



Work Plan for the FMWG: Late 2010 – Early 2012

November 4, 2010

FINAL Approved by FMWG Members

Note: This is the condensed version of the full work plan.

The FMWG has proven itself to be a potent force in advancing the global fissile material security agenda and is poised for growth and greater influence. While originally focused on supporting President Obama's four year goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide, it has extended its scope beyond this objective to include defining a cohesive and effective future nuclear material security policy architecture and generating the expert and political support for implementation.

The following policy issues and projects are have been approved by the full working group as areas for continued and potential collaborations.

Tracking Commitments from the 2010 NSS

In the FMWG's [letter](#) to President Obama in 2009, the group indicated that it would develop benchmarks measuring the progress of the four year goal. The FMWG will use the final documents resulting from the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit as the parameters by which to measure this progress.

Expanding the Security Mission Beyond the Four Year Goal

The FMWG was founded to promote practical and achievable policy initiatives in support of President Obama's goal of "securing all nuclear weapons materials at vulnerable sites within four years." With the communiqué from the April 2010 NSS and U.N. Security Council Resolution 1887, this goal became an international objective. The four year deadline has been defined in official documents as December 2013, and it has been useful in generating momentum behind the issue.

However, effective nuclear material security is not a four year issue. It is a lifetime concern and steps need to be taken to ensure that political support for enhanced nuclear material security continue beyond the end of 2013. Therefore, the FMWG's purpose will not only be to continue to support the acceleration of global nuclear material security efforts needed to achieve the four year goal, but also to extend beyond it to identify new initiatives.

Limit and Eliminate the Production and Use of Fissile Materials

Highly-Enriched Uranium (HEU). In 2009, the FMWG [recommended](#) to the Administration that it go beyond merely implementing its HEU minimization policy and become a global leader in accelerating the material's phase out by creating a timetable for a ban on its civil use. Participants at the 2010 NSS agreed to convert HEU fueled reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU) and develop and encourage the use of technologies that do not use HEU fuel or targets for producing medical isotopes.

Plutonium. To date, the FMWG has not taken a position on the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. However, the FMWG will begin to explore what such a position could be in advance of the ROK summit.

Facilitate the Consolidation and Elimination of Fissile Materials

The FMWG proposed a three-part strategy to consolidate and eliminate fissile materials in its 2009 [recommendations](#). The group recommended that the number of locations where fissile materials are stored should be reduced through consolidation and elimination techniques, including down blending the maximum amount of excess and civilian HEU. Next, the FMWG recommended that the security at all locations with these materials be improved and the size of global fissile material stockpiles be reduced. Finally, the FMWG recommended that international monitoring be extended over all remaining excess military and civilian stockpiles. In the 2010 NSS' work plan, participants agreed to consolidate national sites where nuclear material is held and to "consider the...safe, secure, and timely removal" of nuclear materials from facilities "where they are no longer in use."

Funding Global Fissile and Radiological Material Security

Two funding-related [recommendations](#) of the FMWG in 2009 were providing adequate funding to the U.S. nuclear material security programs to meet the four year goal and extending and expanding the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership).

An important element of these recommendations is ensuring that not only is robust U.S. funding in place to address the threat, but that the international community is also prioritizing the issue by collectively supplementing the U.S.' annual expenditures.

Also, while radiological sources—hundreds of thousands exist around the world—are not fissile materials, their misuse by terrorists is a part of the nuclear terrorism threat. While the detonation of a "dirty bomb" would not equal the physical destruction caused by an act of nuclear terrorism, it is a more probable event that could cause massive economic devastation around the globe.

Overall there should be an annual global commitment of \$2.5- \$3.0 billion for global WMD security generally, with nuclear material security being the top priority.

Rationalizing the Regime: Harmonizing Existing Commitments, Ad Hoc Initiatives, and New Ideas

The FMWG [recommended](#) that the Obama administration launch a new “Next-Generation Nuclear Security Initiative” that includes a new global nuclear material security roadmap, a plan for broader scientific cooperation to prevent nuclear theft and terrorism, and a political and technical action plan for achieving the four year goal.

The existing regime is inadequate to prevent nuclear terrorism, and there is no organizing force driving the nuclear material security agenda. Dozens of international agreements and initiatives and national laws and regulations that make up the regime and they are often voluntary and not tied together in any cohesive manner. A framework agreement to bring together these elements—treaty-based and ad hoc— and drive an improved nuclear material security regime is needed.

Developing a “Baseline Standard” for Fissile and Radiological Material Security

During the NSS, an often-asked question was: “what is the standard for nuclear material security?” Many are surprised to learn that there is no one standard, only voluntary guidance and domestic regulations that vary from nation to nation. There are reasons for why the nuclear material system is not standardized, but the question is whether that rationale is still optimal. The need for more standardized methods to implement nuclear material security and to judge its effectiveness is an important issue that merits further examination prior to the 2012 summit.

Expanding the Power of IAEA for Nuclear and Radiological Security

The IAEA is a central international repository of knowledge and assistance for nuclear nonproliferation and has deep international legitimacy. The Nuclear Security Summit underscored the need for the IAEA to play a significant role in nuclear material security, and some countries made financial commitments at that time.

Financial Impact of a Single Nuclear Terrorist Event

There are two fundamental financial dimensions directly related to nuclear security. The first is what it costs to prevent a terrorist nuclear event. The second is what the cost to the global economy would be if such an event occurs. The overall global economic impact of a terrorist nuclear event is not known with any precision, and U.S. and other governmental assessments are classified. A study could be done on the direct and secondary economic impacts of a nuclear terrorist attack (particularly the full scope of secondary impacts on developing countries). The goal would be to transparently and publicly make available the estimated economic impacts and thereby illustrate to all nations (developed and developing) that they have a significant financial and social stake in preventing nuclear terrorism.

Objectives for ROK Summit

By setting another meeting in the ROK for 2012, the 2010 summit participants built in a forcing mechanism that will require them to fulfill their commitments or answer for their inaction. The 2012 summit also offers the opportunity to expand the scope of the discussion beyond existing nuclear material security structures so that new initiatives, funding streams, and focuses that address the current regime’s gaps can receive top-level consideration by global leaders. The ROK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) has been charged with organizing the

summit. It is hoped that the ROK government will be interested in having an NGO component to the events surrounding the summit. The timing of the ROK summit provides the FMWG with a window of opportunity to provide early input on the scope and structure of the summit.

Transparency for Confidence Building

As the NSS documents emphasized, nuclear material security is a national responsibility. As a result, many nations do not want to report openly on their security problems and improvements. But, too much secrecy can be a liability. Countries can learn a great deal from one another's experiences with securing nuclear materials and facilities. Currently, some countries are willing to share information with the IAEA – which maintains strict confidentiality—but not with other governments or the public. Countries should be encouraged to prove to each other that they have strong security mechanisms in place, not simply make statements that must be taken on faith.

Partnering with Industry on Nuclear Security

The responsibility for improving nuclear security extends beyond governments, and both the nongovernmental community and the nuclear industry held complementary summits in Washington during the days surrounding the official Nuclear Security Summit. The FMWG organized the NGO event. The nuclear industry event was organized by the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). These stakeholder communities need to be more engaged with one another and governments in the nuclear material security discussion and the drive for better solutions because each represents an important constituency and each has an important role to play in global nuclear material security improvement.

Expand Training and Education Opportunities

The NSS documents emphasized the need for the expansion of best practices for nuclear material security, but it should also be complemented by additional education and training initiatives. Best practices efforts have been launched by a variety of governments, the IAEA, and private sector and non-governmental organizations. These are all important efforts that should be maintained and expanded. But, there are additional training, research, and capacity building activities that also could be undertaken.

FMWG Network Building

On the road to the ROK summit will likely include periodic meeting of the FMWG members, international partners, and others experts. One event has already occurred Cairo in October 2010. Another is being planned for Europe in spring 2011. A third could be held in Asia later in 2011, and then there could be another NGO summit at the time of the ROK summit.