde.fr/sujet/5e36/duyeon-kim.html" target="_blank" style="text-decoration: none; cursor: text;">Duyeon Kim</a>,  du Centre pour le contr&ocirc;le des armements et la non-prolif&eacute;ration, a  salu&eacute; la prise de conscience du lien entre s&eacute;curit&eacute; et s&ucirc;ret&eacute;  nucl&eacute;aires, un point important <em>&quot;tant que l'on se fie &agrave; l'&eacute;nergie nucl&eacute;aire pour r&eacute;pondre &agrave; nos besoins &eacute;nerg&eacute;tiques&quot;</em>.</p>
<p>Cela dit, l'impression est que les quelques engagements exprim&eacute;s  restent trop limit&eacute;s, m&ecirc;me s'ils repr&eacute;sentent des avanc&eacute;es utiles. Ken  Luongo, de FMWG, une coalition d'ONG et de groupes de r&eacute;flexion  sp&eacute;cialis&eacute;s dans la s&eacute;curit&eacute;, estime que <em>&quot;le r&eacute;gime actuel de s&eacute;curit&eacute; reste inadapt&eacute; au risque repr&eacute;sent&eacute; par le terrorisme nucl&eacute;aire et &agrave; ses cons&eacute;quences&quot;</em>.</p>
<p>M. Luongo juge urgent d'y <a href="http://conjugaison.lemonde.fr/conjugaison/premier-groupe/ajouter" class="lien_interne" target="_blank">ajouter</a> des <em>&quot;normes consistantes et contraignantes, une vraie transparence afin de <a href="http://conjugaison.lemonde.fr/conjugaison/troisieme-groupe/promouvoir" class="lien_interne" target="_blank">promouvoir</a> la confiance &agrave; l'&eacute;chelle internationale, et l'affirmation des responsabilit&eacute;s nationales&quot;</em>. Des points qui seront peut-&ecirc;tre discut&eacute;s au prochain sommet, &agrave; La Haye en 2014.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/asie-pacifique/article/2012/03/27/resultats-modestes-pour-la-securite-nucleaire-mondiale_1676468_3216.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Japan goes off script at nuclear summit to slam North Korea]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=95831a8e-ffce-4f3f-aa26-8b893a8ff2be]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span id="articleText">
<p>The summit was briefly interrupted by a dispute between <a title="Full coverage of Argentina" href="http://www.reuters.com/places/argentina">Argentina</a>  and Britain, which went to war in 1982 over the Falkland Islands, over  suggestions Britain had sent a submarine capable of carrying nuclear  weapons to the South Atlantic.</p>
<p>A  communiqu&eacute; issued at the end of the two-day meeting of more than 50  world leaders in Seoul was light on specifics on how to reduce the risk  of atomic materials falling into bad hands, loosely calling for all  vulnerable material to be secured in four years.</p>
<p>The world's biggest nuclear concerns, those surrounding the weapons programs of North Korea and <a title="Full coverage of Iran" href="http://www.reuters.com/places/iran">Iran</a>, were not on the agenda at the summit, and neither country was invited.</p>
<p>The secretive North has been widely criticized on the sidelines of the meeting, including by main ally <a title="Full coverage of China" href="http://www.reuters.com/places/china">China</a>,  but host South Korea has explicitly stated the North's weapons of mass  destruction programs were off the table during the summit itself.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><span id="articleText">
<p>Miles Pomper of the Washington-based Center  for Nonproliferation Studies said the Seoul agenda was &quot;underwhelming to  say the least&quot;.</p>
<p>&quot;You got a lot of  juice out of the process the first time because it was a new thing and  Obama had just come off the Prague speech,&quot; he said, referring to a 2009  address when he declared it was time to seek &quot;a world without nuclear  weapons&quot;.</p>
<p>&quot;There were a lot of things already in the pipeline, but now we're losing momentum ... we (need to) start being more ambitious.&quot;</p>
</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/27/us-nuclear-summit-idUSBRE82P01620120327">View full article...</a></p>
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			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama sees progress toward securing loose nukes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=8920cc5e-3982-48b5-9dce-94ab5cfd29f6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Obama said the international community has made great  strides toward locking down loose nuclear material, but warned the  threat of nuclear materials falling into the hands of terrorist remains.</p>
<p>&quot;There  are still too many bad actors in search of these dangerous materials,  and these dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places,&quot;  Obama said in an address before the Nuclear Security Summit. &quot;It would  not take much -- just a handful or so of these materials -- to kill  hundreds of thousands of innocent people. And that's not an  exaggeration; that's the reality that we face.&quot;</p>
<p>The summit, which  included more than 50 world leaders, was a follow up to the 2010 summit  where Obama and other leaders pledged to secure the world's nuclear  material within four years. On Tuesday, Obama ticked off several  accomplishments &mdash; including improving security at nuclear sites and  removing tons of nuclear material &mdash; since the last summit. But Obama  said it remains &quot;undeniable&quot; that the threat remains.</p>
<p>Nuclear  security and non-proliferation are issues Obama has spoken passionately  about since his days in the Senate. Shortly after moving to the White  House, he spoke in Prague about his vision for a nuclear-free world as  well as his deep worries about terrorists obtaining nuclear material.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;These pledges represent the most concrete results from the summit and  represent some useful steps forward,&quot; said Miles Pomper, a senior  research associate the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.  &quot;If they are to be realized, however, the White House will have to be  more active than it has been in winning congressional support for  appropriate legislation and sufficient funding.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Ken Luongo, a former Clinton-era Energy Department official and  president of the Partnership for Global Security, argued that nations  desperately need to institutionalize standards for security.</p>
<p>&quot;The  current nuclear material security regime is a patchwork of unaccountable  voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across borders,&quot; Luongo  said. &quot;This system is not commensurate with either the risk or  consequences of nuclear terrorism. Consistent standards, transparency to  promote international confidence, and national accountability are  additions to the regime that are urgently needed.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/03/obama-hails-progress-in-securing-loose-nukes/1#.T3HGC_VTL1W">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Conference in Korea Collides With U.S. Election]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7b4691f2-8847-4b3a-8eab-878d114e2853]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Politics, diplomats like to say, stops at the water&rsquo;s edge. But this  week, the politics of the presidential election crashed into a nuclear  security summit half a world away.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">On Tuesday, <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/index.html?scp=1-spot&amp;sq=President%20Obama&amp;st=cse" title="Times Topic Page">President Obama</a> declared that the United States and <a class="meta-loc" title="More news and information about Russia and the Post-Soviet Nations." href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/russiaandtheformersovietunion/index.html?inline=nyt-geo">Russia</a>  could not realistically work out their dispute over an American missile  defense system this year because politics during the presidential  campaign would make it impossible to win support for any compromise.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">&ldquo;The only way I get this stuff done is if I&rsquo;m consulting with the  Pentagon, if I&rsquo;m consulting with Congress, if I&rsquo;ve got bipartisan  support,&rdquo; Mr. Obama said to reporters here. &ldquo;Frankly, the current  environment is not conducive to those kinds of thoughtful  consultations.&rdquo;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">The tempest began on Monday, when Mr. Obama <a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/03/26/microphone-picks-up-obamas-private-exchange-with-medvedev/?ref=world" title="Times article">was caught by a microphone in a moment of candor</a>, telling President <a href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/dmitri_a_medvedev/index.html?scp=1-spot&amp;sq=Dmitri%20A.%20Medvedev&amp;st=cse" title="Times Topic Page">Dmitri A. Medvedev</a>  of Russia that he would have more flexibility to deal with the thorny  issue of missile defense after the election in November.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">...</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">The accomplishments being announced today are  very concrete, but there&rsquo;s really not that much new that wasn&rsquo;t already  in the pipeline,&rdquo; said Kenneth N. Luongo, co-chairman of the <a href="http://fmwg.presstools.org/" title="Web site">Fissile Materials Working Group</a>, a consortium of 60 nuclear experts.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">To fully address the threat of nuclear terrorism, Mr. Luongo said,  countries need to accept uniform security standards. Citing sovereignty  concerns, however, many countries here resist such measures.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">...</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">&ldquo;We have to get away from this small ball,&rdquo; Mr. Luongo said, &ldquo;and start looking at the big picture.&rdquo;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/28/world/asia/president-obama-talks-missile-defense-at-nuclear-summit-in-south-korea.html?_r=4&amp;ref=global-home">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[World Leaders Vow to Secure Loose Nuclear Material by 2014]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=da7c6d6e-7ac5-40ec-8ae7-84d115178b86]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>World leaders pledged to secure all vulnerable nuclear material by 2014 and to boost security to keep the ingredients for atomic weapons out of the hands of terrorists.</p>
<p>U.S. President <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/barack-obama/">Barack Obama</a>, his Russian counterpart <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/dmitry-medvedev/">Dmitry Medvedev</a> and leaders from more than 40 nations set out the goals in a communiqu&eacute; at the conclusion of a two-day nuclear security summit in Seoul.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;I would have liked to hear an overall plan for improving nuclear-material security worldwide in a uniform way,&rdquo; said Kenneth Luongo, who with the <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/department-of-energy/">Department of Energy</a> helped secure atomic material in <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/russia/">Russia</a> after the Soviet Union disintegrated. &ldquo;We need something that&rsquo;s a lot better across the board.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;The downside of multilateral negotiation is that you&rsquo;re always going to devolve to the lowest common denominator,&rdquo; said Miles Pomper, a senior researcher at the Center for Non- Proliferation Studies, in an interview today in Seoul. &ldquo;The countries with the least incentive to make progress have an effective veto.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-27/world-leaders-pledge-to-secure-loose-nuclear-material-by-2014.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Says ?Bad Actors? Trying to Get Nuclear Material]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d7f9f3c3-e8f8-40a9-be68-af20d522f3ac]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Barack Obama said there are &ldquo;still too many bad actors&rdquo; in the world trying to get their hands on nuclear material, which could result in a terror attack that kills large numbers of people.</p>
<p>&ldquo;These dangerous materials are still vulnerable in too many places,&rdquo; Obama said today at the opening session of the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, which has drawn more than 40 world leaders. &ldquo;It would not take much, just a handful or so of these materials, to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people and that&rsquo;s not an exaggeration, that&rsquo;s the reality that we face.&rdquo;</p>
<p>Obama, who inaugurated the first nuclear security summit in Washington DC in 2010, warned against &ldquo;complacency&rdquo; in preventing loose nuclear material from getting into the hands of terrorist groups. The legacy of the Soviet Union&rsquo;s breakup, inadequate atomic stockpile controls and the proliferation of nuclear-fuel technology mean the world has lost precise count of atomic material, which could be used to make a weapon.</p>
<p>There are at least 2 million kilograms (4.4 million pounds) of stockpiled weapons-grade nuclear material left over from decommissioned bombs and atomic-fuel plants, according to the International Panel on Fissile Materials, a nonprofit Princeton, New Jersey research institute that tracks nuclear material. That&rsquo;s enough to make at least 100,000 new nuclear weapons on top of the 20,000 bombs already in weapon-state stockpiles.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Even a low-level radiological or dirty-bomb attack on Washington, while causing a limited number of deaths, would lead to damages of $100 billion, according to Igor Khripunov, the Soviet Union&rsquo;s former arms-control envoy to the U.S. He is now at the Athens, Georgia-based Center for International Trade and Security.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-26/obama-says-bad-actors-trying-to-get-hands-on-nuclear-material">View full article...</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts call for bolder action to implement Seoul Communique ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=61b9bec3-9538-4972-b3b0-9c5790c6197d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The second Nuclear Security Summit, in Seoul, produced a &quot;modest but important&quot; step forward<br />
in efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism, a group of international nuclear security experts said Tuesday.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;    The Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG), however, stressed that  member states should take bolder action to carry out the communique and  commitments they agreed to at the two-day summit.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;Several key steps should be taken prior to the next Nuclear Security  Summit in the Netherlands in 2014. States should institutionalize  binding, comprehensive standards for security that emphasize performance  and accountability,&quot; Ken Luongo, co-chairman of the FMWG, said in an  emailed news release.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;These pledges represent the most concrete results from the summit and  represent some useful steps forward,&rdquo; said Miles Pomper, senior  researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.&ldquo;If  they are to be realized, however, the White House will have to be more  active than it has been in winning congressional support for appropriate  legislation and sufficient funding.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/28/26/0301000000AEN20120328000200315F.HTML">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Is nuclear terrorism preventable?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d65b01ef-2e2a-4b24-b33e-28a06665ead7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Around 50 world leaders have gathered in South Korea to discuss  measures to fight the threat of nuclear terrorism, including the  protection of nuclear materials and facilities, as well as the  prevention of trafficking of nuclear materials.</p>
<p>Barack Obama, the US president, used the opening day of the nuclear  security summit to set out a series of wide-ranging goals on nuclear  policy. He praised achievements made so far, and promised more would  emerge from these discussions.</p>
<p>The summit represents the half way point of a four-year process set  out by Obama with the goal of locking down nuclear materials worldwide  and preventing their use in a terrorist attack.</p>
<p>But this year&rsquo;s summit takes place against a backdrop of growing  tensions over the nuclear standoff with Iran and concerns about North  Korea's plans to launch a satellite next month - a launch that the US,  South Korea and others believe is a missile test.</p>
<p>So, how big a threat is nuclear terrorism? Who sets the criteria for  acquiring nuclear weapons? Are there grounds for accusing Western  governments of double standards? And can a problem of such magnitude be  tackled by voluntary agreements made at the summit?</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;We have to question whether the rules we have today are adequate, and my view is that they're totally inadequate.&nbsp; There's no uniformity, no requirement to control materials a certain way.&quot; -Kenneth Luongo, Fissile Materials Working Group<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> &nbsp;</span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2012/03/20123276518508771.html"><span style="font-style: italic;">View full article...</span></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[IAEA to assist India's nuclear safety reviews]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=454c02f9-7d38-426a-92e9-0be638e02efa]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><font size="5">T</font>he nexus between nuclear safety and security was the cornerstone of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's  [ <a target="_blank" href="http://search.rediff.com/imgsrch/default.php?MT=manmohan+singh"><span class="sm1">Images</span></a> ] speech to the plenary session of the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on Tuesday. </font></p>
<font size="2" face="ARIAL">
<p>The synergy of nuclear safety and security, Dr Singh highlighted, was  &quot;essential to restore public faith in nuclear energy, especially after  the tragic events at Fukushima.&quot;</p>
<p>The prime minister's speech broadly reiterated the themes he had  outlined in his speech to the first Nuclear Security Summit in  Washington, DC in April 2010.</p>
<p>That 1,181-word speech was more of a mission statement briefing  the 43 leaders who had gathered in America's capital city on India's  [ <a target="_blank" href="http://search.rediff.com/imgsrch/default.php?MT=india"><span class="sm1">Images</span></a> ] atomic energy programme and how secure it is in comparison to the nuclear proliferators in the neighbourhood.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL">
<p>In observations made before the Seoul  summit, Kenneth N Luongo, President of the Partnership for Global  Security and one of the world's leading thinkers on nuclear safety,  pointed out how the IAEA's Nuclear Security Fund, which has a current  annual budget of $25 million, needs to double to enable the Agency to  assist nations improve the security of nuclear and radiological  material.</p>
<p>The United States, Luongo added, spends $1.5 billion annually on  international nuclear material security, its efforts focused on Russia  [  <a target="_blank" href="http://search.rediff.com/imgsrch/default.php?MT=russia"><span class="sm1">Images</span></a>  ] and the Ukraine alone. The US Congress, citing the state of the  American economy, wants to cut this by $300 million. Luongo felt it is  time for a Global Nuclear Security Fund with an annual budget of $3  billion, but till that idea becomes a reality, India's contribution to  the IAEA's efforts is significant.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL">
<p>One is not certain if these Bhabhatrons  machines address the threat of radiological terrorism, which Kenneth  Luongo felt posed a 'higher-probability event than a nuclear attack.'</p>
<p>Radiological devices, Luongo noted, would not result in nuclear  explosions, but would spread toxic radioactive material. It would, he  added, cause less damage than a nuclear attack, but could still impact  the global economy depending on the location of the attack.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/report/iaea-to-assist-indias-nuclear-safety-reviews/20120327.htm">View full article...</a></p>
</font></p>
</font></p>
</font>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Summit Produces Few Significant Outcomes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a3cd1cad-c824-42ba-bff7-40b04f6a1a10]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Barack Obama on Tuesday sat with the leaders of China,  India, Russia and top officials from nearly 50 other countries to try to  reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism at the Nuclear Security Summit  in Seoul, South Korea.</p>
<p>The conference, overshadowed by concerns about North Korea's nuclear  and ballistic missile activities, shied away from expanding its mandate  to call for concrete steps toward ridding the world of atomic weapons.<br />
<br />
But  host South Korea defended the summit, saying it did &ldquo;yield practical  outcomes to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism.&rdquo;&nbsp; Analysts, however,  describe the actual results modest and note that nothing binding was  adopted.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Nuclear-Summit-Produces-Few-Significant-Outcomes-144359465.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Japón critica a Corea del Norte en la cumbre nuclear]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0a88f3ef-e01f-45eb-9d44-454ec5a6aa40]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">Jap&oacute;n se sali&oacute; el martes de la agenda  de la cumbre de seguridad nuclear para arremeter contra los planes de  Corea del Norte de lanzar un misil el pr&oacute;ximo mes, mientras el  presidente estadounidense, Barack Obama, advert&iacute;a en contra de la  complacencia a la hora de tratar la amenaza del terrorismo nuclear.               </span></p>
<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">Un comunicado difundido al final de los dos d&iacute;as de  reuniones entre m&aacute;s de 50 l&iacute;deres mundiales en Se&uacute;l arroj&oacute; luz sobre  cuestiones espec&iacute;ficas, por ejemplo c&oacute;mo reducir el riesgo de que  material at&oacute;mico caiga en las manos equivocadas, a la vez que se ped&iacute;a  que todo el material vulnerable se asegure en cuatro a&ntilde;os.               </span></p>
<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">Las mayores preocupaciones nucleares del momento, aquellas que  rodean los programas de armas de Corea del Norte e Ir&aacute;n, no estaban en  la agenda de la cumbre, y ninguno de los dos pa&iacute;ses fue invitado.               </span></p>
<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">La reservada Corea del Norte ha sido muy criticada en los  m&aacute;rgenes de la reuni&oacute;n, incluyendo a su principal aliado, China, pero la  anfitriona, Se&uacute;l, ha declarado expl&iacute;citamente que el programa de armas  de destrucci&oacute;n masiva de Pyongyang estaba fuera de los temas a tratar en  la cumbre.              </span></p>
<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">El foro est&aacute; destinado a tratar s&oacute;lo la protecci&oacute;n de los materiales nucleares y la prevenci&oacute;n del tr&aacute;fico.</span></p>
<p>...</p>
<p><span class="tit" id="spanNoticia">Miles Pomper, del Centro de Estudios  de No Proliferaci&oacute;n, con sede en Washington, dijo que la agenda de Se&uacute;l  fue &quot;decepcionante por no decir algo peor&quot;.              &quot;Hab&iacute;a  un mont&oacute;n de cosas que ya estaban encaminadas, pero ahora estamos  perdiendo el impulso... necesitamos empezar a ser m&aacute;s ambiciosos&quot;, dijo.</span></p>
<p><a href="http://economia.terra.com.co/noticias/noticia.aspx?icid=Publicadores_Links_Relacionados&amp;idNoticia=201203271000_RTI_MAE82Q09C"><span class="tit">View full article...</span></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Modest outcomes for Seoul summit, bolder steps needed: analysts ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fd9dee2a-4bc7-477d-981e-455bb74da432]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nations gathered at a summit in Seoul pledged on Tuesday to work harder  to better safeguard weapons-usable nuclear materials, marking a modest  but important step forward in efforts to keep loose atomic materials out  of the hands of terrorists, analysts said.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;   But world leaders need to take bolder steps to effectively bolster global defenses against nuclear terrorism, they said.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;    The Nuclear Security Summit, the largest diplomatic event South Korea  has ever hosted, is the second of its kind since the inaugural  gathering in Washington two years ago, hosted by U.S. President Barack  Obama.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;   At the end of the two-day Nuclear Security Summit,  top leaders from 57 nations and international organizations, including  Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao, endorsed the Seoul Communique,  citing &quot;substantive progress&quot; in their efforts over the past two years  to prevent nuclear terrorism.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;   &quot;Nuclear terrorism continues to be one of the most challenging threats to international security,&quot; the communique said.<br />
<br />
&nbsp;&nbsp;    World leaders supported the &quot;essential role&quot; of the International  Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in &quot;facilitating international cooperation&quot;  and reaffirmed their call to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials by  2014.<br />
<br />
...</p>
<p>&quot;Several key steps should be taken prior to the next Nuclear Security  Summit in the Netherlands in 2014,&quot; said Ken Luongo, co-chair of the  Fissile Materials Working Group, an international coalition of nuclear  security experts.<br />
<br />
&quot;States should institutionalize binding,  comprehensive standards for security that emphasize performance and  accountability,&quot; Luongo said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;These pledges represent the most concrete results from the summit and  represent some useful steps forward,&quot; said Miles Pomper, a senior  researcher at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies.</p>
<p>&quot;If they are to be realized, however, the White House will have to be  more active than it has been in winning congressional support for  appropriate legislation and sufficient funding,&quot; Pomper said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Kim Du-yeon, senior analyst at the Center for Arms Control and  Nonproliferation, hailed the inclusion of nuclear safety and security in  the communique.<br />
<br />
&quot;It's an extremely significant first step,  but the key is implementing and sustaining measures that strengthen the  nuclear safety-security nexus beyond 2014 as long as we opt for nuclear  power to meet our energy needs,&quot; Kim said.</p>
<p><a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/27/19/0301000000AEN20120327006300315F.HTML">Read full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Canada Pressured Over Bomb-Grade Uranium for Medical Use]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ec46e9fa-5432-4364-a993-3e79ca7694a9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>A U.S. agreement to supply European countries with material used to create cancer-treating isotopes may raise pressure on Canada to phase out the use of bomb-grade uranium for medical purposes.</p>
<p>Belgium, France and the Netherlands promised to stop making medical isotopes from reactors that irradiate bomb-grade uranium by 2015 in exchange for a U.S. pledge to supply nuclear material until then, the countries announced late yesterday at a nuclear- security summit in Seoul. The reactors produce Molybdenum-99, or Moly-99, that hospitals use to diagnose and treat cancer and heart disease.</p>
<p>&ldquo;This is a very important stride forward and really reduces the chances of this material falling into the wrong hands,&rdquo; U.S. Energy Secretary Steven Chu said at a press briefing. &ldquo;We feel it is very important for all countries to recognize this as an important step forward.&rdquo;</p>
<p>Some 100,000 patients are treated daily worldwide with Moly-99 isotopes. Reactors use highly enriched uranium, also the key ingredient in atomic bombs, to produce isotopes. World leaders attending the summit want nations and companies to invest in new facilities that can make medical isotopes with low-enriched uranium that can&rsquo;t be used for weapons.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Companies are raising nuclear-security concern by not pledging to convert to low-enriched production, said Miles Pomper, a senior researcher at the Washington-based Center for Non-Proliferation Studies.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-27/canada-pressured-over-bomb-grade-uranium-for-medical-use">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Summit seeks to deter nuclear-armed terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=09928b89-5ffb-405e-afcf-3ab69ff5a828]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Material that can be used to make nuclear bombs is stored in scores  of buildings spread across dozens of countries. If even a fraction of it  fell into the hands of terrorists, it could be disastrous.</p>
<p>Nearly  60 world leaders who gathered Tuesday in Seoul for a nuclear security  summit agreed to work on securing and accounting for all nuclear  material by 2014. But widespread fear lingers about the safety of  nuclear material in countries including former Soviet states, Pakistan,  North Korea, Iran and India.</p>
<p>While the threat of nuclear terrorism  is considered lower now than a decade ago, especially after the death  of Osama bin Laden, the nightmare scenario of a terrorist exploding a  nuclear bomb in a major city isn't necessarily the far-fetched stuff of  movies.</p>
<p>&quot;It would not take much, just a handful or so of these  materials, to kill hundreds of thousands of innocent people and that's  not an exaggeration, that's the reality that we face,&quot; President Barack  Obama told world leaders at the meeting, a follow-up to a summit he  hosted in Washington in 2010.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Building a nuclear weapon isn't easy, but a bomb similar to the one  that obliterated Hiroshima is &quot;very plausibly within the capabilities of  a sophisticated terrorist group,&quot; according to Matthew Bunn, an  associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of  Government.</p>
<p>There's an &quot;immense difference between the difficulty  of making safe, reliable weapons for use in a missile or combat aircraft  and making crude, unsafe, unreliable weapons for delivery by truck,&quot;  Bunn said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Russia has dramatically improved its nuclear security over the last 15  years, Bunn said, but it has the &quot;world's largest stockpiles in the  world's largest number of buildings and bunkers&quot; as well as corruption  and a weak security culture and regulations.</p>
<p>North Korea and Iran are viewed with worry because of fears of nuclear proliferation.</p>
<p>But Bunn said both are &quot;likely small parts of the nuclear terrorism problem.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;North  Korea has only a few bombs' worth of plutonium in a tightly controlled  garrison state,&quot; he said. &quot;Iran has not begun to produce weapons-usable  material.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>At least four terror groups, including al-Qaida and Japan's Aum  Shinrikyo doomsday cult, have expressed a determination to obtain a  nuclear weapon, said Kenneth Luongo, co-chair of the Fissile Materials  Working Group, a Washington-based coalition of nuclear security experts.</p>
<p>Nuclear  materials stored at research facilities are generally considered less  secure than weapons at military installations, Luongo said. Last year's  meltdown at Japan's Fukushima nuclear power plant also shows how  terrorists could launch a radiation hazard simply by sabotaging a  facility's functions.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;There needs to be more political leadership from the top, and countries  need to stop talking about what they're doing individually and  acknowledge that this is a cross-border international issue,&quot; Luongo  said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gy4s-AzitxeKZ4WU_YCwAxGCsk2A?docId=17a71895d6a74b6d83e492c751a41a45">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Leaders begin addressing nuke safety]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f0d54cb1-8927-40af-9d3e-4d42668e59f8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><font id="font"> One of the notable achievements of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit is  that global leaders made progress in addressing the safety of nuclear  facilities, a key global challenge after the Fukushima crisis last year,  according to experts Tuesday.</font></p>
<p><font>...</font></p>
<p><font id="font">Kenneth Luongo, president of the Washington-based  non-profit group Partnership for Global Security, pointed to weak  international confidence in nuclear security as a key challenge that  needs to be countered at the third nuclear security summit to be held in  the Netherlands. <br />
<br />
&ldquo;What the summit needs to do going forward is really focus on the issue  of how we are going to raise the level of international confidence in  nuclear security in every country,&rdquo; he told The Korea Times. <br />
<br />
&ldquo;One of the ways to do this is to make sure that there is some  uniformity in the standards by which nuclear materials are protected  because we are running out of countries that are willing to give up  them.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
Luongo said these materials are going to be around for a long time.<br />
<br />
The expert assessed the outcome of the Seoul summit positively. &ldquo;Some of  the commitments which have been made with relation to removing  weapons-usable nuclear materials from different countries will take them  out of a state of vulnerability and make them more secure,&rdquo; he said.  &ldquo;That&rsquo;s very positive.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
Duyeon Kim, deputy director of Nuclear Non-Proliferation of the Center  for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, said one of the notable  accomplishments of the Seoul summit was that world leaders began paying  attention to improving nuclear safety.  <br />
<br />
&ldquo;Fukushima taught us that nuclear energy is not 100 percent safe,&rdquo; she said. </font></p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/03/371_107823.html"><font>View full article...</font></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Smaller Pact Expected at Seoul Nuclear Talks ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4d445342-0bf9-467a-93aa-560a19636e2b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>As 54 world leaders gathered Monday for a second summit on nuclear  security, the seemingly uncontroversial goal they set at their first  meeting two years ago&mdash;securing and reducing radioactive materials that  can be turned into bombs&mdash;has turned out to be difficult to do.</p>
<p>Working-level discussions have bogged down over issues of national  sovereignty, competing corporate interests, trade priorities and  differing perceptions about the threat of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>Even  with the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in Japan last year serving to  focus world attention on the danger nuclear materials can present, the  negotiations on nuclear security have become as complicated as ...</p>
<p>...</p>
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<p>&quot;This is a summit that is going to have a lot of bureaucratic successes but not a lot of vision successes,&quot; said Ken Luongo, co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a U.S.-based consortium of about 60 think tanks and activist groups world-wide that concentrate on nuclear issues. &quot;We need all the things that are being announced over the next two days, but it's not sufficient. We need a bigger vision of where we need to go.&quot;</p>
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<p>Mr. Luongo's group in recent months has urged nations to design a new level of international governance over nuclear-related matters and set hard deadlines for change, in part because a nuclear accident or terrorist act won't simply affect one country.</p>
<p>&quot;This summit and the last summit have almost exclusively focused on the sovereign nature of nuclear security,&quot; he said. &quot;What Fukushima proved is that radiation crises do not respect borders.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB10001424052702303816504577305471158594842,00.html?mod=vocus">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Worldwide Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4f998084-d8a4-4210-939e-5f70effc5e94]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div class="node-body segment-node-body">
<p>Weapons-grade nuclear  material is stored at an estimated one hundred sites worldwide. Many of  these sites are unsecured, leaving them vulnerable to terrorists.   Leaders of 54 nations are meeting in South Korea on the second of a  two-day summit on keeping nuclear material out of the hands of  terrorists.  But the world&rsquo;s biggest nuclear concerns remain focused on  North Korea and Iran, who did not attend the Summit but whose actions  loom large over its participants.  Diane and guests discuss the global  nuclear summit and what it means for the future of worldwide security.</p>
</div>
<div class="fieldgroup group-guests">
<h3>Guests</h3>
<div class="content">
<div class="content-multigroup-wrapper content-multigroup-0">
<div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-guest">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">Joseph Cirincione</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-type-text field-field-guest-credentials">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">
<p>president, Ploughshares Fund</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="content-multigroup-wrapper content-multigroup-1">
<div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-guest">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">Corey Hinderstein</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-type-text field-field-guest-credentials">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">
<p>vice president, international program, The Nuclear Threat Initiative</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="content-multigroup-wrapper content-multigroup-2">
<div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-guest">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">Stephen Rademaker</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-type-text field-field-guest-credentials">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">
<p>principal, The Podesta Group, and former  Assistant Secretary of State for President Bush (2002 - 2006), where he  directed nonproliferation policy toward Iran and North Korea</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="content-multigroup-wrapper content-multigroup-3">
<div class="field field-type-nodereference field-field-guest">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">Yochi Dreazen</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="field field-type-text field-field-guest-credentials">
<div class="field-items">
<div class="field-item odd">
<p>senior national security correspondent, National Journal magazine</p>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
</div>
<p><a href="http://thedianerehmshow.org/shows/2012-03-27/worlwide-nuclear-security-summit">Listen to interview...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 27 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama: US and Russia Should Further Reduce Nuke Stockpiles]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1a9ae9ed-8446-4cc4-b15d-3cfc367000a8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Seoul - President Obama says he wants to further reduce America's nuclear stockpile and will press the issue when he meets with Russia's President-elect Vladimir Putin at Camp David in May.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Obama and more than 50 other world leaders will kick off the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul later today. The summit is a followup to the 2010 summit that Obama hosted in Washington, where he set the lofty goal of securing all loose nuclear material by 2014.</p>
<p>Obama said that the international community has made great strides in the last two years toward securing nuclear material. He applauded Georgia and Moldova for seizing highly enriched uranium from smugglers and noted the killing of Osama bin Laden, whose al-Qaeda terrorist network has sought a nuclear weapon.</p>
<p>About 80% of the commitments made at the first Nuclear Security Summit have been achieved, according to a report by the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of leading U.S. non-proliferation and nuclear security experts.</p>
<p><a href="http://content.usatoday.com/communities/theoval/post/2012/03/obama-us-and-russia-should-further-reduce-nuke-stockpile/1">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[IAEA Says Nuclear Security Improving, More to Be Done]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6c732336-3b4a-4341-95da-177437983e9a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>VIENNA, March 21 (Reuters) - More still needs to be done to safeguard nuclear and radioactive materials given the scores of security incidents the U.N. atomic agency hears about each year, a senior official said on Wednesday.</p>
<p>Khammar Mrabit, a director of the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, said much had been achieved in the last decade to help make it harder for militants to carry out &quot;malicious acts&quot; involving potentially dangerous nuclear substances.</p>
<p>But, Mrabit told reporters ahead of next week's Nuclear Security Summit in <a href="/places/south-korea" title="Full coverage of South Korea">South Korea</a>: &quot;Nuclear security is work in progress. Continuous improvement is a must. Complacency is bad.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>The 2010 summit focused attention and galvanized action to better secure nuclear materials,&quot; said Kelsey Davenport, co-author of a report published this month by the U.S.-based Arms Control Association.</p>
<p>&quot;It would be a huge missed opportunity if states do not make significant new commitments and adopt higher nuclear security standards in Seoul to better safeguard vulnerable nuclear material,&quot; she said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/21/nuclear-security-iaea-idUSL6E8EKA3W20120321">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama's Goal of Nuclear Security Still Far Off]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=625e85c1-18e7-4f03-a3dc-04a3020cc6d8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>WASHINGTON (AP) &mdash; Halfway into an ambitious four-year effort to  safeguard nuclear materials from terrorists, President Barack Obama and  other world leaders are lagging behind their self-imposed goals and  facing renewed threats from Iran and North Korea. They're giving  themselves a checkup at next week's summit in the South Korean capital,  Seoul.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>An independent Arms Control Association study this month found  overall that global leaders have kept about 80 percent of 67 voluntary  commitments made at the 2010 summit to reduce or better secure stocks of  nuclear materials. The study cautioned that &quot;the nuclear material  security challenge will not be solved even after all the national  commitments made ... are completed.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Another independent report earlier this year, from the Nuclear Threat  Initiative, gave poor grades to many of the 32 nations believed to  possess such material. It concluded there is not yet a global consensus  about what the priorities should be or how materials should be tracked  and protected. Radioactive components of civilian nuclear power plants  count as nuclear material, as do nuclear weapons.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gWTPd5_bmTRu_dV7NP67dECcm92Q?docId=2efd05911ffb4e4d8fd935f92dc24a63">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[What Seoul Can and Can't Achieve]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d836a0b2-7a10-4f28-9407-0b52cc37710c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&lsquo;Beyond Security, Towards Peace&rsquo;: the official slogan of next week&rsquo;s <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/eng_main/main.jsp" title="Seoul Nuclear Security Summit (new window)">Nuclear Security Summit</a>  is plastered around Seoul. And as South Korea prepares to host the  largest gathering of world leaders on its soil, hopes are high for  significant agreements aimed at protecting nuclear materials, including  preventing them from falling into the hands of terrorists.</p>
<p>However, the summit is already being <a target="_blank" href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/03/23/world/asia/korea-nuclear-summit-preparations/index.html?eref=edition&amp;utm_source=dlvr.it&amp;utm_medium=twitter&amp;utm_campaign=cnni" title="CNN: Seoul prepares for nuclear security summit (new window)">overshadowed</a>  by North Korea&rsquo;s planned satellite launch next month. Furthermore,  while the agenda will include measures to better protect nuclear  weapons-grade materials and nuclear facilities &ndash; as well as to prevent  the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials &ndash; a weak international  governance framework makes it virtually impossible for summits like  these to effectively eliminate the nuclear-security threat.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>When not trying to galvanise action against his northern neighbour&rsquo;s  proposed satellite launch, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak has  pledged that the summit will produce <a target="_blank" href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/19/13/0301000000AEN20120319000100315F.HTML" title="Yonhap: Lee: Nuclear Security Summit expected to produce concrete outcomes (new window)">&lsquo;more advanced and concrete&rsquo;</a> results than the <a target="_blank" href="http://www.state.gov/t/isn/nuclearsecuritysummit/2010/index.htm" title="2010 Nuclear Security Summit (new window)">2010 summit in Washington</a> (<em>pictured</em>).  These are likely to include a consensus pledge to minimise the use of  highly enriched uranium (HEU) in civilian research reactors (although  the time frame might not be finalised), and a promise on the part of  more than ten countries to remove or eliminate their own weapons-grade  materials. However, it could be <a target="_blank" href="http://www.iiss.org/conferences/eu-non-proliferation-and-disarmament-conference/speeches/special-session-4/" title="EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Conference - Session 4 on nuclear security (new window)">six to ten years</a> before these commitments are fulfilled.</p>
<p><a href="http://iissvoicesblog.wordpress.com/2012/03/23/what-seoul-can-and-cant-achieve/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Report Examines Effort To Secure Loose Nukes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=59783d13-fa06-45d4-b401-098ef483490f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>ROBERT SIEGEL, HOST:</p>
<p>As Mike Shuster said  a moment ago, the main subject of the summit in South Korea is the  problem of potentially insecure nuclear materials around the world. For  short, loose nukes. In April 2009, President Obama called for a global  effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world in  four years.</p>
<p>Well, on the eve of the Seoul  Summit, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at  Harvard's Kennedy School has released a progress report on that  four-year effort. And joining us is one of the authors, Matthew Bunn, a  former White House staffer who's now at Harvard and is a specialist on  this issue. Welcome to the program once again.</p>
<p>DR. MATTHEW BUNN: Good to be here.</p>
<p>SIEGEL:  And first, what's encouraging in your progress report is that you have  there has been some progress. How do you measure that progress?</p>
<p>BUNN:  Well, it's a hard thing to measure, the progress. But we look at those  stocks of nuclear material or nuclear weapons that seemed to us to pose  some of the highest risks. And we say, is something being done to reduce  that risk and is it significant? And we find that for most of the  highest risk stocks, the answer is yes.</p>
<p>For  example, Ukraine just got rid of all of the weapons usable nuclear  material on its soil. The one area where we said, you know, there is  progress on nuclear security but the things that threaten that nuclear  security are growing even faster, and so the risk is getting worse and  not better, was Pakistan.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>President Obama and other world leaders are meeting in South Korea to  discuss the problem of insecure nuclear material. Matthew Bunn,  co-author of a new report on loose nukes and an associate professor at  Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, offers his  insight.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.npr.org/2012/03/26/149411800/report-examines-effort-to-secure-loose-nukes">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Una cumbre para evitar que armas nucleares caigan en manos terroristas]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=8dbbba12-572f-4b8c-b009-2363aa438d06]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Al margen de las guerras at&oacute;micas, los ataques con armas nucleares  perpetrados por terroristas son la peor pesadilla de casi todos los  gobiernos. Con el objetivo de evitar que las organizaciones terroristas  logren obtenter este tipo de material, hoy se iniciar&aacute; en la capital de  Corea del Sur la segunda cumbre de Seguridad Nuclear.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;El terrorismo nuclear sigue siendo un peligro real&quot;, advierte Matthew  Bunn, de la Harvard Kennedy School, al margen de los debates previos a  la cumbre. Seg&uacute;n Bunn, ya se han registrado intentos terroristas de  acceder a armas y material nuclear.  <br />
<br />
El especialista explica que  existen tres tipos de terrorismo nuclear: la explosi&oacute;n at&oacute;mica, el  sabotaje de instalaciones nucleares y las<i> bombas sucias</i>.  <br />
<br />
Bunn se&ntilde;ala que es mucho m&aacute;s sencillo fabricar una <i>bomba sucia </i>que lograr una explosi&oacute;n at&oacute;mica. En ambos casos, un explosivo convencional libera sustancias radiactivas.  <br />
<br />
Entre  los aspectos positivos de la primera cumbre, Partnership for Global  Security destaca en un informe que casi un 80% de los 67 puntos fijados  fueron cumplidos. Esas pautas incluyen garantizar la seguridad de m&aacute;s de  13 toneladas de uranio enriquecido y plutonio en Kazajst&aacute;n y la  eliminaci&oacute;n de Chile de su uranio altamente enriquecido.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.malagahoy.es/article/mundo/1218400/una/cumbre/para/evitar/armas/nucleares/caigan/manos/terroristas.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama: U.S. can afford to have fewer nukes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=0e781592-f028-4825-abdc-18edc7d79cde]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>(CBS News) SEOUL - Setting the tone for a nuclear security summit,  President Obama reiterated Monday his call for a world without nuclear  weapons.</p>
<p>Mr. Obama told a university audience in South  Korea that the U.S. possesses more nuclear arms than it needs, and can  reduce that arsenal without damaging America's security.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>It appears the summit countries will not achieve their reduction  targets any time soon. Sharon Squassoni, a nuclear security expert with  the Center for Strategic and International Studies, says, despite some  progress, &quot;we're still quite a ways away from the original goal of  securing all vulnerable nuclear material in four years.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;I  don't think you'll get a lot of sexy headlines out of this summit,&quot;  Squassoni tells CBS Radio News. &quot;What you will get is the kind of boring  diplomatic, 'gee, there's continued commitment.'&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-57404373-503544/obama-u.s-can-afford-to-have-fewer-nukes/?utm_source=feedburner&amp;utm_medium=feed&amp;utm_campaign=Feed%3A+CBSNewsGamecore+%28GameCore%3A+CBSnews.com%29">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Analysis: North Korea: Odd man out, yet everywhere]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b7c8951b-591d-4562-9fa0-1c06e5a8a16f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The White House called North Korea the odd man out. President Barack Obama counted it back in.</p>
<p>Billed as a trip about securing dangerous nuclear material, Obama's  mission here has morphed into a concentrated and calculated opportunity  to warn, cajole and shame North Korea to change course. He has stared  down North Korea from an observation post, lectured its leaders, pleaded  for them to choose peace and belittled them as living 50 years in the  past.</p>
<p>Some of this was bound to happen. By holding a nuclear security  summit in South Korea, the world was inviting the shadow of the  uninvited neighbor to the north, whose nuclear weapons program, missile  testing and murky intentions tend to seize attention. Then the North's  plan for a long-range rocket launch unnerved the leaders gathered here.</p>
<p>Obama took it deeper, inviting a showdown rather than dismissing  North Korea as distraction. In an imagery-filled visit to the  demilitarized no-man's land between North and South, in his comments  with the South Korean president, in his appearance before reporters and  in his lobbying with China, Obama pounded on North Korea's behavior.</p>
<p>Politically, Obama had little to lose by getting tough on North Korea,  but plenty if he didn't. Up for election at home, and promising friends  in Asia they are a new focal point of America's strategic interest,  Obama's leadership surely would have been scrutinized had he passed up  the chance to take a stand while here.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;It's hard enough to keep attention on nuclear security, because  there is disagreement on the threat and what to do about it,&quot; said  Sharon Squassoni, director of the proliferation prevention program at  the Center for Strategic and International Studies. And then throw in  the distracting effect of North Korea.</p>
<p>&quot;A summit is a completely inappropriate venue for dealing with the  North Korean threat,&quot; she added. &quot;A summit of 54 leaders is not a  negotiating forum.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.wenatcheeworld.com/news/2012/mar/26/analysis-north-korea-odd-man-out-yet-everywhere/">View full article...</a><br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Leaders Target Loose Nuclear Material, Draft Communique Says]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a141a4c3-70fd-455e-9c1e-9e09d3d2f608]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>World leaders may pledge tighter controls over nuclear materials to keep them out of the hands of terrorists, according to the draft of a communique to be released at the end of their two-day meeting in Seoul.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;One of the virtues of the nuclear security summit process is that all countries can agree that it is worthwhile to prevent nuclear terrorism, even if they cannot agree on proliferation, disarmament, and nuclear energy issues,&rdquo; Matthew Bunn, a Harvard University professor and former adviser to President Bill Clinton, wrote today in an e-mailed response to questions.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;The summit participants include countries who want the nuclear weapon states to commit to rapid nuclear disarmament and states with nuclear weapons that absolutely oppose going to zero any time soon,&rdquo; Bunn said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;We&rsquo;re at the beginning of a much different nuclear era,&rdquo; Kenneth Luongo, President of the Partnership for Global Security and a former arms-control adviser at the Department of Energy, said in an interview in Seoul. &ldquo;Nuclear power will begin growing in much more dangerous neighborhoods as the world population grows and energy demands increase.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-26/leaders-target-loose-nuclear-material-draft-communique-says">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Hu in Seoul for key nuclear meeting]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f62e7c67-cfc3-47b0-9949-a0518ca8ef79]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Hu Jintao arrived in the capital of the Republic of Korea on Sunday for the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, a key meeting that will tackle the threat of global nuclear terror.</p>
<p>The summit will discuss measures to protect nuclear material and facilities from terrorist groups. Leaders from more than 50 countries and four international organizations will attend the summit on March 26-27. A joint declaration stressing security measures is expected at its conclusion.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University's John F Kennedy School of Government, told China Daily that there remains a &quot;very real danger&quot; that terrorists could get a nuclear bomb and use it to destroy a major city.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/26/content_14909091.htm">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Globaler «Atomgipfel»: Westlicher Appell an Iran und Nordkorea ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b8033ab4-92f8-40c0-b6f6-aec7da1eefec]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span class="leadContent">
<p><span class="leadContent">
<p>Zum Beginn des internationalen Atomgipfels in S&uuml;dkorea haben  westliche Staaten Nordkorea und den Iran aufgerufen, auf den Bau von  Atomwaffen zu verzichten. US-Pr&auml;sident Barack Obama bot Russland  gleichzeitig an, das Atomwaffenarsenal der beiden Grossm&auml;chte weiter zu  verringern.</p>
<p>...</p>
</span></p>
</span></p>
<p>&laquo;Der Nuklearterrorismus bleibt eine reale Gefahr&raquo;, warnte Matthew  Bunn von der Harvard Kennedy School am Rande von  Vorbereitungsdiskussionen &uuml;ber den Gipfel in Seoul. Es gebe Versuche von  Terroristen, an Atomwaffen und -materialien zu gelangen.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.tagesschau.sf.tv/Nachrichten/Archiv/2012/03/26/International/Globaler-Atomgipfel-Westlicher-Appell-an-Iran-und-Nordkorea">View full article...</a></p>
<p><span class="leadContent">
<p><span class="leadContent"> </span></p>
</span></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Pakistan's nuclear arsenal is the most vulnerable in the world]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=47590cd7-27ca-45f1-9cea-b03d0b802725]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><font size="5">I</font><em>t is a sweltering summer day.   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>Truckers  caught in the traffic on the bustling highway from Multan to Rawalpindi  swear at the heat and mull over the convoy of seemingly unconnected  trucks traveling the other way from the garrison town where the Pakistan  army has its headquarters to the bustling city in the Punjab.   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>'They don't look like truck<em>wallah</em>s,' one driver tells the cleaner, sitting alongside, digging his nose. 'They look <em>fauji</em>.'   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>Suddenly, out of almost nowhere it seems, a gaggle of pick-up trucks and SUVs block either end of the '<em>fauji</em>' convoy.   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>Shooting breaks out between the men in the trucks and the men in the pick-up vehicles.   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>The  exchange of fire continues for several minutes. Traffic halts  instantaneously. People take cover. Even in Pakistan where gunfire is a  daily occurrence these days, the vehemence of the encounter is  startling.   </em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>When the  firing stops, men from the pick-up trucks emerge, wearing radioactive-  protective uniforms. They seem to know what they are looking for,  quickly entering one of the trucks and taking away what appears to be a  small canister.</em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>...</em></font></p>
<p><font size="2" face="ARIAL">The Nuclear Security Summit is not country  specific. It did not discuss the many threats to Pakistan's nuclear  weapons in Washington and it is unlikely the meeting in Seoul will do  so, at least externally -- even though as Matthew Bunn, Eben Harrell and  Martin B Mallin noted in their eve-of the second-NSS report released on  Friday, <b>'Pakistan's nuclear assets face a greater threat from extremists seeking nuclear weapons than any other stockpile on earth.'</b></font></p>
<p><a href="http://www.rediff.com/news/slide-show/slide-show-1-why-the-world-must-worry-about-pakistans-nuclear-arsenal/20120326.htm"><font size="2" face="ARIAL"><em>View full article...</em></font></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The Nuclear Threat has not diminished]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ec571efd-e1f0-4cf7-8902-b967d46d5063]]></link>
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<p class="MsoNormal">This article <a href="http://www.clarin.com/opinion/amenaza-nuclear-disminuido_0_669533181.html">originally appeared</a> in <em>Clarin</em>, a newspaper in&nbsp;Argentina.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:16.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
line-height:115%;mso-ansi-language:EN-US">The Nuclear Threat has not diminished</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">Under the motto &ldquo;Beyond security, towards peace&rdquo; fifty-three heads of state and leaders of international organizations will gather next Monday in Seoul to agree on further steps to strengthen nuclear security. A meeting of this magnitude shows the importance that is given to nuclear terrorism as a real and tangible threat.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">The theft of highly sensitive materials &ndash; either highly enriched uranium or plutonium - and the subsequent explosion of a crude nuclear bomb in any overpopulated city constitutes the most frightening scenario. The dispersion of radioactive material would lead, not only to contamination of people but also to a high disruption of the social functioning. And an attack on a nuclear facility would entail a new &ldquo;Fukushima.&rdquo;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">Although this subject constitutes for some people a priority artificially imposed by the Western powers, evidences show the opposite. Besides the tragic loss of human lives, it is clear that, should an attack of these characteristics occur anywhere in the world, no country would be exempt of its catastrophic consequences.<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp; </span>The economic downturn caused by a nuclear terrorism event would, for example, drag tens of millions under the poverty line due to the collapse of countless productive activities. These impacts would generate a very different world for the worse, than the one we today know. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">On the other side, many events show the existence of a real risk and the need for global actions. It is well known that terrorist organizations are committed to acquire weapons of mass destruction and their technology. Besides, the nuclear material stockpiles worldwide suitable for these ends are so vast, that they would allow the building of over one hundred thousand nuclear weapons. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">In this scenario, the President of the United States, Barack Obama, summoned the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, in 2010, to deal with this subject. During that meeting, measures were agreed by world leaders to achieve greater security for nuclear materials and prevent their illicit trafficking. Almost 30 countries, including Argentina, undertook voluntary commitments to reduce their vulnerabilities, from the reduction of their sensitive material stockpiles to the strengthening of their international obligations through the signature and ratification of treaties and initiatives on the matter.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">To the success of the 2010 Summit &ndash;80% of acquired voluntary commitments have been met so far&ndash; comes now the challenge of the Seoul Summit, organized this time by the government of the Republic of Korea. Argentina, as a country with state of the art nuclear technology, will once again be present in this extremely high level forum. During the presidential debates there will be opportunity to go into more detail on what has already been accomplished on the matter of prevention with the conviction that there still remains much to do.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">From the standpoint of Latin America our moral obligation goes beyond preventing a possible event of nuclear terrorism. The greatest challenge to avoid is that none of our countries, whether it be by direct action or because of their own vulnerabilities &ndash;corruption, poor institutional quality, tolerance to organized crime &ndash; <span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;</span>may contribute in any form to the occurrence of a terrorist attack, anywhere in the world. </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">The tenor of decisions at the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit will point to reinforcing, without a doubt, the sovereign rights of nations regarding the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Certainly, responsibility of countries in combating nuclear terrorism will benefit in many aspects their peaceful nuclear development, as it will increase their credibility, reliability and international support.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-ansi-language:EN-US">Irma Arg&uuml;ello, NPSGlobal Foundation Chair</span></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear security effort faces uncertain future]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a2fd85d9-76c8-4e17-b274-b6e974e79b70]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The bottleneck of grime-splattered cars and trucks loaded with food  supplies and industrial goods snaked in both directions over the Chui  River.</p>
<p>For centuries this outpost in Central Asia was a stop along  the Silk Road, the ancient trade route from the Far East to Arabia. At  dusk on a recent Tuesday, it was one point in a vast monitoring network  being set up across the former Soviet Union and beyond to detect illicit  nuclear materials that could fall into the hands of terrorists.</p>
<p>Yet,  this interdiction effort, a major part of President Obama&rsquo;s ambitious  plan to prevent nuclear terrorism, is in jeopardy. Administration  officials, citing fiscal restraints and a need to reassess the campaign,  want to cut funding for the project by 65 percent.</p>
<p>Nonproliferation specialists are denouncing the proposed cuts, contending the need for protection is as urgent as ever.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;It  just doesn&rsquo;t make any sense to be whittling that number down,&rsquo;&rsquo; said  Ken Luongo, the former director of the office of arms control and  nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, the  Department of Energy group that oversees the effort. &ldquo;The justification  for why they are cutting the budget is zero.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://articles.boston.com/2012-03-26/nation/31237055_1_nuclear-materials-nuclear-terrorism-global-threat-reduction-initiative">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[US Expert Says Threat of Nuclear Terrorism is 'Very Real']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e3e8b885-698e-41f4-a8ca-bfb8de9b2b88]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h3>The threat posed by nuclear terrorism is  &quot;very real&quot; in the view of US nuclear security expert Alexandra Toma, who  spoke in the South Korean capital.</h3>
<p>The threat posed by nuclear terrorism is &quot;very real&quot; in the view  of US nuclear safety expert Alexandra Toma, who spoke to reporters in the South  Korean capital.</p>
<p>&quot;There is intelligence that confirms that terror organizations are  seeking weapons of mass destruction,&quot; says Toma, co-chair of the  steering committee of the Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG).</p>
<p>It is generally accepted that al-Qaeda has tried to get its hands on a  nuclear weapon, although it has not yet managed to do so, Toma says.</p>
<p>There have been 20 known cases of smuggling highly enriched uranium  or plutonium - the raw materials for a bomb - according to data obtained  by the FMWG, an umbrella body of more than 60 international  organizations dedicated to improving nuclear safety, and providing  recommendations to the US adminstration.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.businesslive.co.za/world/int_generalnews/2012/03/26/us-expert-says-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-very-real">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[2012 Nuclear Security Summit: So What?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fb8c6e3c-304d-45cc-a5ce-c19ccb91deb1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Fifty-eight world leaders will be in Seoul, Korea Monday and Tuesday to agree on ways to prevent nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>Since when have we ever seen a nuclear terrorist incident?</p>
<p>True, nuclear terrorism is an extremely low probability scenario but its consequences are unimaginable.</p>
<p>Still, the threat is certainly real because terrorist groups  including al-Qaeda are believed to pursue weapons of mass destruction.  And an international consensus exists on the threat. More sobering is  that there&rsquo;s enough nuclear materials in the world to make 100,000  additional nuclear bombs.</p>
<p>Who really cares except a select group of policy wonks?</p>
<p>By agreeing to chair this summit, the largest Seoul has ever hosted,  Korea has entered tough waters. It would, and still, puzzle many:  nuclear terrorism is still a foreign concept for Koreans, they don&rsquo;t  have nuclear weapons or fissile materials, and security is always framed  in the context of their number one threat, North Korea, which does not  even make it on the Summit agenda, though for good reason. So the lack  of initial interest and awareness is natural. The other problem is the  lack of public outreach and education on the issue ahead of the Summit  and amid this increasingly globalized and interconnect world &ndash; but this  is true for all countries, not just Korea.</p>
<p><a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2012/3/26/1523/51610">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Danger of Nuclear-Armed Extremists Persists, U.S. President Says]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ae110356-5b74-42c7-88ad-800c02a287e5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The potential for extremists to detonate a nuclear weapon or  radiological &quot;dirty bomb&quot; is still among the most significant dangers  facing the international community, President Obama said on Monday in  comments reported by Agence France-Presse (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/administration-touts-nuclear-security-accomplishments-eve-summit/"><em>GSN</em></a>, March 26).</p>
<p>Nations have achieved large strides since 2010 in securing potential  nuclear-weapon fuel against extremists, the U.S. leader said prior to  the start of this week's Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea.</p>
<p>&quot;But we're under no illusions. We know that nuclear material -- enough  for many weapons -- is still being stored without adequate protection,&quot;  Obama said. &quot;We know that terrorists and criminal gangs are still trying  to get their hands on it, as well as the radioactive material for a  dirty bomb ... the danger of nuclear terrorism remains one of the  greatest threats to global security.&quot;</p>
<p>State participants in the summit must &quot;keep at it&quot; and pursue  substantive actions to lock down atomic substances, he said in remarks  to heads of government or senior delegates for 53 countries.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;At the end of four years, the global risks of nuclear theft will be  significantly lower than they were before,&rdquo; said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard  University nuclear weapons expert who co-wrote the assessment. &ldquo;But  there will still be a great deal left to do to make sure that all the  world&rsquo;s stocks of nuclear weapons and the materials needed to make them  are protected from the full range of plausible terrorist and criminal  threats -- in a way that will last.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/danger-nuclear-armed-extremists-persists-us-president/">View full article...</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Ongoing Nuclear Threat Looms Over Seoul Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=df3dd75a-d3c3-478b-9a2f-87e054a5efa9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Six months after the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorists attacks on New York, Henry Kelly, then president of the Federation of American Scientists, warned U.S. leaders there may be worse to come.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Recent events make it necessary to take almost inconceivably evil acts seriously,&rdquo; he told members of the U.S. Senate&rsquo;s Foreign Relations Committee.</p>
<p>In a calm, determined voice he described the threat posed by nuclear terrorism &mdash; a risk so grave it looms over a two-day summit of 53 world leaders that opens in Seoul, South Korea, Monday.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;We believe the potential for nuclear terrorism remains high,&rdquo; said Page Stoutland, vice-president for nuclear security at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington-based think-tank.</p>
<p>&ldquo;There are currently thousands of tons of nuclear materials in the world and those materials today are stored at hundreds of sites in over 30 countries.&rdquo; he said. &ldquo;Some of those sites are well secured. Many are not, leaving weapons-usable nuclear materials vulnerable to theft or sale on the black market to terrorist organizations.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The elements of a perfect storm are in place: an ample supply of weapons-usable nuclear materials, an expansion of the knowledge and technical know-how to build a crude nuclear bomb accessible by the Internet or through rogue scientists and the determination of terrorists organizations to do it.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;There is an immense difference between the difficulty of making safe, reliable weapons for use in a missile or combat aircraft and making crude, unsafe, unreliable weapons for delivery by truck,&rdquo; said Matthew Bunn, a professor at Harvard University&rsquo;s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.</p>
<p>&ldquo;With highly enriched uranium, a gun-type bomb &mdash; like the one that obliterated Hiroshima &mdash; is very plausibly within the capabilities of a sophisticated terrorist group,&rdquo; he said.</p>
<p>With weapons-usable nuclear material stored in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries, under security situations that range from very stringent to virtually non-existent, the risk of terrorists acquiring bomb-making materials remains great.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Theft of only 0.01% of the world stockpile could cause a global catastrophe,&rdquo; Mr. Bunn said.</p>
<p><a href="http://fullcomment.nationalpost.com/2012/03/24/preventing-devastating-nuclear-terrorist-attack-aim-of-world-leaders-meeting/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Effort Faces Uncertain Future]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=9362f142-4c3d-455a-b585-6ec712c05c65]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>AK-ZHOL CROSSING, Kyrgyzstan - The bottleneck of grime-splattered  cars and trucks loaded with food supplies and industrial goods snaked in  both directions over the Chui River.</p>
<p>For centuries this outpost in Central Asia was a stop along the Silk  Road, the ancient trade route from the Far East to Arabia. At dusk on a  recent Tuesday, it was one point in a vast monitoring network being set  up across the former Soviet Union and beyond to detect illicit nuclear  materials that could fall into the hands of terrorists.</p>
<p>Yet, this  interdiction effort, a major part of President Obama&rsquo;s ambitious plan to  prevent nuclear terrorism, is in jeopardy. Administration officials,  citing fiscal restraints and a need to reassess the campaign, want to  cut funding for the project by 65 percent.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;It just doesn&rsquo;t make any sense to be whittling that number down,&rsquo;&rsquo;  said Ken Luongo, the former director of the office of arms control and  nonproliferation at the National Nuclear Security Administration, the  Department of Energy group that oversees the effort. &ldquo;The justification  for why they are cutting the budget is zero.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;It was a mistake to cut the budget as much as they did,&rsquo;&rsquo; said  Matthew Bunn of the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University&rsquo;s  Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs.</p>
<p>In a report  published Friday ahead of the nuclear security summit, Bunn stressed  that &ldquo;a multilayered effort to block the terrorist pathway to the bomb  is needed.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;There are 6,000 detectors in New York City,&rsquo;&rsquo; said Luongo, who is  now president of the Partnership for Global Security, &ldquo;but only 2,000 in  the rest of the world.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;There are 6,000 detectors in New York City,&rsquo;&rsquo; said Luongo, who is now president of the Partnership for Global Security, &ldquo;but only 2,000 in the rest of the world.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://articles.boston.com/2012-03-26/nation/31237055_1_nuclear-materials-nuclear-terrorism-global-threat-reduction-initiative/3">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Impact of Japanese accident 'will fade']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=02c2d112-172f-459a-a663-6fc8aeb16674]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Fukushima nuclear disaster drove the world to reflect on the nuclear energy industry, but the negative impact won't last long, experts said ahead of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.</p>
<p>Officials from 53 countries and international organizations are scheduled to attend the summit, which will be held on Monday and Tuesday in the capital of South Korea.</p>
<p>Nuclear generation itself is not on the formal agenda, but it will feature heavily at the summit because a great deal of trust in atomic energy was lost as a result of the Fukushima nuclear disaster in Japan last March.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>The impact of Fukushima has been far-reaching globally, but it varies from country to country, said Matthew Bunn, an associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government.</p>
<p>&quot;The countries that are the largest markets for new nuclear reactors - China, India, Russia, South Korea - are moving ahead. Some countries, such as Germany and Switzerland, have decided to phase out nuclear energy,&quot; he said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Almost all countries using nuclear energy have undertaken in-depth reviews of their nuclear safety rules and practices, and many introduced substantial new measures to ensure that reactors are better protected against events such as flooding and loss of power, Bunn said.</p>
<p>&quot;Unfortunately, few countries are drawing similar lessons about improving security - despite the possibility of terrorist attacks, for example, that might destroy both off-site power and back-up power for a reactor,&quot; he added.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;The No 1 topic on the agenda of the nuclear security summit in Seoul is how to protect nuclear material that can be used in a nuclear weapon - highly enriched uranium and plutonium - from falling into the hands of terrorists,&quot; said Togzhan Kassenova, an associate in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a Washington-based think tank.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Terrorists have also considered sabotage of reactors to cause a Fukushima-scale disaster, or spreading radioactive materials over an area in a so-called &quot;dirty bomb&quot;, Bunn said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012-03/26/content_14908702.htm">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama: Tenemos Mas Armas de las que Necesitamos]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=8216eb47-c699-4a2e-908a-fdf87c4efbef]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="p">Impedir otro <a href="http://www.abc.es/especiales/aniversario-tsunami-japon/" class="a">accidente como el de la central nuclear de <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U15025822728038nB" class="span">Fukushima</span></a> y evitar que grupos terroristas se hagan con armas at&oacute;micas. Esos son los dos objetivos de la <a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abci-obama-seul-201203260507.html" class="a">II Cumbre de Seguridad Nuclear</a>  que ha arrancado este lunes en Se&uacute;l, a la que asisten m&aacute;s de medio  centenar de jefes de Estado y Gobierno. Al frente se sit&uacute;a el presidente  de Estados Unidos, <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U1502582272803xwH" class="span">Barack Obama</span>,  quien en 2009 pronunci&oacute; en Praga su hist&oacute;rico discurso para reducir el  arsenal nuclear mundial y hace dos a&ntilde;os impuls&oacute; la primera reuni&oacute;n de  este foro en Washington.</p>
<p class="p">...</p>
<p class="p">Garantizar  su seguridad es crucial para todo el planeta, ya que cada vez hay m&aacute;s  material radiactivo que puede caer en malas manos y ser utilizado por  grupos terroristas. &laquo;Tenemos un problema global que exige una soluci&oacute;n  global, pero no hay requisitos de seguridad internacionales, sino solo  recomendaciones, para proteger los arsenales at&oacute;micos y las cada vez m&aacute;s  numerosas instalaciones nucleares de uso civil&raquo;, alerta Kenneth Luongo,  copresidente del Grupo de Trabajo de Materiales Fisibles. A su juicio,  la <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U150258227280302B" class="span">falta de estos est&aacute;ndares de seguridad obligatorios</span>  es una de las principales carencias de esta cumbre porque &laquo;se deber&iacute;a  garantizar que todos los pa&iacute;ses con aspiraciones nucleares est&aacute;n  preparados para controlar dicha energ&iacute;a&raquo;.</p>
<p class="p"><a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abci-obama-propone-eliminar-armas-201203261550.html">View full article...</a></p>
<p class="p">&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear summit highlights research reactor risk]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=adabcbb8-eb2e-49f4-9fc0-e92128a2ff5c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Today marks the beginning of the <a href="http://www.thenuclearsecuritysummit.org/eng_main/main.jsp">2012 nuclear security summit</a> in South Korea. Ahead of the meeting, US President Barack Obama delivered <a href="http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/03/26/remarks-president-obama-hankuk-university">a speech</a> at Hankuk University in Seoul, in which he reiterated his hope for a world free of nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>Obama has been particularly worried about the &lsquo;loose-nuke&rsquo; scenario,  in which a terrorist procures some nuclear material and fashions it into  a crude weapon. One source would be research reactors, many of which  were built during the height of the cold war and run on highly enriched  uranium-235 (HEU) &mdash; the same material used in basic nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>In 2010, I accompanied a group of American advisers as they spirited  uranium out of the Polish Institute of Atomic Energy in Otwock-?wierk,  30 kilometres southeast of Warsaw. It was a big undertaking, and you can  watch a shaky bit of video from my trip below.</p>
<p>The US <a href="http://nnsa.energy.gov/">National Nuclear Security Administration</a>,  which oversaw the operation, continues to work at converting research  reactors and removing nuclear material. Today the agency announced the  successful conversion of Mexico&rsquo;s lone research reactor to the less  dangerous low-enriched fuel.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>It&rsquo;s a positive step, but to really get the research-reactor problem  under control, the US needs to work on Russia, which has dozens of  HEU-fuelled research reactors (see diagram). After years of negotiation,  Russia has agreed to do &ldquo;feasibility studies&rdquo; on the possibility of  converting a handful of its reactors, according to Matthew Bunn, a  non-proliferation expert at Harvard University in Cambridge,  Massachusetts. But Russia, Bunn says, could do much more. The former  superpower &ldquo;has not yet committed even to do a study of which ones are  still needed, and which could be converted or shut down.&rdquo; Bunn has <a href="http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/Consolidation_Thwarting_Nuclear_Theft.pdf">a new report</a> out this month with a lot more detail on the research-reactor problem.</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/03/nuclear-summit-highlights-research-reactor-risk.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama's Chapter in the Story of Global Nuclear Non-Proliferation]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=15e9b3f7-9256-4fd7-b5b5-ecc2d8cd1f10]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="MsoNormal">In April 2010, Barack Obama convinced leaders from forty-seven countries to meet in Washington and discuss a topic to which most had previously paid scarce attention: securing vulnerable nuclear materials. Most of these leaders cared little about the matter at hand but were eager to please a popular new U.S. president with the goal of securing all nuclear materials within four years. The desire to cultivate Obama's favor had an important payoff: high-profile attention to an issue that has often lingered in obscurity, even compared to other concerns in the abstruse world of global nuclear politics. And that attention meant potentially significant progress in keeping nuclear-weapons materials from terrorists.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">The leaders at that summit also agreed that South Korea would host another nuclear-security summit in 2012. On the face of it, South Korea was a strange choice, given that it neither possessed nuclear weapons nor the materials to make them--highly enriched uranium or separated plutonium. But Obama's first choice, Russia, turned down the opportunity, and South Korea's president Lee Myung-bak was eager to raise Seoul's standing on the global stage and give the country's burgeoning nuclear-energy industry a global seal of approval.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">So, today, 50 or so leaders descend on Seoul to track progress since the last summit and make a batch of fresh commitments. While their presence is sure to be heralded by the U.S. government, Korean citizens are likely to be less welcoming. Many in Korea find it strange that their government should be putting so much effort into an event on nuclear terrorism when nuclear threats from North Korea and the effects of the Fukushima accident in Japan appear to be more pressing issues for the peninsula. Other countries share similar concerns, believing that the United States has devoted too much attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism at the expense of nonproliferation, safety, and disarmament issues.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal">These concerns are likely to limit the ambitions of those who would like to see governments make significantly deeper nuclear-security commitments at Seoul. They are also likely to hamper efforts to make the current biannual security-summit process an ongoing fixture of international relations--particularly if attempts are made to stretch the current process beyond Obama's four-year time frame. States face a choice: they can move forward with a wider process that takes in more issues in order to justify continued high-level attention; they can continue discussing a relatively narrow set of issues at a lower level; or they can maintain these high-level meetings but on a less frequent basis.</p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/03/obamas-chapter-in-the-story-of-global-nuclear-non-proliferation/251115/2/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts Urge Leaders to Think Globally About Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=682a12f3-be1b-4492-be94-d7c5162dbd55]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear security experts have called on governments to look beyond state lines  to tackle nuclear terrorism threats and disasters at a global level.  ?<br />
<br />
Members of the Fissile Materials Working Group said it was time for  states to look beyond their own individual commitments to the bigger picture as  they moved on from the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit held on Monday and Tuesday.  ?<br />
<br />
&ldquo;Nations are responsible, but they also have an international  obligation and how you match those two things up hasn&rsquo;t been tried and hasn&rsquo;t  really been worked on,&rdquo; said Kenneth Luongo, co-chairman of the FMWG which  advocates for stronger nuclear security efforts.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Nuclear power is going to grow in dangerous parts of the world, in particular  in the Middle East where there is not a safety or security culture,&rdquo; he said,  adding that every individual nation currently dealt with nuclear security its  own way. ?&ldquo;There is nothing that requires countries to adhere to a uniform  standard across borders and there is nothing that requires them to take specific  actions that the International Atomic Energy Agency or any other body tells them  to take.&rdquo;?And Miles Pomper, research associate at the James Martin Center for  Non-proliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute, said: &ldquo;The communique  itself, I am not really expecting much out of.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Duyeon Kim, deputy director of nuclear non-proliferation at the Center for Arms  Control and Non-proliferation, said this summit&rsquo;s success could be judged on  progress made since the first summit in Washington in 2010, new actions pledged  by state leaders, and how much money governments bring to the table to implement  their commitments. <br />
<br />
&ldquo;Our understanding is that 80 percent of the national  commitments (made in Washington) may have been completed but there is far more  work that needs to be done,&rdquo; she said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120326001273">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nucléaire : la Chine hausse le ton contre la Corée du Nord]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=8b793a2d-8b90-443d-87cc-d9e3a3ddddd8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Sous la pression de Washington, P&eacute;kin hausse le ton contre son  prot&eacute;g&eacute; nord-cor&eacute;en. &Agrave; l'ouverture du sommet sur la s&eacute;curit&eacute; nucl&eacute;aire &agrave;  S&eacute;oul, <a target="" href="http://plus.lefigaro.fr/tag/hu-jintao">Hu Jintao</a> a d&eacute;nonc&eacute; le projet de tir d'une fus&eacute;e annonc&eacute; par la <a target="" href="http://plus.lefigaro.fr/tag/coree-du-nord">Cor&eacute;e du Nord</a>,  prenant pour la premi&egrave;re fois ses distances avec le r&eacute;gime de Kim  Jong-un. Le num&eacute;ro un chinois a fait part de sa &laquo;vive inqui&eacute;tude&raquo; au  sujet de ce lancement qui a d&eacute;clench&eacute; une escalade r&eacute;gionale et a promis  &agrave; <a target="" href="http://plus.lefigaro.fr/tag/barack-obama">Barack Obama</a> d'intensifier ses efforts pour faire reculer son alli&eacute;.</p>
<p>Le  dossier nord-cor&eacute;en a domin&eacute; les discussions entre Hu et un pr&eacute;sident  am&eacute;ricain offensif qui a demand&eacute; &agrave; P&eacute;kin de changer de strat&eacute;gie  vis-&agrave;-vis de son turbulent petit fr&egrave;re communiste. L'approche suivie  jusqu'ici par la Chine &laquo;ne fonctionne pas&raquo;, avait d&eacute;clar&eacute; la veille  Obama, lors d'une rencontre avec son alli&eacute; sud-cor&eacute;en Lee Myung-bak.  Devant les &eacute;tudiants de l'Universit&eacute; Hankuk, &agrave; S&eacute;oul, le pr&eacute;sident  d&eacute;mocrate a mis en garde Pyongyang: &laquo;Il n'y aura pas de r&eacute;compense pour  les provocations, cette &eacute;poque est r&eacute;volue.&raquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&laquo;Ils ont &eacute;voqu&eacute; une possible r&eacute;duction des importations de p&eacute;trole. Mais  tout d&eacute;pendra de l'attitude de la Russie, car P&eacute;kin s'alignera sur  Moscou pour &eacute;viter l'isolement&raquo;, pr&eacute;dit Miles Pomper, expert au Monterey  Institute of International Studies.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2012/03/26/01003-20120326ARTFIG00552-nucleaire-la-chine-hausse-le-ton-contre-la-coree-du-nord.php">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 26 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seoul summit to target nuclear terror risk]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=397a7c09-e532-4327-9d6d-cc8329cc0a4a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>More than 50 heads of state are expected  to join a two-day summit that opens here on Monday to pledge steps to  minimise the risk of what analysts call a low-probability,  high-consequence event &mdash; nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">For the second  time in two years, leaders and their delegations are meeting to discuss  actions aimed at preventing nuclear terror scenarios portrayed for years  in popular fiction and movies &mdash; from Frederick Forsyth&rsquo;s 1984 book <i>The Fourth Protocol</i> to the 1997 thriller <i>The Peacemaker</i>, starring Nicole Kidman and George Clooney.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">Prime Minister  Manmohan Singh arrived here tonight to combine an official visit to  South Korea with the Nuclear Security Summit amid expectations that this  mega diplomatic event will nudge the world towards fresh actions to  bolster nuclear security.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">The Seoul summit  follows the first such event in Washington DC in 2010 that was widely  interpreted as a personal initiative by President Barack Obama. But  nuclear security analysts say a global consensus on what should be the  highest priority &mdash; the most effective &mdash; actions to prevent terrorists  from gaining access to nuclear materials does not exist.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">...</p>
<p align="left" class="story">&ldquo;There remains a very real danger that terrorists could get a nuclear  weapon and use it to destroy the heart of a major city,&rdquo; said Matthew  Bunn, associate professor at Harvard University, an authority in  research on nuclear theft and terrorism.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">...</p>
<p align="left" class="story">Over the past two decades, Bunn said, authorities have seized stolen,  highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium &mdash; raw materials for nuclear  weapons &mdash; in at least 20 cases in Bulgaria, Georgia, Lithuania and  Russia. The last seizure was in Moldova  last year where officials  arrested six smugglers who claimed they had access to 9-kg HEU.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">...</p>
<p align="left" class="story">&ldquo;Some sites are well-secured, many are  not,&rdquo; said Deepti Choubey, director for nuclear and bio-security with  the UK-based Nuclear Threat Initiative, a non-government think tank.  Unsecured materials leave them vulnerable to theft, sale on the black  market to terrorist organisations, she told <b>The Telegraph</b>.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">The security of  nuclear materials in Pakistan is a concern to many analysts. &ldquo;We have  very little confidence that the (Pakistan) nuclear programme is  absolutely secure or will remain secure,&rdquo; a senior Indian source said.  &ldquo;This is a big worry for us.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120325/jsp/nation/story_15292698.jsp#.T3DX_PVTIct">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Pak nuke stocks face most risk]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=66d5d8a8-3452-4012-a003-d09c36a13008]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear security experts have  labelled Pakistan&rsquo;s nuclear material stocks as more at risk of being  grabbed by terrorists than  any other in the world but  a Pakistani  diplomat today said such fears were unjustified.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">A report analysing  the  threat of nuclear terror and released on the eve of a nuclear  security summit that opens here tomorrow has said the nuclear materials  at the highest risk are in Pakistan, Russia and in research reactors  fuelled by highly-enriched-uranium.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">Several factors in  Pakistan &mdash; the threat of sympathetic insiders, the world&rsquo;s  fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and a weak government &mdash; expose its  nuclear assets to a greater threat from extremists seeking nuclear  weapons than any other stockpile on Earth, the report by researchers at  Harvard Kennedy Centre in the US said.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">But Pakistan&rsquo;s  ambassador in Seoul said today that  all of his country&rsquo;s nuclear   installations are well guarded. &ldquo;There should not be any  fear of any  type. All our  (nuclear) installations are well guarded,&rdquo; ambassador  Shaukat Mukkadam said.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">...</p>
<p align="left" class="story">The Indian sources as  well as the  co-authors of the Harvard report &mdash; Matthew Bunn, Eben Harrel and Martin  Malin &mdash; have expressed concern at the threat that  nuclear materials  face from &ldquo;insiders&rdquo;.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">Their report,  relying on unclassified information, said the threat of insiders within  Pakistan&rsquo;s military, security and nuclear establishments  is &ldquo;very real &mdash;  and may be growing&rdquo;.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">...</p>
<p align="left" class="story">&ldquo;Will Pakistan&rsquo;s Strategic Plans Division,  which controls (the country&rsquo;s) nuclear weapons, always be able to   exclude all personnel with  extremist sympathies?&rdquo; Bunn, Harrel and  Malin have asked in their report.</p>
<p align="left" class="story">Pakistan&rsquo;s growing  nuclear arsenal is another source of worry, they wrote. &ldquo;The country  has two plutonium reactors now operating and two under construction,  which will increase bulk processing of fissile material &mdash; the stage in  which the life cycle of nuclear material that historically has proven  the most vulnerable to insider theft.&rdquo;</p>
<p align="left" class="story"><a href="http://www.telegraphindia.com/1120326/jsp/nation/story_15295866.jsp#.T3DT7PVTIct">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[US still fixated by nuclear terror]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=482e8cb2-7af1-4885-b8b8-809b23adb1de]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>SEOUL &mdash; Visions of a mushroom cloud over a US city may have led  America into a dubious war in Iraq, but the threat of nuclear terror has  lost none of its power to fixate US leaders and shape foreign policy.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;What we have seen is increasing evidence of intentions... it is not  just Al-Qaeda, it is other organisations as well,&quot; said Sharon  Squassoni, of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.</p>
<p>&quot;It  is pretty shocking how much material is out there. 1440 tonnes of  highly enriched uranium, 500 tonnes of separated plutonium (which is)  weapons ready.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;I think America is absolutely safer now than it was three years  ago,&quot; said Kingston Reif of the Center for Arms Control and Non  Proliferation.</p>
<p>&quot;Seven countries have removed all their highly  enriched uranium. That is material that is no longer capable of being  used by terrorists in some kind of nuclear explosive device.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5hIIWIlImfnEHPRQ02t4wjEW0R6FA?docId=CNG.0008368da129efbedb740d4b4c908745.b11">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[National committments key to summit success]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2e0fd878-6fee-46a4-828c-bf8cc7752476]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Nuclear Security Summit, first held in Washington in 2010, takes its  origin in U.S. security strategies to prevent nuclear terrorism. <br />
<br />
Since  taking office in 2009, U.S. President Obama has tackled global threats  stemming from nuclear terrorism in a multilateral scheme.<br />
<br />
During  his speech in Prague in April 2009, Obama singled out nuclear terrorism  as the most serious threat to international security, announcing his  plan to lead a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material  around the world within four years.<br />
<br />
A year later, he held the  first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington where 47 heads of states and  three international organizations, the U.N., IAEA and EU, gathered  together.<br />
<br />
In Washington, the participating countries agreed on  the urgency and seriousness of nuclear threat, promising to work  together toward the four-year goal to secure all vulnerable nuclear  materials.<br />
<br />
Nuclear security experts say the Washington summit did  not produce with many results, except for adopting the Washington  Communique and the following work plan.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>According to the Global Fissile Material Report 2011 by the  International Panel on Fissile Materials, global stocks of  highly-enriched uranium for military and civilian purposes are estimated  to have reached 1,600 tons. The stock of plutonium, is estimated to be  500 tons ? enough for about 100,000 nuclear weapons.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>After the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. signed an agreement  with Russia to eliminate at least 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium,  said Miles Pomper, senior research associate of the James Martin Center  for Nonproliferation Studies.<br />
<br />
Pomper said, however, there are &ldquo;missing commitments&rdquo; in HEU minimization.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><br />
&ldquo;More ambitious goals are needed for the communique and work plan for 2012 and especially 2014,&rdquo; Pomper said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120325000145">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear experts discuss threats, challenges, solutions]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=29d3edd3-0477-44dc-bedd-be7ff3a6dafa]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Hundreds of nuclear security experts stressed the dangers of nuclear  threats in Seoul and discussed a variety of solutions for overcoming  challenges in securing fissile materials two days before South Korea  kicked off the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit.<br />
<br />
The nine-hour  Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium began with a keynote speech by Graham  Allison, director of the Belfer Center for Science and International  Affairs at Harvard University, who wrote &ldquo;Nuclear Terrorism: The  Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
He put a map of Seoul onto the  screen, raising the question of &ldquo;what if&rdquo; the densely populated city  comes under attack by nuclear terrorists.<br />
<br />
Allison stressed that the scenario was &ldquo;plausible&rdquo; and it could be a direct threat to South Koreans.<br />
<br />
If  terrorists smuggle a small amount of fissile materials into South  Korea, assemble them to make so-called &ldquo;dirty bombs&rdquo; and detonate them  in an important financial district, it will have a &ldquo;huge&rdquo; impact on the  global financial system, he warned.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Miles Pomper, senior research associate of James Martin Center for  Nonproliferation Studies, said there had been some progress in the last  two years in securing, eliminating and consolidating vulnerable nuclear  materials.<br />
<br />
&ldquo;States completed 80 percent of their individual commitments,&rdquo; Pomper said.<br />
<br />
However,  he added that such progress was not enough, and the Washington  Communiqu, which seeks to secure all vulnerable materials by 2014, was  not likely to be implemented on schedule.<br />
<br />
He called on countries  at the Seoul summit to set more ambitious goals in minimizing highly  enriched uranium and ratifying the Convention on the Physical Protection  of Nuclear Material.<br />
<br />
He also urged the states to develop a  system that can &ldquo;bundle together the disparate pieces of nuclear  security conventions, rules and standards.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreaherald.com/national/Detail.jsp?newsMLId=20120325000165">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to chart course to prevent nuclear terrorism ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a2e10221-ad64-4d15-af60-aee94fbc6ad7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>SEOUL (<strong>Xinhua</strong>) - World leaders are gathering in  Seoul for the Nuclear Security Summit due to open on Monday with one  common goal in mind: Preventing nuclear terrorist attacks, something  none of them has ever experienced.</p>
<p>Though never successfully pulled off, the threat of nuclear terrorist  attacks is on the rise and more than 50 heads of state attending the  summit are increasingly aware of the need to strengthen the global  nuclear security regime.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;It is important to recognize that even small amounts of (nuclear)  material in any country, if not adequately protected, are a danger,&quot;  Kenneth Luongo, head of the US-based Partnership for Global Security,  said at a recent symposium in Seoul.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;A single act of nuclear terrorism can potentially kill a countless  number of people and cause irrevocable damage,&quot; Professor Jun Bong-geun  at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy said in a recent interview.  &quot;There is a need for international efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism,  and the Nuclear Security Summit is part of the efforts.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;Most of the pledges required minimal action on the part of the state  and often reaffirmed initiatives already underway,&quot; Miles Pomper, a  senior research associate at the James Martin Center for  Nonproliferation Studies, said at a symposium earlier this week. &quot;States  were able to set their own standards as to what constituted progress.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=790894&amp;publicationSubCategoryId=200">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama in South Korea for Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c9807440-cf18-4a72-8b53-9ae36d887b42]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Barack Obama is in South Korea to take part in the Global  Nuclear Security Summit. This is the second meeting of its kind since  Mr. Obama took office. It brings together more than 50 national leaders  taking stock of progress in safeguarding dangerous nuclear materials and  discussing what else might need to be done to keep it out of the hands  of terrorists. President Obama arrives in South Korea at a time of  considerable tension. North Korea's threatening to carry out a  long-range rocket launch next week, an action this country has warned it  should not take. NPR's Mike Shuster reports from Seoul.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>SHUSTER: Despite success like this though, there is still much dangerous material floating around the globe. How much?</p>
<p>KENNETH LUONGO: It's a lot, and in some parts of the world, particularly in South Asia, it's continuing to grow.</p>
<p>SHUSTER:  Kenneth Luongo is president of the Partnership for Global Security. He  says there are still nations in the world, like Pakistan and India,  where little is known about how they secure these materials.</p>
<p>LUONGO:  The problem with terrorism is that they exploit gaps in the security  system. So small amounts of material, material in countries that don't  have a culture of security or safety, those are the kinds of places we  worry about.</p>
<p>SHUSTER: And that will be the heart of the discussion here over the next three days. Mike Shuster, NPR News, Seoul.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.npr.org/2012/03/25/149331727/obama-in-south-korea-for-nuclear-security-summit">Read or Listen to Full Interview...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear threat a clear and present danger]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=eca98c1d-3b57-426e-8dd4-13aa89738f96]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Threats of a Cold War nuclear attack sparked by aggression between  the Yanks and Ruskies are 20 years behind us. But the world is now  wrestling with a different nuclear threat - there's enough highly  enriched uranium and separated plutonium lying around to produce more  than 100,000 nuclear weapons, and not all of it is properly secured.</p>
<p>So this week, Prime Minister Stephen Harper will join over 50 world  leaders and UN, International Atomic Energy Agency and European Union  representatives in Seoul, South Korea, for the second Nuclear Security  Summit aimed at tackling that very murky threat.</p>
<p>It's not just about securing the stockpiles of weapons in nuclear  states - the U.S., U.K., Russia, France, Israel, China, Pakistan and  India - against terrorists. It's also about facing and fixing the myriad  security gaps in the nuclear power industry at large.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;There is more (weapons grade) material on civilian sites than all  weapons stockpiles put together,&quot; says Matthew Bunn, a nuclear security  expert with Harvard University.</p>
<p>Bunn says progress has been made since the inaugural nuclear summit  in Washington in 2010, when states committed to securing all vulnerable  nuclear material by 2014.</p>
<p>&quot;The bad news is we really have a long way to go,&quot; Bunn said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.edmontonsun.com/2012/03/23/nuclear-threat-a-clear-and-present-danger">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 25 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[La amenaza nuclear no ha disminuido]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f6ad7d13-8dce-4b14-9911-052d88a98aec]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>El pr&oacute;ximo lunes, bajo el lema &ldquo;M&aacute;s all&aacute; de la seguridad, hacia la  paz&rdquo;, 54 jefes de estado y l&iacute;deres de organizaciones multilaterales <b>se reunir&aacute;n en Se&uacute;l para acordar nuevas medidas para reforzar la seguridad nuclear.</b></p>
<p>Un encuentro de esta magnitud muestra la relevancia que se le otorga al terrorismo nuclear como amenaza real y tangible.</p>
<p>El  robo de material de alto riesgo (uranio altamente enriquecido o  plutonio) para fabricar una bomba at&oacute;mica rudimentaria y detonarla en  una ciudad superpoblada es el escenario m&aacute;s aterrador. La dispersi&oacute;n de  material radioactivo llevar&iacute;a no s&oacute;lo a la contaminaci&oacute;n de personas,  sino a una alta disrupci&oacute;n del funcionamiento social.</p>
<p><b>Y un atentado en una central nuclear provocar&iacute;a un nuevo &ldquo;Fukushima&rdquo;.</b></p>
<p>Aunque  este tema es para algunos una prioridad artificialmente impuesta por  las potencias occidentales, las evidencias parecen mostrar lo contrario.  Adem&aacute;s de la p&eacute;rdida de vidas humanas, si un acto de terrorismo nuclear  ocurriera en alg&uacute;n lugar ning&uacute;n pa&iacute;s estar&iacute;a exento de sus  consecuencias pol&iacute;ticas, econ&oacute;micas y sociales. Por ejemplo, el colapso  global de muchas actividades productivas llevar&iacute;a a millones de personas  bajo la l&iacute;nea de pobreza.</p>
<p><b>Estos impactos generar&iacute;an un mundo muy diferente al actual.</b></p>
<p>Por  otra parte, varios hechos muestran la existencia de un riesgo real y la  necesidad de tomar acciones globales. Varios grupos terroristas  expresaron su intenci&oacute;n de obtener tecnolog&iacute;a de armas de destrucci&oacute;n  masiva, particularmente la nuclear. Adem&aacute;s, los inventarios mundiales de  materiales nucleares son tan grandes que permitir&iacute;an construir m&aacute;s de  100.000 bombas at&oacute;micas.</p>
<p>En este escenario, el presidente  estadounidense, Barack Obama, convoc&oacute; a la Cumbre de Seguridad Nuclear  de Washington en 2010 para ocuparse del tema. All&iacute;, 50 l&iacute;deres mundiales  dieron los primeros pasos para, coordinadamente, <b>aumentar la seguridad de los materiales nucleares y prevenir su tr&aacute;fico il&iacute;cito.</b></p>
<p>Cerca  de 30 pa&iacute;ses, entre ellos Argentina, asumieron compromisos para reducir  sus debilidades ante el terrorismo nuclear, ya sea reduciendo  materiales sensitivos como adhiriendo y ratificando los tratados e  iniciativas en el tema.</p>
<p>A los logros de esta primera Cumbre (se cumplieron el 80% de los compromisos) se suma el desaf&iacute;o de la Cumbre de Se&uacute;l, <b>donde Argentina estar&aacute; presente.</b></p>
<p>All&iacute; se dar&aacute; un paso m&aacute;s en materia de prevenci&oacute;n y podr&iacute;an sentarse  las bases para cambiar el actual r&eacute;gimen internacional de seguridad  nuclear por otro mejor para enfrentar los riesgos futuros.</p>
<p><b>Con respecto a Latinoam&eacute;rica, la responsabilidad excede el evitar un incidente nuclear.</b></p>
<p>El mayor desaf&iacute;o es que ning&uacute;n pa&iacute;s de la regi&oacute;n, por acci&oacute;n o sus  propias vulnerabilidades (corrupci&oacute;n, baja calidad institucional o  tolerancia al crimen organizado), contribuya a que un eventual atentado  ocurra en cualquier lugar del mundo.</p>
<p>Un aspecto importante es que estos foros apuntan <b>a reforzar el derecho soberano de las naciones al uso pac&iacute;fico de la energ&iacute;a nuclear</b>  . En efecto, la responsabilidad con que un pa&iacute;s combata el terrorismo  nuclear beneficiar&aacute; de muchas formas a su desarrollo nuclear pac&iacute;fico,  ya que ganar&aacute; en credibilidad, confiabilidad y apoyo internacional.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.clarin.com/opinion/amenaza-nuclear-disminuido_0_669533181.html">View full article in <font face="Arial" size="2"> Diario Clar&iacute;n...</font></a></p>
<p><font face="Arial" size="2">(Translation forthcoming)</font></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 24 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[South Korea summit offers a stage for Obama's nuclear agenda]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b4890dcd-1e55-4e31-8bb2-dbd5895b55c8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Obama lands in South Korea this weekend hoping a summit  there will highlight his initiative to make the world safer from nuclear  terrorism, but the bitterly contested nuclear program just next door  may steal the spotlight.</p>
<p>Monday's nuclear security summit, a sequel to a forum Obama held in  Washington in 2010, is a step toward the White House goal of securing  &quot;all vulnerable nuclear material around the world&quot; by the middle of  2014.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;It's patchwork,&quot; said Kenneth Luongo, a nuclear security expert and  the founder of the Partnership for Global Security, whose organization  counts 18 confirmed cases of theft or loss of nuclear material in the  last 20 years. &quot;The requirements at the national level don't meet up  with the international requirements, and so we have gaps. And what  terrorists do, much like they did on9/11, is exploit gaps in security.&quot;</p>
<p>Roughly  80% of the commitments made at the 2010 summit &mdash; which vary from  playing host to a conference to removing all highly enriched uranium  from a country's border &mdash; have been completed, according to a review  conducted by the Arms Control Assn. and the Partnership for Global  Security.</p>
<p>The White House says it is proud of that record,  although it does not mention that the U.S. is among those countries that  hasn't finished its homework. Ratification of two nuclear security  treaties remains tied up in Congress.</p>
<p>Experts also note that  Obama's 2013 budget proposal seeks to trim funds for two agencies  considered crucial to the international effort.</p>
<p>Obama sought a 6%  cut to the agency that helps convert highly enriched uranium to a less  dangerous form or removes it altogether from sites deemed unsafe. The  budget seeks a 45% cut to the program that seeks to improve security at  sites and governments' ability to track smugglers.</p>
<p>&quot;Cuts to those  programs will slow down the progress for securing nuclear material.  There's just no way around that,&quot; said William Tobey, a senior fellow at  the Belfer Center.</p>
<p><a href="http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/24/world/la-fg-obama-korea-summit-20120324">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 24 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Push Slowing Down, Experts Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=9e55e455-593c-459a-b47c-0712f9a53c9e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>WASHINGTON &ndash; As leaders from more than 50 nations prepare for a major summit on nuclear security next week in Seoul, efforts to achieve <a title="More news, photos about President Obama" href="http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/People/Politicians,+Government+Officials,+Strategists/Executive/Barack+Obama">President Obama</a>'s lofty goal  of locking down loose nuclear material around the world by 2014 could be losing steam, analysts say.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p class="inside-copy">&quot;Much of the low-hanging fruit was picked by  countries at the 2010 summit,&quot; says Michelle Cann, a senior budget and  policy analyst at the independent Partnership for <a title="More news, photos about Global Security" href="http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Global+Security">Global Security</a>.</p>
<p class="inside-copy">the push to ratify the treaties.</p>
<p class="inside-copy">One  pact, which has 77 member states, calls for criminalizing the  possession or use of sensitive materials and creates guidelines for   extradition and prosecution of those  linked to a nuclear plot. The  second  deals with protecting non-military nuclear material. There is  concern among some Democratic lawmakers about a provision in U.S.  legislation tied to the pacts that would make an act of nuclear  terrorism a capital offense subject to the death penalty,  says Miles  Pomper, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for  Nonproliferation Studies in Washington.</p>
<p>Ken Luongo, an <a title="More news, photos about Energy Department" href="http://content.usatoday.com/topics/topic/Organizations/Government+Bodies/United+States+Department+of+Energy">Energy Department</a>  official in the Clinton administration, laments proposed cuts  to  nuclear security programs &mdash; including the slashing of $293 million from  the National Nuclear Security Administration  &mdash; in the Obama  2013  budget. He calls the cuts  &quot;an assault on common sense and a threat to  American and international security.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p class="inside-copy">William Tobey, senior fellow at the Belfer Center  for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, says Obama's first  summit was successful in developing a consensus among world leaders on  the threat of nuclear terrorism and elevating the importance of the  issue on the world stage.</p>
<p class="inside-copy">But it  failed to  create baseline standards for securing nuclear material, and no leader  was willing to acknowledge that security deficiencies exist despite 20  confirmed cases of lost or stolen fissile material over the past 20  years, he  says.</p>
<p class="inside-copy">&quot;With respect to overcoming  the flaws of the Washington summit, there isn't cause for a great deal  of optimism,&quot; Tobey says. &quot;There may even be some regression.&quot;</p>
<p class="inside-copy"><a href="http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/story/2012-03-22/nuclear-security-summit-Obama/53713054/1">View full article...</a></p>
<p class="inside-copy">&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Progress on Securing Nuclear Weapons and Materials: The Four Year Goal and Beyond]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=497d65ad-3184-4224-91d3-4bc94ebf24b7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Obama administration has carefully avoided offering any specific, public definition of what it <br />
hopes to accomplish during the four-year effort&mdash;a fact that has generated some criticism.</p>
<p><br />
In the absence of an official definition of the specific goals to be accomplished, we offer our own <br />
definition here. The officially stated goal is to &ldquo;secure&rdquo; all &ldquo;vulnerable&rdquo; stocks of nuclear material <br />
worldwide. We believe that to accomplish this objective, effective nuclear security measures must be <br />
provided for all the stocks that do not currently have them, so that when the goal is fully met, all <br />
stocks of nuclear weapons, separated plutonium, and highly enriched uranium (HEU) worldwide <br />
will be effectively and lastingly protected against the kinds of threats terrorists have demonstrated they can pose.<br />
<br />
All stocks means any nuclear material that could be used to make a nuclear bomb, whether it is in <br />
a military or a civilian stockpile. It means the effort must ensure security not just for materials in <br />
developing or transitioning countries such as Russia, Pakistan, or South Africa, but also in wealthy <br />
countries such as Belgium and Japan&mdash;and the United States.</p>
<p>Effectively protecting this material is a matter of reducing risk&mdash;another way of stating the goal is that at the end of four years, all nuclear stocks should have a low risk of being stolen. Facilities containing nuclear weapons or weapons-useable materials must be reliably protected against the kinds of adversary capabilities (both outsider and insider) that they are most likely to face. Hence, how much security is enough will vary from country to country (or even between regions within countries), depending on the spectrum of plausible adversary capabilities in each country: a security system that was perfectly adequate in Canada might still be considered &ldquo;vulnerable&rdquo; or &ldquo;high risk&rdquo; in Pakistan. </p>
<p>But in a world with terrorists with global reach, even in the safest countries, nuclear weapons, HEU, <br />
or plutonium must at least be protected against one well-placed insider, a modest group of well-<br />
armed and well-trained outsiders (capable of operating as more than one team), and both outsiders <br />
and an insider working together. In countries facing severe terrorist threats, such as Pakistan, such <br />
stocks must be protected against more capable adversaries.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nuclearsummit.org/files/security_progress_report_2_482949862.pdf">View full report...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Prevent Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c8007368-cbec-4882-936d-bd08b10742df]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul on March 26-27 will further discuss global cooperation in preventing nuclear terrorism. Although no nuclear terrorist attack has been reported so far, nuclear and radioactive materials and related technologies are widely used and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack does exist.</p>
<p>According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, there have been a total of 2,164 incidents involving the loss, theft or unauthorized possession of nuclear and radioactive materials from 1993 to 2011, and the Fukuyama nuclear crisis in Japan has demonstrated that an attack on the diesel-driven emergency power supply system, fuel rods and other key parts of a nuclear power plant could trigger a nuclear disaster.</p>
<p>The international community has made great efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. The United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 1540 in 2004 to prohibit any non-state actor acquiring or manufacturing weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons. Resolution 1887 was adopted at a summit in 2009 on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament aimed at strengthening the implementation of resolution 1540. It urged all countries to ensure the security of especially vulnerable nuclear weapons materials to prevent nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2012HuAsiaTour/2012-03/23/content_14895015.htm">View full article in <em>China Daily</em>...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts Urge Stronger Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f7075fe4-3514-408f-9582-c6549e0c69e1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nuclear experts at a forum Friday urged <span id="lw_1332513876_2" class="yshortcuts cs4-visible">world leaders</span> to take stronger steps to protect global atomic <span id="lw_1332513876_7" class="yshortcuts cs4-ndcor">stockpiles</span> from terrorists when they hold a major security meeting next week.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p id="yui_3_3_0_35_1332787582729196">&quot;The bottom line is that the goal has been set by the leaders but that was not enough,&quot; said <span id="lw_1332513876_1" class="yshortcuts cs4-visible">Miles Pomper</span>, researcher for the <span id="lw_1332513876_4" class="yshortcuts cs4-visible">James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies</span> in California.</p>
<p id="yui_3_3_0_35_1332787582729320">Many agreements at the first  summit were non-binding and were sometimes later scrapped after  diplomatic disputes with the US, he said.</p>
<p id="yui_3_3_0_35_1332787582729317">&quot;There is no definition of what  'security' meant... what 'vulnerable' meant and no way of verifying  whether those goals were met,&quot; Pomper said, calling for a more ambitious  goal of legally-binding initiatives.</p>
<p id="yui_3_3_0_35_1332787582729207">Page Stoutland, vice president of the <span id="lw_1332513876_5" class="yshortcuts cs4-ndcor">Nuclear Threat Initiative</span>  in Washington, said that despite the 2010 pledges, stockpiles of  weapons-usable atomic material had increased in nations including India  and Pakistan.</p>
<p id="yui_3_3_0_35_1332787582729376">&quot;At the Seoul Nuclear Security  Summit... leaders should seize the opportunity to improve stewardship of  the world's most dangerous materials,&quot; he said.</p>
<p><a href="http://news.yahoo.com/experts-urge-stronger-steps-prevent-nuclear-terror-144150906.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium Gives Preview Of Next Week's Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=473247ca-0218-4ba7-b019-89b9759bbbbb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Seoul Nuclear Security Symposium got underway Friday with nuclear  experts from 46 different countries and more than a hundred local nuclear  experts. </p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Miles Pomper, Sr. Research Associate, James Martin Center For Nonproliferation Studies: &quot;I think we'll get some good individual commitments from countries but  unfortunately, I don't think we'll get the kind of global  commitment  that we need for a regime that will protect us and secure us from  nuclear terrorism.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.arirang.co.kr/News/News_View.asp?nseq=127307&amp;code=Ne8&amp;category=1">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Expert Says Safeguard Program for Nuclear Materials Needed]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c308aa79-8792-4cb6-8d54-63562b7feb6f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Just days ahead of the Second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, a  renowned U.S. nuclear expert says loose nuclear materials around the  world simply can not be &quot;locked down.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Alexandra Toma, Co-Chair, Fissile Materials Working Group: &quot;Businesses can also share information on their websites about  nuclear security. They can put people in touch with, expert groups like  the Fissile Materials Working Group for one, for example. They can do  panels and share information on TV.&quot;<br />
<br />
Toma then called on the world leaders to come up with more innovative  ideas to expand national commitments to reduce nuclear weapons and  materials.</p>
<p>Looking ahead, Thursday's panelists said they hope to see the Seoul  Summit provide building blocks to establish a global governance on  nuclear security.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[US Says 5 Nations Clear Out Weapons-Grade Uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=d16e4768-787c-4039-89e1-b0fcad751490]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The U.S. has helped five nations completely clear out their stocks of  highly enriched uranium since President Barack Obama outlined his plans  for securing all weapons-usable materials worldwide, officials say,  citing it as progress in the administration&rsquo;s efforts to prevent nuclear  weapons from getting in terrorists&rsquo; hands.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Nuclear nonproliferation expert Matthew Bunn at Harvard University  said he would not rule out some kind of settlement of the U.S. dispute  with Belarus during the Seoul summit, adding that a number of nations  with small stockpiles of weapons-grade material may also announce they  have cleaned them out.</p>
<p>Meanwhile, he said, several countries could  commit themselves to ratifying relevant treaties, hosting International  Atomic Energy Agency reviews of their security arrangements or creating  law enforcement teams to indict nuclear smugglers. But Bunn said he  expects that much more will remain to be done.</p>
<p>&ldquo;It will, I  believe, be possible to say at the end of four years that for most or  all of the highest-risk stocks, some significant progress has been made  and the risks have been reduced,&rsquo;&rsquo; said Bunn, who advised the Clinton  administration on efforts to lock up the former Soviet Union&rsquo;s vast  stores of nuclear materials. &ldquo;What it will not be possible to say at the  end of four years is that all the nuclear weapons and weapons-usable  material is secured and accounted for.&rsquo;&rsquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://articles.boston.com/2012-03-22/news/31225998_1_weapons-grade-uranium-low-enriched-uranium-nuclear-material/2"><em>See full article...</em></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seizing Momentum in the Quest for Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=14db34ad-27cc-464c-94dd-a2e17b0136a3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>It&rsquo;s time to decide if one of the world&rsquo;s biggest threats will be  confronted by some of the world&rsquo;s best defenses. Next week, President  Obama will join more than 50 world leaders in Seoul, South Korea, to  agree on a strategy to lock down and strengthen global defenses to  prevent vulnerable nuclear materials from falling into the hands of  terrorists. While much progress has been made in recent years on nuclear  security, bold action is needed.</p>
<p>Nuclear terrorism is both one of  the greatest threats to national security and one of the most  preventable. There have been 20 cases of theft or loss of fissile  material &hellip; and that&rsquo;s only what we know about. According to credible  American intelligence assessments, al Qaeda has been after a nuclear  weapon for more than a decade. It was only last fall that Moldovan  police broke up a smuggling ring attempting to sell nuclear bomb-making  materials. The North African buyer and a suspect thought to possess a  kilogram of weapons-grade uranium remain at large. Preventing nuclear  terrorism requires marshaling the resources of our international allies  to close nuclear security gaps.</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/217455-seizing-momentum-in-the-quest-for-nuclear-security">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama to attend nuclear summit in South Korea]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b83c0edd-6f7d-4465-a625-299922800080]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>REPORTING FROM WASHINGTON --&nbsp;President Obama is headed to Asia  (again) for his first foreign trip of the year. The White House has not  been shy about its attempts to try to strengthen U.S. relationships and  economic ties in that part of the world: Obama&rsquo;s last trip abroad was an  eight-day swing around the Pacific Rim.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>In his assessment of the threat, Matthew Bunn, associate professor at <a target="_blank" href="http://nuclearsummit.org/index.html">the Belfer Center at Harvard</a>,  called the possibility of a group making a weapon using highly enriched  uranium &ldquo;very plausibly within capabilities of a sophisticated  terrorist group.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Experts have been monitoring the follow-through closely. <a target="_blank" href="http://www.armscontrol.org/pressroom/New-Report-Finds-Process-on-Track-But-More-Work-To-Do">One report</a>,  released in the run-up to the Seoul sequel, found that 80% of the  commitments have been completed. White House officials say they&rsquo;re happy  with that record.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Still, the U.S. fared pretty well in <a target="_blank" href="http://www.ntiindex.org/">a study by the Nuclear Threat Initiative</a> ranking countries on how well they secure nuclear material. The U.S. landed 13<sup>th</sup>on  the list of 32 countries that store weapons-usable material. The  countries were graded on many factors, including the amount of material,  political stability and regulatory climate. Deepti Choubey, a senior  director at NTI, noted that the U.S. standing was largely a result of  the large amount of material within its borders. If that factor had been  eliminated, the U.S. score would have shot to second place, she said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;I think it is deeply problematic,&rdquo; Bunn said. &ldquo;The governance of  nuclear security is weak, and much weaker than the world is willing to  accept.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/president-obama-nuclear-summit-south-korea.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama to Pursue Nuclear Safety, Security at Seoul Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=401a866e-6c45-4263-a780-12f578937672]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>President Obama is preparing for the second Nuclear Security Summit  next Tuesday in Seoul. The president and other world leaders hope to  better secure stocks of nuclear weapons and make nuclear energy safer.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;And what Fukushima has highlighted for everybody, besides the fact that  you can have a major nuclear accident in a highly developed country, is  that we do not have an adequate system for dealing with radioactive  dangers that cross border,&quot; Luongo said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Obama-to-Pursue-Nuclear-Safety-Security-Nonproliferation-at-Summit-143859206.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Administration Touts Nuclear Security Accomplishments on Eve of Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=da5f1a25-2b3e-433f-bf68-f39b09d9eae3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is highlighting nuclear security  accomplishments made in the last two years in advance of next week&rsquo;s  summit in South Korea and signaling some &ldquo;surprises&rdquo; will be revealed  about how much has been done thus far (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/iaea-warns-against-nuclear-security-complacency-buildup-summit/"><em>GSN</em></a>, March 22).</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Some experts say, though, that it is difficult to assess how much the  security pledges have achieved. Partnership for Global Security  President Kenneth Luongo said earlier this month that despite the  finding that most 2010 commitments had been completed, assessing the  value of those commitments can be difficult.</p>
<p>For example, in his 2009 speech in Prague that led to the first  security summit two years ago, President Obama called for an  international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around  the world within four years.</p>
<p>However, &ldquo;nobody ever defined what the four-year goal was,&rdquo; in terms of  exactly what &ldquo;securing&rdquo; means, said Luongo, calling it a &ldquo;free ride.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Stockpiles of weapons-usable nuclear materials have actually increased  in nations such as India and Pakistan, despite the 2010 commitments,  Agence France-Presse reported Page Stoutland of the Nuclear Threat  Initiative as saying at a pre-summit Nuclear Security Symposium in the  South Korean capital.</p>
<p>&ldquo;At the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit &hellip; leaders should seize the  opportunity to improve stewardship of the world&rsquo;s most dangerous  materials,&rdquo; Stoutland said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/administration-touts-nuclear-security-accomplishments-eve-summit/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear meeting to focus on security ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=9aef4d86-046c-46b0-9c1d-6b086fe870f9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Leaders from around the  world will meet in Seoul, South Korea next  week for the second  Nuclear Security  Summit.</p>
<p>Their goal will be to review the  measures countries have put in  place to secure high-risk nuclear  materials, to prevent them from   falling into the hands of criminal  gangs and terrorists.</p>
<p>New Zealand is participating in  the summit, having earned a place   at the table due to its regional  nuclear security leadership.</p>
<p>Over the past few years, the  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and  Trade  has been funding work  under the Global Initiative to  Combat Nuclear  Terrorism to  secure radioactive materials in  Southeast Asia and the  South  Pacific.</p>
<p>In 2011, senior scientists from  the National Radiation Laboratory   in Christchurch completed a  project in Cambodia, which  permanently  rendered safe a high  risk radioactive source in the  grounds of a  hospital in Phnom  Penh.</p>
<p>The same scientists have been  running MFAT-funded workshops  for  their counterparts in other  parts of Southeast Asia and the  Pacific,  focusing on improving the  security of medical and industrial   radiography sources.</p>
<p>Much of this work has been  taking place in close collaboration   with the Australian Nuclear  Science and Technology  Organisation and  the Vienna- based World Institute for Nuclear  Security, and is part of a  much  bigger global effort to prevent  nuclear and radiological   terrorism.</p>
<p>When they arrive in Seoul,  Australian Prime Minister Julia  Gillard  and New Zealand Prime  Minister John Key will be able to  hold their  heads high and refer to  these activities as evidence their  governments  have been taking  their nuclear security  commitments seriously. But   Gillard may be able to hold her  head a little higher than Key.</p>
<p>The reason is that on February  28 of this year Australia's   parliament passed the Nuclear  Terrorism Legislation  Amendment Act,  which imposes  penalties of up to 20 years'  imprisonment for the misuse  of  radioactive material and nuclear  facilities.</p>
<p>This legislative step will allow  Australia to ratify the   International Convention for the  Suppression of Acts of Nuclear   Terrorism (ICSANT), building on  its earlier ratification of the   Amendment to the Convention on  the Physical Protection of Nuclear   Materials (CPPNM Amendment).</p>
<p>These two instruments are two  of the lynchpins of the global   nuclear security infrastructure,  and ratifying and implementing  them  reinforces Australia's  already strong reputation as a  leader in the  area.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/perspective/6609328/Nuclear-meeting-to-focus-on-security">View full article in <em>The Press (New Zealand)...</em></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Soul Searching in Seoul]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e0b66cfa-9d94-4a85-9694-89c12f1309c1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>If you think Israel&rsquo;s alleged plans to hit Iran&rsquo;s nuclear facilities  constitute the biggest threat to international peace and stability,  you&rsquo;d better think again, and consider this instead: the threat of the  use of a nuclear device by terrorist groups! Remote as the prospect may  seem at the first glance, terrorist attacks with nuclear devices, if and  when realized, would surely have catastrophic and irreversible effects.<br />
<br />
The  threat of nuclear terrorism is not hype, nor is it &ldquo;an instrument of  big powers who want to pursue their hegemonic policies&rdquo; as some argue as  a reaction to the leadership role of the United States on this  initiative. </p>
<p><a href="http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/nuclear-soul-searching-in-seoul-.aspx?pageID=238&amp;nID=16396&amp;NewsCatID=396">View full article in <em>Hurriyet Daily News...</em></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Fact Sheet: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Preview]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fa2f0125-9c58-4b09-9366-19931467b267]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit aims to strengthen and deepen  nuclear security commitments made at the 2010 Washington Summit. The  objective of the summit process is to prevent vulnerable fissile  materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons from falling into  the hands of terrorists and non-state actors with malicious intent. The  goal is the protection of nuclear materials and facilities to help  prevent them from being stolen or diverted to terrorist groups and  non-state actors. There have been 20 confirmed cases of theft or loss of  fissile material. The nuclear threat is real, and al-Qaeda is  reportedly interested in obtaining WMD and know-how. There are over 100  civilian nuclear reactors in the world that still run on HEU, and many  civilian facilities that store fissile materials have less stringent  seucirty measures that military facilities.</p>
<p>The 2012 Summit comes just over a year after the March 2011 Fukushima  nuclear disaster, though many countries still continue to opt for  nuclear power to meet their energy demands.</p>
<p>President Barack Obama vowed to secure all nuclear materials within  four years and work toward a nuclear-free world in his famous <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/obama_prague_speech/">April 2009 Prague speech</a>.  He hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 attended by 47  states and three international organizations that produced a <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nss_communique/">Communiqu&eacute;</a> and <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nuclear_security_summit_work_plan/">&quot;Work Plan</a>, which included <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nss_national_commitments/">National Commitments (also called &ldquo;house gifts&rdquo;)</a>. At the end of the 2010 Summit, Obama asked South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to host the second summit.</p>
<p>So far, about <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_NSS_Report_2012.pdf">80% of the national commitments</a> pledged at the 2010 Summit have been achieved.</p>
<p><a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/factsheet_2012_nuclear_security_summit_preview/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Pacts We Need to Sign]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=59c5d49f-5cee-49d4-924c-2c3db82bac9f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>New Zealand's security legislation needs attention, writes Dr Tanya Ogilvie-White.</strong></p>
<p>Next week, leaders from around the world will meet in Seoul, South  Korea, for the second Nuclear Security Summit. Their goal will be to  review the measures that countries have put in place to prevent nuclear  terrorism.</p>
<p>New Zealand is taking part in the summit, having earned a place at the table thanks to its regional nuclear security leadership.</p>
<p>Over the past few years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has  been funding work under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear  Terrorism to secure radioactive materials in Southeast Asia and the  South Pacific.</p>
<p>Last year, senior scientists from the National Radiation Laboratory in  Christchurch completed a project in Cambodia, which rendered safe a  high-risk radioactive source in the grounds of a hospital in Phnom Penh.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&amp;objectid=10793189">View full article in <em>The New Zeland Herald...</em></a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Risks at Bed, Bath & Beyond Show Dangers of Scrap]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f6b388a1-ec85-4c4c-abbb-50cf3d319de1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Going shopping? Don&rsquo;t forget your wallet and credit card. Or Geiger counter.</p>
<p>The discovery of radioactive tissue boxes at <a class="web_ticker" title="Get Quote" href="http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/BBBY:US">Bed, Bath &amp; Beyond Inc. (BBBY)</a> stores in January raised alarms among nuclear security officials and company executives over the growing global threat of contaminated scrap metal.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Industry and regulators are working to define an allowable limit for radiation in products that isn&rsquo;t hazardous to customers&rsquo; health, according to the draft copy of the new IAEA rules for scrap handlers. This month&rsquo;s Seoul nuclear-security summit will deal for the first time with the threats posed by uncontrolled radioactive sources, said Elena Sokova, executive director of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non- Proliferation.</p>
<p>Forty-five heads of state including Obama, Russian President <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/dmitry-medvedev/">Dmitry Medvedev</a> and Chinese President <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/hu-jintao/">Hu Jintao</a> will attend the nuclear summit, <a href="http://topics.bloomberg.com/south-korea/">South Korea</a>&rsquo;s foreign ministry said in a statement on its website today.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-19/nuclear-risks-at-bed-bath-beyond-show-hidden-danger-of-scrap.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Momentum Stalls on Obama Nuclear Agenda]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=46819237-891f-4de2-a69b-524d0aec2dd5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span id="articleText"> </span></p>
<p>Meanwhile, anti-proliferation groups, which  credit Obama with raising the global profile of nuclear security, are  also voicing complaints. They are unhappy that the fiscal squeeze in  Washington has translated into reduced spending on several nuclear  security programs in his budget plan for fiscal 2013.</p>
<p>Ken  Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security, a  non-governmental research organization, called cuts in Obama's budget  request to secure weapons of mass destruction &quot;an assault on common  sense.&quot;</p>
<p>Two programs at the  Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration were  pinched hard. Funding for the Global Threat Reduction initiative,  designed to secure nuclear material at civilian sites around the world,  was cut by $32 million to $466 million, and will be down $500 million  over the next four years compared with the levels envisaged a year ago.</p>
<p>A  senior administration official insisted, however, that part of the drop  reflected completion of an upgrade of Russian nuclear infrastructure  and removal of Russian nuclear material.</p>
<p>A  bigger hit was taken by the International Nuclear Materials Protection  and Cooperation program, designed to improve security at vulnerable  stockpiles of nuclear weapons in countries deemed to be of special  concern. Its funding request was trimmed by $259 million in 2013 to $311  million.</p>
<p>Despite that,  arms-control experts sees signs of progress on nuclear security efforts  and caution against complacency when Obama and more than 50 other  leaders meet on Monday.</p>
<p>Amid  skepticism about the chances for meeting the Washington summit's  headline pledge to safeguard all of the world's nuclear materials within  four years, they are now pushing for voluntary arrangements to be  turned into enforceable standards.</p>
<p>U.S.  officials expect new commitments from several countries but are playing  down the chances of any breakthroughs in Seoul. &quot;It's (going to be) a  bit of a report card and also figuring out what has to be prioritized,&quot; a  senior official said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/20/us-nuclear-obama-idUSBRE82J06420120320">View full article in <em>Reuters</em>...</a></p>
<p>Also published in the <a href="http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-03-19/news/sns-rt-us-nuclear-obamabre82j064-20120319_1_nuclear-weapons-nuclear-agenda-nuclear-security-summit"><em>Orlando Sentinel...</em></a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Fact Sheet: 2012 Nuclear Security Summit Preview]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=aedb0fd1-0519-498c-ad5a-efb988b54462]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit aims to strengthen and deepen  nuclear security commitments made at the 2010 Washington Summit. The  objective of the summit process is to prevent vulnerable fissile  materials that can be used to produce nuclear weapons from falling into  the hands of terrorists and non-state actors with malicious intent. The  goal is the protection of nuclear materials and facilities to help  prevent them from being stolen or diverted to terrorist groups and  non-state actors. There have been 20 confirmed cases of theft or loss of  fissile material. The nuclear threat is real, and al-Qaeda is  reportedly interested in obtaining WMD and know-how. There are over 100  civilian nuclear reactors in the world that still run on HEU, and many  civilian facilities that store fissile materials have less stringent  seucirty measures that military facilities.</p>
<p>The 2012 Summit comes just over a year after the March 2011 Fukushima  nuclear disaster, though many countries still continue to opt for  nuclear power to meet their energy demands.</p>
<p>President Barack Obama vowed to secure all nuclear materials within  four years and work toward a nuclear-free world in his famous <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/obama_prague_speech/">April 2009 Prague speech</a>.  He hosted the first Nuclear Security Summit in 2010 attended by 47  states and three international organizations that produced a <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nss_communique/">Communiqu&eacute;</a> and <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nuclear_security_summit_work_plan/">&quot;Work Plan</a>, which included <a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/2010_nss_national_commitments/">National Commitments (also called &ldquo;house gifts&rdquo;)</a>. At the end of the 2010 Summit, Obama asked South Korean President Lee Myung-bak to host the second summit.</p>
<p>So far, about <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/files/ACA_NSS_Report_2012.pdf">80% of the national commitments</a> pledged at the 2010 Summit have been achieved.</p>
<p><a href="http://armscontrolcenter.org/policy/nuclearterrorism/articles/factsheet_2012_nuclear_security_summit_preview/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 20 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seoul Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=80c69892-3097-4ecd-b081-01ecb31b6e68]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>On March 26 and 27 in Seoul, the Republic of Korea will host the  second Nuclear Security Summit. Leaders from 53 countries and from  international organizations like the International Atomic Energy Agency  and Interpol are expected to attend. Both the number of countries and  topics have been slightly expanded from the first Nuclear Security  Summit, held in Washington in April 2010. Side events include concurrent  meetings held by experts and industry leaders on March 23.<br />
<strong><br />
Q1: Why a summit on nuclear security now and in Seoul?</strong></p>
<p><strong>A1:</strong> In 2010, President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea  proposed to President Obama to host a second nuclear security summit in  Seoul in 2012. This is the mid-way point of the commitment made at the  2010 summit: to secure the world&rsquo;s most vulnerable nuclear materials  from terrorists over four years. Most bets are on the Netherlands to  host one more summit in 2014.</p>
<p>South Korea is no stranger to nuclear threats, mostly emanating from  its neighbor to the North. South Korea, which does not possess nuclear  weapons or any of the most sensitive nuclear materials like highly  enriched uranium or separated plutonium (which can be used for reactor  fuel or for nuclear weapons), has a sophisticated nuclear power program  and a huge stake in ensuring the all nuclear endeavors are safe, secure,  and reduce proliferation risks.</p>
<p><a href="http://csis.org/publication/seoul-nuclear-security-summit">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 19 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear security: A pressing issue Taiwan is overlooking]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2f7903fb-9ced-40ff-a35d-bc15266c9c1c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The natural disaster which triggered the nuclear meltdown at the  Fukushima Daiichi power plant in northeast Japan a year ago this week  had a dramatic impact on nuclear industry worldwide.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>The management of radioactive material is not just a safety issue but  also a security issue. Even more importantly, it is not only a national  security issue but an international one.</p>
<p>To prevent radioactive material from falling into the hands of  terrorist groups is one of the most pressing international security  issues, one to which the whole global security community is paying close  attention. Ever since the 9/11 attacks, the terrible possibility of  nuclear terrorism has been considered a major threat to every nation  state.</p>
<p>The cold reality is that the global stockpile of nuclear materials is  large enough to build more than 100,000 nuclear bombs. An apple-sized  amount of plutonium fashioned into a weapon detonated in a highly  populated urban area could instantly kill and injure hundreds of  thousands of people. This material continues to accumulate in unstable  regions of the world.</p>
<p>A nuclear terror attack would have a devastating impact far beyond  the immediate tragedy. The country impacted would experience severe and  lasting economic trauma. No single country acting alone can address this  threat to their national security.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120314000074&amp;cid=1703">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Mar 2012 11:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7526c3c5-ec75-4c0b-8c8e-e49e2313efb2]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h6 class="kicker"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=2&amp;ref=global">www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html</a>Op-Ed Contributors</h6>
<h1 class="articleHeadline" itemprop="headline"><nyt_headline type=" " version="1.0">Nuclear Terrorism: A Clear Danger</nyt_headline></h1>
<p><nyt_byline><span itemprop="creator" itemtype="http://schema.org/Person" itemscope="">
<h6 class="byline" itemprop="name">By KENNETH C. BRILL and KENNETH N. LUONGO</h6>
</span></nyt_byline></p>
<h6 class="dateline">Published: March 15, 2012&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</h6>
<p>Terrorists exploit gaps in security. The current global regime for  protecting the nuclear materials that terrorists desire for their  ultimate weapon is far from seamless. It is based largely on  unaccountable, voluntary arrangements that are inconsistent across  borders. Its weak links make it dangerous and inadequate to prevent  nuclear terrorism.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">Later this month in Seoul, the more than 50 world leaders who will  gather for the second Nuclear Security Summit need to seize the  opportunity to start developing an accountable regime to prevent nuclear  terrorism.</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody">There is a consensus among international leaders that the threat of  nuclear terrorism is real, not a Hollywood confection. President Obama,  the leaders of 46 other nations, the heads of the <a title="More articles about International Atomic Energy Agency" class="meta-org" href="http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/i/international_atomic_energy_agency/index.html?inline=nyt-org"><font color="#0066cc">International Atomic Energy Agency</font></a>  and the United Nations, and numerous experts have called nuclear  terrorism one of the most serious threats to global security and  stability. It is also preventable with more aggressive action.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;</p>
<p itemprop="articleBody"><a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/nuclear-terrorism-a-clear-danger.html?_r=2&amp;ref=global">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S. Defends Narrow Focus for Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=989dd049-62f6-473f-b6e3-ec3f9a3da06e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>WASHINGTON -- The Obama administration is defending its efforts to keep  the focus of this month&rsquo;s Nuclear Security Summit in South Korea on  preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear and radioactive materials,  despite warnings from some experts that, in doing so, it is overlooking  other significant dangers (see <a href="http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/nuclear-powers-split-plans-seoul-summit/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;mgf=1"><em><font color="#0066cc">GSN</font></em></a>, March 6).</p>
<p>During a press briefing on Tuesday, Clinton-era Energy Department  official Kenneth Luongo said that last year&rsquo;s meltdown at the Fukushima  Daiichi power plant in Japan highlighted the fact that the international  community does not &ldquo;have an adequate system for dealing with radiation  that crosses borders.&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>In the report released Tuesday, the Partnership for Global Security  found that approximately 80 percent of the 67 national commitments made  by 30 global leaders at the 2010 summit in Washington have been  completed.</p>
<p>Assessing the value of some commitments, including those made by Washington, can be difficult, Luongo said.</p>
<p>For example, in the 2009 speech in Prague that led to the first  security summit two years ago, President Obama called for an  international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around  the world within four years.</p>
<p>However, &ldquo;nobody ever defined what the four year goal was,&rdquo; Luongo said, calling it a &ldquo;free ride.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nti.rsvp1.com/gsn/article/us-defends-narrow-focus-nuclear-security-summit/?mgh=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nti.org&amp;amp;mgf=1">View full article...</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Legislative Quagmire Grips Nuclear-Security Pacts in US]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=de601b7a-009c-4c00-8d24-631aee224ab4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Just weeks before the second Global Nuclear Security  Summit convenes  in South Korea, the United States still has not enacted a  law critical  to ratifying what the Obama administration at the first  summit called  &ldquo;the two key international treaties governing nuclear  security&rdquo; (see <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/congress-could-rewrite-obama-proposals-on-adopting-nuclear-pacts/"><em>GSN</em></a>, Oct. 6, 2011).</p>
<p>The Senate endorsed both pacts four years ago without opposition.   However, Congress has yet to sign off on legislation that would force   the United States to come into line with the mandates.</p>
<p>The administration is still wrangling with Congress over legal   specifics for implementing the international agreements, according to   representatives of the State Department and involved congressional   committees...</p>
<p>&ldquo;The White House needs to call Democrats who are on the Hill and tell   them to make it happen,&rdquo; said Miles Pomper, a senior research  associate  at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies in  Washington...</p>
<p>Pomper, though, said implementing the two nuclear agreements &ldquo;is not a high priority item for Congress...&rdquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;The question is if the U.S. doesn&rsquo;t get this done after the summit,   and there&rsquo;s not necessarily pressure to do it until the next summit or   if there&rsquo;s not really a time line at all, I don&rsquo;t know how that&rsquo;s going   to &hellip; encourage Congress to act on this,&rdquo; Reif said. &ldquo;The time is now.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;Congress has oversight responsibility on this and they should do  their  due diligence &hellip; but this has been going on for months and months  and  months now, and the time has since passed to move this process  forward,&rdquo;  he said.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.nationaljournal.com/congress/legislative-quagmire-grips-nuclear-security-pacts-in-u-s--20120312">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Seoul Summit Crucial in Global Nuclear Safety, Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f7ec6245-f2e5-4843-8456-50ebc7e40c61]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The upcoming Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul is important to keep up  momentum in efforts to operate nuclear facilities more safely and  prevent nuclear terrorism, a group of American experts said Tuesday...</p>
<p>Quotes from&nbsp;FMWG Members:</p>
<p>&nbsp;&quot;States have made significant progress on their 2010 summit national  commitments, but that is only half of the story,&quot; said Michelle Cann,  senior budget and policy analyst at the Partnership for Global Security  (PGS), as the institute issued a report on the Nuclear Security Summit,  together with the Arms Control Association. &quot;The commitments on the  books will not get the job done. To prevent nuclear terrorism in the  years ahead, the global nuclear security system must grow and adapt to  new threats.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;Substantial work remains if the summit process is to meet its goal of  securing all vulnerable nuclear materials,&quot; said Kelsey Davenport, an  analyst at the Arms Control Association.</p>
<p>Kenneth Luongo, president of the PGS, said that is why the Seoul session is important.<br />
<br />
&quot;The 2012 summit provides a window of opportunity to being the  process of reframing the nuclear material security debate and initiating  some key changes in strategy,&quot; he said.<br />
<br />
He pointed out  Seoul is a good venue to hold the second round of the summit, given  South Korea's role as a &quot;global bridge&quot; between advanced and developing  nations, namely G-8 and G-20, the geopolitical situation regarding North  Korea's nuclear threats, and the South's leading technology.<br />
<br />
Regarding the level of discussion on North Korea in the Seoul summit,  meanwhile, William Tobey, senior researcher at the Belfer Center for  Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, said South  Korean officials will likely seek strong international support for the  denuclearization of the peninsula.</p>
<p><a href="http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/14/26/0301000000AEN20120314000200315F.HTML">View full article...</a></p>
<p>Originally published in <em>Yonhap News</em> on March 13, 2012 and picked up by <em><a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/03/120_106879.html">The Korea Times</a></em>, <em><a href="http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v6/newsworld.php?id=652045">Bernama</a></em>, <em><a href="http://www.individual.com/storyrss.php?story=153567884&amp;hash=8beee191801105ac7e33c579ee8ffb5d">Asia Pulse</a></em>, and <em>The Philippines News Agency.</em></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The Road to the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=13196e77-4250-4330-b082-b13230faaf94]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>While the Nuclear Security Summit was held largely in response to an initiative started by President <br />
Obama, the need for stronger measures to protect nuclear material and to prevent nuclear terrorism has been raised since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001.&nbsp; </p>
<p>In his 2009 Prague speech, President Obama warned that nuclear terrorism was &ldquo;the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.&rdquo; This warning was echoed in the 2010 Washington Communiqu&eacute;, when it stated that &ldquo;nuclear terrorism is one of the most challenging threats to international security, and strong nuclear security measures are the most effective means.&rdquo; </p>
<p>President Obama was not the first to highlight the danger of nuclear terrorism. After the 9/11 terrorist <br />
attacks in 2001, there had been repeated warnings. The UNSC Resolution 1540 in 2004 stated that it was &ldquo;gravely concerned by the threat of terrorism and the risk that non-State actors...may acquire, develop, traffic in or use nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery.&rdquo; IAEA Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei also warned in his speech at the 2008 IAEA Annual Conference that &ldquo;nuclear terrorism is the Number One security threat right now. If they get it, they will use it.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/USKI_NSS2012_JUN.pdf">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 01 Mar 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Disarmament's Midnight Hour]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=f68b623b-b7e8-4706-846a-6b682b12e03c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div style="text-align:left;padding-bottom:4px;" class="distribution_date">2012-02-28</div>
<p>CANBERRA  &ndash; Last month, the Doomsday Clock&rsquo;s hands were moved a  minute closer to  midnight by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, the  respected global  organization that for decades has tracked the risk of  a nuclear-weapons  catastrophe, whether caused by accident or design,  state or terrorist,  fission bomb or dirty radiological bomb.</p>
<p>Few around the world seemed to be listening. The story &ndash; as others   like it since the end of the Cold War &shy;&ndash; came and went within a   half-day&rsquo;s news cycle. But the Scientists&rsquo; argument was sobering, and   demands attention. Progress since 2007 &ndash; when the Clock&rsquo;s hands were   last set at five minutes to midnight &ndash; has stalled, and political   leadership has gone missing on all of the critical issues: disarmament,   non-proliferation, and key building blocks needed for both.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>The only half-way good news is that progress continues on a third   building block: ensuring that weapons-usable materials, and weapons   themselves, currently stored in multiple locations in 32 countries, do   not fall into the hands of rogue states or terrorists. At the end of   March, South Korean President Lee Myung-bak will host a follow-up   meeting to Obama&rsquo;s successful Nuclear Security Summit in 2010, which   brought together 47 government leaders to agree on a comprehensive   program aimed at securing all such materials within four years. High on   the agenda will be the security implications of nuclear safety: the   Fukushima catastrophe showed that nuclear-power plants may be vulnerable   not only to natural disaster, but also to terrorist sabotage.</p>
<p>But nuclear security is only one small part of what must be done to   eliminate nuclear threats once and for all, and summit fatigue will make   it difficult to sustain key world leaders&rsquo; commitment to meeting for  so  narrow a purpose. New thinking is urgently needed on how to recover  the  momentum of just two years ago.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/evans15/English">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 28 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security in an Era of Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=c81e1d04-83c6-4da4-bb63-94cecd29ff17]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><em>The following op-ed was written by FMWG International&nbsp;Partner Sunday Jonah, of Ahmadu Bello University in Nigeria.&nbsp; It appeared in both the <a href="http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=9377&amp;catid=7&amp;Itemid=113">Sunday Trust</a> and the <a href="http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=78025:jonah-terrorism-and-nuclear-security-&amp;catid=38:columnists&amp;Itemid=615">Guardian</a> (Nigeria).</em></p>
<p>President Goodluck Jonathan is expected to attend the second Nuclear  Security Summit, (NSS 2012) in Seoul in March and cooperate with other  world leaders on how best to address the threat of nuclear terrorism.  Some may argue that Nigeria, a non-nuclear weapons state without a  large-scale nuclear industry, does not have a major role to play in  preventing nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">However, as the Fukushima crisis has demonstrated, nuclear crises do not  respect borders. Therefore, nuclear threats must be addressed by all  nations. Furthermore, to set the groundwork for the safe, peaceful and  stable use of nuclear energy, efforts must be made to enhance nuclear  safety and security. Soon after the first nuclear reactor was operated  by Enrico Fermi and others in 1942 at the University of Chicago, nuclear  energy activities were dominated by the quest for military  applications. Today, peaceful uses of nuclear energy are the primary  goals of responsible nations...</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">...The first NSS called by US President, Barack Obama, was held in  Washington DC in 2010. As a participant, Nigeria supports the Summit  process and initiative with regards to the philosophy of voluntarism. In  my view, the following policy recommendations should be pursued:  expanding the mission of nuclear security beyond four years; eliminating  the use of fissile materials, provision of adequate funding for nuclear  security; as well as supporting training and education initiatives.</p>
<p style="text-align: justify;"><a href="http://sundaytrust.com.ng/index.php?option=com_content&amp;view=article&amp;id=9377&amp;catid=7&amp;Itemid=113">View full article...</a></p>
<p style="text-align: justify;">&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Lessons Learned from Fukushima: Don't Forget Steps Against Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7f4534f1-7f4d-41a4-9cf0-41c2fde328bf]]></link>
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<h1><span class="Heading"><strong><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">Lessons Learned from Fukushima: Don&rsquo;t Forget Steps Against Nuclear Terrorism</span></strong></span></h1>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
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font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">The following op-ed was published by the Kyodo News Wire service in Japan on February 21, 2012.</span></em><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">&nbsp; <em>This translation was provided by the author.</em></span><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><br />
</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
background:white" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">As we investigate the exact cause of the Fukushima nuclear accident and take steps to strengthen nuclear safety measures, we should not forget the measures against nuclear terrorism. Some tend to think that terrorists may come to New York or Washington to detonate a nuclear bomb or disperse radioactive material with a dirty bomb, but will not bother to come as far as to Japan. But intelligence information showed that Japan was among the targets of radical terrorists.</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">If the nuclear reactors remain in operation up to 40 years as the Japanese government now proposes, they will be around for some time and we don&rsquo;t know what change of course the international situation around Japan may take during that period. Natural disasters can cause havoc as we have witnessed but the terrorist attack with clear intention to destroy nuclear power plants is a greater threat. The US, in that sense, took the risk seriously and applied a number of measures to cope with the threat. If Japan had prepared itself in a similar manner, it could have avoided some of the damages at Fukushima.</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
background:white" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">The Government&rsquo;s Nuclear Energy Commission is drafting a new policy on nuclear terrorism. I look forward to a robust policy that should be implemented together with measures to strengthen nuclear safety. Practically, this means strengthening the security measures around nuclear power stations and other facilities. Against the major threat of armed attacks from the sea or the air, the use of the Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces should be considered. Screening the personnel reliability of those who work at nuclear facilities is a necessity. This is because we cannot totally rule out insider act or assistance of nuclear terrorism.</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
background:white" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">Some of the numerous volunteers who have been going around with radiation monitors after the Fukushima accident have uncovered radiation sources so far unknown in the urban neighborhood such as at a supermarket in Tokyo. We need to be aware of these hidden sources of nuclear terrorism. Radioactive material is not only at nuclear facilities but it is also stored and used for a variety of purposes at many factories, hospitals, research labs around the country. In order to avoid such radioactive material from being used for a dirty bomb we have to reduce the amount of these radioactive materials and tighten their security.</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
background:white" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">The second Nuclear Security Summit is going to be held in Seoul from March 26-27 for the purpose of strengthening the measures to prevent nuclear terrorism. The summit will address the issues of reducing and tightening the control of high enriched uranium and plutonium that are held for medical and research purposes but can also be used to make nuclear bombs. On the occasion of the first Nuclear Security Summit in Washington in the spring of 2010, Japan announced the establishment of a center to support the efforts of developing countries to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security. It has started its activities at Tokai-mura.</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
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color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda should clearly state at the coming Seoul Nuclear Security Summit that Japan will not only take strong nuclear safety measures but also nuclear security measures seriously and discuss with the other heads of government concrete measures to strengthen international cooperation towards these ends. The lessons of Fukushima tell that there is no time to be wasted in meeting the danger of nuclear terrorism.</span></p>
<p style="margin-left: 21.25pt; text-align: center; background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% white;" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt"><span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>*<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>*<span style="mso-spacerun:yes">&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; </span>*</span></p>
<p align="left" style="text-align:left;text-indent:21.25pt;
mso-char-indent-count:1.77;mso-pagination:widow-orphan;tab-stops:45.8pt 91.6pt 137.4pt 183.2pt 229.0pt 274.8pt 320.6pt 366.4pt 412.2pt 458.0pt 503.8pt 549.6pt 595.4pt 641.2pt 687.0pt 732.8pt;
background:white" class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size:12.0pt;mso-bidi-font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:&quot;Times New Roman&quot;,&quot;serif&quot;;mso-fareast-font-family:&quot;MS Gothic&quot;;
color:black;mso-font-kerning:0pt">Nobuyasu Abe, former Foreign Service officer born in Akita 1945, Director- General for Arms Control and Science in the Foreign Ministry, Ambassador in Vienna for the IAEA and other organizations, UN Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs (2003-06), currently, Director, Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-proliferation, an FMWG International&nbsp;Partner.</span><br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p align="left" style="text-align: left; text-indent: 21.25pt; background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% white;" class="MsoNormal">View the article on the Center for the Promotion of Disarmament and Non-Proliferation's <a href="http://www.cpdnp.jp/eng/pdf/Abe%20Oped%20on%20nuclear%20security.pdf">website</a>.&nbsp; </p>
<p align="left" style="text-align: left; text-indent: 21.25pt; background: none repeat scroll 0% 0% white;" class="MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 27 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Maintaining High Level Focus on Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e9272426-d865-4508-a1b6-fcf44f05df89]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>This paper explores how nuclear security can be maintained at the top of  the international agenda following the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in  Seoul and the third summit to be held in 2014 in the Netherlands. The  attention of senior government officials may be vital to catalyzing the  implementation of national nuclear security commitments. But continuing  the summit process beyond 2014 requires finding novel topics that  capture world leaders&rsquo; attention and willingness to making the necessary  bureaucratic commitments. Alternatives to a series of summits include  adding nuclear security to the G-8 or G-20 agendas or integrating it  into the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. The need for  continued summitry on this topic would be clearer if there was an  empirically based system for tracking nuclear security efforts. The  minimalist method for tracking national commitments that has been  decided for the Seoul conference is not the best method for assessing  the status of nuclear security internationally.</p>
<p><a href="http://uskoreainstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/USKI_NSS2012_FitzPandza.pdf">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 24 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Why Latin America Matters at the Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=12223e7e-56b2-48d1-9b92-e941dbb79775]]></link>
			<description/>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 17 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Despite Budget Cuts, Hunt for Dangerous Nuclear Material Continues]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=be22d9c5-f316-4e1c-951d-e174f15c9deb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><span class="NormalText"><font face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">While  State Department officials say the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack  is on the rise, counter-proliferation experts are warning that funding  to fight such threats may soon dwindle.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The probability that the  world may descend into all-out nuclear war is low, the department's  Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation  Thomas M. Countryman told reporters Feb. 15 in Washington, D.C.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
However, the threat of isolated attacks continues to grow, he said.<br />
&nbsp;<br />
The world has not done enough to secure fissile material,&nbsp;</span></font><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; font-size: 16px;">Countryman said. Meanwhile,</span><span style="font-family: &quot;Times New Roman&quot;; font-size: 16px;">&nbsp;terrorist groups are actively trying to obtain it in order to cause mass casualties, he added.</span></span></p>
<p><span class="NormalText"><font face="Times New Roman"><span style="font-size: 12pt;">But  President Obama&rsquo;s proposed budget reduces funding that is intended to  prevent such acts, says the Fissile Materials Working Group, a  non-governmental international coalition that proposes policies for  nuclear security. In a recent statement, the group called Obama&rsquo;s budget  &ldquo;a major step backwards in the fight against nuclear terrorism.&rdquo; The  group cites a $293 million cut to the National Nuclear Security  Administration and reductions to nuclear security programs at the  Pentagon and State Department.</span></font></span></p>
<p><a href="http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=675">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Truckers: Warheads on 18 Wheels]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=278ec8fa-b845-4879-8464-a1081cd9e692]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;</p>
<h3 class="dek">Big rigs with bombs are secretly cruising the interstate near you. But how safe are they from terrorists or accidents?</h3>
<p>&quot;Is that it?&quot; My wife leans forward in the passenger seat of our sensible hatchback and points ahead to an 18-wheeler that's hauling ass toward us on a low-country stretch of South Carolina's Highway 125. We've been heading west from I-95 toward the Savannah River Site nuclear facility on the Georgia-South Carolina border, in search of nuke&nbsp;truckers. At first the mysterious big rig resembles a commercial gas tanker, but the cab is pristine-looking and there's a simple blue-on-white license plate: US GOVERNMENT. It blows by too quickly to determine whether it's part of the little-known US fleet tasked with transporting some of the most sensitive cargo in existence.</p>
<p>As you weave through interstate traffic, you're unlikely to notice another <a target="_blank" href="http://www.sandia.gov/LabNews/LN02-25-00/tractor_story.html">plain-looking Peterbilt tractor-trailer</a>&nbsp;rolling along in the right-hand lane. The government plates and array of antennas jutting from the cab's roof would hardly register. You'd have no idea that inside the cab an armed federal agent operates a host of electronic countermeasures to keep outsiders from accessing his heavily armored cargo: a nuclear warhead with enough destructive power to level downtown San Francisco.</p>
<p>That's the way the Office of Secure Transportation (OST) wants it. At <a target="_blank" href="http://motherjones.com/politics/2011/11/nuclear-weapons-complex-budget-disarmament">a cost</a>&nbsp;of $250 million a year, nearly 600 couriers employed by this secretive agency within the US Department of Energy use some of the nation's&nbsp;busiest roads to move America's radioactive material wherever it needs to go&mdash;from a variety of labs, reactors and military bases, to the nation's Pantex bomb-assembly plant in Amarillo, Texas, to the Savannah River facility. Most of the shipments are bombs or weapon components; some are radioactive metals for research or fuel for Navy ships and submarines. The shipments are on the move about once a week.</p>
<p><a href="http://motherjones.com/politics/2012/02/nuclear-truckers?page=1">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 15 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Obama Administration Slashes Nuclear Security Funding]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=45eeb62c-889a-4f61-9208-f2358e84e7e0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p style="text-align: center;"><span class="Heading">Obama Administration Slashes Nuclear Security Funding: </span><br />
FY13 Budget Request for U.S. International WMD Security Programs <br />
February 14, 2012 <br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: left;">The Obama  Administration&rsquo;s fiscal year 2013 (FY13) budget request dramatically  reduces funding for international weapons of mass destruction (WMD)  security programs from the FY12 appropriated level.&nbsp; Funding for  National Nuclear Security Administration programs are nearly a quarter  (23.3 percent) below the FY12 appropriation.&nbsp; While the Department of  Defense&rsquo;s Cooperative Threat Reduction program is increased slightly  overall, CTR&rsquo;s Global Nuclear Security program is targeted for a 17  percent cut.&nbsp; Funding within the Department of State is also reduced  with cuts to WMD Terrorism, Global Threat Reduction, and Export Control  and Related Border Security Assistance programs.&nbsp;&nbsp; </p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=fy13_budget_request.pdf">Click here for details...</a><br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p style="text-align: left;"><a href="press.cfm?action=article&amp;page=0&amp;id=9c4eb174-8b56-47c2-99f8-acf5ff5f32b5">Click here to view the FMWG Press Release...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 14 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama: Tenemos mas armas de las que necesitamos ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ea694f72-9343-4547-bb69-7c409fa68723]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p class="p">Impedir otro <a href="http://www.abc.es/especiales/aniversario-tsunami-japon/" class="a">accidente como el de la central nuclear de <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U15025822728038nB" class="span">Fukushima</span></a> y evitar que grupos terroristas se hagan con armas at&oacute;micas. Esos son los dos objetivos de la <a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abci-obama-seul-201203260507.html" class="a">II Cumbre de Seguridad Nuclear</a>  que ha arrancado este lunes en Se&uacute;l, a la que asisten m&aacute;s de medio  centenar de jefes de Estado y Gobierno. Al frente se sit&uacute;a el presidente  de Estados Unidos, <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U1502582272803xwH" class="span">Barack Obama</span>,  quien en 2009 pronunci&oacute; en Praga su hist&oacute;rico discurso para reducir el  arsenal nuclear mundial y hace dos a&ntilde;os impuls&oacute; la primera reuni&oacute;n de  este foro en Washington.</p>
<p class="p">A  pesar de los logros obtenidos desde entonces, Obama ha vuelto a  insistir en esa misma l&iacute;nea en un encuentro con estudiantes de la  Universidad de Hankuk previo a la inauguraci&oacute;n de la cumbre. &laquo;El peligro  de un atentado nuclear es una de las mayores amenazas para la seguridad  global porque <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U15025822728035T" class="span">grupos terroristas y bandas criminales intentan apoderarse de material radiactivo</span>  para fabricar una &ldquo;bomba sucia&rdquo; y del arsenal at&oacute;mico que no est&aacute;  debidamente protegido, suficiente para muchas armas&raquo;, advirti&oacute; el  inquilino de la <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U15025822728039hB" class="span">Casa Blanca</span>.  Quiz&aacute;s por su condici&oacute;n de Nobel de la Paz o con la vista puesta en las  elecciones de noviembre, Obama confes&oacute; sentirse con la &laquo;obligaci&oacute;n  moral&raquo; de liderar este recorte armament&iacute;stico. &laquo;Con m&aacute;s de 1.500 misiles  at&oacute;micos desplegados y 5.000 cabezas nucleares, tenemos m&aacute;s armas de  las que necesitamos&raquo;, se&ntilde;al&oacute; antes de entrevistarse con su hom&oacute;logo  ruso, <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U1502582272803MeF" class="span">Dmitry Medvedev</span>, para convencerle de que su pa&iacute;s siga el mismo camino bajo la nueva presidencia de <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U15025822728032IC" class="span">Vladimir Putin</span>.</p>
<p class="p">Adem&aacute;s, ambos discutieron la <a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abci-ahmadineyad-amenaza-otan-nuclear-201203261048.html" class="a">tensi&oacute;n creciente en Ir&aacute;n</a> y Corea del Norte, que ha eclipsado esta cumbre con su <a href="http://www.abc.es/20120316/internacional/abci-satelite-corea-norte-201203160929.html" class="a">intenci&oacute;n de lanzar a mediados de abril un sat&eacute;lite espacial</a> que, en realidad, <a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abcp-teme-pyongyang-lance-misil-20120326.html" class="a">podr&iacute;a ser la prueba encubierta de un misil de largo alcance con capacidad para golpear las costas de Alaska</a> con una ojiva nuclear.</p>
<p class="p">...</p>
<p class="p">Garantizar su seguridad es crucial para todo el planeta, ya que cada vez  hay m&aacute;s material radiactivo que puede caer en malas manos y ser  utilizado por grupos terroristas. &laquo;Tenemos un problema global que exige  una soluci&oacute;n global, pero no hay requisitos de seguridad  internacionales, sino solo recomendaciones, para proteger los arsenales  at&oacute;micos y las cada vez m&aacute;s numerosas instalaciones nucleares de uso  civil&raquo;, alerta Kenneth Luongo, copresidente del Grupo de Trabajo de  Materiales Fisibles. A su juicio, la <span style="font-weight:bold;font-style:normal;" id="U150258227280302B" class="span">falta de estos est&aacute;ndares de seguridad obligatorios</span>  es una de las principales carencias de esta cumbre porque &laquo;se deber&iacute;a  garantizar que todos los pa&iacute;ses con aspiraciones nucleares est&aacute;n  preparados para controlar dicha energ&iacute;a&raquo;.</p>
<p class="p"><a href="http://www.abc.es/20120326/internacional/abci-obama-propone-eliminar-armas-201203261550.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sat, 04 Feb 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[FMWG Releases New Recommendations]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6ff34555-b219-4a5d-8763-7e76c49c2d8b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Prior to the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in&nbsp;Seoul on March 26-27, the FMWG has released an updated version of the group's policy recommendations.&nbsp; <a href="FMWGRecommendationsRpt1912.pdf">View the recommendations...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and HEU Minimization]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=3b170553-09f9-41ba-83a6-2949621865ed]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Highly enriched uranium (HEU) is one of the most dangerous materials in the world, thanks to the ease with which it can be utilized in a nuclear explosive device. Unlike plutonium, highly enriched uranium is suitable for use in the simplest kind of nuclear weapon, a so-called gun-type bomb. In addition, HEU&rsquo;s weak radioactivity makes it relatively easy to handle and hard to detect. Terrorists who acquire a sufficient quantity of HEU would not need to be backed by the scientific and financial resources of a state to construct a nuclear device.</p>
<p>Massive amounts of HEU continue to be set aside for nuclear weapons and for powering nuclear vessels such as submarines and aircraft carriers. The primary civilian use of HEU has been in research reactors and other test facilities. It has also been used in the process of producing medical isotopes and in civilian propulsion reactors. A half century ago, the Soviet Union and the United States started shipping HEU abroad as part of their peaceful nuclear cooperation programs, but by the late 1970s, India&rsquo;s &ldquo;peaceful nuclear explosion&rdquo; and the rise of international terrorism had convinced the two superpowers to launch efforts to phase out research reactor use of HEU (particularly overseas) and replace it with LEU. These efforts were accelerated following the September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States and have made significant gains.</p>
<p><a href="http://uskoreainstitute.org/publications/working-paper-series/nss2012/nss-pomper/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 31 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Loophole in Senate Bill May Create Nuclear Risks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=dc9a5475-1af7-4ea9-97d8-cb8df0932594]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>In the post 9/11 world, the threat of a nuclear bomb being fabricated  and used by terrorists is real. Now a group of nuclear experts has told  Congress that a loophole in a bill meant to limit the use of bomb-grade  uranium in medical isotopes could undo years of work to curb the risk  of such material being diverted to such a bomb.</p>
<p>Signed by over a dozen experts in the medical and nuclear non-proliferation fields, <a href="http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2012/01/Isotopes-group-letter-2012-Jan.pdf">the letter raises concerns</a>  about the American Medical Isotopes Production Act of 2011, passed by  the Senate in November. The bill, currently awaiting a House vote, is  aimed at reducing the use of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) in developing  the medical isotope Molybdenum-99 &mdash; a key ingredient in the medical  diagnosis of millions of American patients a year.</p>
<p>Highly-enriched uranium is also a key ingredient in nuclear weapons, and experts say its continuing production for civilian use <a>poses many security risks</a>.  The letter, submitted by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project  (NPPP), argues that the bill might unintentionally promote the  heightened production of HEU by Russia, in particular.</p>
<p><a href="http://dev.publicintegrity.org/2012/01/27/8003/loophole-senate-bill-may-create-nuclear-risks">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 27 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Involuntary Response]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=1b9f63d7-8d01-44e4-8625-aba21fea520e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Earlier this month, widespread inaction on the increasing dangers posed by nuclear proliferation and climate change forced the <em>Bulletin</em>'s  Doomsday Clock to move one minute closer to midnight, indicating the  mounting perils confronting humanity's survival. One factor pushing the  clock forward to five minutes to midnight was the failure to ensure  strict security and comprehensive international oversight for nuclear  weapons and materials, which continue to accumulate in a few nations.  Despite several ongoing initiatives to strengthen global defenses  against nuclear terrorism, it is clear that much more needs to be done  to ensure that the nightmare doesn't become reality.</p>
<p>In April 2010, 47 heads of state met in Washington, DC, for the first  Nuclear Security Summit in order to find ways to address the largely  overlooked threat of nuclear terrorism. The summit was the largest  meeting of heads of state called by an  American president since 1945,  when leaders gathered in San Francisco in the effort that launched the  United Nations. Major obstacles confronted planners for the first  Nuclear Security Summit, including a lack of consensus on the  dangers  of nuclear terrorism and how best to enhance global nuclear security   (problems that still persist). By gathering world leaders -- rather than  bureaucrats -- to address the issue head on, the first summit made some  important steps in helping to raise global awareness about the threat  of nuclear terrorism. The 47 heads of state, representing countries from  all corners of the globe, concluded in a nonbinding communiqu&eacute; that  &quot;nuclear terrorism is one  of the greatest threats to global security&quot;  and that &quot;strong nuclear security  measures&quot; are the best means to  prevent the threat from becoming reality. Additionally, the leaders  joined President Obama's goal to secure all  vulnerable nuclear material  within four years.</p>
<p>In addition to the strong normative support generated for preventing  nuclear terrorism, the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit resulted in  approximately 50 concrete national commitments to strengthen global  nuclear security -- many of which <a target="_blank" href="http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2011/177680.htm">have already been fulfilled</a>  heading into the second summit this March in Seoul, South Korea. Of  particular note are the pledges to eliminate nuclear bombmaking  materials.</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/involuntary-response">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 26 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[India's Nuclear Security Policy]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=99c941db-fe5e-4ac2-a7bc-30947e3278bb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>On March 26-27, 2012, Seoul is hosting the 2nd Nuclear Security  Summit (NSS). The first summit was held in Washington on April 13, 2010.  India is participating in the Seoul summit, just as it did in the first  summit. In fact, India was one of 47 participant countries at the April  2010 NSS. It had actively participated in all the preparatory Sherpa  meetings for the 2010 NSS. In these Sherpa meetings, the participant  countries decided the communiqu&eacute; and the work plan of the 2010 NSS.</p>
<p>On  January 16-17, 2012, India is also holding the 3rd Sherpa meeting for  the Seoul NSS. This is the first time that India will be holding a  Sherpa meeting as part of the NSS. India did not hold any Sherpa  meetings in the run-up to the 2010 NSS. Does the holding of the Sherpa  meeting demonstrate that India has started playing a proactive role in  the NSS process? India has been an active participant in the summit  process, but is proceeding it cautiously. Organizing the Sherpa meeting  should not mean a major departure from India&rsquo;s nuclear security policy,  which has been marked by cautious activism.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.eurasiareview.com/05012012-india%E2%80%99s-nuclear-security-policy-analysis/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Coming Clean: India's Export Control Regime]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e4133e53-52f7-45e8-a0dd-0e4ab71722f3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Australia's 5 December 2011 decision to lift its longstanding ban on exporting uranium to <br />
India is testament to the country's growing reputation as a responsible host of sensitive goods <br />
and technologies, rather than a rogue nuclear state. This is due in part to India's efforts to <br />
enhance and strengthen its export control regulations and practices in line with international <br />
non-proliferation standards.</p>
<p><br />
India's export controls are entering a new phase of maturity. The country has, in recent years, <br />
gradually adopted internationally recognised 'best practices' for controlling the export of <br />
sensitive goods with potential military or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ramifications. <br />
India has also built a legal framework that provides statutory authority to the regulatory and <br />
institutional structures that implement and enforce its export regulations.</p>
<p>Although India has engaged with major multilateral export control bodies, it continues to <br />
seek accommodation from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, nuclear supplier countries that <br />
seek to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of <br />
guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports) as New Delhi looks to expand its <br />
nuclear power generation without joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).</p>
<p>View article at <a href="http://jir.janes.com/public/jir/index.shtml">Jane's Intelligence Review</a>...</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 20 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Public Health and Nuclear Experts Warn Against Importing Russian Medical Isotopes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=fb8089ae-8e75-4015-92ae-f347401fb319]]></link>
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<p>&nbsp;</p>
<div><span>A broad  coalition of U.S. public health, medical, and nuclear nonproliferation  experts today urged Congress to restrict the use of imported Russian  medical isotopes produced with bomb-grade uranium and to block them  completely within about five years.&nbsp; American patients receive about 16  million medical diagnostic procedures annually using the type of isotope  in question, derived from Molybdenum-99. <br />
</span></div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div><span>Writing  to key legislators, the experts criticized Russia for rapidly expanding  its use of &ldquo;highly enriched&rdquo; &ndash; or nuclear weapons-grade &ndash; uranium to  produce medical isotopes so that it can dominate this sector of the U.S.  health-care market.&nbsp; If successful, the Russian initiative would  undermine Washington&rsquo;s efforts to promote domestic production of medical  isotopes without bomb-grade uranium and to phase-out global commerce in  such uranium.&nbsp; According to the letter, Russia&rsquo;s plan threatens to  render the domestic &ldquo;supply of these vital isotopes vulnerable to  air-traffic interruptions, such as from recent volcanic eruptions,&rdquo;  while also &ldquo;escalating risks of nuclear terrorism.&rdquo; </span></div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div><a href="http://blogs.utexas.edu/nppp/files/2012/01/Isotopes-group-letter-2012-Jan.pdf"><span>Read full article...</span></a></div>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 18 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The Seoul Nuclear Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=8b7e903f-3ffa-4017-b44b-d0bfa4ba1df3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>N APRIL 2010, Barack Obama convinced leaders from forty-seven  countries to meet in Washington and discuss a topic to which most had  previously paid scarce attention: securing vulnerable nuclear materials.  Most of these leaders cared little about the matter at hand but were  eager to please a popular new U.S. president with the goal of securing  all nuclear materials within four years. The desire to cultivate Obama&rsquo;s  favor had an important payoff: high-profile attention to an issue that  has often lingered in obscurity, even compared to other concerns in the  abstruse world of global nuclear politics. And that attention meant  potentially significant progress in keeping nuclear-weapons materials  from terrorists.</p>
<p>The leaders at that summit also agreed that South Korea would host  another nuclear-security summit in 2012. On the face of it, South Korea  was a strange choice, given that it neither possessed nuclear weapons  nor the materials to make them&mdash;highly enriched uranium or separated  plutonium. But Obama&rsquo;s first choice, Russia, turned down the  opportunity, and South Korea&rsquo;s president Lee Myung-bak was eager to  raise Seoul&rsquo;s standing on the global stage and give the country&rsquo;s  burgeoning nuclear-energy industry a global seal of approval.</p>
<p>So late this March, fifty or so leaders will descend on Seoul to  track progress since the last summit and make a batch of fresh  commitments. While their presence is sure to be heralded by the U.S.  government, Korean citizens are likely to be less welcoming. Many in  Korea find it strange that their government should be putting so much  effort into an event on nuclear terrorism when nuclear threats from  North Korea and the effects of the Fukushima accident in Japan appear to  be more pressing issues for the peninsula. Other countries share  similar concerns, believing that the United States has devoted too much  attention to the threat of nuclear terrorism at the expense of  nonproliferation, safety and disarmament issues.</p>
<p>These concerns are likely to limit the ambitions of those who would  like to see governments make significantly deeper nuclear-security  commitments at Seoul. They are also likely to hamper efforts to make the  current biannual security-summit process an ongoing fixture of  international relations&mdash;particularly if attempts are made to stretch the  current process beyond Obama&rsquo;s four-year time frame. States face a  choice: they can move forward with a wider process that takes in more  issues in order to justify continued high-level attention; they can  continue discussing a relatively narrow set of issues at a lower level;  or they can maintain these high-level meetings but on a less frequent  basis.</p>
<p><a href="http://nationalinterest.org/article/the-seoul-nuclear-summit-6284">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 04 Jan 2012 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul: Achieving Sustainable Nuclear Security Culture]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=5d0883e3-45bd-4840-9b25-0490c93d95fd]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>According to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear security culture is &ldquo;the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behavior of individuals, organizations and institutions which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security.&rdquo;1&nbsp; The concept of security culture emerged much later than nuclear safety culture, which was triggered by human errors that led to the Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents. Much as these incidents confirmed the importance of nuclear safety, security culture has gained acceptance as a way to keep terrorist groups from acquiring radioactive materials and prevent acts of sabotage against nuclear power infrastructures. Safety and security culture share the goal of protecting human lives and the environment by assuring that nuclear power plants operate at acceptable risk levels.</p>
<div>The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, DC, emphasized the importance of culture as a critical contributing factor to nuclear security:</div>
<p><strong>Communiqu&eacute;<br />
<br />
</strong>&sect; &ldquo;We will work with the industry to ensure the necessary priority of physical protection, material accountancy and security culture.&rdquo;</p>
<p><strong>Work Plan<br />
<br />
</strong>&sect; &ldquo;Participating States will work &hellip; to promote and sustain strong nuclear security culture and corporate commitments to implement robust security practices.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
&sect; &ldquo;Participating States encourage nuclear operators and architect/engineering firms to take into account and incorporate, where appropriate, effective measures of physical protection and security culture into the planning, construction, and operation of civilian nuclear facilities.&rdquo;<br />
<br />
&sect; &ldquo;Emphasizing the importance of the human dimension of nuclear security, the need to enhance security culture, and the need to maintain a well-trained cadre of technical experts.&rdquo;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.fas.org/pubs/pir/_docs/2011fallpir.pdf">View full article...</a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Dec 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Integrating Nuclear Safety & Security: Policy Recommendations]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=6fa5d4eb-9810-4c1c-9a3d-7c6b3518ea0c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>In April 2010 at the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, D.C., 47 nations agreed to take steps to prevent nuclear terrorism by assuring the highest level of protection for weapon-usable nuclear materials &ndash; highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium.  They all agreed to a communiqu&eacute; and work plan, and individual nations committed themselves to take specific actions within their borders to enhance nuclear material security.</p>
<p>When leaders meet for the next nuclear security summit in Seoul in March 2012, they will continue this core focus on nuclear material security, but they will likely also address the implications and lessons of the March 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident.&nbsp; The severe damage to the reactor cores at Fukushima and local radiation&nbsp; exposure has highlighted the importance of protecting the <br />
global population from all unintended releases of radiation &ndash; including from accidents and intentional acts.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=integrating_nuclear_safety_and_security_memo.pdf">See full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nunn-Lugar: 20 Years of Cooperative Threat Reduction]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=25cb7d1f-6563-4aeb-9287-dff452bec6c8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>December 12 marked the 20th anniversary of the Cooperative Threat  Reduction legislation introduced by US Senators Sam Nunn and Richard  Lugar to aid Russia in dismantling its nuclear arsenal after the end of  the Cold War. The program created by that initial legislation is the  most significant and successful postwar effort since the German Marshall  Plan helped Europe recover from World War II.</p>
<p>The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program has deactivated 7,527  strategic nuclear warheads and destroyed 774 intercontinental ballistic  missiles, 651 submarine launched ballistic missiles, and 906 nuclear  air-to-surface missiles. It has upgraded security at 24 nuclear weapons  storage sites in Russia and downblended 400 metric tons of highly  enriched uranium, which now supplies 10 percent of US electricity. To  date, the Nunn-Lugar program has reduced nuclear arsenals in Russia from  30,000 in 1991 to about 12,000 warheads today. To match the effort in  Russia, the United States has dismantled more than 13,000 warheads since  1990 and destroyed 90 percent of its nonstrategic nuclear weapons,  going from 7,600 to 760 warheads. It took nearly 50 years to build the  most dangerous arsenals in history; it has taken less than 20 years to  dismantle and store more than 75 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.  This is a moment for celebration.</p>
<p>Yet, there will likely be little fanfare to recognize these  accomplishments, nor much praise for those far-sighted and generous  leaders who created the organizations to carry out the most complex  weapons dismantlement in history. Why?</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/kennette-benedict/nunn-lugar-20-years-of-cooperative-threat-reduction">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 19 Dec 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Libya, Belarus and Dealing with Dictators]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b524c670-4a6e-44d4-9388-3f0644367bb5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<h1>Libya, Belarus, and dealing with&nbsp;dictators</h1>
<p><span class="submitted meta">By Fissile Materials Working Group | 26 October 2011 </span></p>
<p>Dealing with thuggish dictators reluctant to relinquish their stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a necessary component in the global effort to secure vulnerable fissile materials by 2013. Unfortunately, nuclear deals are often tentative and prone to collapse if a dictator's whims change. The successful nuclear deal with Libya and the stalled deal with Belarus are indicative of this dynamic, but it should not stop the United States and other nations from seeking deals to secure fissile materials that might otherwise be exploited by would-be nuclear terrorists.</p>
<p>The civil war that has raged for months between loyalists to Libya's former dictator, Muammar Qaddafi, and rebel forces supported by NATO has led to a rebel victory and the violent demise of Qaddafi. While many lessons will be drawn from the Libyan conflict, we should not forget the danger that fissile materials pose, particularly in unstable regions. Had Qaddafi maintained Libya's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs, there is no telling what might have occurred. It is easy to imagine the unstable dictator transferring dangerous nuclear materials to terrorist groups or unleashing his most dangerous weapons on the Libyan people themselves. Even if Qaddafi abstained from these activities, Libya's nuclear security system could have broken down amidst the ongoing power vacuum. This in turn could have enabled fissile material to slip from Libyan control onto the black market and potentially into the hands of a terrorist group. Lastly, if Libya still had a nuclear infrastructure when the country fell into revolt, NATO forces might have been more cautious in their desire to support the rebels, which could have left Qaddafi in power and allowed him to crush the rebellion in Benghazi. Alternately, NATO might have felt pressured to put boots on the ground, which could have stolen ownership of the rebellion and resulted in any number of negative outcomes.</p>
<p>Fortunately, Libya's WMD program was abandoned in a 2003 deal between Libya, Britain, and the United States in the hopes of loosening sanctions and improving relations with the West. Libya shipped its nuclear weapon designs, documents, and enrichment technology to the United States. In 2004, 16 kilograms of HEU fuel was removed from a Libyan nuclear research reactor and sent to Russia for downblending. The research reactor was converted to run on low enriched uranium (LEU) by the United States two years later. Also as part of the bargain, Libya destroyed thousands of shells filled with chemical weapons.</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/libya-belarus-and-dealing-dictators">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 26 Oct 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Managing the Consequences of Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b5a69979-ca07-490d-9798-e4c3ea6e47c6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Substantial progress has been made around the world in preventing a nuclear terrorist attack. More states have secured highly enriched uranium and plutonium (the key ingredients of a nuclear weapon), or transferred these materials to the United States or Russia for safekeeping. More states have also ratified nuclear-security conventions and joined relevant initiatives such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a large forum for sharing nuclear-security best practices and information. Much remains to be done to ensure a nuclear terrorist attack will never take place, but US President Barack Obama signalled American attention to the problem when he convened, in April 2010, the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The second Nuclear Security Summit will be held in Seoul in March 2012, and negotiations on the agenda and the formal outcome are well under way. The outcome of the 2012 summit will matter just as much as the communiqu&eacute; and work plan that emerged from the 2010 summit, because it will help determine how international efforts to prevent nuclear and radiological terrorism &ndash; the latter issue having been added to the summit&rsquo;s scope &ndash; will unfold in the years beyond 2012.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Notwithstanding all the progress made in securing fissile materials, a major shortcoming of international nuclear and radiological counter-terrorism efforts is their almost exclusive focus on prevention. The GICNT June 2011 Plenary Meeting decided to add response and mitigation as a new priority functional area to the initiative, but this is an exception. Barely any consideration has so far been given to improving measures that can be taken after a terrorist attack in order to minimise the consequences.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Preventive measures can never guarantee absolute protection. No matter how much fissile and radiological material is secured in the former Soviet Union or how much money is invested in sophisticated nuclear-detection systems for international border crossings, terrorists may still succeed in acquiring material that had been unaccounted for, and subsequently overcome all defences. This is especially true for the threat of radiological terrorism, because it is far more likely that terrorists could acquire and weaponise radiological material than they could launch a nuclear attack.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Improving national response and mitigation capacities could significantly decrease the risks to the public. If emergency services are able to swiftly identify and respond to a radiological attack; if officials can issue appropriate messages to the public in a timely and consistent manner; and if affected areas can be efficiently decontaminated in the weeks after an event, then lives can be saved and much of the economic, social and psychological disruption that was the aim of the terrorists can be reduced.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>Many states lack these capacities. There is a belief that investing in measures to prevent an incident is sufficient and that in the worst case one could count on the specialist assistance provided by the United States and others to minimise the adverse impact. Yet response and consequence-mitigation measures need to be developed, tested and incorporated into national counter-terrorism strategies well before terrorists strike. Their execution after &hellip;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/survival-2011/year-2011-issue-5/managing-the-consequences-of-nuclear-terrorism/">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 30 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[2012 Nuclear Security Summit: The Korean Twist]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=aecf21cd-fa15-4209-ad46-f0d240b01c71]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...As the 2012 NSS chair, the ROK brings clear advantages and capabilities to the table in leading the global nuclear security initiative.&nbsp; It is a non-nuclear weapons state using nuclear power for peaceful purposes, a major nuclear exporter, and a neighbor to a country that pursues nuclear weapons to threaten peace and stability. The ROK is also positioned to bridge non-nuclear weapons states and nuclear weapons states, emerging nuclear newcomers and established nuclear power users, as well as developing and developed states.</p>
<p>To this end, Seoul would have an interest in an expanded agenda to include nuclear safety-security. Prior to Fukushima, active discussions on nuclear safety were becoming a thing of the past owing to strong safety precautions put in place since the Three Mile Island and Chernobyl incidents...&nbsp;&nbsp; Click to <a href="http://www.keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/2012_nuclear_sec_summit_aps.pdf">view full article</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 28 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
		</item>
		
		<item>
			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Watchdogs Say GAO Report Warns of Lax Int'l Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=9edd7237-204e-4319-a224-a75cd44a34bd]]></link>
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<p class="MsoNormal">This article original appeared here:&nbsp;<span style="color:#1F497D"> </span><a href="http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/09/22/14">http://www.eenews.net/Greenwire/2011/09/22/14</a></p>
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<p class="publishedon" style="margin:0in;margin-bottom:.0001pt;line-height:13.5pt;
vertical-align:baseline"><i><span style="font-size:9.0pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:#555555;background:white">Published:<span class="apple-converted-space">&nbsp;</span>Thursday, September 22, 2011</span></i></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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border-style:initial;border-color:initial;outline-width: 0px;outline-style: initial;
outline-color: initial;background-position:initial initial;background-repeat:
initial initial"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:black;background:white">Nuclear watchdogs say an independent audit that found the federal government hasn't accounted for American nuclear material that has been shipped abroad highlights the need for increased oversight.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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initial initial"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:black;background:white">The Government Accountability Office released a report on Sept. 8 that found the Energy Department, Nuclear Regulatory Commission and State Department have failed to fully account for nuclear material exported from the United States under nuclear cooperation, or &quot;123,&quot; agreements.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
background-attachment:initial;background-origin: initial;background-clip: initial;
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color:black;background:white">The federal government has forged 27 such agreements that establish a framework with other countries for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under such partnerships, countries are required to guarantee the physical protection of material that originated in the United States.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
background-attachment:initial;background-origin: initial;background-clip: initial;
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outline-color: initial;background-position:initial initial;background-repeat:
initial initial"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;
color:black;background:white">The GAO found that the &quot;123&quot; agreements do not require information about the whereabouts and safety of the nuclear material to be reported, and there is no policy in the United States for pursuing or obtaining such data.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
background-attachment:initial;background-origin: initial;background-clip: initial;
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color:black;background:white">&quot;U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements generally require that partners report inventory information upon request, however, DOE and NRC have not systematically sought such data,&quot; the report says. &quot;DOE and NRC do not have a comprehensive, detailed, current inventory of U.S. nuclear material -- including weapon-usable material such as highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium -- overseas that includes the country, facility, and quantity of material.&quot;</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">The agencies cannot account for material such as highly enriched uranium that has been shipped abroad, mainly because the nuclear cooperation agreements do not contain specific access rights that enable DOE, NRC or the State Department to monitor and evaluate the physical security of U.S. nuclear material overseas, and the American government relies on its partners to maintain adequate security, GAO said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">Ed Lyman, senior staff scientist with the Union of Concerned Scientists, says the federal government should strengthen its authority under the 123 agreements, which would allow federal agencies to verify the security of U.S.-origin materials in other countries. Currently, the United States doesn't have enough authority and doesn't use what power it does have, he said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">&quot;Of course, other countries would oppose this as a violation of their sovereignty, ignoring the fact that it is a privilege for them, not a right, to have access to U.S.-origin technologies and materials,&quot; Lyman said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
background-attachment:initial;background-origin: initial;background-clip: initial;
border-style:initial;border-color:initial;outline-width: 0px;outline-style: initial;
outline-color: initial;background-position:initial initial;background-repeat:
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color:black;background:white">The GAO audit also found that DOE, NRC and the State Department have not systematically visited countries believed to be holding the &quot;highest proliferation risk quantities of U.S. nuclear material&quot; or facilities that failed to meet international physical security guidelines in a timely manner. Notably, federal officials found only half of the 55 countries visited from 1994 through 2010 met international security guidelines, GAO said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">The GAO recommended that Congress consider directing DOE and NRC to compile an inventory of U.S. nuclear material overseas, but the agencies disagreed and said conducting annual inventory reconciliations with all partners was unnecessary, according to the report. &quot;GAO continues to believe that its recommendations could help improve the accountability of U.S. nuclear material in foreign countries,&quot; the audit says.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security -- a non-governmental research organization dedicated to securing weapons of mass destruction -- said part of the problem is that the United States has been selling nuclear material and technology around the world since the 1950s. The government has exported highly enriched equipment for enriching uranium and technology for reprocessing spent fuel. Luongo is also a member of the Fissile Materials Working Group, and worked as senior advisory to the Secretary of Energy for Nonproliferation.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">The government is attempting to secure large amounts of material and equipment despite budget constraints, limited staff and more than half a decade's worth of technology that has been globally distributed, he said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
0in;line-height:13.5pt;vertical-align:baseline;background-image:initial;
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color:black;background:white">&quot;If Congress is really worried about this, they ought to give money to conduct the inspections&quot; instead of cutting federal funding for such initiatives, he said.</span></p>
<p style="margin-top:12.0pt;margin-right:0in;margin-bottom:12.0pt;margin-left:
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color:black;background:white">Most recently, lawmakers have cut funding for the DOE's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI), a program that removes U.S. nuclear material from vulnerable facilities overseas and brings back material that meets certain eligibility criteria.</span></p>
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baseline;background-image:initial;background-attachment:initial;background-origin: initial;
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background-repeat:initial initial"><span style="font-size:10.5pt;font-family:
&quot;Arial&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;;color:black;background:white">The Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of more than 60 nuclear experts, criticized the House in July for not fully funding the president's request of more than $500 million for the GTRI program (<a href="http://www.eenews.net/EEDaily/2011/07/22/archive/3"><b><i><span style="color:#990000;border:none windowtext 1.0pt;mso-border-alt:none windowtext 0in;
padding:0in">E&amp;E Daily</span></i></b></a>, July 22). The group argued that the GTRI would reduce the threat of nuclear terrorists by converting nuclear reactors to run on nonweapon-grade low-enriched uranium rather than highly enriched uranium.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Bringing Belarus Back to the Table]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ab1fc9eb-925c-43dc-bece-ee650b511f94]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>On August 19, 2011, Belarus <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/20/world/europe/20belarus.html"><font color="#0066cc">announced</font></a> that it would not proceed with a promised shipment of weapon-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Russia, arguing that the action was in retaliation for sanctions that the United States had recently imposed on Minsk and that the freeze would be lifted after the sanctions were removed. The sanctions were issued in response to the crackdown by President Alexander Lukashenko on his political opponents and the regime's ties with Iran.</p>
<p>The action also reflected shifts in Minsk's perception of the need to improve ties with the West since last December, when Belarusian Foreign Minister Sergei Martynov signed <a href="http://www.mfa.gov.by/en/press/news_mfa/a2c4790977a49f13.html"><font color="#0066cc">a joint statement</font></a> with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. In that statement, Minsk said it &quot;has decided to eliminate all of its stocks&quot; of HEU before the March 2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul. At the time, US officials anticipated that the shipments of the remaining HEU would take place in early 2012, shortly before the summit. In return, the United States promised to &quot;provide technical and financial assistance to support the completion of this effort as expeditiously as possible,&quot; and South Korea indicated that it would be willing to invite Belarus to the summit if Minsk met its commitment.</p>
<p><a href="http://cns.miis.edu/wmdjunction/110920_belarus.htm#fnB9">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 21 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Two Treaties. One Congress. No Time to Wait.]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=34a9f560-2932-4254-98d8-253d441b4143]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...in April 2010, President Barack Obama hosted a historic Nuclear Security Summit in Washington aimed at preventing nuclear terrorism. The 47 world leaders in attendance endorsed the four-year goal of securing all nuclear material worldwide and produced a communiqu&eacute; and a detailed work plan, which called for a crackdown on nuclear trafficking, standards for securing plutonium and highly enriched uranium, and support for existing UN resolutions. Twenty-nine countries at the summit pledged to uphold more than 50 specific commitments to secure or eliminate nuclear materials. According to an <a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/promises-promises-progress-report-one-year-af" target="_blank"><font color="#0066cc">April 2011 joint report</font></a> released by the Arms Control Association and the Partnership for Global Security, roughly 60 percent of the national commitments made at the summit have been completed.</p>
<p>Of the summit commitments that remain unresolved, one stands out: the Obama administration's pledge to accelerate efforts to complete US ratification procedures on both the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the 2005 International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), which would each expand and strengthen US efforts to prevent and combat nuclear terrorism. George W. Bush's administration submitted the Conventions to the Senate in September 2007 -- demonstrating the strong bipartisan support for the treaties -- and the Senate overwhelmingly approved them in September 2008. However, prior to US ratification, both conventions require the United States to pass legislation to criminalize certain offenses, such as the possession of radioactive material other than nuclear material.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/two-treaties-one-congress-no-time-to-wait">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Keeping Nuclear Terrorism a Threat Only in Theory]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=4b4b3868-0640-4f32-88c7-705f1e3c2ad9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>On September 11, as the world mourns the deaths in New York and Washington of ten years ago, some solace might be found in noting that the events that day are still the world's most deadly terrorist attack to date. Osama bin Laden did not subsequently fulfill his self-professed religious obligation to obtain nuclear weapons. The &quot;nuclear hell storm&quot; that Al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheik Mohammed said would be unleashed if bin Laden was killed has not come to pass. There has not been a single incident of nuclear terrorism, even using a radiation-spreading dirty bomb.</p>
<p>The freedom from nuclear terrorism that the world has enjoyed is due, no doubt, to some combination of the competence of concerned governments and the incompetence of those who seek to inflict mass harm. Luck has also played a role. In light of the potential demand for nuclear materials by terrorists and the black market supply, the odds of terrorist nuclear attack occurring somewhere in the world are still far too high.&nbsp;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-fitzpatrick/nuclear-terrorism-september-11_b_957575.html">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 11 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Preventing a Nuclear 9/11 in Three Easy Steps]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=7e74b8cf-1541-46c0-b46d-1560d7284828]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>On March 17, 2012, world leaders have yet another opportunity to take bold action on global nuclear security. They will come together in South Korea for the second Nuclear Security Summit. Their goal is clear: countries need to finish the job they started at the 2010 Summit and push for real global security measures. You cannot solve only part of this problem. You have to solve it all.</p>
<p>And you can&rsquo;t solve a problem unless you agree that there is a problem; unless you put your money where your mouth is; and unless you commit to getting rid of the vulnerable nuclear materials that are the source of the problem.</p>
<p><a href="http://ploughshares.org/blog/2011-09-07/preventing-nuclear-911-three-easy">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Terrorism: A Funding Cut that Endangers America]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=a01cbd8f-d43f-4981-8897-3b03a3d8258c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Congress' failure to accord top priority to programs to keep fissile materials out of the hands of terrorists is highly irresponsible. We must secure loose weapons-grade nuclear material around the world and shut down or convert nuclear reactors using highly enriched uranium as soon as possible. With the Senate returned from recess, it will have an opportunity to demonstrate a greater sense of urgency and less complacency by restoring the reckless cuts in these programs made by the House budget. It makes no sense to agree on the problem but then to debilitate the solution.</p>
<p>The nation's security depends on it.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/opinion/oped/bs-ed-nuclear-terrorism-20110906,0,192154.story">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Regime Change for Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=ed7d10c2-e617-4ce0-a124-ec6199b48a7f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>[G]iven the enormity of the nuclear security complex, how internally coherent is the nuclear security regime? More important, can it cope with current and future challenges?</p>
<p>Simply put, no. The current nuclear security regime urgently needs to evolve into a high-functioning nuclear security <em>architecture</em>. While the current regime attempts to manage nuclear security threats with disparate tools and varied legislative efforts, the nuclear security architecture would be the result of a systemic strategic exercise to integrate all the current security measures while allowing for future needs. The new design would close gaps, weed out weaknesses, and prioritize efficiency.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/regime-change-nuclear-security">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nature and Malice: Confronting Multiple Threats to Nuclear Power Infrastructure]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=b212afd1-d84c-40aa-921c-c7bd77036a1a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<ul>
    <li>As the IAEA has suggested, the lessons of Fukushima that need particular study are &quot;those pertaining to multiple severe hazards&quot; that might afflict a nuclear power plant.</li>
    <li>Such complex hazards can emerge from natural disaster, sabotage by terrorists or other malcontents, or by a combination of natural events and intentional acts.</li>
    <li>Nuclear safety and security staffs -- whose cultures are quite different -- should be trained to interact with one another as they respond to all three types of severe hazards.</li>
</ul>
<p><a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/nature-and-malice-confronting-multiple-hazards-to-nuclear-power-infrastructure">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security in a New Age]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=eb8a4ce1-0840-4eed-b469-f173d7607472]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>TBILISI, Georgia - The rattling olive Audi A4 with two middle-aged smugglers attracted little attention as it slithered through this former Soviet republic one morning in February, speeding toward the Turkish border.</p>
<p>In the trunk, the smugglers carried a silver case filled with iridium-192. They nurtured vague grand plans to sell the radioactive material to a Muslim buyer for $5 million.</p>
<p>Such a black-market sale could have but one likely purpose - construction of a so-called dirty bomb.</p>
<p><a href="http://articles.philly.com/2011-09-04/news/30112962_1_radioactive-material-radiation-detectors-dirty-bomb">View full article...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 04 Sep 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[2012 Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul: Achieving Sustainable Nuclear Security Culture]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=cce1f436-6e78-4b1b-8db1-9f3e611002aa]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit elevated the reliability of the human factor to the top of the nuclear security agenda. A vehicle to improve the human factor is security culture, which connotes not only the technical proficiency of the people but also their awareness of proliferation risks and motivation to follow established security procedures, comply with regulations, and take initiative when unforeseen circumstances arise.</p>
<p><a href="http://www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2011/08/nuclear_security_culture.php">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 31 Aug 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Time to Think Safety - Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=691316ea-f755-4fef-b5cf-886c0dfe46dc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Authors:&nbsp;</strong>Igor Khripunov and Duyeon Kim<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>&nbsp;The Korea Times</p>
<p>The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster gave terrorists and other malefactors a tip. By targeting nuclear plants, they can wreak havoc comparable to that wrought by an earthquake and tsunami, crippling a great economic and military power.&nbsp; A terrorist version of Fukushima is plausible ? with all the human suffering, economic dislocation and national humiliation the March 2011 cataclysm entailed. Both safety and security must be enhanced at nuclear installations around the world.</p>
<p jquery1313004991959="7">To see the full article, please click <a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/08/137_92394.html">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 08 Aug 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Chinese Nuclear Security Practices]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=42595ef2-0817-462e-8d56-8e0c5c679e9c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p jquery1313004648698="7"><strong>Author: </strong>Li Hong<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
China faces two primary challenges to its nuclear security: first, the rapid growth of nuclear power plants in China and the shortage of professional staff with special expertise in nuclear security and, second, the traditionally skeptical attitude of the Chinese Authority on transparency. Overcoming these two challenges requires time and international cooperation. China is drawing deep and serious lessons from the Fukushima nuclear incident and is reviewing its approach to nuclear culture. Working more closely with international partners on securing China's own nuclear material would be the best way to promote China's interests as well as the global nuclear security regime.</p>
<p jquery1313004648698="7">To view the full article, please click <a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/chinese-nuclear-security-practices">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 22 Jul 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[From Budget Cuts to Dirty Bombs]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=3dfd60d7-cb5a-444d-8013-0bfb53bed45d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Authors: </strong>Ken Luongo and Ken Brill<br />
<strong>Source:&nbsp; </strong>The New York Times<br />
<br />
The House of Representatives has decided that countering the threat of nuclear terrorism no longer deserves America&rsquo;s best efforts. Last week, it passed an energy and water budget bill that slashes the country&rsquo;s defenses against nuclear terrorism &mdash; a threat both parties have long recognized as one of the most serious facing America. The Senate has the opportunity to reverse that mistake. If it does not, over a decade of nuclear security gains could evaporate.</p>
<p>To see the full article, please click <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/23/opinion/23Luongo-Brill.html">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 22 Jul 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Fortenberry-Sanchez Amendment a Win for Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=e145d61b-6733-45f6-a102-505a6e1c9f45]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author: </strong>Kingston Reif<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>Nukes of Hazard Blog<br />
<br />
On July 13, the House approved an amendment to the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2354) offered by Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R-NE) and Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) to increase the appropriation for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative by $35 million.&nbsp; The result is an important bipartisan victory for the international effort to secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear material at an accelerated rate and keep our nation safe from the threat of nuclear terrorism &ndash; especially in light of the current budget environment and recent irresponsible cuts to nuclear security programs in the House.</p>
<p><a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2011/7/14/14028/2443">Full story link...</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 14 Jul 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Materials Security: Cooperation is Key]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604643-fccc-7f47-2e52-27ca658d6aca]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author: </strong>Rajiv Nayan<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
As South Korea prepares for the second Nuclear Security Summit, scheduled to take place in Seoul next March, the momentum for collective international action on nuclear terrorism must be sustained. In the months before the 2012 talks, states will have to work together to retain focus on the summit's ultimate goal -- securing vulnerable nuclear material worldwide -- or else risk taking a step backward in the fight against the menace of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>To view the complete article, please click <a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/nuclear-materials-security-cooperation-key">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Mostly Getting Nuclear Safety at the IAEA, but Missing Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604808-c9ef-e16f-be11-1eae59190cc8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author: </strong>Matthew Bunn<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>Power &amp; Policy<br />
<br />
Disasters like Fukushima can be caused not only be accident but by terrorist action.&nbsp; The nuclear industry in many countries is much less prepared to cope with security incidents than with accidents, making the need to take steps to strengthen global nuclear security &ndash; protecting against both sabotage of nuclear facilities and theft of nuclear weapons or the materials to make them &ndash; particularly urgent.&nbsp;&nbsp;<span style="display: none">&nbsp;</span></p>
<p>To view the complete article, please click <a href="http://powerandpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/06/21/mostly-getting-nuclear-safety-at-the-iaea-&ndash;-but-missing-nuclear-security/">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[G-8 Nonproliferation Effort Renewed]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604048-0864-c6b9-bff9-4e80c3724aae]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author: </strong>Martin Matishak<br />
<strong>Source: </strong>Global Security Newswire (NTI)<br />
<br />
The leaders of the world's top industrial powers on Friday renewed the mandate of a program intended to prevent terrorists or rogue nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction (see <a target="blank" refid="nw_20110309_4913"><em>GSN</em></a>, March 9.). The Group of Eight nations' Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction will be maintained beyond its original 2012 expiration date thanks in part to the effort's &quot;concrete achievements and measurable results...&quot;</p>
<p>To view the complete article, please click <a href="http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110531_4817.php">here</a>.</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 31 May 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Preventing the Next Fukushima]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604038-d805-7333-9dae-e3cd85858d1e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Matthew Bunn &amp; Olli Heinonen<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs<br />
&nbsp;<br />
[T]he world needs to take steps to protect nuclear facilities and materials from terrorist action, not just accidents. At many nuclear facilities, the security measures in place today are far weaker than the safety measures. &nbsp;But there is clear evidence that terrorists have considered sabotage of nuclear facilities, and have attempted to get stolen nuclear material and to recruit the expertise needed to turn it into a crude nuclear bomb, capable of incinerating the heart of a major city.</p>
<p><a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/21071/preventing_the_next_fukushima.html?breadcrumb=%2Fproject%2F3%2Fmanaging_the_atom%3Fpage_id%3D72">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 26 May 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[After bin Laden: Nuclear terrorism still a top threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604067-c88e-34c1-ad42-6cd7a101838a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Sarah Williams<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
&quot;Osama bin Laden's death may represent a significant turning point in the US effort to defeat Al Qaeda, but the threat of nuclear terrorism will not lessen in the wake of his demise. Such threats, however, are preventable, and the United States must now take care to sustain the nonproliferation and threat reduction programs that will help stop terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/after-bin-laden-nuclear-terrorism-still-top-t">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 13 May 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Using the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit to Denuclearize the DPRK: A Dialogue on Radiological Source Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047e9-9711-0634-7a13-c629cbf060cc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Kenneth Luongo<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: 38 North<br />
<br />
&quot;On April 12-13, 2010 the United States convened the first Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) in Washington, DC, including 47 nations and three international organizations. The purpose was to strengthen efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism by improving the security of all nuclear materials around the globe. At the end of this event, it was announced that the Republic of Korea (ROK) would host the next NSS in 2012...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?URL=http://38north.org/2011/05/luongo051111/">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 12 May 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[World Needs New Nuclear Governance]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047f9-9e67-5fa3-55e7-7290f6b30c77]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Igor Khripunov and William Keller<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Korea Times<br />
<br />
&quot;<font id="font">Despite the seriousness of the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant in Japan, it is unlikely that events there will significantly curtail the global appetite for nuclear energy..&quot; </font></p>
<p><a href="http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/opinon/2011/05/137_86676.html">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 09 May 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Recent Publications from the Fund for Peace/Center for the Study of Threat Convergence]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604057-fc30-aefc-9a0a-17016f3aeac6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Authors</strong>: Jonas Vaicikonis, Ryan Costello<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Fund for Peace<br />
&nbsp;</p>
<p>Direct links to the articles follow:</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=cr-11-16-tc">Strange Bedfellows: North Korean WMD Trading Relationships</a></em>, by Jonas Vaicikonis - published on April 26, 2011</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=cf-11-02-tc">Briefing: Nuclear Meltdowns</a>, </em>by Ryan&nbsp;Costello - published on April 19, 2011</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=cf-11-01-tc">Briefing: The Pros and Cons of Nuclear Power</a></em>, by Ryan Costello - published on March 29, 2011</p>
<p><em><a href="http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=cr-11-01-tc">Threat Convergence in Pakistan: Countering Terrorist Aspirations &amp; Improving Nuclear Security</a></em>, by Ryan Costello - published on February 1, 2011</p>
<p><br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 26 Apr 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit: A Status Update]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047ba-d041-4864-2bcd-92e2b440212a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Authors</strong>: Rob Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Arms Control Association and The Partnership for Global Security<br />
<br />
The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), held on April 12-13 in Washington, D.C., marked an important step toward improving nuclear material security around the world. Forty-seven nations, 38 of them represented by their head of state or head of government, attended the summit and signed on to joint documents outlining goals for strengthening the global nuclear security regime. While the nuclear security challenge will not<br />
be solved by the next meeting in 2012, important progress has been made in a number of areas and the states are on track to meeting their key commitments. Eight countries have removed all or some of their remaining nuclear material, 13 countries have signed on to one of two major international agreements, and four have joined the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. In addition, 12 countries have made domestic improvements to their regulatory systems, engaged in nuclear security training initiatives, or hosted international conferences on nuclear security issuesIn short, most participants are on their way to fulfilling their national pledges.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/Status_Report_April_11_2011_WEB.pdf">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 11 Apr 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Promises, Promises: A Progress Report One Year After the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047ca-0353-5313-5a3e-315f9cc6d98c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Rob Golan-Vilella, Michelle Marchesano, and Sarah Williams <br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
Two years ago in Prague, President Barack Obama laid out his vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. Recognizing that this would not likely be achieved in his lifetime, he outlined practical steps by which the international community might strive for greater security in a world where nuclear weapons still exist. One of these steps was the four-year goal to secure all loose nuclear material -- almost immediately after his speech, concerns about nuclear terrorism and nuclear material security were prominent on the international agenda...</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/promises-promises-progress-report-one-year-af">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 06 Apr 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Japan's Nuclear Crisis: The Fine Line Between Security and Insecurity]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047aa-af22-0fb8-d7b2-f73b880e0875]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Miles Pomper<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
&quot;On March 11, when the first foreshock struck, my colleague Jeffrey Lewis and I were having lunch with senior industry officials at Japan's controversial Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant. That facility both enriches uranium and reprocesses spent nuclear fuel to extract plutonium, two processes that can also be used to make nuclear weapons. We were in the country to tour its nuclear facilities -- an arrangement designed to show how far Japan was prepared to go to convince the international community that its facilities were only for peaceful purposes...&quot;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/japans-nuclear-crisis-the-fine-line-between-security-and-insecurity">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 22 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[FMWG Experts Discuss Situation in Japan]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460479b-9775-e612-a6a0-969921285fdf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Sources</strong>: NPR, CBS, CNN<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7360305n&amp;tag=cbsnewsVideoArea.0">Matthew Bunn says &quot;the worst is probably over&quot; on CBS's The Early Show on March 21, 2011</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7359806n&amp;tag=related;photovideo">Sharon Squassoni discusses a fire at the Fukushima nuclear plant on CBS&nbsp;News on March 16, 2011</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.cnn.com/video/?/video/bestoftv/2011/03/16/exp.am.intv.walshiaea2.cnn">Jim Walsh talks about the IAEA's role in Japan crisis on CNN's American Morning on March 16, 2011</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7359643n&amp;tag=related;photovideo">Sharon Squassoni discusses the likelihood of a meltdown at Japan nuclear plant on March 14, 2011</a></p>
<p><a href="http://www.npr.org/2011/03/14/134543639/After-Disaster-Japan-Faces-Several-Crises">Sharon Squassoni talks to NPR&nbsp;about the disaster in Japan on All&nbsp;Things Considered on March 14, 2011 </a></p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 21 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Next Nuclear Security Summit Could Take on Radiological Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460478b-0e5a-8c63-c13b-29289f05d7b2]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />
<br />
&quot;World leaders might take a hard look at strategies for preventing terrorists from acquiring materials that could be used in a radiological &quot;dirty bomb&quot; when they meet in South Korea next year for the second Nuclear Security Summit, officials familiar with the event say (see GSN, Feb. 22)....</p>
<p>&quot;South Korea is an &quot;inspired choice&quot; to host the next summit,<strong> Kenneth Luongo</strong> president of the Partnership for Global Security, said during the same panel discussion.</p>
<p>&quot;He noted that while the country has no nuclear weapons, it shares a border with would-be nuclear power North Korea. In addition, South Korea attended the 2010 summit; is a contributor to the Group of Eight industrialized nations' Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction; is a member to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Group of 20 states; is a significant consumer of domestic nuclear power; and home to an established nuclear energy export industry.</p>
<p>&quot;They are at the confluence of a lot of different currents, including the developing world, the developed world and nuclear technology,&quot; Luongo told the embassy audience.</p>
<p>&quot;He suggested the 2012 summit adopt a six-point &quot;Seoul Declaration&quot; that would, among other measures, assess nations' implementation of the 2010 commitments; seek to strengthen the fissile material security regime; establish an international standard for nuclear security; and endorse the idea that all high intensity radiological sources in public buildings will be secured...&quot;<br />
&nbsp;<br />
<a href="http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110318_3525.php">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 18 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Who Wants to be Responsible for Nuclear Terrorism?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246047d9-eef9-548d-1fd4-ace3e86d4ba4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Kenneth Luongo<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Hill <br />
<br />
&quot;Imagine a raging civil war against an autocrat with a history of supporting extreme terrorist acts in a country where nuclear weapons fuel was caught in the crossfire. That would be Libya today if the U.S. had not funded the removal of highly enriched uranium from that country in 2004...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/149977-who-wants-to-be-responsible-for-nuclear-terrorism">View full article</a><br />
&nbsp;</p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 16 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S. Diplomat Upbeat about Future of G-8 Nonproliferation Program]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460476c-e22a-84ea-ddbd-3e12682b80be]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />
<br />
A senior U.S. State Department official said on Tuesday that prospects remain &quot;very positive&quot; for a possible extension of an international program designed to prevent terrorists and rogue nations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.</p>
<p>&quot;I think she's absolutely correct in saying that it will live on,&quot; said <strong>Brian Finlay</strong>, a senior associate at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington. However, he said, the initiative &quot;may not live on in the same form that we have understood in its current iteration.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110309_4913.php">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 09 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[The Most Likely Apocalypse in our Future: An Indian-Pakistani Nuclear Exchange]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460475c-0147-43db-d519-c019c60a123f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Thomas E. Ricks<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Foreign Policy<br />
<br />
&quot;...This is a global problem. &quot;The impact on the United States is potentially larger than people realize,&quot; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, co-principal investigator for the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University. He described studies in which nuclear war was simulated using atmospheric models developed for climate change research, &quot;and if cities are actually burned it can cause enough soot to go up into the upper atmosphere that will stay for a long time, to seriously interfere with global agriculture.&quot; The resultant nuclear autumn could cause famine, and not just in South Asia...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/08/the_most_likely_apocalypse_in_our_future_an_indian_pakistani_nuclear_exchange">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 08 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Funding Cuts Jeopardize Nuclear Non-proliferation]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460473d-e0e1-4ff3-3953-657c02dd1d9d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Reps. Adam Smith (D-Wash.) and Pete Visclosky (D-Ind.)<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />
<br />
&quot;...Though the threat of nuclear terrorism is all too real, it can be prevented. Our best defense is to secure or remove materials that could be used for nuclear weapons or dirty bombs from vulnerable locations where they might be stolen or sold to terrorists. Today, these materials are located primarily in Russia but are also scattered in over forty other countries. Many of these countries possess small, but minimally secured, quantities of this material. Our security is only as strong as our weakest link. Every one of these locations matters...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/146745-funding-cuts-jeopardize-nuclear-non-proliferation">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 01 Mar 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[At Final Panel, Experts Imagine a World after Nuclear Attack]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460472d-095b-e2ed-5752-03114d2a97fd]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Corinne Segal <br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Tufts Daily<br />
<br />
&quot;..At the panel, &quot;The Day After: 21st Century Nuclear Attack,&quot; <strong>Jim Walsh</strong>, of the nongovernmental <strong>Fissile Material Working Group</strong>, said that a response to a nuclear attack could threaten democratic principles...</p>
<p>...Panelist <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, the co-principal investigator for the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, considered how global powers could prevent further attacks while upholding order following a nuclear crisis...&quot;<br />
<br />
<a href="http://www.tuftsdaily.com/at-final-panel-experts-imagine-a-world-after-nuclear-attack-1.2485860">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 27 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[House Cuts Key Program to Keep Nuclear Weapons from Terrorists]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460471e-ffec-a9cf-4498-4cbcdfdd6b89]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Lt. Gen. Robert Gard (Ret.)<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />
<br />
&quot;The House of Representatives has made brutal cuts to key national security programs designed to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists. The cuts are outlined in a continuing resolution bill passed by the House on February 19 to fund the federal government from March 4 through the end of FY 2011 on 30 September...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/economy-a-budget/146171-house-cuts-key-programs-to-keep-nuclear-weapons-from-terrorists">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 25 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Budget Cuts Could Increase Risk of Nuke Terror Attack]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046ff-c06c-c38d-ef09-4ad86f0300dd]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Zachary Roth<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Yahoo!News, The Lookout<br />
<br />
...&quot;These cuts make it easier and more likely that a terrorist is going to acquire a nuclear weapon, and attack the United States,&quot; <strong>Jim Walsh</strong>, a nuclear proliferation expert at MIT's Security Studies Program, told The Lookout. The human and economic cost of such an attack, Walsh added, would be &quot;off the charts.&quot; Experts say that if terrorists detonated a nuclear device in a high-density area like Times Square, the attack could ultimately kill hundreds of thousands of people and do tens of billions of dollars worth of damage...</p>
<p><strong>Alexandra Toma</strong>, a co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a coalition of nonproliferation organizations, said that one of those programs, run by the National Nuclear Security Administration, has secured enough nuclear material to make more than 120 weapons. &quot;Cutting this program would mean we secure less material,&quot; Toma told The Lookout.</p>
<p>And <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security, noted that Ukraine and Belarus--two former Soviet republics that are hotspots for unsecured nukes--recently agreed to voluntarily give up their bomb-grade uranium. But amazingly, because of funding constraints imposed by Congress--some of which pre-date last week's House budget--the United States can't yet take them up on the offer.</p>
<p>&quot;So, nuclear material that countries are willing to give up is going to sit in those countries,&quot; Luongo told The Lookout, &quot;because Congress is essentially playing politics with national security.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://news.yahoo.com/s/yblog_thelookout/20110225/ts_yblog_thelookout/experts-warn-that-budget-cuts-could-increase-risk-of-nuke-terror-attack">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 25 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Global Nuclear Materials Lockdown Will Take Longer Than Four Years]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046df-0484-a9a6-abce-af1cb48eba13]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />
<br />
...&quot;The impression we may have had a couple years ago was that there was some sort of goal within four years,&quot; said <strong>Charles Ferguson,</strong> president of the Federation of American Scientists....</p>
<p>&quot;I think we need to get off the four-year objective and recognize what its importance was,&quot; <strong>Kenneth Luongo,</strong> president of the Partnership for Global Security, said during the same conference. &quot;Its importance was a driver ... it focused attention and it drove actions and I think all of those things are extremely important but it is a long-term effort and I think we need to now start thinking about what are we going to do over the long-term.&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20110222_2593.php">View full article&nbsp;</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 22 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Congress's nuclear terrorism shortfall]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460470e-b275-cf70-9811-a1652071b876]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Michelle Marchesano<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists<br />
<br />
&quot;The US National Security Strategy, released by the White House in May 2010, states that &quot;there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists and their proliferation to additional states.&quot; This is why the Obama administration is in the midst of an international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years. Republicans and Democrats alike have voiced support for limiting access to vulnerable nuclear materials to prevent nuclear terrorism. Yet the US programs charged with securing fissile materials and thwarting terrorists' efforts to acquire them are among the victims of this year's federal budget fights...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/congresss-nuclear-terrorism-shortfall">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 11 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Budget Resolution Hurts Obama's Nonproliferation Goals, Study Asserts]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046d0-e219-1216-d5d8-526c98dbc4b0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />
<br />
&quot;The short-term continuing budget resolution approved by the U.S. Congress last December undercuts programs crucial to President Obama's goal of securing the world's loose nuclear materials, according to a recent analysis by a nongovernment organization (see GSN, Dec. 23, 2010).</p>
<p>The resolution, the third passed by Congress and signed by the president, eliminates a $320 million increase the administration requested in fiscal 2011 for an array of nonproliferation programs within the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Defense Department's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the <strong>Partnership for Global Security</strong> <a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/PDFFrameset.asp?PDF=fy11_wmd_security_programs.pdf">said</a>...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110203_2399.php">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 03 Feb 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Congress Doesn't Show the Money for Nuclear Security]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046c0-b144-2ea4-d344-5d17f964095a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Kingston Reif<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Nukes of Hazard Blog<br />
<br />
&quot;As most observers of Capitol Hill know, the appropriations process for FY 2011 has been a disaster. The 111th Congress did not pass any of the 12 annual appropriations bills that would fund the government for the current fiscal year. An Omnibus appropriations bill that would have combined these 12 bills into a single bill failed in the Senate during the lame duck session due to Republican opposition. This gridlock has claimed a number of casualties, none of which is more alarming than the budget for key programs to prevent dangerous nuclear materials from falling in the hands of terrorists...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://nukesofhazardblog.com/story/2011/1/24/113520/075">View full article&nbsp;</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 24 Jan 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Congress Must Get Serious about the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046a1-f772-952f-1a3e-9f1592effd3e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Sarah Williams and Alexandra Toma<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />
<br />
&quot;With winter in full swing, we all appreciate that salt and sand ahead of time helps us better weather the blizzard. This is because prevention is cheaper than cleanup, planning ahead is more effective than picking up the pieces. It&rsquo;s unfortunate that Congress didn&rsquo;t adhere to these commonsense principles when they failed to fund anti-nuclear terrorism programs this past December in their rush to get out of town. Fortunately, this issue could be the first low-hanging, bipartisan fruit of the 112th Congress...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/homeland-security/138531-congress-must-get-serious-about-the-threat-of-nuclear-terrorism-">View full article&nbsp;</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 18 Jan 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Howard Hall Poses a Question: How Good is Good Enough in Securing Nuclear Materials?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246046b0-c46a-7e9f-2731-39e3ad8ce612]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Frank Munger<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Knox News</p>
<p>&quot;<strong>Howard Hall,</strong> who holds the Governor's Chair in global nuclear security at the University of Tennessee, said the Obama administration is making good strides in the area of nuclear nonproliferation. But he doesn't think the pace is sufficient to meet President Obama's goal of securing vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2011/01/howard_hall_poses_a_question_h.html">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 17 Jan 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Striking Progress on Securing Nuclear Materials, but Premature to Call it a Promise Kept]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604691-da4a-da3b-656d-54f16845a8e4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Author</strong>: Louis Jacobson<br />
<strong>Source</strong>: Politifact<br />
<br />
&quot;... <u>Ongoing negotiations</u>. <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear policy specialist at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, said that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton secured a promise from Belarus to eliminate its bomb material in late 2010, and those shipments have begun. He added that Kazakhstan has pledged to get rid of all of its potential nuclear bomb material except for a large amount of very low-grade material that has just been moved to a secure location within the country and that South Africa has just converted its production of medical isotopes to make them with low-enriched uranium that can&quot;t be used in a bomb...&quot;</p>
<p><a href="http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/promises/obameter/promise/382/secure-nuclear-weapons-materials-in-four-years/">View full article</a></p>]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 10 Jan 2011 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Why Obama's bid to prevent loose nuclear weapons is going slowly]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604682-d4a1-3f96-25e7-1376aa5119e3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;...Nuclear security experts largely concur. The Obama administration cites as a goal its plan to secure so-called &ldquo;vulnerable&rdquo; nuclear materials by 2013. &ldquo;But a lot depends on what do you mean by vulnerable?&rdquo; says <strong>Charles Ferguson,</strong> President of the Federation of American Scientists and a former naval officer who worked on ballistic missile submarines. &ldquo;It fits on a bumper sticker: &lsquo;Secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years.&rsquo; That has a nice ring to it.&rdquo; He adds, however, &ldquo;We can be constructive critics. What do you mean by secure? What security practices?&rdquo;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>The bright side, say experts, is that nuclear terrorism is quite difficult to accomplish. &ldquo;It&rsquo;s hard to get enough materials to make an improvised nuclear device. And even if they can, there are a number of technical things that can trip them up along the way. Terrorists tend to prefer well-proven techniques&rdquo; that involve conventional bombs and assault rifles, <strong>Ferguson </strong>says. &ldquo;They want to make sure they have a chance of doing it right,&rdquo; which has so far dissuaded groups from going down the path of nuclear terrorism, he says.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/1228/Why-Obama-s-bid-to-prevent-loose-nuclear-weapons-is-going-slowly<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Anna Mulrine,<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Christan Science Monitor<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 28 Dec 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Working Group asks Congress to fully fund non proliferation programs at FY-2011 levels]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604653-b7b7-3e76-0a29-51106a794260]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;Earlier this year, both relevant House and Senate subcommittees decided to fully fund Non proliferation programs despite the current economic climate and competing funding demands.</p>
<p>&quot;However, the first Continuing Resolution passed at the end of September to fund the government through December 3 funded most government programs at FY 2010 levels, including programs to secure and safeguard nuclear weapons and materials.</p>
<p>&quot;In response, the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG)</strong> put together a letter to members urging them to fully fun these crucial programs at FY-2011 levels...&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://beforeitsnews.com/story/296/781/Working_Group_asks_Congress_to_fully_fund_non_proliferation_programs_at_FY-2011_levels.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Livable World<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Before It's News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Medical Scans, Without The Weapons-Grade Uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604672-0d3f-b8fb-03eb-ac8e4581cc1a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The U.S. has just received its first shipment of molybdenum-99, an essential material for medical imaging that's being mass-produced for the first time with low-enriched uranium instead of weapons-grade material. Until now, molybdenum-99 has been manufactured only from highly enriched uranium, which has made many people uneasy...</p>
<p>&quot;It's a sitting duck for al-Qaida because these facilities are not guarded like military facilities, but they have bomb-grade uranium,&quot; says <strong>Alan Kuperman</strong>, an expert in nuclear proliferation at the University of Texas.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.npr.org/2010/12/06/131786663/medical-scans-without-the-weapons-grade-uranium<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Tova Smith<br /><strong>Source</strong>: National Public Radio<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Belarus agrees to give up stockpile of highly enriched uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604662-a323-d0ac-1fdd-3359b6c0cfc8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;In a surprise victory for President Obama's campaign to secure nuclear material worldwide, the government of Belarus announced Wednesday that it will give up its stock of highly enriched uranium, a critical component of nuclear weapons...</p>
<p>&quot;I was really fascinated by the fact they want a seat at the [2012] Nuclear Security Summit. That proves to me this process is working,&quot; said<strong> Ken Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security, a group promoting nuclear security...&quot;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/01/AR2010120101198.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Glenn Kessler and Mary Beth Sheridan<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Post<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 01 Dec 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Senior Lawmaker Says U.S. Unprepared for “Dirty Bomb” Attack]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604633-9938-ed76-88e8-f3bcd3583f77]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...Experts are unsure how many radiological sources exist at medical and industrial facilities and other locations around the world today, according to <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security. The latest estimate is that there are somewhere between 100,000 and 1 million worldwide, with 400,000 sources in China alone, he said yesterday during a telephone interview.</p>
<p>&quot;People are focused on the big bang. They're not focused on what it means to have radiation dispersed all around an urban area,&quot; he told Global Security Newswire.</p>
<p>The extent of contamination would depend on a number of factors, including the size of the conventional explosive, the amount of radioactive material used, the means of dispersal and weather. <strong>Luongo </strong>said the cost of reclamation could run into the billions of dollars, depending on where the device is set off...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20101007_3567.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 06 Oct 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Stop holding onto dangerous nuclear material]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604624-0137-b83b-584a-eae87abc9860]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>After depending for decades on imported medical radio-isotopes &ndash; produced in foreign facilities that use bomb-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU) &ndash; the United States recently acquired medical isotopes made with safer, low enriched uranium (LEU), a move that holds great potential for reducing the risk of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>Unfortunately, Sen. Kit Bond (R-MO) is single-handedly blocking legislation, already passed overwhelmingly by the House, which could make such terrorist-proof production of medical isotopes the norm &ndash; both in the United States and abroad.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/121081-stop-holding-onto-dangerous-nuclear-material<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Alan J. Kuperman and Miles Pomper<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 27 Sep 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[G-8 Nonproliferation Program Faces Uncertain Future]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604614-cc77-0adf-bdbc-af536845aa53]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The Group of Eight's Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction has made significant strides and might go on to accomplish yet more, according to experts, but it appears to be a victim of global financial turmoil. The program's widely anticipated renewal beyond its 2012 expiration date failed to materialize in June...</p>
<p>&quot;I'm cautiously pessimistic,&quot; said <strong>Alexandra Toma</strong>, program director for the nongovernmental Connect U.S. Fund. &quot;I hope I'm proven wrong.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;It's a shock,&quot; <strong>Toma </strong>told Global Security Newswire. &quot;Maybe we were just too hopeful. Maybe we were hoping to ride this nuclear spring wave into the summer and thought that, of course, it's only a billion dollars, it's only a few billion compared to the shock that the global economy would endure [following a major WMD event]. It's just shocking that they wouldn't put that money up.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;I think it's been very successful in dealing with the nuclear problem in Russia. I don't think there's much doubt security has improved significantly,&quot; said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security. The G-8 plan &quot;has as its mandate nuclear, biological, chemical and scientists, and it's touched on all of those issues.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Moscow had a &quot;choke hold&quot; on funding, directing the lion's share of money toward its own priorities -- particularly submarine dismantlement and chemical disarmament -- while biosecurity and other projects favored in other capitals sometimes received short-shrift, according to <strong>Luongo</strong>.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;For some countries this was never a high priority. And then some bureaucracies are more dysfunctional than others,&quot; <strong>Luongo </strong>said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&quot;I think that there's a general sense by people who follow this that $10 billion by the non-U.S. G-8 has not been spent and probably will not be spent by 2012. But maybe half of that will be,&quot; <strong>Luongo </strong>said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><strong>Luongo </strong>said he believes the program's credibility suffered due to its financing issues. That might have also reduced the willingness of nations that had met their funding commitments to pursue an extension to the Global Partnership, Finlay said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Germany, in particular, was said to be averse to &quot;committing additional sums of money for international activities when they just contributed to the bailout of the Greek economy,&quot; <strong>Luongo </strong>said.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><strong>Toma </strong>and other experts acknowledged the thinking behind nations' reluctance to funnel additional money into the program at this point. However, they argued that the G-8 states failed to consider the economic ramifications of a WMD strike.</p>
<p>&quot;I think it was a huge lost opportunity,&quot; <strong>Luongo </strong>said. &quot;I don't think the issue will be ready for consideration in 2011 and it may be ready for consideration in the U.S. when it chairs in 2012. But that's going to be in the middle of an election.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>Another $20 billion would maintain the momentum set over the last eight years, according to <strong>Toma</strong>.</p>
<p>&quot;The leaders have agreed that nuclear terrorism is the No. 1 global security issue. Great, let's do something about it. Let's continue to work together, let's expand from Russia, let's get some more of the materials that are out there, outside of the Eurasian corridor,&quot; she said.</p>
<p>The G-8 states could turn their attention to Pakistan, which is possessed of nuclear weapons and is fighting an increasingly virulent insurgency. Potentially vulnerable fissile materials, though, are found all over the world, <strong>Toma </strong>noted.</p>
<p>Ensuring security for the growing number of nuclear power plants in Asia and the Middle East would be a worthy effort, as would protecting disease research materials in Asia from diversion for illicit purposes, <strong>Luongo </strong>said.</p>
<p>Money could be directed to help developing nations eyeing biotechnology as a means of growth to bring their biological security standards up to levels established by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, he said. The International Atomic Energy Agency might also receive additional funds to augment its capability to safeguard the increasing number of nuclear power plants to ensure they are not used to produce weapons material.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p><strong>Toma </strong>and others said they would press their case for maintaining the program, with a planned study on the financial impact of nuclear terrorism as one tool to prove the Global Partnership's value. Much will depend on the state of the world economy as the program heads toward expiration.</p>
<p>&quot;There's an opportunity here to regroup and start to address the challenges of the 21st century or there's an opportunity to do business as usual,&quot; <strong>Luongo</strong> said.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100815_3867.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: G-8 Nonproliferation Program Faces Uncertain Future<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 16 Aug 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[VIDEO: Lawmakers Warn of Dirty Bomb Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604605-f236-d6ae-b5e2-5c0cb14a1094]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>In an interview with Fox News, Representative Jane Harman discusses the danger of a radiological attack and proposes locking down radiological sources in public hospitals as a first step in reducing that danger.&nbsp;</p>
<p>For more on the threat, see Rep. Harman's <a href="http://fmwg.presstools.org/node/35754">op-ed</a> with Senator Susan Collins on the published the same day in the Wall&nbsp;Street Journal.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://video.foxnews.com/v/4291168/lawmakers-warn-of-dirty-bomb-threat<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Jane Harman<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Fox News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Al Qaeda Still Wants a Dirty Bomb ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045f5-f45f-e261-f7b2-f49b86e344ec]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Denying terrorists access to radiological materials that can be used in a dirty bomb attack&mdash;one that could bring our economy to a standstill and render areas uninhabitable for decades&mdash;is a major security challenge.</p>
<p>Should a dirty bomb or multiple dirty bombs be detonated in any American city, port complex, airport or train station, the result could be loss of life and widespread panic. Billions of dollars would be spent in clean-up and medical costs, not to mention lost wages and serious interruptions in the flow of commerce and everyday life.</p>
<p>We know that terror groups remain highly interested in such devices. Al Qaeda's senior leadership has publicly expressed a desire to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons, with which to attack the United States. Since September 11, U.S. officials have recovered many documents detailing al Qaeda's pursuit of these weapons.</p>
<p>In 2006, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, then the leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, called for nuclear scientists and explosive experts to help his organization in making biological and radioactive weapons.</p>
<p>That same year, British citizen Dhiren Barot pleaded guilty to conspiring to detonate a radioactive dirty bomb. He planned to target underground parking garages in the U.K. and U.S. institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the New York Stock Exchange, and offices belonging to Citigroup and Prudential Financial.</p>
<p>Just two weeks ago, Adnan el-Shukrijumah, an American citizen on the FBI's most-wanted list, was named as an accomplice in the New York subway bomb plot with Najibullah Zazi. Currently at-large, Shukrijumah&mdash;a trained nuclear technician allegedly tasked by al Qaeda with carrying off an &quot;American Hiroshima&quot;&mdash;once sought radioactive material from a university in Ontario, Canada. News reports allege that this was an attempt to construct a dirty bomb.</p>
<p>President Obama has rightly focused on the threat of nuclear terrorism by pledging to locate and safeguard loose nuclear material in the world within four years. This critical goal served as the theme of an April Nuclear Security Summit convened by the president in Washington with over 40 countries in attendance.</p>
<p>But an exclusive focus on &quot;loose nukes&quot; could mean missing the threat we face in our own backyard: the dirty bomb, which is far easier to assemble from ingredients that are widely available in this country. Highly dispersible radiological materials like cesium-137 or cobalt-40 are used every day in medical procedures at hospitals and in universities. These components of modern medicine are underprotected.</p>
<p>Many hospitals are eager to upgrade security for these radiological elements&mdash;provided they receive the resources to do so. But the clock is ticking. Entry to most hospitals is easy. Radiology departments usually control access, but a basic tool kit can be used to break into a blood irradiator and seize a substantial amount of radiological material. Once combined with a simple explosive device, you've got a crude radiological weapon. While there have been a handful of successful pilot projects to secure these ingredients, they simply don't go far enough.</p>
<p>Despite those chilling facts, the White House has slashed the domestic radiological protection budget over the past few years. The current budget proposal would cut these domestic resources by half. At the same time, it would more than double the funding for &quot;loose nuke&quot; programs.</p>
<p>This policy is pennywise and pound foolish. We cannot allow a dirty bomb to become America's Achilles' heel because we've lost sight of that threat.</p>
<p><em>Ms. Harman is a Democratic congresswoman from California and chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence &amp; Terrorism Risk Assessment. Ms. Collins is a Republican senator from Maine and ranking member on the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. </em></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://online.wsj.com/article/NA_WSJ_PUB:SB10001424052748704201604575373270385490484.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Jane Harman and Susan Collins<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Wall Street Journal<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 22 Jul 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts Urge Extension of G-8 Nonproliferation Program]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045d6-a8d3-02bd-d072-3cbb0e08f074]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;Several experts last week said the Group of Eight nations made a potentially dangerous mistake at their latest summit by not extending a program intended to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction...</p>
<p>&quot;That move was not good enough, observers said in a statement issued by the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, a coalition of nongovernmental organizations focused on nonproliferation.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The G-8 Global Partnership is a vital multilateral mechanism for securing nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Its geographic expansion and renewed funding commitment are essential for international security,&rdquo; said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security.</p>
<p>&ldquo;It is very disappointing, and extremely short-sighted, for the G-8 to have not extended the Global Partnership program -- an effort specifically designed to lock down or eliminate weapons of mass destruction that threaten every corner of the globe,&quot; he added. &quot;With the U.S. already picking up about $1.5 billion of the $2 billion per year for that program the rest of the G-8 nations would have only had to contribute a half a billion per year collectively, or $ 5 billion over 10 years. With the G-8 nations representing 44 percent of global [gross domestic product], that is more than an affordable investment in preventing a WMD terrorist incident. If a nuclear or biological terrorist event occurs, it will significantly impact the economy of every nation.&rdquo;</p>
<p>Added Connect U.S. Fund Program Director <strong>Alexandra Toma</strong>, who co-chairs the working group with <strong>Luongo</strong>: &ldquo;The G-8 Global Partnership is a crucial part of combating that threat. So, we are very disappointed that world leaders did not agree to extend this vital multilateral effort to prevent WMD proliferation.&rdquo;</p>
<p>Their comments were echoed by <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, co-principal investigator at Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom.</p>
<p>&ldquo;We must avoid repeating the delays and funding shortfalls of the early days of the Global Partnership, if nuclear security improvements are to get to these stockpiles before terrorists and thieves do,&quot; he said .&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100629_3745.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuke security group upset by G-8 inaction]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045e5-a7d5-6566-7edf-0118737c9f9a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> expressed disappointment that G-8 leaders didn't renew a Global Partnership effort to lock down weapons of mass destruction around the world...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://blogs.knoxnews.com/munger/2010/06/nuke_security_group_upset_by_g.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Frank Munger<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Knox News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 29 Jun 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Time to act responsibly on nukes ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045c6-91f7-10ad-412e-e5f7f9700592]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;Global efforts to prevent the spread of the world's most deadly weapons depend on universal compliance with rules that constrain the sale of nuclear technology...&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.stuff.co.nz/the-press/opinion/perspective/3833473/Time-to-act-responsibly-on-nukes<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Zia Mian and Daryl G. Kimball <br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Press<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 21 Jun 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Don’t gamble with America’s future]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045b6-a6e0-e9b2-c762-e6fbf691b06e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;If the car bomb in Times Square contained just one of the tens of thousands of radioactive sources that exist in the U.S. and it had successfully detonated, this American landmark would be uninhabitable for months or years to come. And, if the attack were with an improvised nuclear device instead, a large portion of Manhattan would have been destroyed. We were lucky in many ways that day, but these are real threats posed by ever-bolder terrorists, and our luck might not last forever. That is why it is essential for Congress to join with the Obama administration to make sure that terrorists cannot get their hands on these dangerous materials...&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/100905-dont-gamble-with-americas-future<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Alexandra Toma and Kenneth Luongo<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 01 Jun 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Attack a Ticking Time Bomb, Experts Warn]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246045a7-e1b6-5d75-3b9e-f5a186613718]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...&quot;Even a 1 percent chance over the next 10 years is a huge risk,&quot; said  <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, an associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and an expert on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. &quot;No one in their right mind would put a nuclear power plant upwind of a major city that had a 1 percent chance over 10 years of blowing up.&quot;</p>
<p>The effects of a nuclear detonation would be catastrophic. According to <strong>Bunn</strong>, a 10-kiloton bomb (equivalent explosive power to 10,000 tons of TNT and modestly smaller than the Hiroshima bomb) detonated in midtown Manhattan in the middle of workday could kill half a million people and cause $1 trillion in direct economic damage.</p>
<p>The 20-kiloton nuclear bomb dropped on Nagasaki required 6 kilograms of plutonium, which could fit into a can of soda, <strong>Bunn </strong>said. Three soda cans full of highly-enriched uranium would provide enough nuclear material to produce a bomb of similar destructive power. The Department of Energy has determined that a nuclear weapon could be fashioned from just 4 kilograms of plutonium...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503543_162-20003954-503543.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Daniel Farber  <br /><strong>Source</strong>: CBS News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 03 May 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[A Global Commitment to Nuclear Education and Training]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604597-ebb9-b70c-d5ca-bd5c0e393df5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;During his luncheon remarks at U.S. President Barack Obama's Nuclear Security Summit last week, Yukiya Amano, the new head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is said to have emphasized the important educational dimension of his agency's work. This emphasis might be expected given his past service as Japan's leading Foreign Ministry expert on disarmament and nonproliferation education...&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/23/bomb_school<br /><strong>Author</strong>: William C. Potter<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Foreign Policy Magazine<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 23 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Focus shifts to nuclear 'rogues']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604588-c66d-7950-8190-17e271f88df8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;''President [Obama] has put his personal prestige on the line like no other world leader has before,'' said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, the chairman of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Grou</strong>p, a coalition of 40 non-government agencies urging the securing of nuclear material and campaigning in tandem with the two-day summit. ''Taken together, the individual commitments of participating nations themselves will materially advance the nuclear security agenda,'' he said. ''But, when the lights go down tonight, leaders need to hit the ground running on implementation.''</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.theage.com.au/world/focus-shifts-to-nuclear-rogues-20100414-se17.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Simon Mann<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Age<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[This is What Progress Looks Like ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044fb-a514-14dc-933a-d523ba8b746e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>This week, as Obama convened the international Nuclear Security Summit, the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG)</strong> held their<strong> Next Generation Nuclear Security parallel summit</strong>.  The <strong>FMWG </strong>summit brought together industry experts, former ambassadors, and representatives from NGO&rsquo;s worldwide working to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.  This summit offered a variety of constructive recommendations but two take-away points come to mind.  First, if you are not improving your nuclear security, it is declining.  And second, every country has a stake in the effectiveness of security measures everywhere else.  With this in mind, both summits made substantial progress towards addressing the threat of nuclear terrorism..</p>
<p>...Those who paid attention however, recognize that both the<strong> Fissile Materials Working Group Next Generation Nuclear Security Summit</strong> and Obama&rsquo;s Nuclear Security Summit &ndash;including the bilateral meetings that took place under this forum &ndash;took important steps to start the vital mission to reduce the global threat of nuclear terrorism on state and organizational levels, including concrete commitments from the countries in attendance.. </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2010/04/this-is-what-progress-looks-like.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Erica Mandell <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Democracy Arsenal <br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 15 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear summit told how Georgia 'foiled plot to sell weapons-grade uranium']]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460450b-9772-08d0-12e3-018e2fb180bb]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a leading expert on nuclear security at Harvard University, said: &quot;One of the troubling things about past cases in Georgia is that there was some evidence that this was the activity of an organised criminal group and they were selling lots from the same batch of material. Its an interesting question whether this is the same group.&quot;</p>
<p><strong>Bunn </strong>added: &quot;I hope this puts the fear of God into other leaders and convince them that this a real problem and an ongoing problem.&quot;US officials pointed to some concrete successes from the summit. Ukraine and Canada said they would no longer use HEU in research reactors, and switch to low enriched uranium (LEU) &ndash; which is much harder to turn into a bomb. Canada's HEU will be shipped to the US, from where it originally came, for safekeeping. The Ukrainian HEU originally came from the Soviet Union and will be returned to Russia.. Malaysia announced it had enforced tougher controls on the shipment of nuclear equipment.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/apr/13/nuclear-summit-georgia-uranium-plot<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Julian Borger<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Guardian<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama secures 47-nation pact at nuclear summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460451a-cf2d-0118-2553-1cb8cbff72ce]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, an expert on nuclear security at the Partnership for Global Security, said Obama &quot;has put his personal prestige on the line like no other world leader has before&quot; on the issue. The commitments were positive, he said. &quot;But, when the lights go down tonight, leaders need to hit the ground running on implementation.&quot; </p>
<p>And some experts raised doubts about whether the IAEA is up to the task of helping ensure nuclear security. The agency's main job is making sure that countries aren't building atomic bombs, and it has a budget of less than $10 million for the safeguarding of nuclear material worldwide, <strong>Luongo </strong>said. </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/13/AR2010041300427.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Mary Beth Sheridan<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Post<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Leaders Pledge to Secure Nuclear Fuel ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460448e-d7b9-d3fb-ab19-314550f6c2c6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Ken Luongo</strong>, a former Energy Department official and now president of the Partnership for Global Security, said the summit identified what needed to be done without holding anyone responsible for doing it.</p>
<p>&quot;It's pretty thin soup,&quot; said <strong>Ivan Oelrich</strong>, vice president of the Federation of American Scientists and a member of the Fissile Materials Working Group, a nongovernmental group promoting nuclear security...</p>
<p>Sixty-eight metric tons is a drop in the bucket, <strong>Mr. Luongo</strong> said. The world holds some 500 metric tons of plutonium; 92 of it in the U.S. and 190 in Russia.</p>
<p>But he lauded the week's efforts, especially the setting of a new conference in two years.</p>
<p>&quot;It's a little like being in school,&quot; he said. &quot;The only thing that makes people nervous is having to deliver your homework, and that's what South Korea is all about.&quot; </p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303695604575181781075890998.html?mod=WSJ_hpp_LEFTTopStories<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Jonathan Weisman<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Wall Street Journal<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Wins Backing for Nuclear Security Goal as Summit Ends ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043d2-0163-3f5f-9484-76f410b96b4f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div>&nbsp;The final communiqu&eacute; issued after two days of meetings in Washington should spur higher security standards for separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium and consolidation of scattered material at fewer locations, <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong> and other experts told reporters after the summit ended yesterday.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&ldquo;The summit represents a major step to overcome complacency about this threat,&rdquo; said <strong>Bunn</strong>, an associate professor at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts, who has advised on U.S. nuclear controls. &ldquo;There&rsquo;s a lot of work yet to be done, but this does represent major progress.&rdquo;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>...Issues left unaddressed include the continuing production of fissile materials for weapons in countries such as India and Pakistan, <strong>Daryl Kimball</strong>, executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, said.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>The joint statement &ldquo;leaves a lot of wiggle room,&rdquo; said <strong>Miles Pomper</strong>, a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies in California. He, Bunn and Kimball spoke on a conference call with reporters organized by the Fissile Materials Working Group, which is backing Obama&rsquo;s effort.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-14/obama-wins-backing-for-nuclear-security-goal-as-summit-ends.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: By Viola Gienger and Edwin Chen<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Bloomberg<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[After the Nuclear Summit, What Happens Now?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040a6-eed8-a007-e0d7-8cad1a87e7a7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div>&nbsp;Nobody knows how likely it is that some terrorist group could set off a nuclear weapon.&nbsp; But the consequences are so catastrophic that even a small chance justifies urgent action to reduce the risk. Guests include <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group Members Matthew Bunn and Benn Tannenbaum.</strong><b><br />
</b></div><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.kcrw.com/news/programs/tp/tp100414after_the_nuclear_su<br /><strong>Author</strong>: "To the Point"<br /><strong>Source</strong>: KCRW<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 14 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear agreement hailed as step forward ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044eb-edd2-5137-a755-874555ec7a16]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The president has put his personal prestige on line like no other world leader has before,&quot; said <strong>Kenneth Luongo,</strong> chairman of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, a coalition of 40 groups dedicated to securing nuclear material. &quot;Taken together the individual commitments of participating nations themselves will materially advance the nuclear security agenda. But, when the lights go down tonight, leaders need to hit the ground running on implementation.&quot;</p>
<p><strong>Luongo's</strong> group and others urged vigilance amid the growing threat from al-Qaeda and other terrorists that Obama says are determined to buy or steal nuclear weapons. Much of the material that could be used to build a crude bomb that could kill hundreds of thousands of people is housed at civilian power plants and research reactors that are poorly secured.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-13-nuke-summit_N.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Mimi Hall <br /><strong>Source</strong>: USA TODAY<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Ukraine to give up nuke material; boost for summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460445f-ed20-e9a7-d3ee-663bc09c459b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;There is a great complacency among policymakers around the world that terrorist groups couldn't make a nuclear bomb,&quot; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong> of Harvard.</p>
<p>In a detailed report on the challenge of securing nuclear materials, <strong>Bunn </strong>said no one really knows the likelihood of nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>&quot;But the consequences of a terrorist nuclear blast would be so catastrophic that even a small chance is enough to justify urgent action to reduce the risk,&quot; he wrote. &quot;The heart of a major city could be reduced to a smoldering radioactive ruin, leaving tens to hundreds of thousands of people dead.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gxFY0uxPOYgMUIE7Avm3TmMh8XMAD9F1SAK01<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Robert Burns<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Associated Press<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S., Russia Sign Deal to Cut Plutonium Stocks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043f1-b5a2-2f7b-1f32-9fe31080327e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div><strong>&nbsp;Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at&nbsp;Harvard University, said some U.S. critics question the deal because reactors used for the Russian plutonium could potentially be remodified to produce new weapons-grade plutonium.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>But he said the move to destroy the existing plutonium stock was important in itself.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>&quot;The answer is basically that you're taking weapons-grade plutonium that's in separated form, ready to be put right into a weapon ... and putting it into a form that's in spent fuel,&quot; <strong>Bunn </strong>said.</div><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2010/04/13/world/international-uk-nuclear-summit-russia-plutonium.html?_r=1<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Reuters<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Reuters<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear summit: How much 'loose nukes' material is out there?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604539-c8c7-2e2c-541a-3695f11867aa]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The threat looms large,&quot; according to<strong> Matthew Bunn</strong>, a principal investigator at the Belfer Center. </p>
<p>The greatest threat is in Pakistan, according to <strong>Mr. Bunn</strong>, which has almost 1 ton of plutonium plus a smaller amount of HEU. Pakistan's stockpile is well-guarded, but it confronts &quot;immense threats from both insider theft and outsider attack,&quot; according to <strong>Bunn</strong>. </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2010/0413/Nuclear-summit-How-much-loose-nukes-material-is-out-there<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Peter Grier<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Christian Science Monitor<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Research Reactors Pose Challenge in Push for Nuclear Safety]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604559-e3c5-3ddf-abea-52fa71351424]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard, said in the most recent edition of his annual report, ''Securing the Bomb,'' published Monday, that security arrangements for re-search reactors tend to be ''remarkably modest.'' Among the typical problems: no armed guards, no background checks, no security requirements and no fences with intrusion alarms.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/science/13nuke.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: William Broad<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The New York Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Ukraine, others to dispose of bomb-grade uranium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044dc-c8f6-40b6-bb71-1c46389b59b2]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>...Kenneth Luongo</strong>, co-chairman of the<strong> fissile material working group</strong>, a nongoverment coalition of scientists and policy analysts created to monitor President Obama's promise to secure all nuclear material in four years, said the summit should be seen as an effort to address nuclear security in a post-Sept. 11 context.</p>
<p>&quot;We are also worried about these non-state actors as part of an improvised nuclear device that can take out a piece of a foreign city,&quot; he said... </p>
<p><strong>Mr. Luongo </strong>said it was significant that the Ukraine made its pledge.</p>
<p>&quot;I think the Ukraine pledge is a major accomplishment. It's not like it is coming out of the blue, we have been talking to them about this for a while.&quot;</p>
<p>He added, however, that the announcement &quot;is not going to solve the entire nuclear security problem around the globe, it will solve one piece of it. ... I want to make sure that the commitments made on Tuesday are followed up on Wednesday.&quot; </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/13/ukraine-others-to-dispose-of-bomb-material/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Eli Lake<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Plutonium Security Risks Given Short Shrift at Summit, Experts Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043e2-da8a-343f-1b29-1f296a12ca4a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div>That focus, though, threatens to overshadow the dangers posed by plutonium that is stored or used in the civilian sector, a situation that is projected to become more widespread even as HEU use is curtailed, said former Australian Foreign Minister <strong>Gareth Evans</strong>.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<div>Evans spoke yesterday in Washington at a nonproliferation conference organized by the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> in parallel with the Obama administration&rsquo;s nuclear summit. He called for more attention to the challenges posed by separated plutonium, which is being increasingly produced in the nuclear energy sectors of nations such as France, Japan and South Korea.</div>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<p>...&quot;HEU is globally more plentiful, it&rsquo;s more dispersed, easier to handle, harder to detect, easier to fabricate into a nuclear device,&quot; <strong>Thomas Cochran</strong>, a senior scientist with the Natural Resources Defense Council, told the Washington conference. &quot;The only thing going for the plutonium is that it has a smaller critical mass. But when you weigh all of these factors -- it says HEU is by far the higher risk.&quot;</p>
<p refid="nw_20100330_3751"><strong>Cochran </strong>added, though, that plutonium proliferation was an issue that would have to be addressed....</p>
<p><strong>Miles Pomper</strong>, a senior research associate with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, told <em>Global Security Newswire</em> he was surprised that Evans raised the topic considering how politically sensitive the issue is for Washington right now.</p>
<p>The Obama administration is thought to want to avoid alienating its key allies that produce or use separated plutonium as it seeks to build as broad a consensus as possible on the threat posed by nuclear terrorism.</p>
<p>&quot;HEU is more politically practical and it&rsquo;s also the more urgent,&quot; <strong>Pomper </strong>said.</p>
<p>He said highlighting plutonium security concerns was &quot;tricky given the Japanese and the French.&quot;</p>
<p>...Despite recent progress, the international community is not likely to meet Obama&rsquo;s four-year-goal for securing all loose nuclear materials if it continues along the present course, <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a principal investigator at Harvard University&rsquo;s Project on Managing the Atom, said yesterday in the latest <a target="blank" href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/20068/securing_the_bomb_2010.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2F20068%2Fsecuring_the_bomb_2010">&quot;Securing the Bomb&quot; report.</a></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100413_8356.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: By Rachel Oswald<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama's nuclear summit yields results he sought]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460452a-0ecc-b2c0-c4b1-caa00e9a330e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...&quot;This event has some political dimension to it above and beyond the actual content,&quot; said <strong>Leonard Spector</strong>, the deputy director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. &quot;There's a solidarity, a recognition this is a problem we all confront and we should do our best.&quot;</p>
<p>...Yet, said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong> of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and Technology: &quot;Pretty much every country where there are nuclear weapons, HEU (high-enriched uranium) or plutonium has more to do to protect them against the kinds of capabilities that thieves or terrorists have shown they can put together.&quot;</p>
<p><br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/04/13/92097/obamas-nuclear-summit-yields-results.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Jonathan S. Landay and Margaret Talev<br /><strong>Source</strong>: McClatchy Newspapers<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 13 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Russia, U.S. to sign deal on plutonium]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460446e-05b4-7725-2893-f18c1f101bac]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The deal will provide for the United States to spend up to $400 million to transform the Russian plutonium involved, said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at Harvard University. </p>
<p>The process would involve taking plutonium that is &quot;ready to be put right into a weapon&quot; and &quot;putting it in a much more secure form for decades to come,&quot; <strong>Bunn </strong>said on Friday.</p>
<p>He said U.S. critics question the deal because reactors used for the Russian plutonium could potentially be remodified to produce new weapons-grade plutonium. </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/12/AR2010041201580.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Reuters <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Post<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Is Obama Putting Money Behind His Nuke Security Pitch?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044bc-e844-3f7c-7451-fa339e1cc828]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Several days ago, the <a href="http://www.fmwg.org/">Fissile Materials Working Group</a>, a collection of nonproliferation experts and groups, released a <a href="http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/deconstructing-us-funding-nuclear-material-se">paper</a> that analyzes Obama's budget and concludes that he is not funding nuclear security programs adequately&mdash;especially given his rhetoric:</p>
<p class="rteindent1">One year ago, President Barack Obama made a bold pledge to &quot;secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years.&quot; His immediate follow-through, however, has been wanting...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://motherjones.com/mojo/2010/04/obama-putting-money-his-nuclear-security-pitch<br /><strong>Author</strong>: David Corn<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Mother Jones<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[World leaders meet to discuss nuclear terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604578-0e16-c0a0-dbb7-facfee5dd687]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>...Daryl Kimball,</strong> executive director of the Arms Control Association, said, &quot;What Obama is trying to do here is to focus on a facet of the nuclear problem that has not gotten high-level attention.&quot;</p>
<p>He said the main goal of the conference was to persuade nations with nuclear infrastructure to &quot;reduce the vulnerability of those facilities and nuclear-weapons-usable materials that they have. The overall goal, I believe, needs to ex-pand support for measures that better secure the materials that exist and to expand technical and financial support for nuclear security and safeguards programs.&quot;</p>
<p>...Most of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are located in the north and west of the country and around the capital, Islama-bad. The Taliban and al Qaeda forces in tribal areas straddling Pakistan's western border have placed these facilities in the terrorists' back yard. &quot;Pakistan's military has a 10,000-person force specifically designed to protect nuclear facilities. The problem is that Pakistan is in a bad neighborhood,&quot; said<strong> Ken Luongo</strong>, a former Energy Department arms control and nonproliferation director.</p>
<p><br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/apr/12/world-leaders-meet-to-discuss-nuclear-terrorism/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Eli Lake and Ashish Kumar Sen<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Washington Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Global efforts to address nuke terror threat ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604307-c5a0-b512-972c-fb315f19b51d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>&nbsp;Alexandra Toma</strong>, a nuclear security expert with the Connect US Fund, said the danger is real. &quot;It's the number one threat to American security today - to American and global security, frankly,&quot; she said.</p>
<p>Recent reports have shown that several terrorist groups, including Al-Qaida, have been trying to get nuclear weapons for more than a decade, <strong>Toma </strong>said...</p>
<p>There is enough weapons-grade nuclear material spread across the globe to build more than 120,000 nuclear bombs. In some countries and regions, significant stockpiles are not adequately protected, and securing them is essential to prevent terrorists from acquiring or building nuclear weapons, according to the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, a collection of more than 40 leading experts in nuclear security and nonproliferation....</p>
<p>A successful summit would be marked by commitments from more than 40 world leaders, and by a broad consensus that nuclear terrorism is a threat to all nations, according to <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government and co-principal investigator for the Project on Managing the Atom.</p>
<p>&quot;Nuclear material anywhere is a threat to everyone, everywhere,&quot; <strong>Bunn </strong>said. &quot;Securing these stocks is a big job, a complicated job, but a do-able job.&quot;...</p>
<p>&quot;Because the goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials is extremely ambitious, it could face significant opposition from some of the summit attendees and other countries,&quot; said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president and founder of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>.</p>
<p><strong>Luongo </strong>said some countries do not believe terrorists want to obtain nuclear materials to build a bomb.</p>
<p>&quot;A lot of countries are not buying the fact that nuclear terrorism is a high priority and there's a big divide between the view of the United States and some of its key allies and the rest of the world, in particular in the developing world,&quot; he said.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-04/12/content_9713502.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Tan Yingzi<br /><strong>Source</strong>: China Daily<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear-Fuel Recycling Debate Arises on Margins of Obama Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460443f-aca7-dc59-9000-1f9b1925bcd0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...The position of Evans and Gallucci drew a retort from Areva&rsquo;s former director of non-proliferation and international institutions, who is attending the meeting of experts.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Recycling in the proper manner in good conditions can be a support to non-proliferation efforts,&rdquo; Caroline Jorant, who is leaving Areva to become a consultant, told the meeting organized by the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, which is supporting Obama&rsquo;s efforts. &ldquo;I think we should focus on the security of fissile material.&rdquo;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-12/nuclear-fuel-recycling-debate-arises-on-margins-of-obama-summit.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Viola Gienger<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Business Week<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[How dire is the threat of nuclear terrorism?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604394-cdf5-b310-ea07-051d226216b1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...The <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, an organization collaborating in a series of meetings designed to create consensus on controlling fissile materials, called nuclear terrorism the number one threat the international community faces. And with enough materials worldwide to build 120,000 nuclear bombs, the possibility that a terrorist network could buy or steal such material is far too high, as not all the world's nuclear materials are secure, the organization said in a statement...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://newscri.be/link/1069167<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: People's Daily Online<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[US, Russia to sign plutonium pact]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044ad-07a5-87e9-2324-16c97253a85e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The deal will provide for the United States to spend up to $400 million to transform the Russian plutonium involved, said<strong> Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at Harvard University.</p>
<p>The process would involve taking plutonium that is &quot;ready to be put right into a weapon&quot; and &quot;putting it in a much more secure form for decades to come,&quot; <strong>Mr Bunn</strong> said.<br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://news.ie.msn.com/world/article.aspx?cp-documentid=153001760<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Irish Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Prods Leaders on Curbing Nuclear Terror Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604317-ce1a-81ba-e9f7-4b0b73e6d6ac]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<div>
<p class="indent">...Al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the Sept. 11 attack on New York and the Pentagon, has tried repeatedly to obtain stolen nuclear materials, said<strong> Matthew Bunn</strong>, an associate professor at Harvard University who once worked as an adviser on U.S. nuclear controls.</p>
<p class="indent">&ldquo;In 2003, they were negotiating to buy what they believed were three nuclear devices,&rdquo; <strong>Bunn </strong>told reporters at a briefing last week by the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, independent experts backing Obama&rsquo;s effort. &ldquo;The United States has never managed to identify&rdquo; a Pakistani expert referenced in a message as helping al-Qaeda, Bunn said....</p>
<p class="indent">&ldquo;The global stockpile of nuclear weapons materials is large enough to build more than 120,000 nuclear bombs,&rdquo; said <strong>Alexandra Toma</strong>, co-chairwoman of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>.</p>
</div>
<p class="indent">&nbsp;</p>
<div>&nbsp;</div>
<p>&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-04-12/obama-prods-leaders-on-curbing-nuclear-terror-threat-update1-.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Viola Gienger and Roger Runningen<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Bloomberg<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Video: Washington Readies for Huge Nuclear Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604401-a239-c572-199a-3ff5670d5b2d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>This video clip features FMWG member <strong>Corey&nbsp;Hinderstein</strong> of the Nuclear Threat Initiative.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://cnettv.cnet.com/nuclear-security-summit-d-c/9742-1_53-50086148.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: ABC<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Summit: Realistic Expectations]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604420-e8f7-78ba-88be-56c5f9a3a7a4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...Given that this is an issue where you can't tell the players without a scorecard, there are numerous resources emerging that will keep track of what is going on. An umbrella group is the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> (fissile materials are those that can be used in or adapted for the making of a nuclear weapon), whose web site will be a repository for analysis of governmental actions in implementing pledges made during the Nuclear Security Summit...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/04/12/nuclear_security_summit_realistic_expectations/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: William Hartung <br /><strong>Source</strong>: TPM Cafe<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[A Chance to Boost Nuclear Security ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604430-9c2f-625e-2852-30663b7202e4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...And on another level, you also have people coming together as part of what's called the <a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group" target="_blank">&quot;<strong>fissile materials working group initiative,</strong>&quot;</a> which involves experts from around the world...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.cfr.org/publication/21864/chance_to_boost_nuclear_security.html?breadcrumb=%2Fpublication%2Fpublication_list%3Ftype%3Dinterview<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Bernard Gwertzman<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Council on Foreign Relations<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Summit Takes Urgent Tone]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604345-a64f-d871-188f-2c77b7362314]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The idea of the summit has garnered applause from many outside the government who have been trumpeting this cause for years, such as <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, an expert on nuclear proliferation at the Managing the Atom project at Harvard.</p>
<p>&quot;This material, unfortunately, is easy to smuggle and hard to detect. The nuclear material needed for a nuclear bomb would fit easily in a suitcase. Hence, insecure nuclear material anywhere is really a threat to everyone, everywhere,&quot; <strong>Bunn</strong> says. </p>
<p>Over the past 15 years, many programs have been established and billions of dollars have been spent to secure some of the world's plutonium and highly enriched uranium. But the effort still has fallen short, says <strong>Ken Luongo</strong>, a former Department of Energy official, now president of the Partnership for Global Security.</p>
<p>&quot;As important as this event is &mdash; because no one has ever convened this kind of an event before, and the president and his administration deserve credit for that &mdash; if it just focuses on ratifying the status quo, I think that's going to be inadequate,&quot; says <strong>Luongo</strong>. &quot;Because the status quo for preventing nuclear terrorism is inadequate.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125835449<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Mike Shuster<br /><strong>Source</strong>: NPR Morning Edition<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Experts: Doubts on nuke terror may raise risk]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604568-a730-ffec-24e2-3678ea9a957e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;There are a number of people inclined to think that maybe concerns about nuclear terrorism are alarmist, that terrorists could never make a functioning nuclear weapon,&quot; said former Australian Foreign Minister <strong>Gareth Evans</strong>, co-chair of an international nuclear study commission...</p>
<p>&quot;It is possible, plausible and, over time, probable&quot; that a &quot;determined and well-financed&quot; terrorist group will set off a nuclear blast somewhere, said U.S. nonproliferation expert and ex-ambassador <strong>Robert Gallucci</strong>...</p>
<p>&quot;It's a remarkable fact that the host of this nuclear security summit hasn't gotten around to ratifying this amendment,&quot; said Harvard University's <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>. &quot;It's a little embarrassing.&quot;<br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.tri-cityherald.com/2010/04/12/973549/experts-doubts-on-nuke-terror.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Charles Hanley <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Tri-City Herald<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Seeks Front Against Nuclear Terror]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604336-0000-f0dd-ebcb-a2351182d4f4]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;Some of the material already has been stolen, according to&nbsp;Harvard University's <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, author of&nbsp;<i>Securing the Bomb</i>. &quot;Nuclear theft is not a hypothetical worry,&quot; he says. &quot;It's an ongoing reality.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2010-04-11-nukesummit_N.htm?loc=interstitialskip<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Mimi Hall<br /><strong>Source</strong>: USA Today<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Top-secret transfer: Chile ships uranium to US before nuclear summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604411-fae3-9865-e9a1-a9881066449f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The Harvard University professor<strong> Matthew Bunn</strong> told a forum of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, an umbrella organisation for 40 non-governmental groups working on the ''loose nukes'' issue: ''There's a lot that has been done. There's a lot more to do. And the key will be to convince policymakers and nuclear managers around the world that this is a threat.''</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.smh.com.au/world/topsecret-transfer-chile-ships-uranium-to-us-before-nuclear-summit-20100412-s455.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Simon Mann<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Sydney Morning Herald<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Video: Abrüstungskonferenz: Obama ruft zum Gipfeltreffen zur Sicherheit von Atomwaffen ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460444f-f400-7043-e71c-be15a59b4dec]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Features video from the <strong><em>Next Generation Nuclear Security</em></strong><em>&nbsp;</em>summit and of FMWG co-chair <strong>Alexandra Toma</strong></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.tagesschau.de/multimedia/video/video685682.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Klaus Scherer<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Tagesschau.de<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[On summit sidelines, experts warn of global complacency over 'probable' nuclear terror attack ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604365-9bef-d8c2-e51f-c6b29fd4daae]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;&quot;There are a number of people inclined to think that maybe concerns about nuclear terrorism are alarmist, that terrorists could never make a functioning nuclear weapon,&quot; said former Australian Foreign Minister <strong>Gareth Evans</strong>, co-chair of an international nuclear study commission.<br />
Evans and others, who staged an <strong>unofficial parallel &quot;summit</strong>&quot; of more than 200 specialists from dozens of countries, said they believe a crude nuclear weapon is within the capabilities of al-Qaida and other groups.</p>
<p>&quot;It is possible, plausible and, over time, probable&quot; that a &quot;determined and well-financed&quot; terrorist group will set off a nuclear blast somewhere, said U.S. nonproliferation expert and ex-ambassador Robert Gallucci.</p>
<p>&quot;It's a remarkable fact that the host of this nuclear security summit hasn't gotten around to ratifying this amendment,&quot; said Harvard University's <strong>Matthew Bun</strong>n. &quot;It's a little embarrassing.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/politics/wire/sns-ap-us-nuclear-conference-experts,0,4281961.story<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Charles Hanley<br /><strong>Source</strong>: AP<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Summit: What Success Will Look Like ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460447e-f86a-3c98-e98e-bc4ba6a4f7dd]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...When it&rsquo;s over, what will success look like? In a general sense, a series of high-level commitments that nuclear terrorism is a serious threat. But the real test won&rsquo;t be immediately apparent. &ldquo;We won&rsquo;t know the evening the summit ends if it&rsquo;s a success or not,&rdquo; says <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a Harvard public-policy professor and nuclear-weapons expert. It'll be a factor of both leadership and resources; if both line up, &quot;there is a real chance to get major improvements in security in the short term.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://blog.newsweek.com/blogs/thegaggle/archive/2010/04/12/nuclear-summit-what-success-will-look-like.aspx<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Daniel Stone <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Newsweek<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Locking Down Loose Nuclear Material Is Not Rocket Science]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246044cc-fc65-197c-6f3d-b62e29a456e1]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>... But &quot;political and economic obstacles continue to hamper efforts to achieve a global clean out of civilian HEU,&quot; <a target="_blank" href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/fissile-materials-working-group/reduce-the-civilian-use-of-heu-now">according</a> to the <a target="_blank" href="../../../../../../blog">Fissile Materials Working Group</a>. Some countries don't want to give up what they see as an asset for science or medicine.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/04/12/time_is_of_the_essence?page=0,2<br /><strong>Author</strong>: David E. Hoffman<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Foreign Policy Magazine<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[NGOs Praise U.S. Leadership on Nukes]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604326-ac56-61e8-ec06-62c679be6b8f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The two-day event is organised around the goal of keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. Representatives of NGOs, along with experts from academia, held a <strong>parallel summit</strong> on the same topic several blocks away...</p>
<p>But many of the NGO and academic experts meeting at the <strong>parallel summit</strong> felt there was a connection to be made between securing vulnerable nuclear materials and reducing the existence of those materials...</p>
<p>&quot;Securing 'loose nukes' is one part of a nuclear security agenda,&quot; said <strong>Alexandra Toma, co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, told IPS. &quot;The second part is the strengthening the nonproliferation regime and that's going to be happening next month. The third part is disarmament which is what we're seeing in the new START treaty and hopefully the CTBT if that happens next year.&quot;</p>
<p>&quot;It's a very, very heavy agenda. When you look at the Obama administration four years from now, changing the debate on nuclear nonproliferation will be one of its major accomplishments,&quot; contended <strong>Nancy Soderberg</strong>, president of the Connect U.S. Fund.</p>
<p>She said the Obama administration's approach has been welcome. &quot;It's a huge shift from the Bush administration which pretty much objected to these types of international efforts and felt they could go their own way,&quot; she told IPS. &quot;There's a growing recognition that you need American leadership to drive the debate and that it's hard and so it's not going to happen overnight and it's all linked in together.&quot; ...</p>
<p><span class="texto1">&quot;Obama has really breathed a breath of fresh air into multilateral participation and he's raised the bar for all countries. By having a summit here in Washington DC he's forcing many countries all over the world to really focus on this issue and make a personal commitment on behalf of their country to follow through,&quot; <strong>Paul F. Walker</strong>, director of Global Green USA's security &amp; sustainability programme, told IPS. <br />
<br />
&quot;This will be a big feather in Obama's cap and a big feather in other countries' caps as they begin to renew their commitment to article six [of the NPT], in which all the nuclear countries commit to full nuclear disarmament,&quot; he said. <br />
<br />
&quot;In the nuclear posture review last week we saw not a huge shift but a good solid step in changing U.S. nuclear policy towards the rest of the world. We saw the START signing and this week we're seeing the nuclear security summit. So I think this is all part of the momentum going into the NPT review conference,&quot; said <strong>Toma</strong>. </span></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=51015<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Matthew Berger and Eli Clifton<br /><strong>Source</strong>: IPS News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Terrorists 'likely' to build nuclear bomb]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604355-fd26-f6db-e4c8-6fb64f64c65b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;The risk of a militant group getting hold of nuclear material and building a bomb with it is &quot;possible, plausible, and over time probable,&quot; <strong>Robert Gallucci</strong>, president of the MacArthur Foundation, told a gathering of nuclear security experts ahead of a summit meeting on the same subject...</p>
<p>...Harvard University professor <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong> said wealthy Western countries like the United States and European Union members needed to do more to improve security at their atomic sites. He said US research reactors that yield plutonium are exempt from US security rules.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.stuff.co.nz/world/americas/3576223/Terrorists-likely-to-build-nuclear-bomb<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Reuters<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Reuters<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 12 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[President Obama's high-stakes nuclear meet]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043a3-b930-5530-e7ef-0835d75900f5]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&ldquo;The president&hellip;has made a lot of bold predictions in this area: secure all vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. Well, we&rsquo;ve been at it for 15 years and we haven&rsquo;t succeeded in one country yet, so that&rsquo;s a very difficult thing,&rdquo; said one anti-proliferation advocate, <strong>Kenneth Luongo </strong>of the Partnership for Global Security. &ldquo;The budget is not adequate, frankly, for that kind of a mission.&rdquo;</p>
<p><strong>Luongo </strong>said a positive result for Obama will ride in large part on the degree of detail in the commitments that come out of the summit.</p>
<p>&ldquo;Will it be one of the greatest achievements of the president&rsquo;s foreign policy? I think that depends on whether or not we have gauziness and unclarity or whether we have &hellip; a working plan that is going to be very specific,&rdquo; <strong>Luongo </strong>said.<br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0410/35633_Page3.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Josh Gerstein<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Politico <br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Russia cast as nuclear security leader despite flaws]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043b3-a6b9-9d02-cb33-06e6c06dee3b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...&quot;Russia wants to be seen as a leader, with the U.S. and other countries, of the global effort to prevent nuclear terrorism,&quot; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at Harvard University. &quot;And they are a leader, in important ways.&quot;</p>
<p>But despite dramatic improvements in the protection of Russia's nuclear materials, funded in large part by billions of dollars in U.S. assistance, experts say threats remain....</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63A23620100411?feedType=RSS&feedName=politicsNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+Reuters%2FPoliticsNews+(News+%2F+US+%2F+Politics+News)&utm_content=Google+Reader<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Reuters<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Leaders Gather for Nuclear Talks as New Threat Is Seen]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460449d-a427-aa9e-d4ac-1b5ddd75c20b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&ldquo;It&rsquo;s doable but hard,&rdquo; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a nuclear expert at Harvard. &ldquo;It&rsquo;s not easy to overcome secrecy, complacency, sovereignty and bureaucracy.&rdquo;</p>
<p>&ldquo;The Obama administration got off to an unimpressive start,&rdquo; <strong>Mr. Bunn</strong> wrote in his most recent update of &ldquo;Securing the Bomb,&rdquo; a survey to be published Monday by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit advocacy group that Mr. Nunn helped found in Washington. But he added that its proposed budget for the 2011 fiscal year calls for a 31 percent increase.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/12/world/12nuke.html?pagewanted=1&sq=william%20broad&st=cse&scp=2<br /><strong>Author</strong>: David Sanger and William Broad<br /><strong>Source</strong>: New York Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama leads summit effort to secure nuclear materials]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460428a-a304-41ec-eb76-cf80b53771e0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The 'Made in the USA' label does not necessarily guarantee buy-in from others regarding this threat,&quot; said <strong>Elizabeth Turpen</strong>, an associate at Booz Allen Hamilton and an expert on nonproliferation...</p>
<p>The<strong> Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, an umbrella organization for nongovernmental groups working on nuclear issues, estimated that there is enough &quot;weapons-usable nuclear material&quot; in the world to build more than 120,000 nuclear bombs...</p>
<p>&quot;Unfortunately, there's been a sense in some countries, especially in developing countries, that they are not the target of such threats -- that nuclear terrorism is not a realistic worry,&quot; said <strong>Corey Hinderstein</strong>, an expert at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonpartisan group working on the problem...</p>
<p>&nbsp;<strong>Miles Pomper</strong>, a nuclear expert at the James Martin Center for Non-Proliferation Studies, said that &quot;it's a big engineering process&quot; to switch reactors to low-enriched uranium, which is harder to weaponize...</p>
<p>&quot;There's a lot that has been done. There's a lot more to do. And the key will be to convince policymakers and nuclear managers around the world that this is a threat,&quot; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a professor at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government who has written on the subject.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/10/AR2010041002991.html?wpisrc=nl_headline<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Scott Wilson and Mary Beth Sheridan<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Post<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Sun, 11 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Five Ways Obama Can Secure Nuclear Materials]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460426b-a65f-08f0-35fc-ece969b33424]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Because of the vital importance of this nuclear security objective, the nongovernmental expert community in the United States, including the Stanley Foundation, joined together to create a <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>. This working group believes in the administration&rsquo;s four-year policy objective and will work to see that it is achieved in the United States and internationally.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/articles.cfm?ID=607<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Stanley Foundation<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama's Nuclear Security Budget Should Match His Rhetoric]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460425b-e592-429d-2b8c-e3a640f96920]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;So far, the president's laudable rhetoric has not matched the budget request proposed by the administration. The Obama administration has proposed a $624 million increase in U.S. nuclear weapons-related spending over the previous year and is requesting $5 billion in additional funding over the next five years. Although an unprecedented increase, the majority of this funding is slated to go toward maintaining and enhancing U.S. nuclear weapons, which would have little impact on securing nuclear materials globally.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/20100409/OPINION01/4090335/1036/OPINION/Guest-column-Obama-s-nuclear-security-budget-should-match-his-rhetoric<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Dr. Peter Wilk<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Des Moines Register<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[US: al-Qaida Exemplifies New-Age Nuclear Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246043c2-a40a-5a74-a58a-3ae5cb710cf7]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Sharon Squassoni</strong>, a nuclear expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, estimates there are 500 tons of weapons-usable materials in civilian and military reactors that could be targets for sabotage or diversion...</p>
<p>...<strong>Thomas Cochran</strong>, senior staff scientist at the Natural Resources Defense Council, said Friday that the top security priority should be highly enriched uranium, which is easier than plutonium to engineer into a weapon.</p>
<p>''A crude but potentially devastating nuclear device can be made with as much of this material as would fit in a six-pack of soda cans,'' <strong>Cochran</strong> said. </p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2010/04/09/us/politics/AP-US-Nuclear-Conference.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Associated Press<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Administration Confronts Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042f7-d7b0-1824-1407-610939d9d87b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...The summit could not be more relevant, as <strong>Kenneth Luongo of the Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> explains, &quot;the growing global stockpile of nuclear and radiological materials and the increasing boldness of terrorists are changing the international requirements for nuclear security.  What have not yet changed are the international obligations that respond to these evolving circumstances.&quot;</p>
<p>Recognizing the importance of this goal, the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> is holding a parallel <strong>Next Generation Nuclear Security Summit</strong> alongside the official event, to enhance the transparency and accountability necessary if efforts to secure nuclear materials are to succeed.  These summits come on the heels of other landmark accomplishments by the Obama administration to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1569<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: National Security Network<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S., Russia reach deal on disposing of plutonium from nuclear weapons]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604384-c6f1-c3db-2406-5f3596ecfdbc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...<strong>Kenneth N. Luongo</strong>, a senior nuclear nonproliferation official in the Clinton administration, said the agreement was originally intended as a powerful sign of shrinking stockpiles. &quot;It was supposed to be a declaration of our intentions to move beyond the Cold War,&quot; he said.</p>
<p>But experts also worry about the security of plutonium because only a small amount, roughly the size of a grapefruit, would be needed to build a nuclear bomb...</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/08/AR2010040805405.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Mary Beth Sheridan<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Washington Post<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Administration Confronts Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460429a-ce39-398e-8f2c-4834e2075a9b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The summit could not be more relevant, as <strong>Kenneth Luongo of the Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> explains, &quot;the growing global stockpile of nuclear and radiological materials and the increasing boldness of terrorists are changing the international requirements for nuclear security.  What have not yet changed are the international obligations that respond to these evolving circumstances.&quot;</p>
<p>Recognizing the importance of this goal, the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> is holding a parallel Next Generation Nuclear Security Summit alongside the official event, to enhance the transparency and accountability necessary if efforts to secure nuclear materials are to succeed.  These summits come on the heels of other landmark accomplishments by the Obama administration to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons.  [Arms Control Association, September 2004.  Arms Control Association, January/February 2010.  Secretary Clinton, 4/8/10]</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nsnetwork.org/node/1569<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: National Security Network<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 09 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Summit Must Convince Nations of Terror Threat, Experts Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041fd-9859-dc8f-dd97-af499df94c6a]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The fundamental key is going to be convincing policy-makers and nuclear  managers around the world that this is in fact a real threat, that  there's more action that needs to be taken on nuclear security,&quot; <strong>Matthew  Bunn</strong>, a principal investigator at Harvard University's Project on  Managing the Atom, said during a panel discussion this week at the  National Press Club.</p>
<p>If the conference &quot;just focuses on ratifying the status quo that's going  to be inadequate because the status quo for preventing nuclear  terrorism is inadequate,&quot; <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership  for Global Security, said during the discussion at the National Press  Club.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100408_2710.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Summit: Resources for Next Week's Big Event]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604374-f67f-22f0-2a66-9a31890e1abf]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><font face="Verdana,Geneva,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" color="#1e304c" size="1" style="color: rgb(30, 48, 76); font-family: Verdana,Geneva,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 8pt;">The <b><a target="_blank" shape="rect" href="http://www.fmwg.org/" rel="nofollow"><strong>Fissile Materials Working Group (FMWG) </strong></a></b>has been working to support and hold accountable the Obama Administration in its goal to &quot;secure all vulnerable fissile materials in four years.&quot;</font></p>
<p><font face="Verdana,Geneva,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif" color="#1e304c" size="1" style="color: rgb(30, 48, 76); font-family: Verdana,Geneva,Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; font-size: 8pt;">Next week, the FMWG is hosting over 200 experts from around the world to discuss policy recommendations for how to achive this four-year goal. We invite you to watch our &quot;<a target="_blank" shape="rect" href="http://www.ibroadcasts.tv/FMWG-04-12-2010-LiveWebcast.htm" rel="nofollow"><strong>Next Generation Nuclear Security</strong></a>&quot; summit on Monday, April 12, via live webcast.</font></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://archive.constantcontact.com/fs087/1101483031206/archive/1103280463371.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Connect U.S. Fund Community Newsletter<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Audio: Treaty Addresses Weapons Left Over From Cold War]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460422c-cc60-3082-5320-f1a7da2ab4e9]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The new arms control treaty requires the U.S. and Russia to cut their arsenals by up to one-third. It's meant to start dealing with a legacy of weapons left over from the Cold War. <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, associate professor at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, talks to Steve Inskeep about what the new treaty is expected to accomplish.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125707691<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Steve Inskeep<br /><strong>Source</strong>: National Public Radio<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Summit:  Resources for Next Week's Big Event]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460427a-93bf-a817-8c63-fd3b7319f04d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>As you know, the <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> (FMWG) has been working to support and hold accountable the Obama Administration in its goal to &quot;secure all vulnerable fissile materials in four years.&quot;  Next week, the FMWG is hosting over 200 experts from around the world to discuss policy recommendations for how to achieve this four-year goal.  We invite you to watch our &quot;Next Generation Nuclear Security&quot; summit on Monday, April 12, via this live webcast.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.connectusfund.org/blogs/nuclear-security-summit-resources-next-weeks-big-event<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Connect U.S. Fund<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 08 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Two contrasting views could present obstacles to upcoming global nuclear security summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041af-ca77-c8c6-83e1-f3135d80826c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><font id="Zoom">...&quot;There is a significant perception gap between in  particular the United States and the developing world on how serious the  threat of nuclear terrorism is,&quot; said <strong>Kenneth Luongo, </strong>president of the  Partnership for Global Security, a non profit promoting efforts to  secure weapons of mass destruction.</font></p>
<p><font id="Zoom">    </font></p>
<p><font id="Zoom">&quot;The reason is that 9/11  is seared into the American psyche and we are obviously not as well  protected as we could be and we are target number one,&quot; he said.</font></p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/world/2010-04/07/c_13239891.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Matthew Rusling<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Xinhua News<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Video: VOA Briefing on Nuclear Security with Matthew Bunn]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042e8-ef65-8f42-2644-ab652ac49ca8]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Voice of America (VOA) hosted Matthew Bunn for a briefing on how improving nuclear security world wide fits with other developments, including the release of the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review and the new START treaty. <br />
&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.voanews.com/wm/live/special-events/Nuclear_Security_Summit_040610-vb.asx<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Voice of America <br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, Journey Home]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042d8-b848-ec0c-e910-b784819b3757]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The host of the Journey Home, interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.ksfr.org/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: KSFR Santa Fe, NM<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Summit Aims to Enhance Global Protection of Nuclear Materials]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041bf-fdc1-0f44-9056-6d8e05032ff6]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>At a press conference Tuesday, members of the <strong>Fissile Materials Working  Group</strong> explained the goals and possible outcomes of the summit. The group  is composed of 26 organizations that collaborate and provide  recommendations on nuclear material control priorities to government  officials.<br />
<br />
The threat of nuclear terrorism is a very real possibility, said <strong>Matthew  Bunn</strong>, a member of the FMWG steering committee and associate professor  of public policy at Harvard University. Terrorist groups such as  al-Qaida are constantly working to acquire nuclear materials, but  there's no proof they have any, he said. If lax security allowed any  terrorist organization to get nuclear material, it would create  international concern.</p>
<p>The two types of nuclear materials used in nuclear weapons are highly  enriched uranium and plutonium. Nearly 40 countries have stockpiles of  these materials, the largest being in Russia and the United States.</p>
<p>Establishing a consensus of the threat posed by nuclear materials is the  No. 1 goal of the summit, said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, co-chair of FMWG and  president of the Partnership for Global Security.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.infozine.com/news/stories/op/storiesView/sid/40693/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Megan McCourt<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Kansas City Info Zine<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Analyse: Obama will in die Geschichtsbücher eingehen]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460424b-9d2c-b3f3-f298-97cc872c3266]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Auch den START-Vertrag sieht Obama als eine Art Stopp-Schild f&uuml;r all  diejenigen dunklen Kr&auml;fte, die nach Nuklearwaffen streben. &laquo;Die tiefere  Bedeutung ist die Delegitimierung von Nuklearwaffen&raquo;, meint <strong>Kenneth  Luongo,</strong> Chef der Organisation &laquo;Partnership for Global Security&raquo;. START  ist lediglich als erster Schritt konzipiert, &laquo;als ein Schl&uuml;ssel, der f&uuml;r  eine ganze Reihe von weiterer Schl&ouml;sser passen sollte&raquo;, wie das  Washingtoner Council on Foreign Relations meint. Ein erster Testfall  auch, wie es um die Beziehungen zwischen Moskau und Washington bestellt  ist - die Atomprogramme im Iran und in Nordkorea immer fest im Blick.  Denn Obama ist klar, ohne die helfende Hand Moskaus hat er keine Chance,  die Daumenschrauben gegen Teheran anzuziehen.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.zeit.de/newsticker/2010/4/7/iptc-bdt-20100405-10-24434656xml?page=1<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Zeit Online<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[ANALISIS: Obama establece estrategia nuclear de EEUU presentando la Revisión de la Postura Nuclear]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460420d-dbca-b7a6-d5bf-3f2e8251537d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;Hay una diferencia significativa entre EEUU concretamente y el resto  del mundo desarrollado sobre c&oacute;mo de seria es la amenaza del terrorismo  nuclear&quot;, asegur&oacute; <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, presidente de la Asociaci&oacute;n por la  Seguridad Global, una organizaci&oacute;n sin &aacute;nimo de lucro.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://espanol.cri.cn/782/2010/04/07/1s195610.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: CRI Online<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Ein neuer Start für die Abrüstung]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460421d-028c-3637-4a5e-222f096ed714]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Den Start-Vertrag sieht Obama als eine Art Stopp-Schild f&uuml;r all  diejenigen dunklen Kr&auml;fte, die nach Nuklearwaffen streben. &bdquo;Die tiefere  Bedeutung ist die Delegitimierung von Nuklearwaffen&ldquo;, meint <strong>Kenneth  Luongo</strong>, Chef der Organisation &bdquo;Partnership for Global Security&ldquo;.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.rundschau-online.de/html/artikel/1270484302031.shtml<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Von Peer Meinert und Ulf Mauder<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Kölnische Rundschau<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 07 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[VIDEO: Nuclear Security Summit Preview]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041ee-a3ea-ceaf-0e00-95278447582f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>The FMWG pre-summit media briefing at the National Press Club was broadcast live by C-SPAN. The FMWG panel at this briefing consisted of:</p>
<ul>
    <li><a href="http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/experts/368/matthew_bunn.html">Matthew Bunn</a>, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project, Harvard University</li>
    <li><a href="http://www.partnershipforglobalsecurity.org/About%20Ransac/Staff.asp">Kenneth N. Luongo</a>, President, Partnership for Global Security</li>
    <li><a href="http://connectusfund.org/about/staff/alexandra-i-toma">Alexandra Toma</a>, Program Director, Connect U.S. Fund</li>
    <li>Elizabeth (Libby) Turpen, Associate, Booz Allen Hamilton</li>
</ul><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/292867-1<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Fissile Materials Working Group<br /><strong>Source</strong>: C-SPAN<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Washington Summit to Discuss Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041de-fb92-5b9c-7d60-7c4ea6e01c42]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p><strong>Alexandra Toma</strong> is a nuclear security expert with the group Connect U.S.  Fund. She says the danger is real. &quot;It's the number one threat to  American security today - to American and global security, frankly.  We've seen two bi-partisan commissions come out just this January saying  al-Qaida has been trying to get nuclear weapons since the 1900s and  they are actively continuing to do so,&quot; Toma said.<br />
<br />
The conference  is expected to look at improving security for nuclear materials  worldwide and increasing international cooperation. <br />
<br />
But experts  say no-one knows how large the world stockpile of nuclear material is  because not every country reports what it's producing.<br />
<br />
&quot;During  the Cold War in particular, the U.S. and Russia produced for military  purposes,&quot; <strong>Ken Luongo</strong> said. He heads the research organization  Partnership for Global Security. &quot;They didn't report to each other or to  any international authority how much. The Pakistanis and the Indians  are now very secretive about how much material they produce. We don't  know how much the Israelis have produced etc. etc. So we don't have an  accurate gauge.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/usa/Washington-Summit-to-Discuss-Nuclear-Terrorism-90014797.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Andre de Nesnera<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Voice of America<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Your Guide to National Nuke Policy History Month]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041ce-a621-9153-ef0c-f28f3c785c2e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...I do, however, mean that the <a href="http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pdb/NucMatlsPDB_310.pdf">Stanley  Foundation has convened </a>very smart people to elicit their ideas on  the matter (as is our wont). My colleagues also work closely with the <a href="../../../../../../about">Fissile Material Working Group</a>,  and the <a href="http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists">Bulletin  of the Atomic Scientists</a> has a special page of the Working Group's  ideas. Plus, Ken Luongo laid out everything the summit should do in an <a href="http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_01-02/Luongo">Arms Control  Today article </a>last winter. Oh, and the Stanley Foundation also made  this <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OmcayPcNFos&amp;feature=related">cool  video</a>.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://tpmcafe.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/04/06/your_guide_to_national_nuke_policy_history_month/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: David Shorr<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Talking Points Memo<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[?????????? ????? ??????? ?????? ????????????]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=2460423c-e606-a462-57fa-eed5912d5762]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>?? ???? ??????, ???????? ? ?????-?????? &laquo;?????? ???????&raquo;, ????? ????  (<strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>), ????????? ???????????? ???????????? (Harvard  University&rsquo;s John F. Kennedy School of Government).</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www1.voanews.com/russian/news/politics/terror_threats_2010_04_06-90048722.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Voice of America Russia<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 06 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Ken Luongo, The Bev Smith Show ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604190-a337-4d5d-faac-b5f180fb9295]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Bev Smith, host of The&nbsp;Bev Show, interviews Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.aurnol.com/networks/renaissance/bev_smith.asp<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: American Urban Radio Networks<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 01 Apr 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Will Obama Respond to the Call to Increase the Dismantlement Rate Before Upcoming Summit?]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246041a0-de83-0afd-fbdb-d0b45da803dd]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Our hats off to Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Representative Ed Markey (D-MA) for <a href="http://pogoarchives.org/m/nss/feingold-markey-dismantlement-letter-20100331.pdf">sending a letter today to President Obama</a> asking that he increase the dismantlement rate of retired nuclear weapons. This is an issue we raised in our recent<a href="http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/88667-us-must-get-its-nuclear-house-in-order-before-april-security-summit"> op-ed published in <em>The Hill</em></a>. The 39 percent decrease in dismantlement of retired weapons in<a href="http://www.cfo.doe.gov/budget/11budget/index.htm#Detailed%20Budget%20Justifications"> Obama's FY 2011 budget</a> will exacerbate the growing backlog of thousands of nuclear warheads in the dismantlement queue and raises concerns about security. A number of our most secure military storage bunkers are filling up fast. For example, the Air Force's most secure facility, the Kirtland Underground Munitions Storage Complex, is virtually full. As more warheads are likely to be retired as a result of the new START treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review, it's not clear that there are adequate secure storage facilities for these excess warheads. Until the retired weapons are dismantled, they could still be used by the U.S. (or terrorists), sending a mixed message to the nations of the world.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://pogoblog.typepad.com/pogo/2010/03/will-obama-respond-to-the-call-to-increase-the-dismantlement-rate-before-upcoming-summit.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Ingrid Drake<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Project on Government Oversight<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 31 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, Urban Scene]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604151-938a-178c-2013-7be789049e23]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Don Frierson, host of Urban Scene, interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.wgcv.net/The%20Urban%20Scene.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WGCV AM, Columbia, SC<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Ken Luongo, One Hour of Hope]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040d4-b47e-ee47-60ad-8121ebcbda93]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Doug Clifford, host of One Hour of Hope, interviews Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://audio.thesky973.com/wsky-the-doug-clifford-show.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WSKY, Gainsville, FL<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Obama Intervened Frequently in Arms Control Talks]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604142-b466-144e-aa26-28538e98b963]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;U.S. President Barack Obama played a key role in hammering out a successor to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, speaking with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on 14 occasions since last spring to help resolve impasses that arose between negotiators meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, the <em>New York Times</em> reported Friday.</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>&ldquo;The larger meaning [of the treaty] is the delegitimization of nuclear weapons,&rdquo; Partnership for Global Security head<strong> Kenneth Luongo</strong> told the Times. &ldquo;Obama will be able to go [to upcoming nuclear security meetings], and Medvedev as well, and say, &lsquo;Here&rsquo;s what we did on disarmament. Now we need to get serious about nuclear terrorism and nuclear materials.&rsquo; &rdquo;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100329_1928.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, The Breakfast Club]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042c8-0a45-0e27-fde5-48bf375f830c]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Host of the Breakfast Club interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.cubradio.com/<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WCUB Manitowoc, WI<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 29 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Jim Walsh, "The Surreal News Show"]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042b9-f313-cdda-503e-135b03c0a39e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Larry and Steve, co-hosts of The Surreal News Show, interview Jim Walsh, research associate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and steering committee member of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://steve.podomatic.com/entry/eg/2010-03-26T12_17_05-07_00<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WSLR Sarasota, FL<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, The Voice of Dakota]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604171-9a0a-9670-126f-6d9fd7f11dd3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Dakota Huseby, host of The Voice of Dakota, interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.knoxradio.com/default.asp?pid=23178<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: KNOX Grand Forks, ND <br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Ken Luongo, The Cliff Kelley Show]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604132-9f0e-e7fe-2fa6-6ea6bbef154b]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Cliff Kelley, host of The&nbsp;Cliff Kelley Show, interviews Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://wvon.com/personalities/cliff-kelley-show.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WVON, Chicago, IL<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, Parallel University]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604180-ddbd-bdba-a65d-b3f97241561d]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Kim Dobson, host of Parallel University, interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://kaos.evergreen.edu/about.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: KAOS, Olympia, WA<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Leonor Tomero, "Breakfast with Nancy"]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246042a9-a80b-bb58-2b3e-d92be766c07f]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Nancy Stapp, host of Breakfast with&nbsp;Nancy, interviews Leonor Tomero, director of nuclear non-Proliferation at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferationand and member of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.1340kvot.com/front/index.aspx<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: KVOT, Taos, NM<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Treaty Advances Obama's Nuclear Vision ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604113-faa6-5dc5-5220-e9f4c0573dfc]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;The arms control treaty being completed by the United States and Russia represents another step toward closing the books on the defining struggle of the final half of the 20th century. But it also marks the opening of a broader campaign to counter the emerging threats of the 21st century.&quot;</p>
<p>...</p>
<p>If President Obama signs the treaty with President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia in Prague on April 8 as expected, it will give Mr. Obama a stronger hand heading into two back-to-back nuclear summit meetings where he wants to push toward the nuclear weapons-free world he envisions. At the two meetings, Mr. Obama hopes to forge international consensus to limit the spread of weapons and secure materials that could be vulnerable to terrorists, efforts that could be accelerated by the new treaty.</p>
<p>&ldquo;The larger meaning is the delegitimization of nuclear weapons,&rdquo; said<strong> Kenneth N. Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security, a nonprofit group pushing for aggressive efforts at the approaching meetings. &ldquo;Obama will be able to go, and Medvedev as well, and say, &lsquo;Here&rsquo;s what we did on disarmament. Now we need to get serious about nuclear terrorism and nuclear materials.&rsquo; &rdquo;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/26/world/europe/26start.html<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Peter Baker<br /><strong>Source</strong>: New York Times<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 25 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[U.S. must get its nuclear house in order before April Security Summit]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040f4-c135-3d58-c739-b59361feec65]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;As part of President Barack Obama&rsquo;s initiative to secure all vulnerable nuclear material within four years, the U.S. will host more than 40 heads of state next month for a nuclear security summit. There is good reason for such a summit: There is enough bomb-grade nuclear material in the world &mdash; in every corner of the globe &mdash; to build more than 120,000 nuclear bombs. The U.S., which has the world&rsquo;s second-largest stock of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium, needs to unveil a much bolder strategy for securing its own bomb-grade material to inspire other nations to follow suit</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/88667-us-must-get-its-nuclear-house-in-order-before-april-security-summit<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 24 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Ken Luongo, U Need 2 Know ]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604103-c563-9689-5831-2126cfce38c0]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&nbsp;Frank Knapp, host of U Need 2 Know, interviews Ken Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about the upcoming Nuclear Security Summit.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://woic.com/skin/elink.php?url=www.Uneed2know.info<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: WIOC-AM, South Carolina<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 23 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, The Journey Home Radio Show]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604161-bc58-e079-0c52-5489ea94f2fe]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Diego Mulligan, host of The Journey Home Radio Show, interviews Alexandra Toma, program director at the Connect U.S. Fund and co-chair of the Fissile Materials Working Group, about keeping nuclear material out of terrorists' hands.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.hbci.com/~wenonah/new/diego-m.htm<br /><strong>Author</strong>: <br /><strong>Source</strong>: KSFR FM, Santa Fe, NM<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Mon, 22 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Funding the Fight Against Nuclear Terrorism]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040e4-d8bd-0387-8c9a-6303ba1c137e]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Just about a year ago, President Obama made a very bold pledge to &ldquo;secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years&rdquo; in order to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack.  He then offered up a budget for 2010 that was over $200 million less than the last budget of the Bush administration, which did not support this ambition.  The Administration then did nothing to support a House bill that significantly boosted the funding for his objective and then again did nothing to oppose the actions of other congressional committees that either took the request at face value or rearranged elements of it without significantly adding to it overall.  So, in essence the Administration has lost a year in its four year quest.  As a result it is extremely unlikely that it will meet its stated four year goal.  In fact, the Administration has yet to define what it considers vulnerable nuclear material.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://budgetinsight.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/funding-the-fight-against-nuclear-terrorism/#more-2769<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Kenneth Luongo<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Budget Insights<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Tue, 16 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Facing the Nuclear Terrorism Threat]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040c5-ba38-d092-98c0-25da832b81c3]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>...But, the real question should be whether we can afford not to aggressively finance the president&rsquo;s four-year goal. &nbsp;Compare the budget for locking down nuclear weapons and materials with another global challenge like climate change. In 2007, climate change funding was at $6.5 billion &mdash; more than triple what we spend today on nuclear security. And nuclear security spending is only about one-third of 1 percent of the total defense budget this year.&nbsp;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/86325-facing-the-nuclear-terrorism-threat<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Alexandra Toma and Kenneth Luongo<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Hill<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 12 Mar 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nuclear Security Plan Requires Additional Leadership, Funds, Experts Say]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=246040b5-bb91-4330-8539-6b441e0a28ea]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>Sustained executive leadership and more money in future budget cycles will be needed to even attempt to meet U.S. President Barack Obama's goal of securing the world's loose nuclear material within four years, according to a pair of nuclear experts.</p>
<p>&quot;In order to get this job done in four years we are going to have to do more and we're going to have to do it faster and that's going to take more money,&quot; said <strong>Matthew Bunn</strong>, a principal investigator at Harvard University's Project on Managing the Atom.</p>
<p>The White House must play a role in overcoming obstacles to international cooperation -- such as complacency about the threat of nuclear terrorism, national sovereignty concerns over nuclear security and bureaucratic entanglements -- in order for the worldwide effort to succeed, according to Bunn.</p>
<p>The president's fiscal 2010 budget for programs related to nuclear security &quot;was totally inadequate to the mission that he laid out both in the [presidential] campaign&quot; and his nonproliferation speech in Prague last year, said <strong>Kenneth Luongo</strong>, president of the Partnership for Global Security.</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20100226_9566.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Martin Matishak<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Global Security Newswire<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Fri, 26 Feb 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Controlling nuclear threat must be top priority]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604096-ed70-050a-140b-b7e6e6ea3f50]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;...The April summit can provide a general framework of core principles, catalog initiatives already under way, and point the way for needed follow-through by nations and international bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. <strong>A related &quot;unofficial summit&quot; of nongovernmental nuclear specialists and groups, organized in part by the Stanley Foundation</strong>, will support the work of the leaders' summit and emphasize the importance of periodic benchmarks and implementation follow-up. Both summits can stress that sensible progress is possible despite differing political agendas and mutual suspicions. The U.S.-Russia experience is illustrative in this regard.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=412<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Vlad Sambaiew<br /><strong>Source</strong>: Des Moines Register<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 10 Feb 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Interview with Alexandra Toma, The Jeff Farias Show]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604086-c6b6-981b-48fd-20fcdbe11d03]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;at 5:30 PM MST <strong>Alexandra Toma is the Program Director for the Connect U.S. Fund</strong>, where she manages the Fund&rsquo;s programmatic operations in nuclear nonproliferation, human rights, climate change, and the civilian-military balance. In addition, <strong>she co-chairs the </strong><strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong> and regularly convenes the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty &ldquo;Contact Group,&rdquo; which works with the State Department in preparation for the May 2009 NPT Review Conference.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/4454085<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Jeff Farias <br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Jeff Farias Show<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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			<title><![CDATA[Nonproliferation Budget Increases Dramatically]]></title>
			<link><![CDATA[http://www.fmwg.org/in-the-news.cfm?action=article&id=24604077-d65d-e45c-e923-de0c3a1d64af]]></link>
			<description><![CDATA[<p>&quot;Today, a group of 40 nuclear security experts called on Congress to fund the nonproliferation programs. <strong>Ken Luongo</strong><strong>, the chair of the</strong> <strong>Fissile Materials Working Group</strong>, praised the administration's budget increase request.&quot;</p><br /><strong>URL</strong> http://politics.theatlantic.com/2010/02/non_proliferation_budget_increases_dramatically.php<br /><strong>Author</strong>: Marc Ambinder<br /><strong>Source</strong>: The Atlantic<br />]]></description>
			<author>rcostello@connectusfund.org</author>
			<pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2010 00:00:00 CST</pubDate>
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